Theatron Perceived: The Seen, The Unseen, And The Seers In Greek Tragedy by Norman, Sarah
  
 
THEATRON PERCEIVED: THE SEEN, THE UNSEEN, AND THE SEERS IN 
GREEK TRAGEDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Sarah Christine Norman 
August 2011
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2011 Sarah Christine Norman
  
THEATRON PERCEIVED: THE SEEN, THE UNSEEN, AND THE SEERS IN 
GREEK TRAGEDY 
 
Sarah Christine Norman, Ph. D. 
Cornell University 2011 
 
What if the ornate purple fabric in Agamemnon was not on stage at all? What if 
the cataclysm at the end of Prometheus Bound was not staged? This dissertation 
argues that ancient Greek tragedy demanded an active, imaginative engagement from 
the audience in order to create theatrically real props and action that may not have 
been visible on the stage. Drawing on philosophical texts as well as key tragedies, 
including Sophocles’ Philoctetes, Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes and Prometheus 
Bound, and Euripides’ Heracles and Hippolytus, this study further shows that seeing 
was itself understood as a powerful force, almost a physical touch between seer and 
seen object, and that this understanding is a crucial concept behind ancient anxieties 
about the powers and dangers of theatrical spectatorship. 
Chapter 2 delineates the major functions of props in Greek tragedy, ultimately 
proposing that the unique functions of props do not always demand the presence of a 
visible prop on stage. Instead, some may have been theatrically real yet physically 
absent, too small to see, or very abstract. These objects, “rhetoricized props,” emerge 
through the language of the play, dramatic context, actors’ gestures, and imaginations 
of the spectators, which collaborate to create the theatrical reality of the props. 
Chapter 3 builds on the idea of rhetoricized props to approach action that takes 
place on stage but that seems too unwieldy to have been represented fully with ancient 
stagecraft. Several key scenes yield a range of techniques that serve as indicators to 
 the spectators of what is happening and how they should imagine it, even if they 
cannot see it. 
Chapter 4 explores ancient philosophical texts that attempt to explain the 
mechanics of perception. The Greeks seem to have understood vision as involving a 
close connection between seer and seen, and this serves as framework for 
understanding tragic scenes in which characters cover themselves or others to avoid 
being seen. If one can become polluted by simply seeing a polluted person, such as 
Heracles after he has murdered his family, what might that mean for those who watch 
theatrical performances?  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: STAGE AND SPECTATOR 
 
“It is the joint effort of author and reader which brings 
upon the scene that concrete and imaginary object which 
is the work of the mind. There is no art except for and 
by others.” 
—Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature? 
 
Part One: The Creative Work of Spectators in the Theater 
 Recall, for a moment, a memory of reading a particularly engrossing novel.
1
 
The author’s words have created a story, characters, a physical and social environment 
for those characters, and a tone or style that inflects the world of that story. But what 
did you add to your own experience and understanding of that novel? Why might it 
have been so enthralling to you, perhaps despite your awareness that it was not so to a 
friend or a critic who had read the novel? Even from our own past experiences, 
without working through any complex theories, we know that we contribute to our 
experiences of literature, at least to some extent. Perhaps we speak of being “at the 
right time of life” to enjoy and find meaning in a particular work, or we notice that our 
own personal experiences inform our understanding of a piece, or we admit to looking 
for a book that would complement our current mood or create a mood we would like 
                                                
1
 I am using the novel as a familiar example, but most of these considerations would 
hold true for other forms of literature as well, such as poetry and drama. 
2 
to substitute for our current one. We might even realize that particular external 
circumstances tend to lead us to a stronger experience with a novel: a bustling 
bookstore or noisy subway might stimulate the imaginations of some readers, who feel 
the busy world melt away as they slip into the book, while other readers might need 
silence and a comfortable chair at home in order to connect strongly with a novel. 
If we can acknowledge that readers contribute to the creation of the artistic 
whole in the context of literary fiction, which can so often be written and read in 
solitude, how much more must this be true in the context of live theater, which 
engages the visual, aural, and sometimes even tactile and olfactory, senses? Consider, 
for example, just how different two performances of the same production might be as 
a result of differences in audience. A lively Friday-night audience of college students 
can create an entirely different performance of a university production than the 
Sunday-matinee audience of older community members and the actors’ relatives. Even 
before the audience enters the space and joins the artistic event, the theater is already a 
thoroughly collaborative art form.
2
 Relatively small-scale productions commonly 
involve a playwright (whether alive or deceased), a director, actors, stage manager(s), 
and a few designers, while large-scale efforts in the present day may include far more, 
                                                
2
 I acknowledge that there are exceptions to this statement, such as a performance 
written, directed, and performed by a single person, but these are minor by comparison 
with all of the performances that involve multiple collaborators. In the ancient Greek 
context, the subject of this study, we might think of rhapsodes, the itinerant performers 
or epic poetry, as the equivalent of the “one-person show,” and while rhapsode 
performances were theatrical in some sense, they were a distinctly different form from 
the performances of tragedy, comedy, satyr-play, and even dithyramb. Ultimately, of 
course, even one-person shows and rhapsode recitations become collaborative with the 
addition of an audience. 
3 
such as the fifty-seven credited collaborators, even aside from producers and 
stagehands, for the long-running Broadway production of Phantom of the Opera.
3
  
A work of theatrical art and the resulting experiences of its artists and 
spectators emerge through a complex interaction of a wide variety of elements, 
including the live, continually changing dynamic between performers and spectators. 
Everyone in the space can contribute to the production of meaning and experience, 
whether through a striking gesture, a powerful line delivery, the crinkling of a candy 
wrapper, or a well- or ill-timed laugh. The theater is a place of imagination: a space 
for thinking and feeling, for responding, consciously or not, to the physical, vocal, and 
even tactile cues of performers and spectators alike. Every new piece of sensory data, 
every memory or thought, is available for incorporation into one’s imagining, just as it 
may also serve to distract or divert the imaginative process. Performers and spectators 
may share many aspects of their experience and their understanding of the 
performance, while each may also have some uniquely personal aspects of her 
experience or interpretation. The theatrical experience combines the collective and the 
individualistic, interpellation and agency, emotional contagion and individual 
projection-identification, in an intricate network of factors and effects that, when 
successful, yields an active, imaginative experience for all involved. 
 In Theatron Perceived: The Seen, the Unseen, and the Seers in Greek Tragedy, 
I will be exploring imagination and perception in the context of the Greek tragic 
                                                
3
 The perpetually postponed Spider-Man: Turn Off the Dark is a particularly 
spectacular example. In an article on the production’s woes in The New York Times, 
Patrick Healy and Kevin Flynn report its grand, and likely ill-advised scale, with such 
representative examples as the twenty-three-person costume team, seven stage 
managers, and about thirty-five stagehands to coordinate the many stunts. 
4 
theater. Our very term “theater” is derived directly from the Greeks’ term for their 
theater, “!"#$%&'” [theatron], meaning “seeing-place.”
4
 What does it mean for the 
Greek theater to be a place for seeing? What exactly could the spectators see, and how 
did they see it? How might the imagination contribute to what one sees or otherwise 
perceives in the theater? 
Before turning to these questions in the specific Greek context, I will consider 
in a more critical and theoretical light some of the claims I have just made about the 
theatrical experience. Who contributes to the production of meaning and experience? 
What makes live theater categorically different from literature or filmed media? What 
is the cognitive basis for humans’ methods of making meaning, sending or “catching” 
emotions, and filling details into the imaginative construction? What kinds of external 
factors influence experience, and how do they do so? These theoretical considerations 
will provide the backdrop for a larger exploration of how playwrights, performers, 
spectators, and others might have come together as co-creators of the theatrical 
experience of Greek tragedies. 
 
Reader-Response Theory: The Move to an Interactive Model in Literary Criticism 
 The role of the audience in the production of meaning in the theater has long 
been acknowledged by theater practitioners, if not always by its theorists. Even at a 
time when critics tended to judge plays primarily by their adherence to formal 
                                                
4
 Liddell and Scott’s lexicon provides the following definition for “!"#$%&'”: “place 
for seeing, e(p. for dramatic representation, theatre…” The root word is “!)*&µ#+”: to 
“gaze at, behold, mostly with a sense of wonder.” For all discussions of word 
definitions, I use Liddell and Scott’s A Greek-English Lexicon, the standard and 
authoritative dictionary of Ancient Greek. 
5 
“unities” derived from Aristotle, generally by way of Lodovico Castelvetro’s 
interpretation of the Poetics, the immensely popular playwright Lope de Vega insisted 
that successful plays must take into account the comfort, attention span, preferences, 
and potential experience of the audience. His 1609 address to the Academy at Madrid 
on the art of writing plays in the present day focuses specifically on what will please 
the crowd, and his own suggestions for adapting the “rules” of the ancients is based on 
his assertions of what that crowd likes. He bases his recommendation for length, for 
example, on the audience’s comfort: “Let each act have but four sheets, for twelve are 
well suited to the time and patience of him who is listening” (203).  
 Bertolt Brecht, being both a theorist and a practitioner, was acutely aware of 
the audience’s role in the production of theatrical meaning and experience, though his 
approach runs counter to Lope’s interest in catering to the taste of the crowd and 
keeping the spectators comfortable, both physically and mentally. Brecht’s primary 
goals for his theater are in fact goals for the audience’s response, as he articulates in 
“Theatre for Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction”: “The epic theatre’s spectator says: 
I’d never have thought it – That’s not the way – That’s extraordinary, hardly 
believable – It’s got to stop – The sufferings of this man appal me, because they are 
unnecessary – That’s great art: nothing obvious in it – I laugh when they weep, I weep 
when they laugh” (71). Such Brechtian techniques as “alienation,” historicization of 
events, and incorporation of commenting songs and placards all work towards 
achieving a particular mode of cognitive engagement among the spectators: an active, 
critical mode that leads to action in the real world after the performance ends. The role 
6 
of the spectators’ participation is clearly a fundamental element of Brecht’s theory and 
theater. 
 Aside from those who were also practitioners, whose success and even 
livelihood might depend upon the audience’s experience and involvement in a 
performance, critics historically tended to focus more heavily on the dramatic or 
literary text than on a spectator’s or reader’s role. The theoretical movements of 
formalism and New Criticism took this inclination particularly far, deeming the text as 
the complete and independent artistic work, with such elements as the author’s 
intention or personal background, the historical or social context of the text’s 
composition or reception, and the role of the reader/spectator becoming strictly off-
limits. Reader-response theory emerged as a sharp critical turn from this approach, in 
the 1960s and 1970s. These critics insisted that the reader, sometimes figured as an 
ideal or collective reader and sometimes as a unique individual, takes an active role in 
the production of meaning from a literary work.  
In a survey of this criticism as a backdrop for her own exploration of 
production and reception in the theater, Susan Bennett summarizes several of the key 
arguments of reader-response theory. Norman N. Holland, one of the earliest 
proponents of this approach, was particularly interested in the element of fantasy, both 
the text’s and the reader’s, in the process of reading literature, and Bennett explains 
Holland’s argument at a mid-point in his development of his theory: “Both texts and 
readers, Holland argues, hold a central core of fantasy, and it is the interaction of the 
two which produces meaning” (37). In his later work, Holland placed more of the 
responsibility for fantasy and interpretation upon the reader, and ultimately, in 
7 
Bennett’s words, “Interpretation becomes solely a function of the reader through what 
Holland describes as an identity theme” (37). 
Later reader-response theorists began to emphasize the conditions of reception, 
positing a reader who is not a theoretical construct in a vacuum, but rather an 
individual, or group of individuals, influenced by a community, a social context, and 
external circumstances. German critic Hans Robert Jauss particularly pressed the need 
for theorizing reception in its context, focusing on how context, in addition to the text 
itself, shapes the reader’s expectations.
5
 This interest in the effect conditions of 
reception might have on the receiver and reception process serves as an important 
precedent for the subsequent, and current, critical interest in identity politics as an 
element in both production and reception, and this is where Susan Bennett intervenes 
in the critical discussion. Bennett consistently criticizes earlier reader-response 
theorists for their tendency either to omit or to minimize the importance of such 
considerations as race, class, gender, and sexuality in studying response and reception. 
The early reader-response critics laid much of the theoretical groundwork for a more 
inclusive, interactive model of reception, but the work of Bennett and others has now 
propelled the discussion to a more careful approach to the “reader” or “spectator,” and 
their insistence on the receiver’s personal background, expectations, and active 
choices remain a foundation for my approach in this study.
6
  
                                                
5
 See Bennett p. 49-51 or Jauss’s Toward an Aesthetic of Reception (Trans. Timothy 
Bahti. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1982) for a more detailed explanation of his 
arguments. 
6
 Although I will not explore the details of spectators’ contexts and identities, I do 
accept the fundamental argument of the reader-response critics and their descendents: 
the reader/spectator is an active contributor to the meaning of a text/performance and 
8 
 
Bodily Presence and Communication 
 Despite the usefulness of reader-response theory as a starting point, live 
theatrical performance is fundamentally different from literature that exists firmly on 
the written page, or even from filmic and mediatized forms, though that line is 
becoming increasingly blurred.
7
 In the theater, the live bodies of performers share the 
same space with the live bodies of spectators. They exist together, in the unfolding of 
the performance event, and even in a fully scripted performance, the possibility always 
exists for spectators to influence that performance. A vocal response, such as laughter, 
can either refresh or derail the performers’ energy, and a physical response, such as 
leaving the theater, applauding, or even throwing objects onto the stage can interrupt 
or otherwise alter the performance. While mediatized forms that are not prerecorded 
may capture the live theater’s possibility for mistakes and improvisation, it cannot 
achieve that direct, two-way interaction between performer and spectator that lies at 
the heart of live performance.   
                                                                                                                                       
to that reader/spectator’s own experience in interpreting, feeling, and imagining while 
interacting with the literary text or theatrical performance. 
7
 I accept Phillip Auslander’s point that mediatized performance often mingles with 
live performance, thus troubling ontological distinctions between the two. I do not, 
however, agree with Auslander’s conclusion from this fact that such distinctions do 
not exist at all: “The progressive diminution of previous distinctions between the live 
and the mediatized, in which live events are becoming more and more like mediatized 
ones, raises for me the question of whether there really are clear-cut ontological 
distinctions between live forms and mediatized ones;” “Mediatized forms like film and 
video can be shown to have the same ontological characteristics as live performance, 
and live performance can be used in ways indistinguishable from the uses generally 
associated with mediatized forms” (Auslander 7, 184). The mingling of live and 
mediatized forms should not eliminate the possibility that there are essential, 
ontological differences between the two, such as the spectator’s ability to influence the 
performance directly. 
9 
 The presence of a live actor may have even further implications for 
communication between stage and auditorium. Not only does live theater allow for a 
more interactive form of communication, but it may also activate a different kind of 
perception than does a mediatized form. In his application of research in cognitive 
studies to theatrical spectatorship, Bruce McConachie dwells briefly on the argument 
between those who would dispense with ontological differences between live and 
mediatized forms, such as Phillip Auslander, and those who insist on some kind of 
fundamental difference between the two, such as Noël Carroll. McConachie takes 
Carroll’s side in this debate, based on a difference in human perception, depending on 
the object of perception. In Ways of Seeing, Pierre Jacob and Mark Jeannerod develop 
a theory of “visual intentionalism,” as McConachie explains:  
Jacob and Jeannerod synthesize much of the recent psychological and 
neuroscientific work on vision to put forward a dual model of human 
visual processing, based on anatomical and neurological differences. 
On one hand, humans viewing the inanimate world generate ‘visual 
perceptions’; on the other hand, humans intending to act upon the 
world or watching others act in intentional ways use a different mental 
system to generate ‘visuomotor representations.’ (56) 
While we certainly respond to characters in a mediatized form with emotion, those 
filmed characters do not have the capability to act in intentional ways in the real 
world. They cannot directly act upon us, for example. Thus, as McConachie asserts, 
drawing upon Jacob and Jeannerod, as well as Carroll: “Mechanical repetition is not 
the same as intentional communication, and the audience will know the interactive 
10 
difference between them. …. Carroll’s categorical difference carries over into visual 
cognition; we process liveness differently from landscapes” (58). 
 The presence of live performers in the theater with live spectators thus 
activates what Jacob and Jeannerod term “visuomotor representations,” with 
spectators perceiving the performers, and vice versa, as live and intentional actors in 
the shared physical space. This co-presence, interactive communication, and 
perception through “visuomotor representations” serve as the basis for the cooperative 
imaginative participation that enlivens a performance. If spectators perceive the 
performers with special attention to the intentionality of their movement, how might 
the spectators’ conclusions about that intentionality serve as a basis for their 
imagining? How might spectators relate affectively to those performers and the 
fictional characters they (re)present? 
 
Imaginative Participation: Interpretation, Affect, Emotional Contagion, and 
Cooperative Creation 
 The process of interpreting a theatrical performance might involve a variety of 
cognitive actions on the part of the spectator, and many of these are also active in the 
spectators’ everyday lives outside the theater. As Joseph Anderson has explained in 
his ecological approach to film theory, humans have a strong, perhaps innate, tendency 
to create stories, to narratize their own experiences and information they encounter. 
Information is more salient and easier for us to remember when in the form of a 
narrative with cause and effect, especially when then put into relationship with 
ourselves. Anderson explains: “Objects and events are, of course, whatever they are in 
11 
a physical sense, but meanings are generated in the relationships of individuals to such 
objects and events—the relationships that J. J. Gibson has called affordances” (147). 
Narratives, fictional or not, place objects and events in a relationship with characters, 
fictional or not, thus allowing reader/spectators to understand their meaning in relation 
to those characters as a part of the meaning-making process. 
 Characters themselves may require some cognitive effort on the part of the 
spectator. In the theater, spectators must blend the live actor with the fictional 
character, creating a complex blend of the two that may further vary over the course of 
the performance. Again, this process has its basis in real-world cognitive tasks, as 
humans must often blend two concepts in order to create a new one. Bruce 
McConachie discusses research by cognitive scientists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark 
Turner into this process of conceptual blending in the context of interpreting identities, 
explaining: “As Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (F and T) have noted in The Way 
We Think, audiences generally ‘blend’ the actor and character together into one image, 
one concept of identity, to enable their affective immersion in the performance. Like 
other conceptual universals, identity can work singly or can participate in the more 
complex cognitive operation of blending” (42). Furthermore, according to these 
researchers, “blending is learned in infancy and soon occurs automatically to generate 
complex cognitive concepts, mostly below the level of consciousness,” which means 
that theatrical spectatorship need not involve a conscious “suspension of disbelief” or 
similar effort (42).  
Theatrical spectators are constantly active in their blending, but much of this 
process may occur without conscious awareness of it, even though the blending itself 
12 
is constantly in flux, as McConachie further asserts: “As viewers, we oscillate 
millisecond by millisecond among blends and singular identities” (44). If an actor 
forgets a line and “falls out of character” for a moment, spectators might perceive the 
actor more strongly than the character in the blended identity, while in another 
moment, a spectator might feel more absorbed in the fictional diegesis and thus 
perceive the character virtually to the exclusion of the actor. Individual spectators will 
blend in different ways and to different degrees, depending on their own conditions 
and choices. For example, a spectator who has a personal relationship with an actor 
might remain more aware of that actor’s identity, in comparison to the character’s, 
throughout the performance. 
Humans’ tendency to understand events in relation to themselves or to other 
people, along with their ability to blend concepts such as actor and character, forms a 
basis for imaginative participation in the theater. The basic level of interpretation of a 
performance may also involve more conscious or more culturally inflected decoding, 
as the semiotic approach has helpfully examined. Spectators may need to decode 
verbal language or culturally specific gestures, and knowledge of theatrical 
conventions may further contribute to the process of making meaning. A particularly 
crucial element for imaginative participation, though, is affective participation in the 
performance. 
In his 1956 work, The Cinema, or The Imaginary Man, French thinker Edgar 
Morin explored the nature of film in relation to a fundamental human phenomenon 
that he termed “projection-identification” or “affective participation.” Whether on a 
conscious or sub-conscious level, as Morin explains, humans have a subjective, 
13 
affective response to almost everything they encounter. We project our own feelings, 
memories, and subjectivity onto the world, while at the same time taking qualities of 
the world into ourselves through the process of identification. This complex process 
may occur below the level of consciousness, and it may be a messy jumble of 
projections, identifications, and perceptions, as “[t]he zone of affective participation is 
that of mixed, uncertain, ambivalent projection-identifications” (Morin 89). Morin’s 
explanation of projection-identification complements Joseph Anderson’s assertion of 
humans’ need to understand events in relation to themselves or another person: both 
phenomena reflect the fact that, as an evolutionary or ecological approach shows, we 
are a very human-centered species, and our cognitive abilities have developed to serve 
this perspective on the world. 
The phenomenon of projection-identification is the fundamental element of our 
affective participation in the world around us, and thus it becomes the foundation for 
our affective participation in the theater. As theatrical spectators, we might project our 
own memories and preferences upon the characters and actions we see on the stage, 
and we might take elements of those characters and actions into ourselves, feeling that 
we share certain aspects of ourselves with those enacted characters and events. This 
affective participation is partially responsible for the diversity of interpretations and 
experiences that spectators might have: if each of us draws from our own memories, 
moral positions, cultural backgrounds, and similar perspectives, we should certainly 
create different imaginative constructs of the characters and action. For example, a 
spectator might interpret a character as domineering because she, perhaps 
unconsciously, associates the actor’s mannerisms with those of her overbearing boss 
14 
and thus imaginatively fills a sense of “domineering” into her understanding of the 
character. She might then have a more negative reaction to that character than another 
spectator does, even if she does not realize the connection she has made. Projection-
identification is thus a major contributor to the unique individuality of experience in 
the theater, and it emphasizes the spectator’s active role, likely both conscious and 
unconscious, in creating the meaning and experience of the performance. 
Recent research in neuroscience has uncovered a further element in our process 
of perceiving and making meaning from the actions of other people. While the 
findings are not yet conclusive or clearly defined, the mirror neuron system seems to 
be an automatic, unconscious level of our interpretation of others’ intentions and 
emotional states. Bruce McConachie provides a useful synthesis of the research on 
mirror neurons and the automatic level of empathy, explaining that people can “‘read 
the minds’ of actor/characters, to intuit their beliefs, intentions, and emotions by 
watching their motor actions” (65). This process, McConachie explains, often operates 
on an unconscious level, and in his summary of the findings of a study by Paula M. 
Niedenthal et al., he further argues that the observer’s response involves an embodied 
mirroring of the target’s own emotional behavior: “Citing many studies that rely 
primarily on monitoring electromyographic responses in perceivers of angry faces, 
comedy routines, and other stimulating experiences, the authors conclude that 
‘individuals partly or fully embody the emotional expressions of other people’” (67).
8
 
                                                
8
 McConachie is citing Paula M. Niedenthal et al. “Embodiment in the Acquisition and 
Use of Emotion Knowledge.” Emotion and Consciousness. Ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, 
Paula M. Niedenthal, and Piotr Winkielman. New York: Guilford Press, 2005. 21-50. 
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Thus the interpretation of another’s emotional state may involve some degree of 
automatic “mirroring” of that state in the perceiver. 
Research into the mirror neuron system, specifically, further suggests that this 
process of base-level empathy involves an unconscious simulation of the target’s 
intentional action. As McConachie explains,  
Our mirror systems generate what Jacob and Jeannerod have called 
visuomotor representations of others’ intentional actions. As they state: 
‘[T]he perception of biological motion automatically triggers, in the 
observer, the formation of a motor plan to perform the observed 
movement. …. Thus, motor imagery lies at the interface between the 
planning of movements and the observation of others’ movements. 
Arguably, in humans, the capacity for motor imagery may have unique 
adaptive value, since the observation of others’ bodily movements is a 
crucial source for the learning of skilled gestures by imitation.’ (72) 
The ability to mirror another’s motor actions clearly brings evolutionary advantages, 
especially for a species as social as humans, and while the precise mechanisms and 
degrees to which we do this remain contested, these processes of visuomotor 
representation and mirroring do provide a good explanation for how we interpret the 
behavior and states of mind of others, including actor/characters in the theater. 
 In addition to research into mirror neurons and similar systems, studies have 
also emerged to provide more evidence for a similar but more generally acknowledged 
phenomenon: emotional contagion. The idea that “emotions are contagious” may be a 
truism, but it nonetheless stems from a truth. An individual can easily feel caught up in 
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the emotion of a larger group, eventually joining it to contribute to mass hysteria or a 
political protest, for example. If we accept the research on mirror systems, we can see 
that the unconscious mirroring of another’s intentional actions and emotional states 
might create a similar emotion in the perceiver and thus result in emotional contagion. 
Even without involving mirror neurons, however, researchers have conducted studies 
that support the existence, though not necessarily the mechanism, of emotional 
contagion. 
 In Emotional Contagion, Elaine Hatfield et al. distinguish between several 
types of emotions and focus on what they term “primitive emotional contagion”: “This 
is defined as ‘the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions, 
vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person and, 
consequently, to converge emotionally. (Hatfield et al., 1992, pp. 153-154)”
9
 (5). This, 
then, is the level of emotional contagion that occurs below our threshold of 
consciousness, though we may become consciously aware of our emotional change 
and its source. Hatfield et al. provide evidence for a process of contagion, including 
automatic mimicry of “facial expressions, vocal expressions, postures, and movements 
of those around them,” followed by the actual experience of emotions that suit those 
expressions (5).  
In a 2001 paper, Barbara Wild et al. experimentally confirm the earlier 
hypotheses of Hatfield et al., also adding new data about particular aspects of primary 
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 Hatfield et al. begin this book-length study by citing their earlier (1992) article on the 
subject, “Emotional Contagion,” in Review of Personality and Social Psychology: Vol. 
14. Emotion and Social Behavior (Ed. M. S. Clark. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 151-
177.). 
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emotional contagion. Wild’s team presented volunteer subjects with pictures of faces 
adapted from images in Ekman and Friesen’s Pictures of Facial Affect.
10
 They used 
basic “happy” and “sad” faces, with varying degrees of expressiveness, and subjects 
were asked to look at each picture, then respond immediately to a short questionnaire, 
asking how pleasant or unpleasant the picture was, which emotion(s) it evoked 
(choices were given), and how strongly those emotion(s) were present (113-114). 
They found that subjects generally reported feeling the basic emotion that the face in 
the picture expressed, except in the case of the most extreme “happy” face, which 
often generated the response of “surprise.” More interestingly, they also found that 
subjects’ responses were consistent independent of the time the picture was presented 
to the subject, even down to a duration of 500ms (116). This result serves as further 
evidence for the automatic nature of the interpretation and contagion of emotions. 
More work certainly remains to be done, but as Wild et al. conclude, “The fast and 
automatic induction of emotional experiences by the perception of emotionally 
expressive faces should be a powerful instrument to simultaneously decode emotional 
states in other people and to form the basis for potential reactions” (121). 
 The implications of visuomotor representation, mirroring, and emotional 
contagion are very significant for theatrical spectatorship. These processes allow 
spectators to interpret the emotions and intentions that actor/characters present on the 
stage, and emotional contagion in particular can contribute to the spectators’ collective 
experience: spectators can influence each other with their emotions. In the ancient 
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 Ekman, P and W. Friesen. Pictures of Facial Affect. Palo Alto: Consulting 
Psychologists Press, 1976. 
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Greek context, interpretation of actor/characters’ emotions and intentions is more 
complex than it is in the context of more intimate theaters. The use of masks, together 
with the large distance between most spectators and the stage, prevents spectators 
from seeing and responding to facial expressions. Larger, physical gestures are still 
available, though, and these must have formed an important part of the interpretation 
of the action. Furthermore, in a crowded outdoor auditorium in full daylight, 
spectators would be more aware of each other’s expressions and emotions than we 
tend to be in the typical modern theater, with our dimmed house lights. Perhaps the 
specific elements of the context of the Greek theater served as conditions for a 
particularly high degree of emotional contagion among spectators, allowing for a 
strong communal experience and sense of unity. Perhaps, to a different effect, this 
context also helps to explain why ancient theatrical performances, athletic events, and 
spectacles could so often result in riots. 
 These processes of cognitive interpretation and basic-level emotional response 
to the expressions and actions of others come together as some of the underlying 
mechanisms of theatrical spectatorship. Cognitive blending, projection-identification, 
mirroring, emotional contagion, and probably other processes as well, may all 
contribute to spectators’ experiences in the theater. These active, though sometimes 
unconscious, processes confirm that spectators always participate in the creation of a 
performance’s meaning and their experience of it, at least to some degree. Some forms 
of performance will make higher cognitive and imaginative demands on their 
spectators than others, and the Greek tragic theater, as I hope to show, strongly 
encouraged such imaginative participation and cooperative creation in its spectators. 
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The Battle over the Arm-Rest: And Other Elements of Context 
 As I have just suggested, the specific context of a theatrical performance can 
have a significant effect on the spectators’ experience. An outdoor performance in the 
afternoon sun may, for example, enhance the communal sharing of emotion and 
experience, while a performance in an indoor theater with a darkened house may 
increase individual variation and, perhaps, heighten individual projection-
identification. In Theatre Audiences: A Theory of Production and Reception, Susan 
Bennett provides a useful analysis of many of the possible elements of context that 
could influence spectators’ experience in the theater. For example, she suggests that if 
tickets for a particular show are in high demand and difficult to get, that can add to the 
excitement and experience of the event, even before spectators arrive at the theater 
(101). Similarly, a spectator who plans far in advance to attend a performance will 
have longer to build up specific expectations than a spectator who decides to attend 
just before the performance begins (124). The particular conditions that spectators 
encounter when they first enter the auditorium also contribute to their expectations and 
their preparation for the performance: if the lights are low, the audience:  
…is reminded of its purpose in being at the theatre. The subdued lights 
encourage a subdued atmosphere in the auditorium at large, and prepare 
the audience for interpretive activity. Conversely, a well-lit auditorium 
continues the element of social display encouraged by the theatre foyer. 
The moment when the lights are dimmed then becomes a significant 
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instruction to the audience as well as a means to heighten anticipation 
quickly and effectively. (135) 
Bennett thus explores these and a range of other elements of context, showing how 
everything from the program to the curtain call can affect spectators’ interpretation 
and experience of a performance. 
 Bennett also addresses the importance of the audience as a group, though her 
methodology does not involve the neuroscience research that McConachie highlights. 
Without using the term “emotional contagion,” she argues for the existence of such a 
phenomenon: “In almost all cases laughter, derision, and applause are infectious. The 
audience, through homogeneity of reception, receives confirmation of their decoding 
on an individual and private basis and is encouraged to suppress counter-readings in 
favour of the reception generally shared (Elam 1980: 96-97; Ubersfeld 1981: 306)” 
(153). This tendency toward shared reception may be a positive or negative quality. 
On the one hand, it may suppress valuable diversity that could be meaningful to 
individual spectators, particularly of cultural backgrounds that comprise a minority of 
the audience, but on the other hand, it also brings people together and may encourage 
feelings of unity or even an impulse to work toward social change in the real world. 
The simple context of being in a theater together encourages spectators to 
become a temporary community, an idea at the center of Jill Dolan’s Utopia in 
Performance, and it is this latter possibility, one of audience unity and social change, 
that Dolan finds inspiring about the theater. As Dolan explains in her introduction,  
Utopia in Performance … examines the audience as a group of people 
who have elected to spend an evening or an afternoon not only with a 
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set of performers enacting a certain narrative arc or aesthetic trajectory, 
but with a group of other people, sometimes familiar, sometimes 
strange. I see, in this social choice, potential for intersubjectivity not 
only between performer and spectators but among the audience, as 
well. Audiences form temporary communities, sites of public discourse 
that, along with the intense experiences of utopian performatives, can 
model new investments in and interactions with variously constituted 
public spheres. (10) 
Once created, the temporary community of a theatrical audience may affect the 
performance itself, as well as the after-effects of the performance if, as Dolan hopes, 
that community and the energy it generates can linger after the show ends, 
encouraging spectators to feel hopeful for the possibility of a better world.  
Dolan recounts many of her own experiences in a variety of theatrical contexts 
throughout Utopia in Performance, and in each case, the context of that performance 
is a significant factor in the way the audience comes together and the way she 
remembers her experience. For example, when discussing performances done as part 
of artists’ residencies at a university, she suggests that “[t]he festival or series format 
extends the temporary public the audience constitutes across a longer period of time, a 
condition that facilitates utopian performatives” (25-26). In her discussion of The 
Laramie Project, she considers the importance of the geographic and cultural location 
of the performance, wondering “Perhaps, too, Austin is just that much closer to 
Laramie, compared to New York, which kept performers and audiences respectful 
instead of condescending” (129). For any given performance, then, the various 
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elements of context help to shape the audience’s temporary community, affecting the 
collective experience as well as individual spectators’ experiences. 
Given the importance of context for the spectators’ experience, a cognitivist 
approach to performance and spectatorship is most successful when coupled with a 
historicist approach. While cognitive psychologists and theorists have provided new 
information about how all human minds work, they have also confirmed that some 
processes involve a strong influence from an individual’s culture and personal 
experience. Thus, although the cognitivist approach may seem to be ahistoricist, 
cognitive theory and historicism can actually work well in conjunction with one 
another, as I hope they will do here. To provide some of the relevant historicist 
background, then, we should turn now to some elements of the context of the ancient 
Greek theater. What kinds of conditions might have shaped the imaginings of the 
spectators in classical Athens? 
 
Part Two: Introduction to the Classical Greek Theater 
What exactly do we know about the theater of classical Greece, and how do we 
know it? Broadly speaking, our evidence is either archaeological, including 
excavations of theaters and pottery or other artifacts, or textual, including the dramatic 
texts themselves as well as fragments, inscriptions, and references in non-dramatic 
texts. Our evidence is limited in many respects, and what we do have has sparked 
widely divergent interpretations and positions on the issues. Despite such 
complications, an overview of the evidence and arguments related to a few of the 
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major issues will be helpful as we move forward to an exploration of seeing, hearing, 
and imagining the performance of Greek tragedy. 
 
Narrowing the Scope: Chronology, Geography, and Genre 
 The origins and early history of Greek theater remain murky: much of our 
evidence for the earliest performances comes from vase paintings of the seventh and 
sixth centuries BC that show revelers or dancers of various sorts (“komasts”), while 
inscriptions and fragments determine a few dates by which certain innovations must 
have arisen. We do not know the precise nature of the early performances, but such 
forms and events as festival processions, athletic competitions, and choral 
performance (later, formal dithyramb) preceded, influenced, and coexisted with the 
theatrical genres of tragedy, comedy, and satyr play that developed into their 
recognizable forms later in the sixth century and into the fifth.
11
  
 “Komasts,” male revelers, are common subjects in early Greek vase painting. 
These figures are depicted with many variations, but they are almost always dancing, 
often while drinking, and their assumed connection to Dionysus and their engagement 
in a kind of performance (dancing) have led to speculations that they could be one of 
the early sources for Greek drama. In her recent study of early komast vases, primarily 
black-figure vases of the sixth and early fifth centuries BC, Tyler Jo Smith has 
corrected the misapprehension that the majority of these komasts are “padded 
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 While an extensive discussion of the origins of the Greek theater is not the province 
of this brief introduction, I would direct the reader to Csapo and Slater’s Context of 
Ancient Drama, Chapter II, “Origins of Greek Drama” for a thorough survey of the 
evidence (p. 89-101). 
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dancers,” which more closely relate to later theatrical practice, particularly costume. 
Smith explains: “In a few instances, we shall notice a dancer of the familiar type 
participating in what may be interpreted as early comic parody. …. In other rare 
examples, the revellers might be wearing masks or padded costumes, both 
fundamental elements of later staged drama. There are occurrences of possible cross-
dressing or of play-acting, rather than dancing,” but although these examples have 
been the focus of much of the scholarship on komast vases, they “are notably few and 
far between” in comparison with the larger collection of komast works (10-11, 10).
12
 
We do not know to what extent these vases might reflect Greek practices, 
particularly symposia, but the vases and references in literature do suggest that such 
reveling had a performative element, and thus scholars make connections to the 
development of formal, public theatrical performance: “We imagine how such 
intimate, informal performances, encompassing sung poetry and dance movement, 
may have developed into more large-scale, formal ones” (Smith 11). While Smith’s 
work has shown that we should not overemphasize the importance of komast vases for 
the origins of formal drama, the performative element of the vases nevertheless points 
toward the developing interest in public performance, even if the vases are less 
reliable as sources for specific practices. 
Several vases from the middle of the sixth century are of particular interest for 
the origins of drama, with much closer connections to later practice that most of the 
komast vases present. This group of vases seems to prefigure the animal choruses of 
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 For images of many of these komast vases, see the Plates section at the end of 
Smith’s book. 
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Old Comedy, depicting men riding animals, or men costumed as animals, including 
horses, dolphins, and ostriches. Jeffrey Rusten has discussed the major pieces and their 
implications for the origins of comedy in his 2006 article, “Who ‘Invented’ 
Comedy?,” and while he cautions that these vases cannot be taken as explicit 
illustrations of performances, particularly due to the outlandish nature of the men 
riding animals, he also contends that “it is of course also quite possible that in an 
original performance men were dressed as the animals to be ridden and that these 
animals have been transformed by the painter into their real counterparts, in the same 
way that tragic myths are later illustrated ‘realistically’ without any hint of the theater” 
(52).
13
 These vases may have been inspired by some kind of performance, comic or 
not,
14
 even though they do not explicitly represent performances. While not depicting 
a theatrical performance, a fragment of a vase from the early sixth century already 
depicts an audience sitting in bleachers, here to watch the funeral games for Patroclus, 
a scene taken from Book 23 of the Iliad. Although this image involves spectators 
watching athletic contests, rather than choral performance of some sort, the fragment 
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 Rusten’s article also provides images of several of the most famous of these vases, 
including the Berlin Knights and Oltos’ Dolphin Riders. 
14
 Rusten suggests that dithyramb may be a better contender: “The reason these vases 
had all been connected with Old Comedy was the inherent silliness of an animal-riding 
chorus. Yet apart from this incongruity, there is nothing else about a chorus of men, 
often in armor but never costumed or masked, riding animals (often dolphins) to the 
accompaniment of the pipe, that necessitates Old Comedy. If there is any kind of 
choral performance underlying the images, it would be easier to think rather of the 
early dithyramb, sung and danced by a male chorus to the accompaniment of the pipe, 
that flourished and diversified in sixth-century Athens” (52). 
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is useful for thinking about performance, broadly construed, in that it serves as an 
example of how one sixth-century painter imagined an audience.
15
  
 As we proceed later in the sixth century, inscriptions and fragments 
supplement the visual evidence for performance. There are still many uncertainties 
about the nature and chronology of early performances, but the traditional date for the 
first official performance of tragedies in Athens is 534 BC. Our evidence for this date 
comes from the Parian Marble inscription, which itself dates to 264/3 BC, and which 
provides this note on tragic competition at the place for 534 BC in its list of major 
events: “From the time when Thespis the poet first [act]ed, who produced a [dr]a[ma 
in the c]it[y], and the goat was established as the [prize], 250 [plus ??] years have 
elapsed, the archon in Ath[ens being …]naios, the Elder” (Csapo and Slater 120).
16
 
Thespis and his “first drama” are legendary, and we do not know much more about 
these earliest performances, which may have strayed very little from the choral 
dithyramb at first.
17
 By the beginning of the fifth century BC, however, the dramatic 
competition had become more firmly established and had come to involve three 
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 Fragment of a dinos by Sophilos. Funeral games of Patroclus. Ca. 580-570BC. 
Athens, National Museum item A 15499. An image is available on the National 
Museum’s website (http://www.namuseum.gr/collections/vases/archaic/archaic12-
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16
 Part III, source 45 in Csapo and Slater, The Context of Ancient Drama, p. 120. 
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 For more on the dithyramb, see Armand D’Angour’s very good article “How the 
Dithyramb Got Its Shape.” Focusing particularly on a fragment from Pindar, 
D’Angour argues that the dithyramb was originally performed with choreuts dancing 
in a line but that the sixth-century Lasos of Hermione changed the shape to semi-
circular, giving the aulos player a central position from which to keep the choreuts in 
unison, particularly with troublesome sibilant (“s”) sounds. D’Angour suggests that 
this change occurred after tragedy had begun to break away into its own form, with 
rectilinear choral dancing similar to the original dithyramb shape. 
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competitors, each with a tetralogy of three tragedies and a satyr play. Performances of 
comedies were added to the City Dionysia, also called the Great Dionysia, in 486 BC.  
Aeschylus won his first competition in 484 BC, and inscriptions of lists of 
victors provide dates for some, though far from all, of our extant tragedies. These 
extant tragedies date to the fifth century BC, with the likely exception of Rhesus, 
which is traditionally attributed to Euripides but seems to be later and quite different 
in style.
18
 One of our best-attested dates is that for the production of Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia trilogy in 458 BC, a year for which the complete entry on a victor list 
survives. Our oldest extant plays are Aeschylus’ Persians (472 BC), Seven against 
Thebes, and Suppliant Women, while the latest surviving tragedies are Euripides’ 
Bacchae (405 BC) and Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus (401 BC), both of which were 
produced posthumously. Tragedy continued into the fourth century, but our evidence 
becomes much more fragmentary, and re-performances of “old tragedy” joined 
productions of new plays. 
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 Euripides did write a Rhesus, but many scholars now believe that the play we have 
is not his. David Kovacs summarizes the argument about authenticity in his 
introduction to the Loeb edition, concluding: “So [due to the “monotonously 
bombastic characters” and repetitive language,] the chief line of defense for those who 
believe Euripides wrote our Rhesus is to say that it is a work of his youth. This cannot 
be disproved, but I think it more likely that at some point a Rhesus by an unknown 
poet of the fourth century was mistaken for the by then lost Rhesus of Euripides” 
(352). The standard work in favor of Euripidean authorship is William Ritchie’s The 
Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides. A more recent and methodologically unique 
approach, yielding a conclusion that the play is stylistically incompatible with 
Euripides’ early and middle works but deviates less from the style of his late works, is 
Bernd Ludwig’s 1997 article, “A Contribution to the Question of Authenticity of 
Rhesus Using Part-of-Speech Tagging.” (See especially p. 241 for his interpretation of 
the results of his statistical study.) 
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The Greek theater involved productions outside of Athens, through the Rural 
Dionysia in deme theaters, as well as productions both before and after the fifth 
century BC, but my scope here will be limited to the original performances of 
tragedies in fifth-century Athens. Despite the very serious problem of theater being a 
live, visual, and aural art form, the texts of the plays are our best evidence for the 
Greek theater, and I will accordingly focus my study within the chronological limits of 
that evidence. The brief chronology I have provided here simply sketches a broad 
trajectory for tragic performance in Athens and should serve as a general framework 
for the reader unfamiliar with Greek theater.
19
 
 
!"#$%&' [Theatron]: The Physical Space 
 The !"#$%&' [theatron] is, by definition, a place for seeing. What, then, is the 
nature of this place? Into what sort of orientation did spectators enter when taking 
their seats? What could they see in front of them, before the performance began? We 
are in a somewhat privileged position for this issue, since the physical spaces where 
plays were performed still exist, but they do so with the complications of varying 
degrees of changes, from centuries of rebuildings, mining for materials, excavations, 
and weather. The archaeological evidence has given rise to a variety of reconstructions 
and interpretations, particularly at the Theater of the Sanctuary of Dionysus 
Eleuthereus in Athens, where our extant tragedies were first performed.  
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 Csapo and Slater’s Context of Ancient Drama features a useful timeline as Appendix 
B (p. 403-406). 
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Theaters in other cities and from later dates are often better preserved, since 
they were not subjected to the many rebuildings that occurred in Athens. In Tragedy in 
Athens: Performance Space and Theatrical Meaning, David Wiles provides a useful 
study of these theaters in demes such as Rhamnous and Ikarion. Wiles is not always 
very careful to keep his discussions in chronological context,
20
 which weakens the 
ensuing conclusions he draws about the Theater of Dionysus in Athens, but his survey 
of the deme theaters is nevertheless a concise and evocative exploration of those 
physical spaces and their meanings.  
For the purpose of serving as an example of a deme theater, the theater at 
Thorikos is particularly valuable. As Wiles notes, this is the only Greek theater that 
has survived more or less in its fifth-century form, which makes it especially useful for 
imagining fifth-century performance spaces. Thorikos features a rectangular 
performance space, with a temple to Dionysus on one side and an altar on the other, 
and the seating forms a sort of partial rectangle with rounded but relatively tight 
curves at the corners. The land drops off behind the theater, and a cemetery lies at the 
bottom. In his discussion of the theater, Wiles notes that while this theater seems to be 
awkwardly shaped, “these sacred elements have primacy, and the auditorium is 
arranged in order to accommodate cult activity” (31).  
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 Most of the deme theaters that Wiles discusses date to the fourth century, but he 
uses them to imagine the fifth-century theater in Athens. Further, he discusses the 
theaters at Megalopolis (360s) and Epidauros (330-320) alongside a few earlier 
theaters, such as the fifth-century theater in Thorikos. Wiles does note the dates for 
these most of the theaters as he introduces them, but when he transitions to his 
discussion of the Theater of Dionysus, this already limited chronology seems to fade 
to the background, as he moves freely among Epidauros, Thorikos, and others. 
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This space was used for drama, but, as Wiles explains, it seems better suited to 
“choral and processional forms of presentation,” with its very wide playing space and 
lack of a clear focal point, and this may be key to understanding the unique nature of 
deme theaters as compared to the Theater of Dionysus in Athens (33). Deme theaters 
must have been multi-purpose spaces, to a greater extent than the Theater of Dionysus. 
Smaller cities and towns had fewer places for public gatherings, and theatrical 
performances would have been only a small percentage of the events held in those 
theaters. In the case of Thorikos, Wiles notes that there were about “sixty annual 
sacrifices at Thorikos, and the altar must have been the major deme altar for there is 
no evidence of a separate agora” (34). The dramatic performances of the Rural 
Dionysia may seem quite minor by comparison with the other community needs for 
the space. 
One of the most significant differences between the Theater of Dionysus and 
theaters in the demes is simply the scale. The theater at Thorikos, for example, held 
2,000-3,000 spectators before the seating area was enlarged in the fourth century, 
while the Theater of Dionysus may have held as many as 15,000, or even up to 
30,000, if one accepts Plato’s rather unlikely estimate.
21
 The City Dionysia was a 
much larger festival than those celebrated in the demes, and numerous sources indicate 
that it drew a crowd of foreigners in addition to locals, a feature facilitated by its 
scheduling in the springtime, specifically the month of Elaphebolion, when the 
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weather was beginning to accommodate such travel.
22
 The festivals of the Rural 
Dionysia, on the other hand, most likely all took place during Posideion, which 
roughly corresponds with our December, when travel was possible but more difficult 
(Csapo and Slater 121). It seems that these festivals did not occur all on the same day 
and that travel between them was possible, but they surely did not draw large external 
crowds. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates’ interlocutor Glaucon mocks those theater-lovers 
[“,+-&!)*µ&').”] who “run around to hear all the choruses in the Dionysia, not 
leaving out any, whether in the cities or in the villages” [!/#0&"(#+ /*'$1' 2&%#' 
/)%+!"&3(+ $&$. 4+&'3(5&+., &%$) $#' 0#$& /6-)+. &%$) $#' 0#$& 07µ#. 
'/&-)+/6µ)'&+] (Book V, 475d.5).23 From this passage, we can conjecture that the 
festivals were scheduled in such a way as to make this travel possible, but Glaucon is 
also treating such behavior as laughable, which resonates best if it was indeed the 
province only of dedicated theater-addicts. Further, Glaucon’s distinction between 
“cities” [/6-)+.] and “villages” [07µ#.] confirms that some festivals must have been 
larger than others, depending on the size and resources of the town.  
While there was undoubtedly some variation, most of the fifth-century rural 
theaters must have been quite small in comparison to the theater in Athens, and this 
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 For sources on foreigners at the City Dionysia, see especially Csapo and Slater’s 
sources 122-125 in section IVBi, “The Athenian Audience in the Fifth and Fourth 
Centuries B.C.” (p. 290-291). Aristophanes’ Acharnians 501-508 provides particularly 
strong contemporary evidence, with Dicaeopolis announcing that he can speak freely 
because he is at the Lenaea, without the foreigners and tribute presentation of the 
Dionysia. 
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 This translation is my own, and all translations from Greek in this dissertation are 
my own unless otherwise noted. The Greek texts of ancient plays that I quote are from 
the most recent Loeb Classical Library editions, and the first section of the Works 
Cited, “Primary Texts, Commentaries, and Lexica” includes references for all of the 
Greek texts I cite. 
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creates different conditions for the audience and the performers. As David Wiles 
summarizes: “In the deme theatres, where collective self-awareness was not a problem 
because the scale was intimate, rectilinear playing spaces were not sealed 
confrontational stages, but were surrounded by an encircling auditorium and opened 
into the thoroughfares of the deme” (52). Thus, although many deme theaters are 
better preserved than the theater in Athens, it is very risky to use those theaters as 
evidence for the fifth-century form of the Theater of Dionysus. The rural theaters 
simply filled different needs in very different kinds of communities, and in different 
physical locations with their own unique topographical constraints. Epidauros has 
become the most vivid image of the Greek theater for moderns, with its nearly perfect 
circles, impressive acoustics, and excellent preservation, and yet its late date of 
construction (330-320 BC) makes it particularly unsuitable as a basis of comparison. 
Despite these many complications and provisions, we should turn now to the Theater 
of Dionysus in Athens, where Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides staged their plays. 
The Theater of the Sanctuary of Dionysus Eleuthereus in Athens has naturally 
garnered the most interest of all the ancient theaters, since our extant plays had their 
original performances in that space, and yet there is little that we can say little about it 
with certainty.
24
 As Csapo and Slater summarize: “Most of the evidence has been 
destroyed: the theater was frequently rebuilt in antiquity, used as a marble quarry in 
the Middle Ages and subject to the experiments of early archaeology in the 19
th
 c. The 
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 The earliest performances were done somewhere in the agora, but we do not know 
where or what kinds of temporary structures might have been used. The move to the 
hillside of the acropolis must have represented some heightened degree of 
permanence, even though its own structures remained wooden and “temporary” for 
many years to come. 
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Archaic remains are scant and their interpretation disputed” (CAD 79). Indeed, 
scholars have used the archaeological evidence in service of many different 
reconstructions that remain highly contested.  
In a 2000 article, Jean-Charles Moretti compiled much of the archaeological 
evidence and the resulting interpretations for the Theater of Dionysus. While offering 
his own synthesis of the material, Moretti is careful to stay very close to the evidence, 
and while his results may not offer a fully imagined sense of the theater space, they are 
very useful as a starting point for considering the complex evidence and the basic 
shape of this space. Summarizing some of the specific findings and the history of 
major excavations and interpretations, Moretti explains: 
There are many different ways to combine and interpret these remains, 
which moreover have been variously dated. Dörpfeld associated R, V, 
and Q to reconstruct a large circular orchestra, somewhat displaced to 
the southeast in comparison with the orchestra of the second half of the 
fourth century. …. Fiechter resolutely criticized the association of R, V, 
and Q, and he established that Cutting V was not curved and that Q not 
only did not follow a curvilinear course, but was very different in 
masonry technique from R/SM1. (Moretti 392)
25
 
This contrast between Wilhelm Dörpfeld, who excavated the site in the 1880s, and 
Ernst Fiechter, who did his own excavations and published new reconstructions in the 
1930s, is the beginning of the highly contested argument about the shape of the 
playing space. Scholars remain sharply divided about whether the original orchestra 
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 See Moretti for drawings of the stones and other remains of note. 
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was round, as it is in Epidauros, or roughly rectangular, as it is in many of the deme 
theaters.  
There remains no clear scholarly consensus on the shape of the original 
orchestra. David Wiles makes a strong case for a round orchestra by arguing that the 
dithyramb was the primary event at the City Dionysia and that a round performance 
space would best accommodate the circular dancing of a fifty-person chorus, and yet 
Armand D’Angour has suggested that tragedy may have emerged before dithyramb 
settled into its circular shape, which would significantly weaken Wiles’s reasoning 
(Wiles (1997) 49; D’Angour 347-348). Ultimately, all of these arguments are based on 
the evidence of a few stones, theaters in very different contexts, and inferences about 
the demands the performances themselves place on the performance space. While 
certainly regretting that we have no conclusive evidence, we must, I think, admit that 
our imaginings of the shape of the playing space often have more to do with our own 
preferences and preconceptions than with concrete archeological evidence. 
 The shape of the playing space may be ambiguous, but we do have some 
indications of its size, though still not firmly conclusive. Moretti summarizes: 
More than 30 m. separate the virtual northward extension of this drain 
and the west side of the Odeion of Pericles. …. About 14 m. separate 
the line of the drain from the axis of the fourth-century koilon. 
Assuming that this axis is the same as that of the fifth-century koilon—
an assumption that is by no means assured—the Classical orchestra 
would have extended some 28 m. east to west at the point where it is 
met by the parodoi. (Moretti 395-396) 
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The orchestra, then, was less than thirty meters across, at the point where the chorus 
entered and exited. This width may seem quite large by comparison to modern 
theaters: it is more than twice the width of the stage at the new Globe Theatre in 
London or the Broadway Theatre in New York. On the other hand, we could think of 
it as approximately 38 yards: less than half the width of an American football field, the 
stadiums for which may accommodate more than 100,0000 spectators in some of the 
largest examples. Perhaps it is difficult to imagine watching a play on this scale, but 
we need not think of the scale as entirely foreign to our own experience, when most of 
us have some experience watching the crucial movements of players in outdoor field 
sports. 
 The fifth-century theater may or may not have included a raised stage for 
actors. Interaction between actors and chorus is very important to many of the 
tragedies, so it seems unlikely that actors were confined solely to a separate stage. 
There was a skênê, a building that provided a backdrop and at least one central door 
for entrances and exits to and from an interior space:  “A wooden stage-building of 
one storey was erected for performances in front of the central section of the koilon. It 
had no second floor, but a flat roof which was usable for performance” (Moretti 397). 
This skênê was originally wooden and temporary, though it is unclear just how long 
each skênê would remain in place. We do not know when the skênê was added to the 
theater, and Oliver Taplin has noted that the only Aeschylean plays requiring a 
building as a background and usable interior space are those of the Oresteia, which 
gives us only a date by which the skênê must have been added, that is, 458 BC (Taplin 
(1977) 454). There is some argument over whether the fifth-century skênê had more 
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than one door, but as Oliver Taplin has shown, the extant tragedies themselves do not 
demand multiple doors, so it is most likely that additional side doors were added only 
later
26
 (Taplin (1977) 439-440). 
 The very schematic, highly limited sketch we can develop of the Theater of 
Dionysus in Athens may be disheartening. If we are seeking a precise reconstruction 
of the theater and the performances that took place there, we will always be frustrated 
in that search, and it will ultimately draw us away from endeavors that might be more 
fruitful. While it would be irresponsible to neglect the facts we do have and to indulge 
fully in our personal flights of fancy, we also must accept that this is an inevitable 
element in our study of the ancient Greek theater and that taking a wider view, 
focusing on the spirit of the performances, their the larger dynamics and meanings, 
may sometimes be the best we can do. 
 
!)#$#5 [Theatai]: Spectators in the Theater 
The physical space of a theater involves not only the performance space, but 
also the audience space, and again, the current remains of the Theater of Dionysus can 
be misleading. Most of the remnants of seats we see built into the hillside of the 
acropolis today actually belong to Lycurgus’ rebuilding of the auditorium in stone in 
the late fourth century, and even before this, modifications were made to the theater at 
various points, and it is difficult to determine the precise state of the theater at any one 
time. For example, the addition of the Odeon of Pericles, built ca. 440 BC, likely 
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 Many New Comedies demand at least two doors, so it is clear that additional doors 
became available at some point. 
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shifted the layout of the theater somewhat, and there may have been several attempts 
to increase the steepness of the embankment by adding fill (Csapo and Slater 79-80).  
Nevertheless, we do know, at least, that the auditorium of the fifth century was 
not entirely of stone: most of the audience, in fact, sat on wooden bleachers, perhaps 
similar to those depicted on the vase fragment of the funeral games of Patroclus. Jean-
Charles Moretti summarizes these two seating options: “…rows of seats in stone and 
rows of wooden benches raised upon scaffolding. The stone seats bordered the 
orchestra. This can be deduced from the presence among them of inscriptions marking 
them as part of the prohedria, and from the existence of other Classical and Hellenistic 
theaters where only the prohedria is built of stone” (Moretti 386). The prohedria, 
“front-seating,” was set aside for guests of honor, such as public officials, foreign 
dignitaries, and those being recognized for particular service to the city. That others 
sat on wooden bleachers is very clear from several sources, including a fragment from 
the comic playwright Cratinus: “Hail, O greatly-laughing-at-stupidities-crowd, best of 
all judges of our wisdom on the days after the festival. Blessed bore you your mother, 
the noise of the wooden bleachers” (Csapo and Slater 300, Source IV.154).
27
 
The size of the audience space sets it firmly apart from modern theaters, with a 
distance between spectacle and spectator that we might now find only in large-scale 
sporting events. In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates remarks that the previous day, 
Agathon (the tragic playwright, who also appears as a character in the Symposium) 
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 For further evidence, see also Csapo and Slater’s sources IV.130, p. 291-292 (a 
passage from Aristophanes’ Women at the Thesmophoria, lines 390-397, that refers to 
wooden bleachers), IV.153, p. 300 (scholion to that passage), and IV.169, p. 303 (a 
passage from Pollux). 
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shone forth his wisdom before more than thirty thousand Greeks [“/-"&' ( 
$%+.µ3%5&+.”] (175e). Despite this grand statement, excavation suggests that the 
auditorium could not hold nearly that many people, though the capacity was still very 
large. Moretti provides a concise synthesis of the measurements and estimates that 
lead to the current approximation of 15,000 as a maximum capacity:  
More than 30 m. separate the virtual northward extension of this drain 
and the west side of the Odeion of Pericles. This permitted the 
installation of some forty-five rows of benches at a depth of 0.65 m. 
each. Supposing that this many benches were actually built and that the 
other two branches of the koilon were of similar size, we can estimate 
that the theater held from 10,000 to 15,000 spectators, if we allow each 
a seating space of 0.40 m. (Moretti 395) 
Even the small end of this estimate is a very large crowd, and we can imagine some of 
the effects that might have on the spectators’ experience. 
 Scholars have long debated the composition of this audience. The theater was 
certainly large, but it does not seem possible that it could have held the entire 
population of Athens, as well as crowds of foreigners bringing tribute or just coming 
for the festival. Nevertheless, we have no evidence that attendance was ever restricted, 
at least not in any formal way, and indeed, there are sources that suggest that members 
of such marginalized groups as women, metics (resident aliens), and slaves were 
present, though perhaps not in large numbers. The question of women’s participation 
has been particularly contentious, but Csapo and Slater’s compilation of evidence in 
The Context of Ancient Drama makes a very convincing case for women in the 
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audience. As they contend, “In our opinion, the testimony of ancient authors shows 
clearly that women (and boys) were present in the audience (124, 126-29, 155, 156, 
172). The contrary argument rests mainly upon the comic poets’ habit of addressing 
the audience as ‘gentlemen.’ This fails to distinguish physical from ideological forms 
of exclusion” (286). They concede that the number of women may have been 
“disproportionately small,” but their sources nevertheless seem to imagine a diverse 
audience (287). 
 Two passages from Plato serve as particularly strong evidence for this diversity 
in the composition of the audience. In the dialogue Gorgias, written ca. 390 BC but set 
in 427 BC, Socrates turns to the theater for an example, when debating the techniques 
and intentions of rhetoric: “SOCRATES: Or don’t you think the poets practice rhetoric 
in the theaters? KALLIAS: I do. SOCRATES: So now we’ve discovered a kind of 
rhetoric directed at a public composed of children together with women and men, 
slave and free” (Csapo and Slater 291, source IV.127, Gorgias 502d). The diversity of 
the audience is critical to Socrates’ reference here, as he builds his argument that 
orators are more interested in entertaining than in improving their audiences. In a well 
known passage from Laws, Plato categorizes the artistic tastes of the public by age and 
gender, implying that women and children were exposed to these performances: 
“ATHENIAN: If the very young children were to judge <the best performance> they 
would choose the magician; …if the older children, the comic poet; the educated 
among the women, the young men, and just about the bulk of the crowd would choose 
tragedy” (Csapo and Slater 291, source IV.128, Laws 658c-d). From these sources, 
alongside others in Csapo and Slater’s compilation, we should reconstruct an audience 
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that includes members of all sectors of the Athenian population, as well as foreigners, 
though we might still conjecture that male citizens comprised the majority of the 
audience. 
 The diversity of the audience did not end with social position and background: 
as Plato’s categorization of the public’s tastes suggests, the artistic and intellectual 
backgrounds of the spectators must have varied just as widely. Martin Revermann’s 
2006 article “The Competence of Theatre Audiences in Fifth- and Fourth-Century 
Athens” provides a useful strategy for approaching the problem of uncovering the 
degree and range of competence of these audiences, beginning with his definition of 
competence: “If the theatrical event can be described as a complex exchange of signs 
between actors and audience, competence in theatrical communication is the ability to 
decode and encode those signs” (105). Revermann proposes that two unique qualities 
of the Athenian theater must have particularly influenced audience’s competences: 
citizens’ participation in theater as members of choruses for both dithyramb and 
drama,
28
 and “continuous exposure to an art form as conservative (in formal terms) as 
Athenian drama, in a cultural environment which called for, and trained, skill-sets not 
dissimilar to those needed for theatrical competence in the contexts of ritual, the 
symposium and military training” (107). The audience for Greek theater was certainly 
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 Revermann contextualizes this point with a calculation that between 1,1117 and 
1,165 men and boys (617-665 adults) performed in choruses for each year’s Dionysia, 
assuming that the chorus for each play of a tetralogy was composed of the same 
members. He estimates that this figure would represent approximately 2%-4% of the 
adult citizen population (108). Assuming that the same citizens did not participate year 
after year, this would, of course, result in a larger percentage of the population that 
would have performed in a chorus at some point in their lives. Revermann also 
postulates that the choreuts likely came from diverse backgrounds, reflecting the 
diversity of the demos (111). 
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stratified, but it seems likely, from Revermann’s study, that elite and non-elite alike 
shared a large body of common experiences, which resulted in a relatively high degree 
of competence as spectators. The playwrights, then, endeavored to strike a successful 
balance between under- and over-challenging that audience. 
 
The Stuff of the Theater: Costumes, Masks, and Machinery 
 Our evidence for the physical trappings of the theater may be our most 
confusing yet. On the one hand, vase paintings provide excellent evidence for the 
costumes, masks, props, and stagings of comedy,
29
 but on the other hand, vase 
paintings tell us almost nothing about tragedy. Richard Green poses the problem aptly:  
All too few pictures survive of classical Greek actors acting tragedy. 
There are good reasons for this, the principal of which is the convention 
that vase-painters (and doubtless, therefore, the purchasers of their 
vases) were governed by the sense of the story conveyed by the 
performance. Thus, what is usually depicted on vases is not the process 
of performance but what the audience was persuaded to see, as it were 
the ‘real’ Agamemnon of Greek myth—history rather than the actor 
playing that role. (Green 93) 
As tempting as it might be, we cannot use vase paintings of tragic scenes as evidence 
for how those scenes were actually staged in performance. Comic scenes tend to be 
painted with a clear foregrounding of the performance context, often showing the 
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 For images and interpretations of comic scenes in visual art, see Oliver Taplin’s 
excellent 1993 study, Comic Angels: And Other Approaches to Greek Drama through 
Vase-Paintings. 
42 
stage itself, but just as overt metatheatrical references are absent from the texts of 
tragedies, any theatrical apparatus of whatever performance might have been the 
source for a painting of a tragic scene disappear entirely in that painting. 
 Regarding costumes, vase paintings reveal the padded, grotesque styles of 
comedy, but we have less evidence for the other genres. The Pronomos Vase, a red-
figure volute-krater from the late fifth-century, is one of our best sources for costumes 
and masks: it depicts actors, some for a satyr play and some possibly for a tragedy, 
shortly before or after a performance, in various levels of costume.
30
 Many hold their 
masks, giving us an excellent view of mask shape and style, and some play 
instruments or practice dance steps. From this and a few other vases,
31
 we know that 
masks enclosed the whole head of the performer, not just the face, and included a wig 
and/or facial hair, as appropriate for the character. Richard Green describes the style of 
tragic masks in the depictions we have as “very simple, almost plain… The features 
and hair are not in any way exaggerated” (Green 99). According to Green’s synthesis 
of the visual evidence, costumes were likewise simple and similar to everyday dress 
early in the fifth century, but: “It is the vases of the later fifth century which appear to 
demonstrate the development of a distinctive theatre costume of a kind that is both 
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 Images of the Pronomos Vase are readily available in many sources, including the 
website of the Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Napoli 
(http://museoarcheologiconazionale.campaniabeniculturali.it/thematic-views/image-
gallery/RA84/view), the new and richly illustrated The Pronomos Vase and Its 
Context (ed. Oliver Taplin and Rosie Wyles, 2010), and Csapo and Slater’s Context of 
Ancient Drama (as a line drawing, Plate 8). Naples inv. 81673 (H 3240). 
31 See, for example, the famous “Würzburg Actor” fragment, reproduced in Taplin’s 
Comic Angels, as illustration 22.118 (held by the Martin von Wagner Museum der 
Universität Würzburg, item L832). 
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different in cut and composition from, as well as more elaborate than, that of the well-
dressed person of everyday life” (Green 97).  
In keeping with this gradual transition in the fifth century, costumes in the 
Hellenistic period became more elaborate, and this is the period for which Pollux’s 
lexicon, the Onomasticon, gives us lists of specific theatrical items, including costume 
pieces.
 32
 Although introductory courses and textbooks on theater history and the 
Greek theater often include such pieces as buskins (high boots worn for tragedy) in 
their general picture of the Greek stage, these more complex and stylized costumes 
actually belong to the Hellenistic theater, not the theater of the fifth century.
33
  
As with costumes, the Pronomos Vase gives us some evidence for stage 
properties, such as staffs, thyrsoi, and the lion skin one actor carries, slung over one 
                                                
32 Sections 115-120 of the Onomasticon cover costumes and props, and a translation of 
relevant sections of the lexicon is available as Appendix A of Csapo and Slater’s 
Context of Ancient Drama (p. 393-402). As is appropriate for his lexicon format, 
Pollux’s discussion is list-like: “…footwear in tragedy are buskins (kothornoi) and 
embades (“step-ins”); while embatai are comic. Tragic clothes are the poikilon 
(“embroidered”)—so the chiton was called—and the overgarments are the xystis, 
batrachis (“frog-colored”), chlanis, gilded chlamys, gilt-edged, the statos, phoinikis 
(“scarlet cloak”)…” (Csapo and Slater 395). 
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 Rosie Wyles explores this problem in her essay on tragic costume on the Pronomos 
Vase. She notes that expectations often interfere with interpretation of the evidence on 
the vase, using Herakles’ shoes as an example: “The predominant interpretation of this 
footwear demonstrates a classic case of the type of ‘misreading’ which I have already 
described. The viewer comes to the image with the assumption that since the actors are 
in ‘standard’ costume they must be wearing tragic buskins—hence this is what the 
viewer sees on Herakles’ feet and he is described as wearing kothornoi. Yet if we shed 
our preconceptions and look closely at the footwear, we see that Herakles is not 
wearing boots at all, but shoes with upturned toes and patterned greaves on his legs” 
(237). Wyles ultimately argues that there was not a single, standard shoe or boot for 
tragic actors in the fifth century but that “if a tragic actor or chorus member is depicted 
in boots, these should not be assumed to be worn through the necessity of tragic 
convention, but rather that they, like any other part of the costume, should be assumed 
to have been chosen because they are appropriate to, and significant for, the role being 
played” (239). 
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shoulder, to complement his Heracles costume. Visual evidence for props in comedy, 
as for costumes, is plentiful, and both the texts and the vase paintings suggest that 
comedy often featured many and varied props, from baskets and jars to dead geese and 
wine-skin “babies.”
34
 Tragedy likely involved fewer props, as we can infer not only 
from the texts of the tragedies, but also from Aristophanes’ mockery of Euripides’ 
overuse of props in Acharnians 448-489. If Euripides’ surplus of theatrical props, 
which Dicaeopolis wants to borrow in preparation for his speech to the people, is to be 
funny, it must be in some way noteworthy, by comparison with the prop usage other 
plays by other tragedians. This brief gloss on props in the Greek theater will suffice 
for this introduction, but I will return to the topic in more detail in Chapter 2, “Objects 
of Imagination.” 
 Greek stagecraft included the skênê, costumes, masks, props, and two pieces of 
machinery for creating special effects: the ekkyklema and the mêchanê (crane). The 
ekkyklema was some kind of device that revealed an interior scene, probably by rolling 
out a platform through the central door of the skênê. Aristophanes parodies this 
machinery in the Acharnians, as the tragedian Euripides grudgingly orders himself 
“ekkyklema-ed out” to meet the insistent Dicaeopolis outside his door:  
{48.} '--’ !0030-9!:$’. 
{;<.} '--’ '=>'#$&'. 
                                                
34 At least two surviving vases feature a goose, including a red-figure calyx-krater with 
a dead goose at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York (ca. 400-390 BC) and a 
bell krater with a live goose at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (ca. 370 BC). The 
wine-skin “baby,” from Aristophanes’ Women at the Thesmophoria, appears on a bell 
krater held at the Martin von Wagner-Museum, University of Würtzburg. Images of 
all three of these vases are available in Taplin’s Comic Angels as illustrations 10.2, 
11.3, and 11.4 (in the section of illustrations following page 36). 
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{48.} '--’ )µ1.. 
{;<.} '--’ !0030-9(&µ#+· 0#$#?#5')+' =’ &* (2&-9. (407-409) 
DICAEOPOLIS: Well, have yourself wheeled out! [literally, 
“ekkyklema-ed”] 
EURIPIDES: No, it’s not possible. 
DIC.: But all the same… 
EUR.: Fine, I will be wheeled out, but I don’t have free time to come 
down. 
Tragedies themselves sometimes indicate the use of the ekkyklema with cue lines, as a 
character prepares the audience for the revelation of a scene inside the house or other 
structure. Tecmessa and the Chorus provide this cue in Ajax, for example, before the 
interior scene of Ajax with his slaughtered livestock is revealed: 
{@A.} ''+% ,%&')$' ,&+0)'. '--’ ''&5B)$). 
$*2’ -' $+'’ #.=# 0'/’ !µ&/ ?-"C#. -*?&+. 
{D;.} .=&>, =+&5B1· /%&(?-"/)+' =’ ,E)($5 (&+ 
$& $&"=) /%*B:, 0#*$0. 1. ,21' 03%)$. (344-347) 
CHORUS: The man seems to be sane, but open up! Perhaps upon 
seeing me he will take some shame/dignity/respectability. 
TECMESSA: Look, I open it. It is possible for you to look upon his 
matters/deeds and how he is doing. 
We cannot be sure that cues such as this one necessarily introduced actual use of the 
ekkyklema, but it seems a likely convention.  
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 Evidence for the mêchanê, or crane, is more controversial. This device, whose 
actual construction and capabilities are hotly debated, could lift an actor in the air, 
presumably above the roof of the skênê, though we do not know exactly how high. 
Some of the strongest evidence for the existence and use of the mêchanê comes, again, 
from Aristophanes’ parodies of it in several plays, including Birds (Iris’ entrance, 
1199ff.), Peace (Trygaeus flying to heaven on a dung beetle, 80ff.), and Women at the 
Thesmophoria (Euripides flying in as Perseus to rescue his kinsman, 1008ff.). 
Although Donald J. Mastronarde has argued that the crane “represents a striving for 
‘realism’ in physical movement, a striving that suggests that mere imagination was not 
always thought to be sufficient for the representation of divine epiphanies or 
spectacular flight,” its evidently frequent parody in comedy suggests that it may never 
have been “realistic” in anything approaching our modern sense of the term (253). The 
device may have been quite awkward, and while it could create a spectacular effect in 
a tragedy, the audience was, most likely, keenly aware of it as an artificial apparatus. 
The audience’s ability to participate in a performance with imagination and ready 
adaptation to a play’s spectatorial demands would then be the key to a device that 
should inspire awe one day and laughter the next. 
We do not know when the crane was first introduced, how it developed, or 
how often it was used. There are very few scenes that truly demand a flying actor, and 
when in doubt, a simpler solution for the staging problem, such as placing an actor on 
the skênê roof, should be our preferred option. Even the epiphanies of gods at the ends 
of plays may not have used the mêchanê very often in the fifth century, despite the fact 
that our term for these scenes, “deus ex machina,” assumes this component. As Taplin 
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notes, “the mechane was conventionally used for these epiphanies [at the ends of 
plays] in the fourth century, and it soon became proverbial,” but it remains unclear 
whether many of Euripides’ original productions featured the machinery (Taplin 
(1977) 444). Since its operation was probably somewhat cumbersome, the mêchanê 
may not have been the most dramatically effective choice in all situations. Taplin 
suggests that the Euripidean epiphanies that demand immediate intervention, 
particularly when they lack a speech about the god’s approach, may have simply 
placed the god on the roof of the skênê, for a sudden appearance (Taplin (1977) 445). 
The ekkyklema and the mêchanê became available for the Greek theater at 
some point during the fifth century, but their precise usage remains unclear. 
Regardless of exactly how and when they were used, we can take them as indicators of 
the kind of performance and spectatorship that the Greek theater featured. Audiences 
must have been able to understand the theatrical meanings of this machinery and how 
to use those as tools for their own imagining during the performance. We need not see 
these as tools of “realism,” and indeed, it would be irresponsible of us to liken such 
devices to the slick, nearly invisible special effect machinery of a modern Broadway 
theater. Even if they were abstract, clumsy, and noisy, the ekkyklema and mêchanê 
could have been very effective in a theater that sought to engage actively the 
imaginations of the spectators.  
 
Conclusion 
 This introduction to the Greek theater has necessarily been very brief, and I 
have omitted many important aspects of its context, including the details of the festival 
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context and ritual significance, the elements of competition and judging, and the roles 
of the choregus and the theoric fund in paying for these events. For more information 
on these and other topics, I direct the inquiring reader to Csapo and Slater’s Context of 
Ancient Drama, which collects many important testimonia in English translation, or to 
the revised edition of Graham Ley’s A Short Introduction to the Ancient Greek 
Theater, which provides a very concise and lucid general introduction to the Greek 
theater, complete with a very helpful bibliography organized by topic. 
 The classical Greek tragic theater, as I hope to show, invited its spectators into 
a strongly imaginative and active participation with the performance. Classicists have 
sometimes explored this imaginative component of Greek tragedy, but they tend to do 
so specifically in the context of offstage action: since many important actions, often 
violent, happen off stage, the audience must be able to imagine them in order to 
understand the continuing narrative. Nicolaos C. Hourmouziades’s Production and 
Imagination in Euripides is representative of this trend: his study of the “area of 
imagination” includes treatment of the interior space, the off-stage areas, and the off-
stage sections of the parodoi or the destinations implied by them. Hourmouziades is 
interested in the audience’s understanding of action that happens off stage, beyond the 
audience’s sight and, thus, outside of the theatron. While his study has many 
interesting ideas and implications for spectators’ understanding of offstage action and 
space,
35
 however, his study, like those of messenger speeches and offstage violence 
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 For example, he explores the problem of how very familiar elements of the 
Athenian context must become, in some way, places from the world of the play: “…if 
the space in the theatre did not represent a part of Athens, the outer region had also to 
undergo a corresponding imaginary transformation, so that the transition from the one 
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specifically, does not consider the role of spectators’ imagination in understanding 
objects, characters, and actions within the onstage space. 
 Rather than retreading the well-worn path of messenger speeches and offstage 
violence, I will investigate here the spectators’ imaginative participation with the 
onstage space. This onstage space did not simply include visible representation of 
action but also, I propose, cues that stimulated spectators’ imaginations, asking them 
to understand other objects and actions as being present in the onstage space and 
unfolding in the present time, in opposition to the offstage, past-tense events related in 
messenger speeches, even if those objects and actions are not literally visible to them.  
In Chapter 2, “Objects of Imagination: Props Seen and Unseen on the Greek 
Tragic Stage,” I will consider the roles of props in extant Greek tragedy, using the 
texts of the plays to help determine which objects implied in the texts might have been 
physically present, which might have been absent, and which might have been present 
but either too small for most spectators to see or too abstract to serve as fully iconic 
representations of the objects. Even the physically absent props, I will argue, can be 
theatrically real for the performance, with the spectators’ active imaginative 
participation. 
Chapter 3, “Staging the Unstageable: Battles, Earthquakes, and Destruction,” 
will take a similar approach, showing how spectators can contribute to the production 
of theatrically real action in the stage space, even if that action is not physically, 
                                                                                                                                       
area to the other could be performed without violating the conventional links between 
what was seen and what was only imagined” (109). Despite the value in his 
consideration of this transformation, however, his division of “seen” and “imagined” 
is far too stark, as I hope to show. 
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visibly represented or is represented only in a very abstract way. I discuss such 
traditionally problematic examples as the earthquakes in Heracles and Bacchae, as 
well as the cataclysm at the end of Prometheus Bound, and I propose that 
understanding “unstageable” action as literally unstaged but theatrically and 
imaginatively real solves many of the critical conundrums that have troubled scholars 
for so long.  
A foundational issue for both unseen props and unstaged action is the 
spectators’ perception. What do they see and hear? How do they construct a larger 
understanding and experience of the action, inflecting what they see and hear with 
their imaginations? And what does it mean, for a fifth-century Greek, to see or to 
hear? In Chapter 4, “The Touch of the Spectator: Perception as a Point of Contact,” I 
address these questions first by exploring the implications of gods on the stage, which 
I suggest may have been literally seen but imaginatively “unseen,” then by analyzing 
both tragedies and some philosophical writings on perception in order to uncover 
some of the meanings and implications of perception for the Greeks. The Greek 
understanding of perception, and vision in particular, seems to involve some sense of 
contact between perceiver and perceived, and this concept may inform both the actions 
of certain tragic characters and the selection of which actions might be appropriate to 
represent fully on the stage and which might be best left to the imagination. 
I conclude with “Seeing in the ‘Seeing-Place,’” a brief study of the spectators 
of tragedy and philosophical arguments about the effects of theatrical spectatorship. In 
particular, I discuss Aristotle’s notorious dismissal of “spectacle” in Poetics and 
Plato’s attitudes toward theater and mimetic poetry in The Republic and Ion, for 
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which, I argue, his notions about seeing and hearing are important contexts. Finally, I 
begin to widen the scope to consider the lasting effects of these stage practices, 
perspectives on perception, and ethical concerns, as they continued to reappear in 
various ways in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OBJECTS OF IMAGINATION: PROPS SEEN AND UNSEEN ON THE GREEK 
TRAGIC STAGE 
 
As compared to set and costumes, theatrical properties are particularly 
significant pieces of the theatrical mise-en-scène, due to actors’ direct interactions 
with them. In his phenomenological study of the theater, Stanton B. Garner explains 
this unique importance of props: “Even when most sparse—as in the minimalist 
settings of Beckett’s plays or Slawomir Mrozeck’s Tango (1965)—props constitute 
privileged nodal points in the scenic field, asserting a powerful materiality and a 
density both semiotic and phenomenal” (89). These objects attract spectators’ 
attention, and they may serve to connect actor/characters36 with their physical 
environment, bridging the gap between the live bodies and the distant, (usually) 
stationary set. Unlike most sets, props travel, and movement is an important element 
of the live theatrical performance, one that, moreover, does not translate as well to the 
reading of a written text.  
Props may serve a variety of functions in the theater, and in some cases, the 
idea of the prop may serve that function without a physical object being present. In 
these cases, verbal cues combine with actors’ gestures and spectators’ imaginations to 
                                                
36
 I follow Bruce McConachie in his use of the term “actor/character” to designate the 
unique entity of an actor playing a character. I use this term in contexts in which my 
discussion should not refer specifically to the actor (the physical person playing a role) 
or to the character (the imagined person within the diegesis) but to the blended 
actor/character that exists in the imaginations of the spectators and actors. 
McConachie explains this phenomenon as “cognitive blending.” See especially pages 
42-44 of McConachie’s Engaging Audiences for further discussion. 
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invoke the reality of that prop, without its visible sign. After proposing a definition of 
“prop,” I will begin by discussing the various types and functions of props in extant 
Greek tragedy, then continue to an exploration of which props must have been seen on 
the stage, which might not have been seen, and why the visual aspect of them may be 
significant.  
 
The Stage Property: Towards a Definition  
If props can be so significant, then, what could be the role of stage properties 
in the context of a non-illusionistic, pre-modern theater? Specifically, how did they 
function on the ancient Greek stage? What did they look like? How often and under 
what circumstances were they used? What purposes did they serve? What is the 
difference between a prop in a comedy and a prop in a tragedy? What and how do 
props mean, both to the original spectators and to modern spectators of those plays? 
Given the recent interest in ancient acting and staging, it is surprising that scholars 
rarely address these questions about props in any but the most cursory fashion.
37
 One 
must wonder why we can all agree on their importance, yet hesitate to study them 
beyond that simple claim. 
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 David Seale, for example, readily acknowledges the importance of props at the 
beginning of a paragraph in his introduction: “As regards stage properties, many are so 
crucial to the working of a scene or to the meaning of the whole tragedy, like the great 
bow in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, that it is difficult to imagine the plays without them” 
(20). After such a promising statement, however, he merely uses this as an excuse for 
assuming realism in Greek tragedy – “There is, then, good reason to believe that 
within the conventional framework there is room for a fair degree of naturalistic 
performance” – and never returns to props with any substantial attention (20). 
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Perhaps the scarcity of hard evidence has inhibited close study of objects on 
the stage, but this lack has not stopped explorations of and speculations about Greek 
stagecraft in general. Furthermore, in the case of comedy, the visual evidence from 
vase paintings actually provides more information about props than we have about 
many other elements of stagecraft, and the images confirm the heavy use of props and 
suggest ways that they might contribute to the meaning, humor, and physical action of 
the performance.
38
 Regrettably, we have no vase paintings that clearly depict a 
performance of tragedy (they instead reflect the myths behind the plays, or perhaps the 
scenes as spectators might imaginatively fill them out), so the evidence for tragic 
props is admittedly rather scant.  
Despite the deficiencies of the evidence, the situation is no worse for props 
than for other issues of staging, and we can at least find some textual evidence for 
their use, while recognizing the limitations of using the text to reconstruct 
performance. There are, for example, some moments in which the text clearly 
indicates the passing of an object from one actor to another,
39
 and others strongly 
suggest that an actor is using a prop to accomplish an action that the text and context 
clearly demand.
40
 Such information about staging must surely be as valuable as that 
for character entrances and exits, a topic that has attracted a great deal of scholarly 
                                                
38
 For examples of these vase paintings, see especially the plates in Taplin, Comic 
Angels: and Other Approaches to Greek Drama through Vase-Paintings.  
39
 See, for example, the heavily emphatic passing of the bow from Philoctetes to 
Neoptolemus in Philoctetes 762 ff. 
40
 A common example would be the jars that characters use to pour libations, as in 
Sophocles’ Electra 634-659. 
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attention over the years,
41
 but in spite of the various attempts to construct a grammar 
of dramatic techniques for character entrances and exits, none has been made for the 
movements of stage properties.
42
 A grammar of this sort would provide only a dim 
glimpse into the full life and meaning of props on the stage, but it would be no less 
valuable than the similar studies of other elements. At the least, a closer study of a 
wider variety of examples of props, including their movements and their purposes, 
should shed some light on the nature of the stage property as an element of Greek 
stagecraft, and this chapter will begin this work. 
While props on the Greek stage have long lacked close attention, this 
deficiency is just as common in the rest of theater history scholarship. In 2003, 
Andrew Sofer was able to begin The Stage Life of Props with the observation that “A 
survey confirms that most books that mention stage properties in their title are 
manuals aimed at the aspiring stage designer or technical director, rather than studies 
aimed at the actor, director, playwright, or scholar” (v). In 2011, the situation is hardly 
different. Interest has risen somewhat with the publication of Sofer’s study, and with 
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 See especially Oliver Taplin, The Stagecraft of Aeschylus and Michael R. Halleran, 
Stagecraft in Euripides. Both of these works seem to understand “stagecraft” primarily 
as entrances and exits, and in fact, this is Halleran’s explicit purpose: “This study 
builds on and contributes to the ‘grammar of dramatic technique’ by examining three 
aspects of it in Euripides: (1) entrances and their announcements; (2) preparation for 
and surprise in entrances; (3) dramatic connections between exits and entrances and 
the lyrics that they frame.” (1) 
42
 Joachim Dingel has done a methodical study of tragic props, but his approach is 
primarily one of identification and catalogue, rather than a study of the props’ 
movements and stage lives. For his list of examples of props in tragedy, see Dingel, 
“Requisit und szenisches Bild in der griechischen Tragödie,” in Die Bauformen der 
griechischen Tragödie (1971), 347-367. Dingel’s conclusion is that Aristotle’s 
assertion that visible things are unnecessary for tragedy is belied by the significance of 
certain props. 
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the recent volume of Theatre Symposium (Vol. 18, 2010) devoted to the topic, but 
overall, most studies of props remain either non-existent or purely literary in their 
approach.  
In this literary perspective, critics approach props as literary images or 
symbols, without attempting to understand their theatrical nature and effect. In the 
area of Greek tragedy, this has long been the almost-exclusive approach: anyone who 
studies Philoctetes must discuss the symbolism of the bow; the color and richness of 
the fabric in Agamemnon have traditionally been favorite objects of speculation for 
those who read the play as tracing Agamemnon’s hubris and fall; and critics as early 
as the Hellenistic scholiasts have been fascinated by Electra’s urn, whether they see it 
as an opportunity to think about the nature of mimesis when an actor is thought to 
carry the real ashes of a loved one,
43
 or whether they use it to apply Freudian 
psychoanalysis to Sophocles’ character.  
In her recent study of tragic props, Tragic Props and Cognitive Function: 
Aspects of the Function of Images in Thinking, Colleen Chaston has taken a step away 
from the overwhelming trend of literary interpretation of props by bringing cognitive 
research to her approach. Her work is valuable for its appropriation of important 
cognitive findings for inquiry into Greek tragedy, and particularly for her focus on 
spectators’ processes of perceiving and interpreting what they see on the stage,44 but 
                                                
43
 Aulus Gellius (writing ca. 180 BC) tells the story of an actor named Polos who 
supposedly performed Sophocles’ Electra using the ashes of his own son in the urn 
(Attic Nights VI.5). For the relevant passage in translation, see Csapo and Slater, The 
Context of Ancient Drama, Part IV, source 62 (p. 264). 
44
 Her initial discussion of the urn in Sophocles’ Electra is representative of this aspect 
of her approach: “The urn is an image which connects with the spectators’ past 
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nevertheless this study is greatly deficient in its attention to the materiality and 
embodiment of live performance.  
Despite the word “props” in her title, Chaston is interested not in material 
props, or even necessarily in objects that are imagined to be on stage if not physically 
present, but on “mental images.” This focus allows her to broaden her scope to include 
such objects as the shields in Seven against Thebes, which are imagined specifically as 
being outside the city walls, beyond the area shown on the stage.45 As Chaston 
explains at the beginning of her introduction, “the present study proposes that props 
represent images, both visually perceived and mental, which may serve a cognitive 
function in thinking and problem solving” (1). Thus, her approach becomes far too 
close to the traditional literary one: with such an emphasis on the text as creating the 
images and no significant distinction between onstage and offstage images or props, 
one is left to wonder exactly how seeing a live performance would be different from 
simply reading the text. 
Certainly all of these studies do illuminate some aspects of the object, the play, 
and/or the involved characters, but by collapsing a complex, dynamic theatrical event 
into a simpler text of words on a page and their meaning to an individual reader, they 
                                                                                                                                       
associations and invites a perceptual comparison between what a funerary urn 
symbolizes in real life (namely death) and the purposes to which the image is being 
put in the play. As the urn accrues its further dramatic symbolism of deceit and 
revenge the spectators are drawn into perceptual anticipation in the form of 
hypothesis. The dramatization itself, cued by the image of the urn, offers a simulation 
of successful revenge through which Athenians can hypothesise about the 
effectiveness of revenge as a solution” (48-49). Chaston’s attention to this spectatorial 
process, particularly as the object’s meaning changes, is a valuable contribution to 
scholarship on Greek tragedy. 
45
 Indeed, she devotes an entire chapter of her three-chapter study to the shields of 
Seven against Thebes 375-676. 
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limit the larger explorations of how material objects move and mean on the stage in a 
live performance before an audience. A new, theatrical approach must begin by being 
open to the project of rematerializing the prop, as Sofer outlines in his preface:  
By viewing the prop as an entity rather than as a symbol, tool as well as 
trope, I aim to make visible precisely what we as text-based critics are 
trained not to see: the temporal and spatial dimensions of the material 
prop in performance. …. I argue that we can parse the ideological 
ramifications of historical stage objects for their audience only once we 
have recovered their mobile, material life on the stage. (vii) 
We must examine specific props, whether or not they are traditionally popular objects 
of critical inquiry, with a new focus on their movement, materiality, and theatrical life. 
This project may even identify some props that might seem insignificant based only on 
the text of the play but that animate their scenes and add important meaning to the 
performance when manipulated by live actors on the stage.  
The first step for a fresh approach to this theatrical element is to construct a 
definition of “prop.” For the purposes of this study, I will consider a “prop” to be: any 
object on the stage that actors hold, manipulate, use, or pass from one to another; or 
any such object whose existence and significance are clearly demanded by the play 
and understood by the audience, and that takes a role in the theatrical life of the 
performance, even if it is not visible or physically present. Note, first, that both parts 
of this explanation of the nature of the stage property are based on the theatrical life of 
the object, not simply on its function as a sign (the semiotic understanding of its 
nature), on its effect on spectators (the vital point for phenomenologists), or on its 
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capacity to symbolize, to foreshadow, or to collect connotations (the favorite focal 
points for literary critics). Rather, a theatrical approach should allow room for all of 
these potential functions and meanings of the prop to come together with a focus on its 
theatricality to create a more holistic understanding of its nature, effect, and 
significance.  
The first part of this definition clearly reflects the simpler and more familiar 
understanding of “prop,” so I begin here: a prop is any object on the stage that actors 
hold, manipulate, use, or pass from one to another. This definition necessarily includes 
costume items that actors put on, take off, or move while on stage, such as veils or 
wreaths. On occasion, costume pieces to which characters specifically call attention 
may be noteworthy, though they are not actually props unless the actors manipulate or 
interact with them in ways other than simply wearing them.
46
 This understanding of 
“prop” will not generally include large, stationary set pieces such as statues or altars, 
unless actors specifically interact with them physically. In these distinctions from 
costume and set pieces, I follow, for the most part, Andrew Sofer, who notes that it is 
the actor’s manipulation that causes an object to become a prop: “…a stage object 
must be ‘triggered’ by an actor in order to become a prop (objects shifted by 
stagehands between scenes do not qualify). Thus a hat or sword remains an article of 
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 Breaking away from the ancient Greek context for a moment, we may find an 
excellent example of a prop-like costume in Eugène Labiche’s classic 1851 farce, An 
Italian Straw Hat. Hélène struggles with her wedding dress in Acts I and II, crying out 
that a pin is sticking into her back (16-17, 28). The dress is her costume, but her 
interactions with it are more similar to the problems others in the play have with such 
props as the Italian straw hat and potted palm than to a typical wearing of a costume.  
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costume until an actor removes or adjusts it, and a chair remains an item of furniture 
unless an actor shifts its position” (12).
47
  
For the application to Greek tragedy, I will be a bit more generous than Sofer 
in applying the term “prop” to set pieces. Given the sparseness of the Greek tragic 
stage and the rarity even of “normal” interaction with set pieces, such as sitting on a 
chair, I will include all set pieces with which actors specifically interact. For example, 
several plays suggest that altars or statues of gods may be on stage, but only when 
actors move or interact with these might they enter into the realm of “prop,” as in the 
case of Oedipus with the statue of Colonus in Oedipus at Colonus, or with Helen’s 
clinging to the tomb of Proteus in Helen. Sofer’s definition would probably categorize 
both the statue and the tomb as set pieces, but in the context of the Greek tragic stage, 
I would argue that for each, the actor’s interaction with the item is significant and 
unusual to the point that it should be considered alongside the other props, with which 
it more closely shares its theatrical role and meaning. Furthermore, objects naturally 
attract a different kind of attention from perceivers when they are connected with a 
human and his or her intentionality. Even if the actor/character is using a piece of 
furniture or a statue for “normal” interaction, that interaction still confers additional 
importance to the object and transforms it from a piece of background scenery to a 
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 In his footnote here, Sofer comments, “the distinction is drawn by Erika Fischer-
Lichte, The Semiotics of Theater p. 107” (n. 34). Oliver Taplin uses a similar rationale: 
“The instances I discuss [of costume pieces as props] are, in fact, mostly distinct items 
which can be taken off and given special attention—wreaths, armour, veils and so 
forth” (Taplin (1978) 78). I prefer Sofer’s approach because it requires that pieces 
actually be taken off or manipulated in ways other than simple wearing, not simply 
that they have the potential for such use. 
61 
piece of action and intentionality, and thus the object becomes, for my purposes here, 
a prop.48 
The second part of my proposed definition of “prop” is more difficult: I 
suggest that a prop could also be any such object whose existence and significance are 
clearly demanded by the play and understood by the audience, and that takes a role in 
the theatrical life of the performance, even if it is not physically present. Here, I depart 
from Sofer’s definition, as well as from most common understandings of “prop.” How 
can something be a prop if it is not physically on the stage? Certainly physical objects 
are the most common props, and they are clearly the easiest to understand and study. 
Nonetheless, if we take a strong theatrical approach, we should include here any 
objects that are important to the theatrical life of the performance, objects that take an 
active role in the action of the play and/or in the audience’s experience of it, even if 
they are not physically present in a particular performance. We can also add here any 
props that are physically present but are too small for most spectators to see them. A 
prime example of such props would be recognition tokens: from tragedy to New 
Comedy and beyond, these objects tend to be very small, such as a lock of hair, a seal, 
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 Working from a cognitivist perspective in Engaging Audiences, Bruce McConachie 
explains this transformation of meaning that a prop undergoes when an actor interacts 
with it: “Manipulation, when it occurs, links the prop to the actor/character’s 
intentionality. The moment of manipulation is a crucial transition for spectatorial 
vision. At that instant, the audience ceases to look at the potential prop as part of the 
visual surround and shifts its gaze to generating a visuomotor representation to attempt 
to understand how the actor is using the prop-in-the-hand to support his or her 
character’s emotions and intentions” (83). In a section prior to his discussion of props, 
McConachie synthesizes some research into the mirror neuron system, empathy, and 
visual perception to show that humans automatically search for human intentionality 
in what they perceive and that they perceive this differently than other kinds of 
movement and objects. See especially pages 65-75. 
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a ring, or tiny childhood tokens.
49
 These objects may not be visible, and so may not 
even exist physically, yet their roles exist in a very real way that extends beyond the 
language of the play and into its theatrical life.  
In her study of props in Shakespeare, Frances Teague also departs from the 
traditional definition to include mimed props, and her example demonstrates why it is 
important to include physically absent but theatrically real objects in a study of props: 
“Presumably Yorick's skull is a property in Hamlet whether it is tangible or not; if the 
actor wishes to mime picking up a skull, and if the audience is willing to accept that 
gesture and understand that it signifies an object, then the property exists, if only in the 
imaginations of the actor and the audience” (16). For the Greek theater, this provision 
is particularly important because in such a large space, many of the physically present 
props might have remained unseen, or at least very small and indistinct, for most of 
the audience, and thus the physical presence of the prop would have been insignificant 
for that group of spectators, while its role within the performance would presumably 
have remained meaningful and understood.
50
  
I would like to emphasize again that this addition to the definition of prop is 
still based on a theatrical approach to understanding how the stagecraft works. While 
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 Perhaps taking this trend ad absurdum, Plautus’ Rudens comically highlights that 
each object in Palaestra’s trunk is the teeniest, tiniest trinket (lines 1129-1171). Each 
item is named with a diminutive form, highlighting the “little-bittiness” of the trinket; 
see, for example, cistellam (“little box,”1129), ensiculu[s] (“little sword,” 1156), and 
securicula (“little axe,” 1158). 
50
 There is one significant caveat here: physically absent props are particularly prone 
to failure. If the audience does not understand the prop and its role, or if it rejects the 
proposed imaginative move, the prop will not truly fulfill its theatrical role. Should we 
call such a failed theatrical element a prop? Perhaps not, but particularly in the ancient 
Greek context, evidence for such exceptions is scarce, so for present purposes, I will 
put aside this complication. 
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the addition does allow for intangible or unseen objects to fall under the term “prop,” 
it is still focused on the project of rematerializing the prop in a theatrical sense. This 
inclusion does not return us to the literary project of analyzing only (or primarily) 
language, but rather it allows us to see the material, theatrical role and effect of an 
object that may not initially seem to be material in itself. I will return to this 
distinction and explore the possibilities of meaningful but physically absent props later 
in the chapter. For the present, I will put aside these questions and first discuss the 
kinds of props found in Greek tragedy, ways of categorizing them, their most 
significant functions, and some case studies.
51
 
 
What Is It, and What Does It Do? Categorizing Props 
Based on a theatrically oriented understanding of the stage property, I have 
compiled a catalogue of these objects in extant Greek tragedy, found here in Appendix 
I. As a way of beginning to interpret these data and investigate what they might mean 
for a broader understanding of the role of props in Greek stagecraft, we can consider 
the common themes that arise in this catalogue and how we might use those themes to 
categorize the examples of props and their uses. As that last phrase, “examples of 
props and their uses,” suggests, there are two primary approaches to this task, yielding 
two distinct schemata for categorization.  
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 To clarify, some of the props I am including in the following discussion may not be 
physically present on the stage, but the text and/or context of the play calls for them, 
and for the present, I am not distinguishing between physically present and absent 
objects to fill these roles. 
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The first approach is the simplest way to classify an object: to identify what it 
is. This is a descriptive approach that categorizes a prop based on the type of object it 
is or represents. For example, the water jar that Electra carries in Euripides’ Electra 
could be classified most specifically as a water jar or more generally as a vessel, a 
household item, or a handheld object. The basic identity of the object and its physical 
or material essence are important for any theatrical approach, since the object’s shape, 
weight, and other material features can affect the spectators’ understanding of and 
affective response to the object. To this primary identification, one could add 
associations that relate to the object’s identity, and these connotative functions of 
objects tend to be particularly valuable for those engaged in literary analysis. The 
water jar, for example, might be described as feminine, earthly (as opposed to 
supernatural), or domestic. It might also carry connotations related to class and station 
in life, as Electra herself suggests.
52
 
Building from the catalogue in Appendix I, then, the props in Greek tragedy 
can fall into the following major categories when sorted by the specific types of 
objects that they are: weapons, clothing pieces, jars/urns, branches/wreaths/garlands, 
mats/litters/biers, bonds/ropes, torches, and tablets. Corpses could make up one of the 
largest groups, if we accept that dummies that actors can embrace, adorn, and move 
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 See, for example, Electra’s side comment in reference to her water jar: “$6=’ -BB&. 
$2=’ !,)=%)"&' 0*%3 / ,"%&3(# … / &* =9 $+ 2%)5#. !. $&(6'=’ ',+Bµ"':, / '--’ 1. 
4?%+' =)5E1µ)' F.B5(!&3 !)&$.” (55-58). […carrying this pitcher resting on my head 
… not, indeed, having come to such a point of necessity, but so that I might show the 
hubris/insolence of Aegisthus to the gods…”] 
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around onstage are, in essence, props.
53
 More general categories would include 
household items, magical objects, and religious objects (including offerings, thyrsoi, 
small statues of gods, and garlands). A more superficial classification could also 
divide items by size, ranging from small trinkets that probably would not be seen from 
the audience (and thus might not be onstage at all), to handheld items that actors 
manipulate, to large, stationary or mostly stationary, set pieces. For a detailed 
classification of the props found in the Catalogue of Props in Greek Tragedy, see the 
first section (“Props Organized by What They Are”) of Appendix II, “Categories of 
Props in Greek Tragedy.” 
Based on the natures of the objects that props represent, there could also be a 
wide range of indirect associations and connotations attached to those props, and those 
could have a strong effect on their meaning, especially for the original spectators. 
Here, generalizations may be less useful, as any individual prop will accrue many 
different meanings and associations through its use and descriptions in its play. 
Nevertheless, the catalogue of props does suggest some particular trends, including 
some associations that make contrasting pairs. A prop could be masculine or feminine, 
earthly or supernatural, light or dark, Greek or barbarian. It could belong to the world 
of the home or of war, to the temple or oracle, to mourning or death. It could also 
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 Andrew Sofer makes this argument and considers its implications in “‘Take up the 
Bodies’: Shakespeare’s Body Parts, Babies, and Corpses,” in Volume 18 of Theatre 
Symposium (p. 135-148). Since most deaths in Greek tragedy occur offstage, the 
corpses are generally played by dummies, rather than by live actors, so the case for 
considering the corpse to be a prop is even clearer than in Sofer’s Shakespearean 
context. Continuing the distinctions from costumes and set pieces, however, I will 
consider corpses to be props only when actors interact with them, as when they cover 
or uncover the body, for example. 
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indicate such things as good or bad fortune or could belong to the city or the 
country/farmland. There can be no firm list or limit of associations of this kind, but 
most of the props found in tragedy carry at least one of the specific associations I have 
identified, though these may be complex and even interact with each other in 
conflicting ways.
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Let us take a relatively straightforward example as a way of thinking through 
this particular approach of classifying a prop. The sword of Hector in Ajax is a 
particularly important and symbolic prop: Hector gave it to Ajax when they exchanged 
gifts after the gods insisted that they end their man-to-man combat in a truce, and now 
Ajax kills himself by falling on that sword. Clearly, we can identify this prop as a 
weapon, specifically a sword. As such, it is from the world of warfare and, for an 
Athenian audience, carries masculine associations. Further, its mythological back-
story identifies it as barbarian (and thus significantly out of place in the Greek camp), 
antagonistic, and even associated with death, as Achilles had used the girdle that Ajax 
gave Hector in the exchange to drag Hector around the city after his death. Thus some 
associations adhere to a prop based simply on the nature of the object it represents (i.e. 
swordness), while others develop for the spectators as they perceive the particular 
uses, descriptions, and histories of the object as it is represented in the play. 
When presented with a collection of objects, most would find this 
categorization by what they are (physical qualities, familiar item types, etc.) to be the 
most instinctive approach.  However, we can also approach such a collection of 
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 See the final section of Appendix II for a longer list of the common associations I 
have identified for props in Greek tragedy. 
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objects by identifying what they do, and this tactic seems particularly useful in a 
theatrical context, where most objects are present for at least one very specific reason. 
There are a number of ways to look at the functions of props, beginning with the 
different aspects of a performance to which a prop’s function or purpose could relate. 
In some cases, we might best describe a prop’s function as primarily theatrical, 
creating a certain kind of moment, interaction, or spectacle on the stage, while in 
others, the function may seem to be more dramatic, relating to the diegesis and 
characters’ actions. These two functions clearly overlap in most cases, and our own 
perspective may determine which we see as dominant, but nevertheless, identifying a 
prop’s primary function(s) should be crucial for understanding its theatrical life. 
One of the most important and, as Appendix II clearly shows, common 
functions of a prop is to identify a character. This may be an identification of the 
specific person (as a club and lion skin identify Heracles), or it may be an 
identification of a type of character or a role a character is playing (as a garland might 
indicate a priestess or show that a character is acting as a suppliant). This is a very 
important theatrical function of a prop: a reader of the play (a modern reader, at least) 
has plenty of signals in the text to identify characters, from the list of dramatis 
personae to the individual speaker notations, but a spectator of the play needs the 
visual elements of the performance for an efficient and successful identification of a 
character. The mask, costume, and props all contribute to this process, and in some 
cases, a closer consideration of these elements can emphasize roles and other aspects 
of characters that readers might overlook. In Oedipus Tyrannus, for example, a reader 
might gloss over Creon’s appearance as a victorious, returning suppliant of the Oracle 
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of Delphi, but for a spectator, his crown of laurel is a strong visual indicator of this 
role and keeps the information in a position of some prominence throughout the 
scene.
55
 A further, common example of this function would be the costumes and props 
for foreign characters, who almost always speak correct, tragic Attic Greek and might 
not otherwise be easily identified as foreign.
56
 The impact of such visual and material 
elements is thus very significant for any theatrical study that values performance and 
the spectatorial experience, and it confirms that on some level and in some moments, 
objects do have important semiotic functions independent of language. 
In the context of the tragic Greek theater, many props function in the context of 
religious rituals. Not only do some objects identify characters as suppliants, priests, or 
similar figures, but others allow characters to perform rituals or parts of rituals on 
stage. In fact, by my count in Appendix 88, this is the second-largest category of prop 
function, when items used for making offerings or sacrifices, worshipping, granting 
sanctuary, and performing funerary rites are totaled. For example, Clytemnestra makes 
offerings to Apollo on stage in Sophocles’ Electra (634 ff.), and Electra pours 
libations on her father’s tomb in Libation Bearers (124-51). In Oedipus Tyrannus, 
Iocasta brings garlands and incense to the statue or temple of Apollo to pray for help 
(911-13). Ajax, Trojan Women, and Alcestis, among others, include scenes in which 
characters honor and adorn the dead bodies of loved ones with such objects as locks of 
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 The Priest calls attention to this crown when he describes Creon’s approach: “'--’ 
).0*(#+ µ"', 5=>.· &* B&% 6' 0*%# / /&-3($),+. 7=’ )8%/) /#B0*%/&3 =*,':.” (82-
83). [As one can guess, [he brings] pleasant news: for his head would not come all 
crowned with wreaths of berried laurel.] 
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 There are a few exceptions to this rule. The Chorus of Egyptians in Aeschylus’ 
Suppliant Women and the Phrygian Slave in Euripides’ Orestes both seem to speak in 
broken Greek that emphasizes their barbarian status. 
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hair and fine fabrics. If these props are bound together by their function of allowing 
characters to perform rituals, or occasionally gods to grant sanctuary, what exactly is 
the nature of those rituals and sacred phenomena in the context of the stage? How do 
the objects perform such a function, and what is the result?  
While ritual has long been a popular topic in scholarship of Greek tragedy, 
most research has either focused on the possible origins of theater in ritual or 
attempted to derive information about ritual practice from its representations in drama. 
Both of these topics, however, should point us toward another question: what is the 
status of the rituals performed in the context of tragedies? A more focused study of the 
role of stage properties in staged ritual could be one way of approaching an 
exploration of the significance of such ritual and the complex knot of theatricality and 
reality involved.  
How does the degree of “realness” of the prop itself affect the degree of 
“realness” of the ritual? Further, if the props are real objects normally used for 
“authentic” rituals performed in non-theatrical contexts, the nature of the performance 
as a whole becomes more complicated. Stanton B. Garner’s concern about naturalistic 
props on the modern stage becomes relevant even to this very different, non-
illusionistic theater:  
When a cast-iron pot is ‘played’ by a cast-iron pot, imported from 
actual use, the transparency of fictional semiosis is pressured by a 
material opacity, and the stage announces itself as a territory of 
surfaces, dense, particularized, sensory, radically actual. As 
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verisimilitude increases, in other words, it risks disrupting the very 
illusion it was imported to serve… (92) 
If actors use objects that are normally used for authentic rituals in a non-theatrical 
context, how do those objects shift the meaning both of that performed ritual and of 
the remainder of the theatrical performance? Conversely, if the objects are obviously 
other objects standing in for the authentic objects, how should the audience understand 
the performance? Has the ritual actually occurred? If not, does the theatrical play 
elevate or diminish the ritual’s status? 
 As Louise Bruit Zaidman and Pauline Schmitt Pantel explain in their survey, 
Religion in the Ancient Greek City, ancient Greek religion involved a very different 
understanding of the sacred and the profane than do the major religions familiar to a 
21
st
-century audience. The line between sacred and profane was not a firm, inherent 
distinction:  
Thus ta hiera designated the cults and sanctuaries of the gods, but also 
sacrificial victims. The latter, in other words, were objects endowed by 
ritual with qualities that brought them into relation with the divine and 
thus caused them to enter the domain we label ‘sacred’. These acts, 
these places, these objects were endowed with a power that rendered 
them conducive or favourable to the efficacy of the ritual. However, 
nothing in their intrinsic nature distinguished them from objects of 
everyday use, either the implements that were employed in sacrificial 
cooking…or the food…that was transformed into sacred offerings by 
being deposited in consecrated places. (8) 
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For the Greeks, then, objects could become sacred through their use in a ritual or 
through presentation at a temple or altar. Before that ritual or offering, those objects 
are no different from any other objects. 
 This understanding of the sacred has important implications for the nature of 
ritual in tragic performance. If the actors use actual garlands, jars, libations, or other 
offerings, there is no definitive reason why those objects could not be understood as 
becoming sacred and performing an authentic ritual. This possibility lies in contrast to 
the complex issues that adhere to the Christian Eucharist in performance, for example. 
The Eucharistic wafer becomes consecrated only under certain conditions, and in the 
Catholic understanding, it actually becomes the body of Christ through the proper 
administration of the sacrament. As Andrew Sofer has discussed, this understanding 
then poses a profound challenge for medieval plays that focus on reinforcing this 
doctrine and the authentic presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Is the wafer in a play 
such as the Croxton Play of the Sacrament played by an actual consecrated wafer, or 
does an unconsecrated wafer stand in for it? Either possibility drastically alters the 
meaning of the stage action, particularly for an audience that accepts the orthodox 
understanding of the Eucharist.
57
  
 In the Greek context, by contrast, a libation of milk and honey that a character 
pours as an offering is in itself no different from any other mixture of milk and honey 
until the moment that someone pours it out as an offering. Further, the rituals in Greek 
tragedy are private ones, performed by individuals, as opposed to public rituals for 
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 For more on the Eucharist in medieval plays, see Sofer’s Chapter 2, “Playing Host: 
The Prop as Temporal Contract on the Medieval Stage,” p. 31-60. 
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which a priest might be required.58 There is no definitive reason why an actor with an 
object appropriate for an offering, such as fruit or a libation, could not authentically 
perform that ritual on the stage. Thus, the pivotal question for these staged rituals then 
becomes not “Is this the right kind of item?” but “Is this item physically present?” For 
example, when Electra pours a libation on her father’s tomb at the beginning of 
Libation Bearers, it would be reasonable to assume that the actor does hold a real jar 
of some sort, since this object is central to the scene, but is there a real libation inside 
that the actor can pour out? Further, if the context, such as a temple, altar, or tomb, is 
particularly important for transforming an everyday object into a sacred offering or 
ritual implement, is the stage setting sufficient for stimulating that transformation? 
 Unfortunately, we do not have enough evidence to determine exactly how 
these rituals were performed on the stage or how the audience understood them. We 
cannot know with any certainty whether the Greeks considered these staged rituals to 
be authentic, sacred rituals in a proper relationship to the gods, but further exploration 
of the nature of the objects themselves should be fruitful for elaborating the 
implications of the possible stagings. Such a study should be particularly valuable 
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 One interesting complication of this would be the fact that the performance of the 
play is a public event, even though the ritual within the play may be a private one 
within that imagined world. However, because the ritual itself is not specifically 
framed as being on behalf of the general public, I do not think that this would 
invalidate the possibility that an actor (i.e. a private citizen) could be capable of 
performing the ritual. A more difficult question would be on whose behalf these rituals 
would be, if they are understood to have meaning and potency beyond the world of the 
play. Most of these offerings or other rituals are performed on behalf of a particular 
character within the diegesis, and it would be difficult to determine what the precise 
purpose would be if the rituals were to have meaning on an extra-diegetic level. We 
might say that they simply take their place alongside the many other rituals of the 
larger festival context, but a more specific answer to this question could be very 
rewarding, though difficult to determine. 
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given that much research on Greek religion has used tragedy as one of the major 
sources for reconstructing ritual practices, and we must be very critically aware of the 
complexities that arise as a result of the theatrical context. 
Returning to a delineation of some of the most common functions of props in 
Greek tragedy, one distinctly theatrical function of these props is to create a particular 
kind of action or scene. On a dramaturgical level, this could involve a prop that 
instigates a recognition scene, for example. Or, if we think in terms of simple physical 
actions, a prop could allow an actor to do a particular action, such as to carry another 
person by means of a litter. Props often fulfill such practical, physical functions in the 
theater: Ion uses a broom to sweep in Ion, Hector’s shield bears the body of Astyanax 
in Euripides’ Trojan Women, and the urns and voting pieces allow Athena to conduct a 
vote to decide Orestes’ trial in Eumenides. The most common examples of props 
serving practical, physical functions in extant Greek tragedy include jars that hold 
offerings (and thus serve a ritual function as well) and litters, mats, biers, and similar 
objects used to carry the dead or dying. 
Unlike the modern theater with its affinity for naturalistic stage business, 
however, Greek tragedy demands very few props whose only purpose is to serve such 
practical functions: in most cases, these props tend to carry further significance 
beyond that simple function. On a practical level, something flat and of an appropriate 
size and strength should be used to carry in a dead body. The specific use of Hector’s 
shield to serve this function for his son Astyanax clearly brings symbolic and affective 
resonances to that object and the scene. The purpose of such props then extends from 
practical functions to include symbolic functions: it is not enough for the object to 
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facilitate an action, but now it must also be seen and understood by the audience in its 
own right. Such symbolic functions of props have generally received more attention 
than their other functions, as they tend to be powerful for readers as well as for 
spectators of live performances. Much traditional dramatic criticism recognizes the 
poetic qualities of the symbolic aspects of props and other theatrical elements, and for 
a theatrical perspective on this function, we must simply remember the additional 
power that comes from the visual nature and the movement of the real prop, rather 
than simply from the language or the idea of the object. 
To return to the possibility of props serving dramaturgical functions, there are 
some plot points and dramatic scene-types that require objects. Many scenes involving 
fights or stand-offs, for example, demand appropriate weapons, and indeed, props 
commonly function to show aggression, enact a confrontation, or create a stand-off in 
Greek tragedies, though an actual physical struggle is rare. In some cases, props may 
also be used to kill, or attempt to kill, another character, which also, dramaturgically, 
can create a death scene. Many props could be understood as creating particular kinds 
of dramatic scenes or theatrical actions, but there are two possibilities that carry 
especially significant theatrical weight. 
The recognition scene may be the prop scene par excellence: two people who 
have long been lost to each other are finally reunited and come to recognize each 
other’s true identity and relationship, often by means of one or more significant 
objects. While the recognition scene truly came into its own in New Comedy, where 
tokens often reveal slave girls to be freeborn daughters of respectable citizens, its roots 
began at least as early as Aeschylus’ Libation Bearers, in which Electra gradually 
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recognizes her long-lost brother. Although Orestes guesses his sister’s identity when 
he first sees the group of women bringing offerings to the tomb (16), Electra’s 
recognition of him is driven by tokens. She sees a lock of hair on her father’s tomb 
and wonders who might have left such an offering, then declares that it resembles her 
own hair (176). The Chorus takes her suggestion and asks, “Is this then a secret gift 
from Orestes?” (177). As Electra’s hope grows, she sees footprints near the tomb and 
compares them to her own, concluding that they match perfectly. Orestes then reveals 
himself, but when Electra is reluctant to believe that he truly is her brother, he 
produces a piece of weaving as confirmation:  
.=&" =’ 4,#(µ# $&"$&, (9. ,%B&' 2)%6., 
(/*!:. $) /-:B&. :=; !9%)+&' B%#,9'. (231-232) 
[And look at this weaving, work of your own hand, and the strikes of 
the loom blade, and a picture of a beast.] 
It is this final token that at last gives Electra confidence in her brother’s identity and 
creates the scene of recognition and joyous reunion. 
 These three recognition tokens must have been memorable, as Euripides 
famously parodied them in his own Electra. They might certainly raise a number of 
questions of plausibility, from Euripides’ jokes about the natural difference in the size 
of a man’s and a woman’s footprints, siblings or no, to the question of how Orestes 
can recognize his sister at first sight, though he was sent away as a baby, while Electra 
needs three tokens to recognize him. Indeed, perhaps the intrusion of so many objects 
lends a comic quality to Aeschylus’ original scene as well, since most tragedies are 
sparing with props, and even a token-driven recognition scene surely need not have 
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three different tokens.
59
 Nevertheless, we might conclude simply that Aeschylus’ 
scene, overdetermined by props as it might be, makes good theater. Each new item is 
described in loving detail for spectators who might not be able to see the objects 
themselves, and each becomes a focal point for a few moments before another takes its 
place. The three build upon each other, forming dramatic steps to a scene of joyous 
release, before the play moves again to a building of tension, as the brother and sister 
begin planning the murders of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. Although such scenes 
might be more common to the later New Comedy, Libation Bearers represents an 
early usage of props functioning to bring about a recognition scene, and tragedy yields 
similar examples in Sophocles’ Electra, Euripides’ Ion, and Euripides’ Iphigenia 
among the Taurians. 
 
A Special Case: Props as Points of Contact 
 Recognition tokens may drive their scenes on both dramaturgical and theatrical 
levels, but another example of props that create particular scenes or moments reveals 
even more strongly the possible significance and theatricality of props in Greek 
tragedy. I would like to term this category the “contact-point” props. Such an object 
becomes a physical contact point between actor/characters, a particularly striking 
theatrical device given that direct physical contact between speaking actor/characters 
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 For more on the potential comic quality of props in the context of Greek drama, see 
my article “Helen’s Theatrical Mêchanê: Props and Costumes in Euripides’ Helen,” in 
Volume 18 of Theatre Symposium (2010). A comparison to other recognitions in 
tragedy may further support this claim. Ion, which has much in common with later 
New Comedy, features a token-based recognition scene. Oedipus Tyrannus, however, 
likewise centers on a recognition of parentage, but this recognition progresses 
primarily through the verbal testimony of witnesses, not through objects. 
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(i.e. not mute extras) seems to be quite rare in Greek tragedy. In this use of props, two 
actors might, for example, touch a prop at the same time; one might hand a prop to the 
other or use a prop to touch the other; one might touch a prop or costume piece that 
another is wearing; or one might physically reject another’s offered contact by pushing 
away an object. 
 Why might such moments be particularly significant, climactic, and 
theatrically vital? On a simple level, any use of props in Greek tragedy would likely 
have drawn some degree of extra attention, due merely to the relative scarcity of props 
in tragedy. The Catalogue of Props in Appendix 8 supports this point: while there are a 
few prop-heavy plays (Bacchae and the Electra plays in particular stand out), most of 
the tragedies require no more than five objects that we could definitively identify as 
props, and some could easily be performed with no props at all, other than perhaps a 
few corpses. These data confirm Oliver Taplin’s simple, intuitive point about the 
significance of props: “As with all stage business the Greek tragedians are sparing in 
their use of stage-properties, but this very economy throws more emphasis on their 
employment” (Taplin (1978) 77). Simply put, if there are only, let us say, three props 
in a performance, those objects should strongly attract the spectators’ attention and 
interest, by nature of their scarcity and visible distinction. 
Furthermore, as material parts of the imagined environment, props allow 
characters to interact with that environment, a particularly important function on a 
mostly bare stage, such as that of Greek tragedy. Stanton B. Garner describes this 
function itself as forging a type of contact: “Props establish points of contact between 
actor/character and mise-en-scène; they localize dramatic activity and materialize it in 
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scenic terms. By extending and physicalizing the body’s operation on its material 
environment, props situate the body more firmly within it” (Garner 89). In most cases, 
actors can pick up, move, and otherwise manipulate props, and such actions should 
help spectators anchor the imagined characters in their imagined world. These actions 
build concrete, material connections among the various elements of the theatrical and 
dramatic world. Props, then, can serve as points of contact between actor/characters 
and the physical world that the actors and spectators imaginatively create on the stage, 
and a similar type of connection should form when an object moves between actors.  
 Of course, neither the scarcity of props on the tragic stage nor their nature as 
connections between character and environment goes far towards explaining why 
inter-character contact-point props in particular would be unusually compelling and 
significant, as compared to any other props. Rather, it is the nature, use, and (again) 
relative rarity of physical contact between actor/characters on the Greek tragic stage 
that would lend a strong sense of significance, and possibly emotion or suspense in 
some cases, to scenes in which an object brings two characters together, almost, but 
not quite, to the point of direct physical contact. 
As Maarit Kaimio explains in the introduction to her study, Physical Contact 
in Greek Tragedy, the very large acting space of the Greek theater suggests that: 
It is unlikely that the author-director would have positioned his actors 
very close together in this space; on the contrary, they were probably 
usually a good distance from each other, even when discussing 
together, so that they should be clearly visible by the large audience, 
that the large space could be filled up, and that it could clearly be seen 
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which of the masked characters was speaking. Thus, from the point of 
view of the use of theatrical space, it is probable that scenes involving 
physical contact were rather an exception from the usual way of acting 
and that they consequently had great potential theatrical effect. (9) 
Kaimio’s conjectures about staging seem reasonable, though we certainly cannot 
prove them conclusively. We can, however, examine the texts for scenes in which the 
action and context necessitate physical contact, or at least make it extremely probable, 
and this is what Kaimio has done in her study. 
 While admitting that the relation between text and actual staging is problematic 
and that there is no simple way to extract the staging from the text, Kaimio proceeds to 
search the texts for probabilities and patterns in their indications for physical contact. 
As she explains, “In whatever manner the text was staged in performance, either in the 
fifth century or later, the words referring to physical contact are there in the text and 
deserve our attention; even if we consider them merely as a part of the literary text and 
not as part of dramatic deixis, they fall into certain patterns and reveal certain 
conventions that affect the way we read the text” (8-9). The result of her approach is a 
breakdown of physical contact in tragedy into categories describing the type of 
contact, with a brief discussion of all of the examples she has found for each category 
or sub-category. Kaimio is interested here primarily in moments that seem to indicate 
physical contact between actor/characters (i.e. excluding contact between an actor and 
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mute extras
60
), which are ultimately quite rare, though they seem to have increased in 
frequency later in the fifth and into the fourth centuries (Kaimio 9-10).  
The examples of this type of physical contact break down rather neatly into 
Kamio’s major categories: support and nursing (e.g. guiding an old or blind person, 
nursing a sick or dying person), clasping hands, embraces, supplication, and violence. 
Throughout her discussion, Kaimio notes examples that could involve physical contact 
between actor/characters but do not, such as when mutes support the old or blind (12-
14) or when a character supplicates another verbally but does not seem to complete the 
ritual with physical contact (49-50, 55-56). Such moments, some of which may even 
be common enough to be conventional, may then serve to heighten further the 
significance, poignancy, or tension when an action does culminate in physical contact, 
as, for example, when Antigone (rather than a mute attendant) leads her blind father 
Oedipus in Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus and Euripides’ Phoenician Women. 
Ultimately, Kaimio’s extensive survey confirms that, while physical contact may have 
been more common on the Greek tragic stage than we know, there are relatively few 
examples in the extant plays themselves for which the text provides strong evidence 
for staging as physical contact.
61
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 Contact between an actor and mute extras is much more common, particularly in the 
cases of supporting contact (mutes supporting an old, blind, or otherwise weak actor) 
and violent contact (mutes arresting an actor or escorting an already-bound actor). 
Kaimio discusses these briefly but is more interested in the examples of contact that 
break with these conventions by giving the supportive or violent role to a speaking 
character, thus increasing the significance of the contact and the scene. (See especially 
Kaimio 12-13.) 
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 Kaimio does not include any numerical totals, since her interest is not in 
determining the exact number of examples but rather in deciphering trends and 
conventions. By my count, she catalogues approximately 77 examples (from the body 
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We can conclude, then, that direct physical contact between actor/characters in 
Greek tragedy should generally heighten tensions and emotions or carry other 
important meanings. Moments of contact, even simple, everyday gestures such as an 
embrace or a handshake, can become very significant moments in this theater. It 
follows, then, that a moment in which a prop acts as a point of connection between 
two actors would be similarly significant, possibly even with an added tension from 
actor/characters being very close but not yet touching.  
As a fairly simple and typical example, in Euripides’ Iphigenia among the 
Taurians, the tablet
62
 on which Iphigenia has written a note to be taken to her family at 
home may seem insignificant. After all, Iphigenia recites all of the pertinent 
information aloud, in case her messenger Pylades should lose the physical tablet on 
the way back to Greece. From a literary perspective, it is her words and not the tablet 
itself that bring about the recognition between Iphigenia and her brother Orestes, but 
from a theatrical perspective, the physical tablet provides a material point of contact 
among the three Greeks throughout the scene. Although the text gives no specific 
indication for when it happens, Iphigenia seems to pass the tablet to Pylades at some 
point after her entrance, during her negotiation with Orestes and Pylades.
63
 Tensions 
                                                                                                                                       
of 33 mostly complete plays, plus a few of the major fragments) in which physical 
contact between actors is very likely, but this number is very rough, as she sometimes 
discusses unclear examples and leaves them open to either possibility. 
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 Iphigenia brings the tablet when she reenters at line 725 and indicates it at lines 727-
728: “Here, strangers, are the folds with many leaves in the shape of a letter.”  
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 I think the most likely possibilities would be either lines 735-736, where Iphigenia 
asks that Pylades give an oath that he will deliver this tablet, or just after the oath, 
perhaps around line 752. Pylades certainly has it before he gives it to Orestes at lines 
791-792, and it would be most natural and most dramatically powerful if he has it 
during Iphigenia’s recitation of its contents. 
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and emotions grow as Iphigenia then tells Pylades what the letter says, with the men 
gradually coming to recognize Iphigenia as Orestes’ sister, and as soon as she finishes 
her message, Pylades announces that he will discharge his duty and give the tablet to 
Orestes at once: 
.=&>, ,"%1 (&+ ="-$&' '/&=5=1µ5 $), 
 <%"($#, $9(=) (9. 0#(+B'9$:. /*%#. (791-792) 
[Here, I bring a letter to you and deliver it, Orestes, from your sister 
here.] 
Orestes accepts it (“="2&µ#+,” 793), says he will not bother to open and read it, and 
proceeds to try to bring Iphigenia to recognize him in return. 
 After Iphigenia realizes that this Greek man is indeed her brother, the two 
embrace (829 ff.), and it is unclear what might happen to the tablet. Perhaps Orestes 
passes it back to Pylades, or perhaps they embrace with the letter between them. They 
might simply cast it aside, but from a practical standpoint, it is generally inconvenient 
to leave props lying around on the stage, where an actor might easily trip over them. 
More likely, one of them, probably Pylades or Orestes, continues to hold the tablet 
until they exit at line 1088 to begin their escape plan.  
Regardless of where it is after the recognition, the tablet serves an important 
role in the emotional life of the scene before the relationship is confirmed. It is a 
recognition token to some extent, but because Iphigenia recites her message and story, 
the physical letter is not necessary to create the recognition. Certainly Euripides could 
have written the scene such that Iphigenia gives her message only verbally, so we 
should assume, I would argue, that the object itself has some further significance 
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dependent on its being an actual letter. That significance may well be due to its use in 
forming a point of contact: first, whenever Iphigenia hands it to Pylades, the tablet 
forms a physical, visual link between her and one of the Greek strangers. Her gesture 
of handing over the letter helps to seal their bargain and show their trust of each other, 
bringing these three Greeks just a little closer together. Visually, it may also look like 
a handclasp, a powerful gesture of agreement and solemn promise. Further, the 
spectators know that the men are actually her brother and his companion, and this link 
can be an early step in the building of tension and anticipation for the recognition. 
When Pylades delivers the letter to Orestes, it then provides a connection between 
brother and sister, as Orestes holds what he now knows to be a letter written by his 
long-lost sister. He can touch, even embrace, this letter that she herself has written and 
held, long before Iphigenia recognizes him and allows him to embrace her. The tablet 
that might be unnecessary for a reader of the play could, in performance, become a 
locus of spectators’ attention, anticipation, and emotion, as they watch the brother and 
sister slowly approach recognition. 
A more complex and significant example of the power of a contact-point prop 
comes in Sophocles’ Philoctetes. On the level of staging, the tensions and movements 
of this play truly emerge through physicality, from the extreme isolation of Philoctetes 
to the several moments of contact between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, to 
Philoctetes’ seizure at the hands of Odysseus’ men, to Neoptolemus’ staying hand that 
prevents Philoctetes from killing his enemy.  
The theme of significant physicality, whether contact or lack thereof, naturally 
stems from Philoctetes’ total isolation on the island of Lemnos, which is both part of 
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the familiar mythological back-story and a state emphasized in the opening of the 
play, through Odysseus’ account of the abandonment and through Odysseus’ and 
Neoptolemus’ exploration of the man’s empty, makeshift home. They point out a bed 
of leaves, a poorly made wooden cup, stones for starting fires, and rags drying 
outside,
64
 all of which supplement the picture of Philoctetes’ lonely life and lack of 
anything beyond the barest and most basic of necessities, thus providing details that 
should stimulate spectators’ imaginations (33-39). This opening scene highlights 
Philoctetes’ isolation from any other human beings and his total separation from 
society and civilization, thus preparing spectators to see other characters’ contact with, 
or, when it can be determined, proximity to Philoctetes as significant. 
Philoctetes’ exclamation upon first seeing Neoptolemus and his sailors (the 
Chorus) emphasizes his isolation and the usual responses of the few people he does 
meet on his island. He calls out to the strangers, asks who they are and where they are 
from, and then pleads:  
… 0#/ µ9 µ’ =0'> 
=)5(#'$). !0/-#B9$’ '/:B%+1µ"'&', 
'--’ &.0$5(#'$). -'=%# =>($:'&', µ6'&', 
!%9µ&' 7=) 0-,+-&' 0#0&>µ)'&' 
,1'9(#$’, )?/)% 1. ,5-&+ /%&(90)$). 
230 '--’ ''$#µ)5C#(!’·    (225-230) 
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 These items may not actually be on stage or visible to the audience. The inside of 
the cave does not need to be visible and probably is not, since characters can exit into 
the cave. The rags hanging outside could have been on the stage to set the scene, but 
no one specifically interacts with them, so they could be invoked only in words. 
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[And don’t shrink back with hesitation, fearing me who has become 
wild, but having pity on this wretched man, alone, desolate, and thus 
afflicted, friendless, speak, if you come as friends. But answer!] 
For Philoctetes, with his wild appearance and putrid smell, there is a great risk that 
these newcomers might draw back or even leave in revulsion, without speaking to him 
at all, and his repetition of pleas for the strangers to speak (“,1'9(#$’,” 
“''$#µ)5C#(!’”)65 emphasize these fears. Neoptolemus remains, but he most likely 
maintains some distance from Philoctetes, not only for practical reasons of staging, 
such as those Kaimio identifies as related to the size of the stage, but also for dramatic 
reasons. Philoctetes, as desperate as he is to talk to another human being and to find a 
way to get home, is very conscious of his repulsive appearance and smell and would 
not be likely to approach Neoptolemus too closely, for fear of turning him away. 
When he begs the young man to bring him home, he acknowledges that he will be an 
unpleasant companion on the ship but suggests that he could travel in the hold,
66
 on 
the prow, on the stern, or anywhere else out of the way (481-483). It seems that others 
withdraw from Philoctetes, and he accordingly withdraws from others in order to 
minimize his repulsiveness and beg for the help he needs. 
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 Some editors read “0#-&>µ)'&'” [call out!] instead of “0#0&>µ)'&'” [afflicted] in 
line 228 and if this reading is correct, Philoctetes would have an additional imperative 
asking the strangers to speak.  
66
 “!. ''$-5#'”: “''$-5#” may mean “the hold of a ship” or “bilge-water,” the latter of 
which may better convey the sense of alienation and the lowliness of the 
accommodation that Philoctetes is willing to endure. (See Liddell and Scott’s entry for 
“''$-5#.” “Hold of a ship” is the first definition, and the second is “bilge-water, 
filth.”) 
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 The staging of the first part of the play, then, is most likely marked by 
Philoctetes’ physical distance from Neoptolemus and the Chorus, while Neoptolemus’ 
willingness to remain and talk with Philoctetes, then to take him onto the ship, gives 
the wretched man some hope of escaping from his isolation. There is one moment that 
could involve physical contact but most likely does not: Philoctetes’ supplication of 
Neoptolemus. As he begins to beg for passage back to Greece, Philoctetes cries out: 
/%6. '>' () /#$%6., /%6. $) µ:$%6., @ $"0'&', 
/%6. $’ )? $5 (&+ 0#$’ &A06' !($+ /%&(,+-"., 
470  B0"$:. B0'&"µ#+, µ+ -5/C. µ’ &4$1 µ6'&'… (468-470) 
[Now by your father, and by your mother, o son, and by whatever at 
home that is dear to you, I beg you as a suppliant, don’t leave me thus 
alone!] 
Later in his plea, he says that he is falling on his knees before Neoptolemus, 
“/%&(/5$'1 () B6'#(+,” one of the physical components of full, ritual supplication 
(485). He does not, however, make any reference to any of the other physical elements 
of supplication, the touching of the knees, hands, and chin of the other person.
67
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 See John Gould, “Hiketeia,” for an explanation of the components of ritual 
supplication. See especially his analysis of Thetis’ supplication of Zeus in Book I of 
the Iliad on p. 76: “The significant elements in this sequence of actions are those of 
lowering the body and crouching (sitting or kneeling), of physical contact with knees 
and chin, and of kissing. …supplication in some sense can be said to take place 
without any of them, but together they constitute the ritual act in its ‘complete’ or 
strongest form.” Other examples also involve the hands. For a more recent study 
involving a variety of sources, see F. S. Naiden, Ancient Supplication. In his 
discussion of gestures (p. 44-62), Naiden suggests that contact is particularly effective 
for demanding a response from the person supplicated but that prostration and raising 
the hands are common when the suppliant is too far away from the supplicandus (see 
especially p. 51). 
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Maarit Kaimio suggests that his lameness prevents Philoctetes from completing the 
ritual with physical contact, but it is just as likely that he maintains distance in order to 
show how little of an imposition he will make himself on the voyage (Kaimio 54-55). 
Regardless of the motivation, Philoctetes most likely does not touch Neoptolemus 
here, and the two Greeks probably remain somewhat separated on the stage. 
 Given Philoctetes’ extreme isolation, the first moment of physical contact 
between him and another human should naturally be climactic. Significantly, the first 
contact actually comes through the medium of his bow. Philoctetes has most likely 
been holding his bow since his entrance, and Neoptolemus first calls attention to it at 
line 654: 
{G;.} D $#"$# B&% $& 0-)+'& $6E’ E '"' ,2)+.; 
 {H8.} $#"$’, &* B&% ---’ ,($’, '--’ E ?#($*I1 2)%&$'.  
(654-655) 
[Ne. Is this indeed the famous bow that you’re holding now? 
Phi. This, for there is no other, but the one that I am carrying in my 
hands.] 
The spectators have probably been able to see the bow since Philoctetes’ entrance, 
which would also facilitate a quick, visual identification of the character, but now, as 
Neoptolemus continues with a wish to look closely at it, their attention should focus 
on the object: 
F%’ ,($+' G($) 0'BB>!)' !"#' -#?)$', 
0#/ ?#($*(#+ µ) /%&(0>(#+ !’ G(/)% !)6';  (656-657) 
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[Would it be possible for me to take a look from close at hand, and to 
kiss it and reverence it as if it were a god?] 
 In “Neoptolemus and the Bow,” Ismene Lada-Richards argues that 
Neoptolemus is “a privileged, ‘internalised’ onlooker” here and that his desire to look 
closely at the bow reflects that of the spectators themselves (Lada-Richards 179). This 
is the moment in which the bow becomes the primary object of attention for the 
characters and spectators alike, and Lada-Richards emphasizes the importance of this: 
“No matter how inherently interwoven with the action Philoctetes’ bow is, 
Neoptolemus’ close look…theatricalises the object by converting it into a dramatic 
spectacle, a thea” (179)
68
. The onstage gazes further direct the spectators’ gazes to the 
central object, and this focusing of attention on the prop heightens its significance and 
builds spectators’ interest and anticipation, thus laying the groundwork for a climactic 
moment, when Philoctetes actually hands the bow over to Neoptolemus. 
 Philoctetes tells Neoptolemus that he will allow him to touch the bow (667-
69), but he will first go inside the cave to take what he needs for his journey home and 
show the young man how he has lived for the past ten years. In a further indication of 
Philoctetes’ growing trust of and closeness to Neoptolemus, he remarks as he exits 
that he will bring Neoptolemus in as well, “$0 B&% / '&(&"' /&!)$ () E3µ/#%#($*$:' 
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 Lada-Richards’s larger argument is that “for large sections of the play’s first 
audience, i.e. those who were memyêmenoi in the Eleusinian initiation rites, both the 
dramatic framing of Neoptolemus’ plea (Phil. 654-75) as well as the emotions 
registered in its verbal level would have suggested a whole string of ritual associations 
falling into the realm of Eleusinian mystic initiation” (180). Such ritual connections 
and overtones may certainly run through the play and adhere to the bow, but I am 
more interested in the specifically theatrical aspects of the bow and of movement in 
the play. 
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-#?)$'” [For being sick requires me to take you as an assistant.69] (674-675). As the 
two exit together into the cave, the actors may be as physically close to each other as 
they have been to this point, further preparing for new intimacy that will come when 
they emerge. 
 As the men come out of the cave, after a Choral song, Philoctetes’ sickness 
strikes him, and Neoptolemus asks, “Do you want me to take hold of you and touch 
you?” [?&>-C -*?1µ#+ =9$# 0#/ !5B1 $5 (&3;] (761). Physical contact is thus offered, 
with the emphatic use of two verbs for grasping or touching (“-*?1µ#+” and “!5B1”), 
but Philoctetes refuses it, asking instead that Neoptolemus take the bow and keep it 
safe for him: 
µ+ =9$# $&"$6 B’· '--* µ&+ $& $6E’ H-I' 
$*=’, G(/)% J$&3 µ’ '%$51., K1. ''L 
765  $0 /9µ# $&"$& $9. '6(&3 $0 '"' /#%6', 
(2I’ #*$& 0#/ ,>-#(()· (763-766) 
[No, not that indeed! But taking this bow of mine, just as you asked 
recently, keep it safe and guard it, until this misery of the disease that is 
now present should release me.] 
Neoptolemus reassures him that he will keep it safe and will not give it to anyone else 
(774-775), and Philoctetes then passes him the bow: 
.=&>, ="2&3, /#$· $0' ,!6'&' =; /%6(03(&', 
µ9 (&+ B)'"(!#+ /&->/&'’ #*$*, µ:=’ )/1. 
                                                
69
 Literally, “(3µ/#%#($*$:.” is “one who stands (($*$:.) together ((3µ-) alongside 
(/#%#-).” The word itself is very descriptive and emphatic with respect to the 
proximity, literal or symbolic, of the helper to the helped. 
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!µ&5 $) 0#/ $2 /%6(!’ !µ&" 0)0$:µ"'>. (776-778) 
[There, take it boy, and worship/prostrate
70
 yourself before the god of 
ill will/jealousy
71
, lest it become for you a thing of much suffering, as it 
was for me and for the one who possessed it before me.] 
 The passing of the bow from Philoctetes to Neoptolemus is a turning point of 
the play. As various critics have noted, this moment represents a confirmation of trust 
and an exchange of power, among other possibilities, but on a more basic level, it also 
creates a point of connection between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus. This is the closest 
they have come to direct physical contact, and the bow serves as the intermediary 
between their outstretched hands. If we imagine this scene on the stage, we might even 
see a handclasp, a powerful mark of agreement, unity, and solemn trust, created 
through the medium of the bow.
72
 This moment, I would like to propose, shows the 
true power of “contact-point” props: they bring actor/characters together and create 
visual linkages with theatrical power that goes beyond plot points or symbolic 
resonance.  
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 Occasionally, in order to best capture the meaning, connotations, and metaphorical 
qualities of a word for readers without knowledge of Greek, I will provide two 
possible translations, as here: “worship/prostrate yourself before.” 
71
 Literally, it would be “prostrate yourself before jealousy,” but ,!6'&' can be taken 
as a personification, as my translation does.  
72
 See Glenys Davies, “The Significance of the Handshake Motif in Classical Funerary 
Art” (1985) for a good summary of the visual evidence for the meaning of the 
handshake. In the late Archaic period, the handshake often appears in mythological 
scenes to show the gods welcoming Heracles or Theseus as an equal (627-28). By the 
classical period, the handshake seems to indicate greeting, parting, agreement or unity, 
and sometimes marriage. The use of the handshake in iconography does not, of course, 
provide clear evidence for its use in everyday life, but since the theater is also an 
artistic medium with its own kind of iconography, the link to tragedy seems 
reasonable. Philoctetes’ own request for Neoptolemus to give his hand as a pledge 
confirms this usage. See also Kaimio’s Chapter 3, “Clasping Hands,” p. 26-34. 
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 During his ensuing pain and delirium, Philoctetes does finally touch 
Neoptolemus directly, as he begs the young man to stay until he recovers and asks for 
his hand as a pledge (809-813). The tensions and emotions that the passing of the bow 
has aroused thus continue to grow throughout the scene of Philoctetes’ sickness, 
reaching another high point with this handclasp and then another as Philoctetes 
desperately begs Neoptolemus to let him go (816-817). As Philoctetes’ sickness leaves 
him and he drops into sleep, Neoptolemus finally releases his hold. 
The remainder of the play continues to highlight the importance of the bow and 
to use physicality as a powerful element of the stage action. Odysseus’ men physically 
restrain Philoctetes as he tries to jump off a cliff to avoid going to Troy and helping 
his enemies (1003), and indeed, Odysseus intends to carry him off by force, as if 
Philoctetes himself were an object. Philoctetes’ physical relation to others continues to 
be of primary importance as Neoptolemus finally returns the bow to him, creating a 
second moment of contact through the bow (1286 ff.). In fact, this moment should be 
particularly strong in the theater, as Odysseus has boastfully given orders and stated 
intentions as if he himself had possession of the bow, yet for a spectator, the bow itself 
remains a strong visual reminder that the crux of the action remains with 
Neoptolemus, who stays true to his pledge not to allow anyone else to touch it. 
Neoptolemus takes hold of Philoctetes once more to prevent the angry man from 
shooting Odysseus with the infallible bow (1300-1302), and then the two are left alone 
to decide how to proceed. It is possible that Neoptolemus would support Philoctetes as 
they exit at the end of the play, having agreed to obey Heracles’ orders to go to Troy, 
but there is no textual indication of contact. 
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Physical proximity and contact significantly shape the rhythms and tensions of 
Philoctetes, and the contact between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus through the 
medium of the bow first prefigures the ensuing direct contact, then reestablishes trust 
and partnership when Neoptolemus returns it. The bow is a central element of the 
visual life of this play, and its function and significance lie as firmly with its 
movement and position on stage as with its symbolic meanings and plot functions. 
  Like Philoctetes’ bow, the urn in Sophocles’ Electra has never lacked for 
critical attention, yet also like the bow, its function as a material connection between 
actor/characters has not generally been of interest. The poignancy of Electra’s lament 
for the brother she believes to be dead, delivered while she holds the urn that 
supposedly contains his ashes, may naturally focus attention on the image of Electra 
holding the urn. However, the previous movements of the object and the subsequent 
position of the urn between Orestes and Electra as he orders her to put it down are also 
very significant for the movement and emotions of the scene. 
 When Orestes and the Paidagogus first enter, the urn is probably not visible to 
the audience. In his opening speech, Orestes mentions the urn as “hidden in the 
bushes” (55), and he details his plan to bring out the urn to show to Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus as proof of his death. The Paidagogus also mentions the urn when he later 
describes Orestes’ death at the chariot race to Clytemnestra and Electra (757-758), so 
the spectators should be well aware of the object’s significance by the time it makes an 
appearance with Orestes, Pylades, and possibly additional attendants
73
 (1098). The 
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 There is no specific indication of further attendants, but mute extras are common, so 
the possibility cannot be excluded, though I think it most likely that only Orestes and 
93 
text does not indicate which character is carrying the urn at their entrance, but when 
Electra presses him for his news, Orestes confirms that his party is indeed carrying the 
urn with her brother’s ashes (1113-1114).
74
 Electra soon asks for the urn so that she 
might properly lament for her brother (1119-1122), and Orestes responds: 
=6!’, M$+. !($5, /%&(,"%&'$).· &* B&% 1. 
!' =3(µ)')53 B’ &N(’ !/#+$)$$#+ $6=), 
1125 '--’ ( ,5-1' $+., ( /%0. #Oµ#$&. ,>(+'. (1123-1125) 
[Give it to her, whoever she is, bringing it forth! For she begs this not 
as one in enmity, but as either one of his friends or one related by 
blood.] 
Orestes’ command indicates that someone else, either Pylades or possibly a mute 
attendant, hands the urn over to Electra.  
If it is indeed Pylades who gives Electra the urn, this moment could prefigure 
their later marriage, a detail of the story that the audience would already know. The 
urn here becomes a contact point between a future husband and wife, and their 
outstretched arms can suggest the gesture of a groom grasping his bride’s wrist or 
hand at their marriage.
75
 In the midst of Electra’s greatest despair, then, the audience 
                                                                                                                                       
Pylades have entered here. Hugh Lloyd-Jones’s Loeb edition does call for extra 
attendants in the stage directions. 
74
 Orestes uses the first person plural (“0&µ5I&µ)'”) for the main verb and a plural for 
the participle (“,"%&'$).”). First person plural does sometimes function as a sort of 
“royal we,” but here it makes equal sense as a literal plural, referring to the delegation 
sent by Strophius (“H109. … -'=%). … $+').,” 1107), so I do not think we can 
conclude that Orestes necessarily carries the urn himself. 
75
 See Sutton, “Nuptial Eros” for a study of the visual motifs associated with 
weddings. Regarding this particular gesture, Sutton summarizes: “The groom’s hold 
on the bride’s arm or wrist was probably a traditional element in the wedding that 
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might see a glimmer of hope that all will eventually be well and that Electra will 
marry Pylades according to the traditional story.  
Despite any closeness or hope that the gesture might evoke, this arrangement 
also ensures that the brother and sister remain physically distant before Electra’s 
lament, as she receives the precious urn from another member of the party. This 
distance continues a pattern from the very beginning of the play: Orestes hears a voice 
lament and thinks it might be his sister, and he considers staying to listen to her 
lament, but instead he takes the Paidagogus’ advice and exits to pour libations on his 
father’s grave (80-85). The brother and sister so dear to each other remain separated 
during Electra’s first lament, during the scene in which Electra first learns the news of 
Orestes’ death through the report of the Paidagogus, and now during her receipt of the 
urn. The distance serves to heighten further the suspense of an anticipated recognition, 
and it may also cast Electra’s devastation into stronger relief, increasing the sense of 
her isolation and possibly even convicting Orestes of some cruelty for not sparing his 
sister such pain, though he does not yet realize that she is indeed his sister. 
At the end of her lament, the Chorus addresses her as “Electra,” and the scene 
begins to move more directly toward recognition, as Orestes realizes that the woman is 
his sister and begins to lament for her own sufferings. As the scene builds, Orestes 
asks that she return the urn, which she absolutely refuses to do (1205 ff.). The two 
struggle back and forth, as Orestes demands the urn and Electra resists, and this 
                                                                                                                                       
signified the legal transfer of the bride to her husband’s control (kyreia)” (29). See 
also John Howard Oakley and Rebecca H. Sinos, The Wedding in Ancient Athens 
(Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1993), p. 45. Vase paintings often depict a groom 
clasping his bride’s arm or wrist as he leads her to his house or to the bridal chamber, 
as in Oakley and Sinos’s Figures 82-84, 86, 94, 106, et alia (p. 96, 98, 103, 110). 
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struggle could be either entirely verbal or both verbal and physical. The urn that 
Electra formerly understood to connect her to what remains of her brother could now 
be a physical connection between her and the man whom she will soon recognize as 
the true, and very much alive, Orestes. I think it highly unlikely that such a scene 
would be performed as involving the two pulling at the urn with all their strength, but 
it seems entirely possible that Orestes could at some point touch the urn as an 
emphatic gesture of entreaty or a stylized stand-in for physical force. Ultimately, 
however, Electra maintains possession of the urn (1216), and Orestes finally shows 
her their father’s seal to confirm his true identity (1222-1223). The two ecstatically 
embrace by line 1226, and there is no further mention of the urn until the men prepare 
to go inside (1324-1325),
76
 and by necessity of context, they must take it when they 
finally do enter at line 1375. 
What happens to the urn during the recognition scene itself? There is no 
indication that Electra gives up the urn, even when she accepts the seal as proof of 
Orestes’ true identity, so it is possible that the two embrace with the urn between 
them. Electra could put down the urn when she learns the truth, but this is a rather 
ungraceful solution: the urn is still necessary for the plot (both Sophocles’ and 
Orestes’), so it must remain intact and readily available, and it does not seem 
theatrically viable for Electra to stoop down to place the urn safely on the ground at 
the height of the scene’s emotion. If she does not keep the urn, the most reasonable 
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 Electra tells the men: “)?(+$’, @ E"'&+, / ---1. $) 0#/ ,"%&'$). &8’ 6' &%$) $+. / 
=6µ1' '/7(#+$’ &%$’ 6' 5(!)5: -#?7'” (1323-1325). [Go inside, strangers, since you 
bring something that no one could turn away from the house, nor take pleasure in 
taking.] 
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alternative would be for her to hand it off to Pylades, or an attendant, if there are any, 
and indeed, she must, in any event, return it to one of the men at some point before 
they exit into the house. Nevertheless, the climactic moment of recognition and 
embrace seems a theatrically clumsy moment for the exchange of a prop that is vitally 
significant to the play but not to the current moment itself. As difficult as an embrace 
might be while holding an urn, I think it most likely that Electra continues to hold the 
urn until at least line 1227, where she shows off Orestes to the Chorus, referring to 
him as “µ:2#'#$(+ µ;' / !#'6'$#, '"' =; µ:2#'#$. ()(1µ"'&'” [dead by contrivances, 
but now saved by contrivances] (1228-1229). The urn is a physical, visible site of the 
µ:2#'#5 [contrivances], so this would be a natural point at which to call attention to 
the object again. 
Speculations about performance are particularly risky when the text provides 
no definite clues, so there is little that we can say with certainty about the movements 
of the urn through its stage life in Electra. It is mentioned several times before it 
appears; it comes on stage in the hands of Orestes, Pylades, or possibly an attendant; 
Pylades or an attendant hands it to Electra, who laments over it; at some point Electra 
must return it to one of the men, and they take it with them when they go inside the 
palace. These are the bare bones of the prop’s movement and the only certain 
indications of where it is at any point. Inferences beyond these specific necessary 
points may be probable, based on practical concerns and the logic of theatrical 
rhythms, but they remain only probabilities. What we can learn from this tracing of the 
urn’s stage life, however, is that its movement is actually quite complex, and its 
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emotional significance is not restricted to the moments of Electra’s one sustained 
lament over it (1126-1170).  
Even though we cannot reconstruct the prop’s movements in the “original” 
performance or in the play’s inherent context-driven requirements, we can at least 
appreciate that the prop’s stage life extends beyond that emotional lament, both before 
and after it, and its movements, however exactly they might occur in any given 
performance, clearly affect the visual tableau and the affective movements of the 
scene. Further, the prop’s materiality and its subsequent capacity to connect the 
actor/characters physically contribute strongly to its theatrical power. The urn’s 
position on the stage can potentially foreshadow a marriage, supplement a sense of 
distance between brother and sister, then heighten the suspense of a possible 
recognition as Electra holds the object, then possibly connect them as an intermediary, 
if Orestes’ attempt to take the urn from her is represented physically at all, and finally, 
possibly join in their embrace, if either Electra or Orestes holds it at that point. 
Whatever its precise movements might be, the urn significantly contributes to the 
movement of the scene itself, its ups and downs, its tensions and affective resonances, 
and it does so primarily as a result of the particular actor/character(s) who are in 
contact with it at any given moment.  
The urn is an interesting example of a contact-point prop because the contact it 
brings about varies. Sometimes it is indirect, as when Electra holds it with the 
understanding that it contains her brother’s ashes; sometimes it is direct but with a 
result of distancing, as when Electra receives the urn not from Orestes but from 
whomever he orders to hand it over to her; and only possibly sometimes the contact 
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involves the more typical effect of an intermediary object heightening tension as a 
prelude to direct contact, as in the case if Orestes does indeed touch the urn during his 
requests for Electra to put it down. The urn is famous with good reason: the object is 
highly significant both for the basic plot of the play and for the affective life of the 
theatrical performance, and the emotion, metatheatricality, and symbolic resonance of 
Electra lamenting so powerfully over an urn that does not, in fact, contain her 
brother’s ashes have naturally driven much of the critical analysis. When we approach 
the prop more firmly from the perspective of its theatrical life, its materiality and 
movements on the stage, however, we should gain a new appreciation for its 
complexity and possibilities. Though we cannot precisely trace every movement or 
moment of contact, the urn’s function as a contact point, whatever the nature of that 
contact might be in any given instance, is an important part of its effect on its scene. 
The various complex possibilities for its movements and effects should expand our 
understanding of what a “contact-point” prop might do and why its movements are so 
significant. 
Most of the objects that I identify in Appendix II as likely “contact-point” 
props facilitate some kind of positive interaction between characters. In several cases, 
contact through a prop precedes direct physical contact or a recognition scene, and in 
these moments, the prop might heighten the audience’s emotions as the scene builds 
towards a joyful recognition and/or a solidification of the characters’ alignment 
through direct contact.77 Contact through a prop might lead to a happy turn of events, 
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 In addition to the examples already discussed, Electra’s examination of the lock of 
hair in Aeschylus’ Libation Bearers may work similarly, and in Euripides’ Hippolytus, 
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as in the case of a recognition scene, or even if circumstances are negative, as when a 
character is sick or dying, the contact itself might suggest trust, kinship, concern, 
allegiance, or any number of other positive qualities. This theatrical technique of 
contact through a prop may or may not have been common enough to be considered a 
recognizable convention in Greek tragedy, but however clear the trend might have 
been, Euripides’ Bacchae takes that trend and turns it to sinister effect. 
The beginning of Bacchae involves some conventional direct physical contact: 
Teiresias enters, presumably with a mute attendant to guide his blind steps.78 Soon 
after Cadmus enters from the palace, he takes Teiresias’ hand (197-19879), and the old 
men support each other in what could be a parody of the conventional supportive 
contact between an old or blind man and an attendant. Whether or not this scene is 
indeed funny, as some have suggested, this contact is at least harmless. The old men 
are supporting each other and planning to dance in honor of Dionysus, acknowledging 
his divinity and his relationship to Cadmus.  
                                                                                                                                       
the Nurse removes and replaces Phaedra’s headdress (201-202, 243-250) before later 
touching her in ritual supplication (325-326). Creusa’s passing of the vial of poison to 
the old man in Ion is more complex, since she is asking him to murder a man she does 
not realize is her son, but the passing itself is a moment of partnership and trust. To 
my mind, the only objects in this list whose contact likely evokes predominantly 
negative emotions or foreshadows negative events are the poisoned tunic in Women of 
Trachis (which involves very indirect contact and distance in both space and time), the 
nails and bonds that Hephaestus uses to secure Prometheus to the rock in Prometheus 
Bound, and the objects in the Bacchae. 
78
 W. J. Verdenius notes that Roux (1970-72) has proposed that Teiresias entered 
without an attendant, guided by Dionysus but that Seidensticker (1982) has shown that 
lines 193 and 198 imply that an attendant has accompanied him. See Verdenius’s note 
on line 174 (p. 241). 
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 JF4KAL: …'--’ !µ9. ,2&3 2)%6.. 
D;8M;L8FL: .=&>, E>'#/$) 0#/ E3'1%5I&3 2"%#. (197-198) 
[Cadmus: …But take my hand. 
Teiresias: Here, take hold of it and join (literally, “yoke together”) it with my hand.] 
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When Pentheus enters, however, contact is used to a different end. He begins 
with a tirade against the supposed god and all his supporters, and he mockingly rejects 
Teiresias’ warning that the god is indeed real and worthy of worship. His grandfather, 
Cadmus, then attempts to moderate his reaction and to convince him that even if the 
god does not exist, it is still more rational to acknowledge than to deny him. With a 
warning that he not suffer the same punishment for boasting as Actaeon did, Cadmus 
attempts to place an ivy garland on Pentheus’ head: 
P µ+ /*!C. (>· =)"%6 (&3 ($"C1 0*%# 
0+((2· µ)!’ 5µ#' $2 !)2 $+µ+' =5=&3. (341-342) 
[Don’t suffer that! Here, I will crown your head with ivy. Give honor to 
the god with us!] 
Pentheus, however, rejects Cadmus’ offered contact: 
&* µ+ /%&(&5()+. 2)$%#, ?#02)>()+. =’ .7', 
µ:=’ !E&µ6%EC µ1%5#' $+' (+' !µ&5; (343-344) 
[Don’t lay a hand on me, but be a bacchant, going away! Don’t wipe 
off your folly on me!] 
This exchange tells us what Cadmus intends to do and that Pentheus refuses to 
allow the contact, but it gives little indication of how the physical action might be 
staged. It is unclear whether there is any contact between the two: Cadmus’ statement 
that he will crown (“($"C1,” a future-tense verb) Pentheus’ head with ivy suggests 
that he has a garland in his hand, which would suit his bacchant ensemble in any case, 
but he may or may not extend that towards Pentheus. The force of Pentheus’ retort 
suggests that it should be accompanied by a physical gesture of some sort, but with 
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our limited knowledge of ancient acting, we cannot know what it might have been. If 
Cadmus does physically approach and attempt to garland him, perhaps Pentheus stops 
his hand or brushes away the ivy. The contact here could be direct, if Pentheus touches 
Cadmus’ hand, or it could take place through a prop, if Pentheus touches an offered 
ivy crown, or it could remain purely rhetorical, if Cadmus offers it without actually 
attempting the contact.  
Although we do not know whether or what kind of contact might originally 
have occurred in this moment, the text clearly creates an offer and a refusal of contact. 
Cadmus’ offer is one of assistance, agreement, and partnership, all qualities that we 
commonly find in moments of positive contact, and Pentheus’ rejection encompasses 
all that Cadmus might be offering with his garland. Pentheus’ retort also reinforces the 
sense of physicality in this scene, as he tells the old man not to “wipe off” 
[“!E&µ6%EC”] his folly on him (344). While the old men might be ridiculous, as they 
attempt to dance around in bacchant regalia, Pentheus’ refusal to be infected by any of 
Cadmus’ “folly” becomes an early step in his downfall: as the culmination of verbal 
arguments in favor of the god, the offer of assisting contact from a relative and elder 
provides an opening for Pentheus to relent, to reconsider the situation. His rejection of 
the physicality is a theatrically emphatic representation of his rejection of Dionysus, 
and it becomes the first in a sequence of significant moments of contact (or here, 
rejection of contact) that reflect his relationship with the god. 
Pentheus’ rejection of contact from a concerned relative suggests that all is not 
well. When he actually faces the captured stranger, whom he believes to be 
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responsible for “bringing a disease”80 upon the women of the city, Pentheus’ curiosity 
grows into anger, as the man refuses to give clear answers to his questions, and his 
fury culminates in contact. At the stranger’s entrance, Pentheus had ordered the 
attendant to release his hands from their bonds (451), but at the climax of his 
frustration, he approaches the disguised god with a most impious contact: 
{N).} /%#$&' µ;' Q?%0' ?6($%32&' $)µ# ("!)'. 
{4+.} B)%0. R /-60#µ&.· $2 !)2 =’ #*$0' $%",1. 
495 {N).} ,/)+$# !>%(&' $6'=) /#%*=&. !0 2)%&$'. 
{4+.} #*$6. µ’ ',#+%&"· $6'=) 4+&'>(> ,&%#. (493-496) 
[Pentheus: First, I will cut your delicate/pretty curl. 
Dionysus: The lock is sacred: I grow it for the god. 
Pentheus: Next, give over the thyrsus from your hands. 
Dionysus: Take it from me yourself: I carry it for Dionysus.]  
Does Pentheus actually cut Dionysus’ hair and physically take away his 
thyrsus? Such an action would certainly be highly intrusive and violent as behavior 
towards a god, and Oliver Taplin has argued it would be too blasphemous to be 
enacted physically: “It has been suggested that Pentheus actually cut the stranger’s 
hair and took away his thyrsus. But such a crudely blasphemous action would surely 
be given more explicit commentary in the words: rather, the impression is reinforced 
that the acceptance or rejection of the god can be made through these material 
emblems” (Taplin (1978) 98). If material emblems do serve as avenues for accepting 
                                                
80
 “P. !(,"%)+ '6(&' / 0#+'+' B3'#+E/ 0#/ -"2: -3µ#5')$#+” […who brings a new 
disease upon the women and defiles/outrages their marriages] (353-354) 
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or rejecting a god, though, why should that avenue remain a symbolic, unfulfilled one 
in this moment? 
 It is possible that Pentheus’ impiety here is restricted to his verbal threats, but 
the physical fulfillment of his words would better prepare for the severity of his 
punishment. Furthermore, the language suggests that he does carry out his threats: he 
begins with a future-tense statement (“$)µ#,” “I will cut,” 493), which would be 
equally appropriate for either a threat or a prelude to the action itself, but his next 
statement implies that he has already accomplished the first action. He begins with 
“,/)+$#,” meaning “then,” “next,” or “afterward,” and follows it with a command, the 
imperative “/#%*=&.”81 (“give over,” 495). If this second threat involved another first-
person, future-tense, indicative verb stating what Pentheus intends to do, these two 
threats would be parallel and might suggest that he has not, and perhaps will not, carry 
them out. The imperative “/#%*=&.,” however, has an immediacy to its command that 
suggests that the pre-conditions to “,/)+$#” [next] have been met: the line makes the 
most sense theatrically if Pentheus has indeed cut a lock of the stranger’s hair by this 
point. It would also make sense for him to strip his prisoner of his thyrsus, which 
Pentheus might, after all, consider a weapon, before sending him off to be locked in 
the dark. Taplin might wish for “more explicit commentary in the words,” but lack of 
further commentary in the text certainly does not prove that the action does not occur, 
and the physical realization of the contact in performance might even make such 
verbal elaboration unnecessary. 
                                                
81
 The aspect is aorist. 
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 If the contact that Pentheus describes does happen here, its significance should 
be obvious: given the rarity of physical contact and particularly the enormous impiety 
of touching a god in such a way, this contact should bring a strong sense of 
foreboding. The contact itself is likely through props. Pentheus’ taking of the thyrsus 
is clearly an example of a contact-point prop, as he need not touch the stranger directly 
at all, yet they would be briefly connected through the thyrsus itself. If he does indeed 
cut a lock of hair, this contact could be understood either as direct contact, in the sense 
that he touches the other’s hair, or as contact through an object, in the sense that he 
might touch only the lock of hair itself, which, furthermore, would be part of an 
actor’s wig. 
 The trend of significant contact culminates in Dionysus’ return of the invasive, 
violent contact as he dresses Pentheus to spy on the bacchants. Pentheus has rejected 
positive, assisting contact from an ally, then imposed negative, violent, even 
blasphemous contact on the divinity that he does not recognize as such. In the dressing 
scene, Dionysus’ contact with Pentheus makes clear that the latter is now under the 
god’s control. Dionysus points out a curl that has come loose from Pentheus’ 
headdress (928-29), then proposes to fix it: 
{4+.} '--’ #*$0' 5µ)$., &8. () !)%#/)>)+' µ"-)+, 
 /*-+' 0#$#($)-&"µ)'· '--’ =%!&3 0*%#. 
{N).} .=&>, (S 06(µ)+· (&/ B&% ''#0)5µ)(!# =9. (932-934) 
[Dionysus: Then, since it is my care/job to serve you, I will put it back 
in order. But hold your head straight! 
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Pentheus: There, you dress/adorn me (06(µ)+, imperative): for indeed I 
am given over to you.] 
Dionysus has conquered Pentheus to the point that the latter willingly accepts contact 
that almost mirrors the violence he previously inflicted on a prisoner. Contact again 
comes through a lock of hair and, here, possibly other clothing articles as well.82 This 
moment is the culmination of a series of ominous scenes of contact. To this point, 
Pentheus has only inflicted contact on others, and his grateful acceptance of another’s 
offered contact now shows that he has lost the agency and control of his own body that 
he was previously so careful to guard.  
The gruesome physicality of Pentheus’ final punishment, his offstage 
dismemberment, followed by the onstage presentation of his body parts and his 
mother’s triumphant waving of his head impaled on her thyrsus, appropriately fulfills 
the theatrical emphasis on contact and physicality that runs through several of 
Pentheus’ most significant scenes of confrontation. The thyrsus connects Agave to the 
head of her beloved son just as locks of hair and thyrsoi have formerly connected 
Pentheus to Dionysus or Cadmus. Bacchae is a complex play, and its power and 
meaning cannot be limited to any one explanation, but these various moments of 
contact are particularly climactic and create a sequence that should increasingly focus 
audience attention on such moments. Furthermore, if contact through a prop is a 
recognizable convention or trend in Greek tragedy, these moments in Bacchae should 
                                                
82
 Dionysus presumably touches, or at least mimes touching, both the lock of hair and 
some kind of headpiece here. He also points out other problems with Pentheus’ 
costume and provides some advice in response to questions, but the text does not 
indicate any other clear moments in which he adjusts Pentheus’ clothing or props. See 
lines 935-944. 
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be especially salient for an audience that would likely expect contact to suggest 
positive feelings or outcomes. On the specific level of theatricality and stagecraft, 
contact, either direct or prop-mediated, thus becomes one important thread of the 
play’s movement and meaning. 
While props may serve a number of different functions in the theater, the use 
of a prop to forge a point of contact between actor/characters is a valuable case study 
for the potential power of a prop in performance. As a final example of a contact-point 
prop, I would like to introduce briefly a phenomenon that I will explore more deeply 
in Chapter 4, “The Touch of the Spectator: Perception as a Point of Contact”: a prop 
that covers an actor/character, most often the face. Many examples of covering or 
uncovering involve contact between actor/characters through the medium of a prop, as 
one character covers or uncovers the other. In some cases the covered or uncovered 
person may actually be a corpse, and thus probably a dummy, but in others, the 
character is alive and played by a speaking actor.  
Moments of covering or uncovering should bring the emotion and poignancy 
that seem to accompany most contact-prop scenes, and in this subcategory, that 
emotion might be particularly high, as the covered or uncovered character is in a 
particularly low or pathetic state. When Theseus covers his son’s face, the mangled 
Hippolytus is dying (1457-1458).83 This moment might particularly resonate with an 
                                                
83 Hippolytus asks his father to cover his face with his clothes: “0)0#%$"%:$#+ $-µ’· 
=-1-# B*%, /*$)%. / 0%>C&' =" µ&3 /%6(1/&' 1. $*2&. /"/-&+.” (1457-1458). [My 
enduring is finished, for I am lost, father. But cover my face with my garments with all 
speed!]. The text does not specifically indicate that Theseus then does so, but the 
dramatic logic of the scene would certainly demand such. He probably covers his son 
before or during his next (and final) speech of lament (1459-1461). 
107 
audience, as it should invoke early moments in the play in which the wretched Phaedra 
first calls for her servants to remove her headdress or veil, then desperately asks her 
Nurse to cover her head again (201-202, 243-245, 250). The second moment, in which 
the Nurse recovers Phaedra, involves contact through the veil84 that precedes the direct 
contact of the Nurse’s later supplication of her mistress, a sequence that we have also 
seen with other contact-point props, such as Philoctetes’ bow. We scholars may argue 
over whether either Hippolytus or Phaedra is a sympathetic character and to what 
degree, but in the theater, these moments of covering and uncovering, of a caring 
servant or father coming into contact with a weakened, suffering character through the 
medium of a garment, should surely heighten emotion and concern. In a simple, 
practical sense, the function of props such as these is to cover or uncover an 
actor/character; in a dramatic or theatrical sense, however, their function may 
sometimes be the same as that of a contact-point prop. 
 
Summary: Types and Functions of Props 
We have seen that props in extant Greek tragedy are relatively rare, with most 
plays involving just a few necessary objects, and that these objects may be classified 
by what they are or by what they do. The most common types of items include 
significant pieces of clothing that actors manipulate, weapons, and objects related to 
ritual or with religious significance. An examination of the functions of props may tell 
us more about the role and importance of props in tragedy: they most often aid in 
                                                
84 The Nurse does comply with Phaedra’s request for her to cover her head or face, as 
she begins her next speech with “0%>/$1” [I cover it] (250). 
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identifying characters or revealing something about their circumstances, but they may 
also be the primary stimuli for creating particular kinds of scenes, such as recognition 
scenes, confrontations, scenes of deception, rituals, or moments of contact between 
actor/characters. 
A prop can provide a material focal point for the audience, accruing a variety 
of associations and meanings with a complexity that can reach beyond that of a simple 
icon or familiar, predetermined symbol. Further, a prop’s relationship with a live actor 
lends it an active theatrical life, with the actor’s contact and manipulation allowing it 
to move and interact with the action in ways that remain unavailable to other articles 
of stagecraft, such as an inert backdrop or a robe that never acquires meaning or 
function beyond its simple “robeness.” To return, then, to a possibility proposed in my 
earlier definition of “prop,” are these unique properties and functions of props 
dependent on the presence of a visible, material prop on the stage, or can they 
sometimes be fulfilled by a prop that remains physically absent or simply invisible to 
the audience? 
 
Unseen Props: From Trinkets to Dragon-Chariots 
The least contentious example of an unseen but theatrically real prop would be 
an object that the action and logic of the play demand but that would be too small for 
an audience to see. In the context of the ancient Greek stage, such a phenomenon may 
have been common, as many handheld objects in a large acting space before a large 
audience would surely have remained unseen, or at least indistinct, to a large portion 
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of that audience.85 Extant tragedy provides several probable examples. In Sophocles’ 
Electra, Orestes presents his father’s seal to Electra to prove his true identity: “$9'=) 
/%&(?-"C#(* µ&3 / (,%#B$=# /#$%0. ,0µ#!’ ). (#,9 -"B1” [Look upon this seal of 
my father and learn if I speak clearly!] (1222-1223). This token serves its purpose and 
stimulates Electra’s recognition of her brother, but the action quickly moves on to 
their joyous reunion, with no further description of or emphasis on the seal itself. As a 
very small, handheld prop, the seal might well have been too small for the audience to 
see, and in this case, the object indeed might not even be missed. It fills a simple 
function, and while the characters’ words demand that the spectators understand 
Orestes to be presenting a seal, the text does not elevate the seal to any special 
significance in its own right, and there is no lengthy description to draw the gaze and 
sustained interest of the audience. Perhaps the actor did have a small prop in his hand, 
but all that is required for the scene is that the audience understand or imagine that the 
character has a seal. 
Euripides’ Ion provides a more complex example of a possible unseen prop. 
After she becomes convinced that Ion is her husband’s illegitimate son and will now 
cut off the line of Erechtheus, Creusa presents a small golden vial (“2%>(1µ’ T!*'#. 
$6=),” 1030) containing one drop of the Gorgon’s blood to her faithful old 
Paidagogus, with instructions to pour the poison secretly into Ion’s wine. The deictic 
                                                
85 While the exact sizes of the theater and audience in the fifth century remain unclear, 
scholars have developed some reasonable estimates. Jean-Charles Moretti, in his 
synthesis of archeological evidence for the Theatre of Dionysus, estimates that the 
theater held 10,000-15,000 spectators, given an estimate of 0.40 meters per seat, and 
that the orchestra was approximately 30 meters wide (395, 397). For further discussion 
of the physical space, see the section “!"#$%&': The Physical Space” in my 
Introduction, pages 28-36. 
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$6=) suggests that there is indeed a vial, and theatrical logic might also suggest its 
presence, as the object is very important, and Creusa has taken pains to describe its 
history and appearance (987-1038). Nevertheless, Creusa’s description has also made 
it clear that this vial must be tiny: she has two vials, each containing only one drop of 
blood (1003, 1017), and she carries them on her wrist, perhaps as something like a 
charm bracelet (1009). The passing of this vial from Creusa to the old man seals their 
partnership and their specific plan against Ion, and in performance, the magical object 
could be, just for a moment, as much a powerful thea, an object of the audience’s 
gaze, as Philoctetes’ bow.  
The extensive discussion of Creusa’s vial should stimulate a spectatorial desire 
to see it, yet it remains improbable that spectators in the large Greek theater could 
have seen a tiny vial possibly the size of the actor’s fingertip. Thus a few possibilities 
present themselves: the actors could have a prop much larger than the tiny size they 
describe, abstracted for the purpose of being visible to the audience; there might be a 
prop that is indeed reasonably realistic in size for the vial, and most, possibly all, of 
the spectators simply would not be able to see it; or the actors might mime an 
appropriate object, and the spectators would imaginatively fill in the special golden 
vial. In each case, the spectators’ desire to see the mysterious vial is thwarted to some 
degree, and they must compensate for some lack in the representation. If there is a 
large object substituting for what the dramatic logic and rhetorical description demand 
be a tiny one, the spectators must imaginatively transform that abstract substitute into 
the little vial. If there is a realistically small object or no object at all, the spectators 
must imaginatively create the vial from the descriptions in the language.  
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The example of the golden vial of Gorgon’s blood shows that in at least one 
case in extant tragedy, a play demands an object whose material representation on the 
stage must fall short of the significance and identity of the dramatic object. On the one 
hand, it is important that the spectators understand the object as materially present, 
capable of movement, and possessing other qualities inherent to stage properties; on 
the other hand, exactly what it is that stands in for the object demanded by the play is 
less important than the spectators’ willing imaginations and the language that allows 
them to create that necessary object imaginatively. The language of the play is vital to 
the understanding of what this object is, and yet the theatrical role of the object 
extends beyond its linguistic invocation, as the object must be understood as material 
and capable of manipulation by actors, whether or not it is so. I would like to term 
such a theatrical phenomenon a “rhetoricized prop.” 
 In his phenomenological study of the theater, Bert States proposes that 
language, setting, actors, and objects come together influence each other in the 
creation of a theatrical world. As he explains, “the scene ‘permeates’ the speech and 
the speech illuminates the setting” (52). To some extent, he argues, language in the 
theater can work similarly to a literary image, with each word adding more detail and 
meaning,86 but ultimately the theater is a more complex medium, with “a combination 
of literary, pictorial, and even musical images constantly interpenetrating each other” 
(53). Thus language not only builds up images through accretion of details, but it also 
                                                
86 For his understanding of the way a literary image works, States quotes Rudolph 
Arnheim, Visual Thinking (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 1969), pp. 
249-50: “….A successful literary image grows through what one might call accretion 
by amendment. Each word, each statement, is amended by the next into something 
closer to the intended total meaning….” (qtd. States 53). 
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“amends the pictorial image of the setting” (53). That is, language in the theater can 
transform a single basic setting from Agamemnon’s palace to the Greek camp at Troy 
to Apollo’s Temple at Delphi: “Even if nothing has changed scenographically, the 
play appropriates the stage as part of its qualitative world as established by its poetry” 
(53). 
States focuses his discussion of what he terms “the powers of rhetorical 
scenery” on Shakespeare’s theater, in which the language often creates impossible 
scenery and action, such as the cliffs of Dover or a great battle scene (54, ff.). I will 
return to this concept of “rhetorical scenery” in the next chapter, for a consideration of 
Greek tragedy’s “unstageable” actions, but to begin with a simpler model, I would like 
to apply this idea to the possibility of absent, unseen, or very abstract props on the 
stage. I have proposed the term “rhetoricized props” for these phenomena, and I define 
a “rhetoricized prop” as: a stage property that is created by the language of the play, 
dramatic logic and context, movement of the actors, and imaginations of the 
spectators but that is not represented by a physical object on stage; or, such a prop 
that is represented by an object that is either too small for the spectators to see or too 
abstract to represent the prop with any realism, as compared to the linguistic and 
contextual stipulations of the prop’s identity and appearance. As my choice of the 
word “rhetoricized” suggests, the language of the play is particularly important in this 
creation, yet it is insufficient on its own. In fact, this preferring of language is due in 
large part simply to the primary evidence we have in the case of the Greek theater, the 
texts of the plays. Without enactment by live actors and the willing cooperation of the 
audience, language cannot take such a prop beyond a literary image or a simple 
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concept, so while the evidence for particular examples may reside primarily in the 
language that survives, each example remains a complex interaction of several 
theatrical forces. 
Orestes’ seal and Creusa’s vial provide a natural starting point for the 
rhetoricized prop: each item must be dramatically real, in that it serves a specific 
function in the narrative of the play and the onstage action, yet each likely remains 
unseen, or at least very unclear, for the majority of the audience. The characters’ 
words and the dramatic situation give the spectators the information they need to 
imagine the object that exists in the world of the play. Locks of hair, often presented in 
tragedy as offerings to honor dead loved ones, may also function in this way, and there 
may be other items whose size likely relegates them to this prop-type. Such small 
objects are also relatively easy to mime, and from a practical perspective, it may be 
easier for actors to mime them than to handle real objects that always present the 
possibility of breaking, being dropped, or otherwise malfunctioning. 
 Very small props on the Greek stage, then, were most likely unseen, regardless 
of whether they were physically present. Why else might a prop remain absent or 
unseen? In what kinds of situations might a very abstract object stand in for a more 
specific prop? As usual, our evidence is very limited, and we cannot know what the 
Greeks might have done in any particular instance, but the surviving texts do yield 
some clues. To return briefly to Creusa’s vial, this prop is characterized not only by its 
small size but also by its significance and the degree of attention that the characters 
give it. Creusa relates in detail the history and supernatural origins of this special vial 
and its deadly poison: Athena gave the two vials to the infant Erichthonius, Creusa’s 
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ancestor, hanging them on gold chains. Each contained a drop of the Gorgon’s blood: 
one drop dripped from the “hollow vein” (“0&5-:.…,-)?0.,” 1011) when the Gorgon 
was slaughtered, and this has healing powers, while the other drop came from the 
serpents and is deadly. Creusa and the old man spend about fifty lines tracing the 
history of the vial, marveling at its properties, and explaining its role in their plan. 
Such sustained attention and descriptive detail serve not only to stimulate spectators’ 
interest in the object, but also to provide raw materials they need for imagining the 
special, supernatural vial they cannot see, and thus an important characteristic of this 
prop is its treatment in the language of the play. 
 The degree and type of a prop’s description and emphasis in the language of 
the play may thus be a clue towards whether it needs to be represented physically, 
visibly, and/or realistically on the stage. Euripides’ Hippolytus provides an example of 
a prop that exists almost exclusively on the level of language: a highly rhetoricized, 
speaking prop that may not necessarily be represented by a physical object. When 
Theseus looks upon his wife’s dead body, he laments her death and calls out for 
someone to tell him what has happened.
87
 He then sees a tablet and grants it the 
agency to show him information: 
,# ,#· 
$5 =9 /&!’ M=) ="-$&. !0 ,5-:. 2)%0. 
:%$:µ"':; !"-)+ $+ (:µ9'#+ '"&';  
…. 
                                                
87 See especially lines 840-843: Theseus wants to hear (“0->1”) the story and wants 
someone to tell (“)?/&+”) him what happened. 
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,"%’ !E)-5E#. /)%+?&-&. (,%#B+(µ*$1' 
 ?=1 $5 -"E#+ ="-$&. M=) µ&+ !"-)+. (856-857, 864-865) 
[Oh, oh! What is this, this tablet hanging from her dear hand? Does it 
wish to show me something new? …. Come, unfolding the coverings of 
the seals, may I see what this tablet wishes to say to me.] 
Before he reads it, Theseus represents this tablet as a combination of visual and 
aural qualities: he looks at it and wonders if it will show (“(:µ9'#+”) him something, 
but he also imagines it as speaking to him (“-"E#+”). As the Chorus laments the 
impending disaster, Theseus reads the tablet, and at the Chorus’ request to hear what it 
says, he exclaims: 
?&U ?&U ="-$&. --#($#. /U ,>B1 
?*%&. 0#0#'; '/0 B&% V-6µ)'&. &?2&µ#+, 
&8&' &8&' )A=&' µ"-&. !' B%#,#$. 
,!)BB6µ)'&' $-*µ1'. (877-880) 
[The tablet cries out, it cries out inconsolable things! To where can I 
flee from the weight of the evils? For I go destroyed, such, such is the 
crying out of song that I, wretched, have seen in the writings!] 
After reading the tablet, Theseus focuses on the aural in his expression of what the 
tablet is doing. It shouts forth (“?&U”), and its writings show him a crying out or 
utterance (“,!)BB6µ)'&'”) of a song (“µ"-&.”). Theseus declares that he will not hold 
back the destructive evil (“V-W0' 0#06',” 884) within his mouth any longer, and he 
then publicly curses Hippolytus, calling on Poseidon to honor his promise to fulfill 
three curses with death. 
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 The tablet itself and the scene as a whole are characterized by the power of 
words: the tablet is a physical incarnation of Phaedra’s voice, and its writing cries out 
its message; Theseus responds to the shouting note by making a loud, public curse, 
and by his speaking it, his son will die.
88
 On the one hand, Theseus can look at the 
golden seal (862), open the folds of the note (864), and read its writings; on the other 
hand, the importance of the tablet is in what it speaks forth, and Theseus’ response to 
it is likewise verbal. The tablet, then, may be an example of a rhetoricized prop. There 
could be a physical object on the stage for Theseus to manipulate, and as a writing 
tablet, that object might or might not be large enough for most of the audience to see. 
The theatrical function of that prop, however, may be filled just as well by the actor’s 
miming of a small tablet: the object’s significance is in what it says, and the audience 
must rely upon Theseus’ words for that information. Further, Theseus’ description of 
the gold seal and the foldings of the tablet may also provide the necessary information 
for the spectators to fill in imaginatively the visual and physical elements of the object. 
 Given that this prop could easily be played either by a physical tablet (or 
tablet-like object) or by an actor’s words and gestures, what might be the significance 
of the latter option? The original performance might or might not have employed a 
physical prop, but the play itself may actually be best enhanced and supported by a 
lack of a physical, visible object here. Within the scene itself, Theseus’ emphasis on 
the verbal nature of the tablet rhetoricizes that prop, and a mimed object would further 
                                                
88 In J. L. Austin’s framework of the performative utterance, Theseus’ curse would be 
an interesting example of a powerful, “happy” performative. His words ensure 
Hippolytus’ death, yet the curse also relies on a promise (a typical form of 
performative language) by Poseidon for its fulfillment. 
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heighten the sense that the object’s significance is in its words, which, further, 
prepares for the absolute power of the words of Theseus’ ensuing curse. Moreover, 
Artemis’ announcement to Theseus of his disastrous mistake at the end of the play 
emphasizes a distinction between things seen and things unseen, continuing the play’s 
interest in the power of words and the nature of knowledge.  
After the messenger graphically recounts Hippolytus’ death, Artemis appears 
and confronts Theseus, asking him why he rejoices that he has killed his son: 
O:()", $5 $*-#. $&$(=) (3'9=C, 
/#$=’ &*2 R(51. (0' '/&0$)5'#. 
C)3="(+ µ>!&+. '-62&3 /)+(!)/. 
',#'9; ,#')%&' =’ ,(2)!). -$:'. (1286-1289) 
[Theseus, why do you, wretched one, rejoice at these things, having 
killed your son in a way not divinely sanctioned, being persuaded of 
unseen things by the false words of your wife? But clearly seen is the 
destruction you have taken.] 
Artemis’ revelation of the truth of what Theseus has done clearly contrasts the unseen 
with the seen through her opposition of “',#'9” and “,#')%&',” the words’ 
placement next to each other further heightening the contrast (1289). Indeed, 
Hippolytus’ mangled body will soon be brought onto the stage for Theseus and the 
audience to look upon, emphasizing the “seen destruction” that Phaedra’s and 
Theseus’ words have wrought. This opposition of seen and unseen would be further 
heightened, particularly on a metatheatrical level, if the tablet itself were to remain 
unseen for the audience. If the Greek stage sometimes employed physical, visible 
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props and sometimes unseen or absent ones, Euripides could be playing with that 
theatrical convention throughout Hippolytus, thus adding a specific level of reference 
to his investigation into the power of words, the relation between the visual and the 
aural, and the sources and nature of knowledge. 
 Euripides’ Hippolytus is a fertile case study for the absent or unseen 
rhetoricized prop because it provides a glimpse into the possible payoff for such a 
theatrical technique. The particular treatment of Phaedra’s tablet through Theseus’ 
rhetorical invocation of it with imagery of crying out may even hearken back to one of 
the most notorious props on the Greek stage: the ornate purple fabric in Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon. 
  Agamemnon’s trampling of the expensive, ornate fabric as he enters his palace 
is a climactic moment in the tragedy, and it is tempting to imagine its appearance and 
symbolic value in elaborate detail, as some critics have done. Despite its strong 
appeal, however, I would contend that this prop is not actually very important in its 
physical, visible qualities. At the end of her speech of welcome, Clytemnestra orders 
her servants to spread out fabrics (“/)$*(µ#(+',” 909) on the ground for 
Agamemnon’s path to the door. Through the scene, it becomes clear that this fabric is 
very ornate and luxurious, though translators disagree on the exact definitions of the 
words that describe it. It seems to be richly embroidered, and the dominant color is 
likely purple (“Q-&3%B"(+',” 946 and “/&%,>%#.,” 957). The physical role of the 
fabric simply involves its being spread out by the servants, at Clytemnestra’s 
command. There is no indication in the text that Clytemnestra holds it out, or asks the 
servants to do so, for all to examine. 
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The fabric’s significance to the scene suggests that there was probably a 
physical object on the stage, but, as I have explained in an earlier article involving the 
differences between tragic and comic props, “that object is so laden with detail and 
symbolic value through the play’s language that it takes on a much more complex 
meaning than an ordinary garment or carpet, even a sumptuous one” (24).
89
 
Clytemnestra and Agamemnon sustain their argument about this fabric for about fifty 
lines (904-950), and their descriptions and arguments build up the precise significance 
of that fabric, both in its expensive luxury and in the potential meaning of walking on 
it. Further, just as Theseus describes Phaedra’s note as crying out, Agamemnon uses 
imagery of speech or crying out to describe the inappropriate nature of walking on 
such ornate fabric: “21%/. /&=&C9($%1' $) 0#/ $#' /&+05-1' / 0-:=I' 'P$)$” [The 
cry (or “appellation” or “omen”) of “foot-wipers” and of “intricate” (or “multi-
colored” or possibly “embroidered”) shouts in different directions] (926-927).
90
 
Language is thus central to the shaping of this object, and in a sense, the idea of the 
object becomes more important than the object itself. 
In this case, then, the prop is rhetoricized in that the language about it is 
necessary to create its specificity of meaning and appearance and in the sense that the 
object itself is imagined as speaking. Nevertheless, the context of the play does call for 
some kind of physical object to play this role. Although the text does not demand that 
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 See Powers, “Helen’s Theatrical Mêchanê: Props and Costumes in Euripides’ 
Helen.” I discuss the purple cloth in Agamemnon as a point of contrast to the very 
physical, earthy, mundane props typical of Old Comedy. 
90 In his Loeb edition, Alan H. Sommerstein provides two further ways of rendering 
the imagery. He translates: “It is cryingly obvious that the words ‘embroidered’ and 
‘doormat’ don’t go well together.” He adds a more literal translation in a footnote: 
“the appellation of ‘foot-wipers’ and ‘embroidered’ cries out divergently.” 
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Clytemnestra unroll and display the fabric, the scene would certainly make more sense 
if the servants do have something to stretch out on the ground and if Agamemnon does 
indeed walk on it. This, then, may be a good example of a rhetoricized prop based on 
an abstract object on the stage. The physical fabric manipulated by the actors need not 
be as expensive and intricately woven and dyed as the fabric that Clytemnestra and 
Agamemnon imply, but their words can fill in any lack of detail in the appearance of 
the physical object, and the theatrical reality of what may look, on the surface, like a 
much simpler roll of cloth, can become the extremely luxurious weaving that the play 
demands. The rhetorical aspect of the prop supports and specifies the physical object, 
and if the object itself is simple and abstract to the point that it could not possibly 
reach up to the quality that the language requires, the spectators’ imaginations are 
freer to substitute the most costly and ornate fabric they can imagine. 
The possibility for an abstract object, that is, an object that is only a schematic 
representation of the object that it represents, to stand in for a prop that rhetoricization 
and spectators’ imaginations make complete should be particularly valuable if the prop 
is in some way unstageable. The rich fabric in Agamemnon could be such an 
unstageable prop to some degree, in that the unique luxury of the prop implied by the 
text probably could not be represented precisely on the stage. Euripides’ Medea, 
however, provides a much stronger example with the chariot with which Medea makes 
her escape. 
Medea’s chariot is a popular object of speculation and wild imagination, 
among both ancient Greek artists and modern scholars. It is possibly the most 
dominant visual image on stage at the end of the play, and its renderings in vase 
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painting suggest that it was indeed a popular object in the Greek imagination.
91
 The 
vase paintings themselves cannot be used as evidence for what the chariot in the 
production of Euripides’ play might have looked like, but they do reflect an interest, 
possibly inspired as much by myth as by any theatrical performance, in this 
supernatural object. 
Euripides’ text actually gives very little information about this chariot. There is 
only one direct reference to it in the text, as Medea enters and responds to Jason’s 
cries for her punishment: 
… ). =’ !µ&" 2%)5#' ,2)+., 
-"B’ )? $+ ?&>-C, 2)+%/ =’ &* C#>()+. /&$"· 
$&+6'=’ =2:µ# /#$%0. X-+&. /#$+% 
=5=1(+' 5µ$', ,%3µ# /&-)µ5#. 2)%6.. (1319-1322) 
[If you have a need/favor of me, say it if you wish, but you will never 
touch me with your hand; such is the chariot [=2:µ#] that my father’s 
father Helios has given to me, a bulwark against a hostile hand.] 
Medea does not describe her chariot with the lavish detail that tradition might suggest, 
and indeed, we might expect more detail in the language to make it a rhetoricized 
prop. Medea’s words indicate clearly only a few significant facts: she is in a chariot 
with her sons’ bodies; her grandfather Helios, the sun god, provided her with that 
chariot; and, based on her own assertion and the context, she is definitively out of 
                                                
91 See, for example, the Lucanian hydria attributed to the Policoro Painter (Policoro, 
Museo Nazionale della Siritide 35296) and the Lucanian calyx-krater possibly by the 
same painter (Cleveland Museum of Art 1991.1), both of c. 400 BC. See Taplin, Pots 
and Plays for full-color images of these vases, along with discussions of them in 
relation to Euripides’ Medea (117-123).  
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Jason’s reach. The context also suggests that the chariot can fly, and if this is the 
chariot that Helios would normally use to pull the sun through the sky, mythological 
tradition would suggest that it is drawn by horses.
92
  
 The tradition that dragons pull Medea’s chariot may come from vase painting, 
but the scholia also support this idea. In his study of Medea’s final appearance, 
Maurice P. Cunningham summarizes such evidence: “One scholium (VB ad 1317) 
states that Medea speaks standing aloft, or, according to a variant reading (B), 
standing upon a tower. The second scholium (B ad 1320) repeats the substance of the 
first in a somewhat fuller form: Medea appears aloft in a car drawn by dragons or 
snakes and carrying off the children. The hypothesis makes the snakes winged” (152). 
As Cunningham acknowledges, these statements may depend upon later traditions, 
and further, I would add that they may also reflect the visual traditions of the scene in 
vase painting. 
Practical considerations render an elaborate, spectacular staging of a flying 
dragon-drawn chariot unlikely, if not impossible. It is unclear whether the mêchanê 
(crane) had even been developed by the time of Medea’s first staging in 431 BC, and 
indeed, this stage machinery was probably never capable of lifting and flying around 
an elaborate chariot with an actor, two dummies, and some kind of dragons or 
snakes.
93
 The first scholium that Cunningham cites may give the most accurate 
description of the basic, physical staging of Medea at the end of the play: she stands 
                                                
92 See, for example, Homeric Hymn 31, to Helios (“O//&+,” line 15.) 
93 In a lecture at Cornell University, C. W. Marshall made this argument, showing that 
the laws of physics and the capabilities of Greek technology necessitate a much more 
conservative understanding of the mêchanê than has generally been assumed. 
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aloft, possibly on a tower. Medea could be standing on the skênê roof,
94
 possibly with 
some basic representation of a chariot around her, and this staging would lend her own 
reference to the chariot an explanatory function. Medea tells Jason that her chariot, 
from her grandfather Helios, will prevent him from ever touching her, and in doing so, 
she also tells the spectators, immediately upon her entrance, that they should 
understand her to be in such a chariot (“=2:µ#,” 1321). Whatever physical 
representation of a chariot that the stagecraft might entail, its theatrical reality 
becomes a supernatural, unreachable chariot through Medea’s rhetoricization of it, 
brief though it may be. Renowned for her sorcery, Medea performs her final conjuring 
act with the summoning of this theatrical device, not only on the stage but also in the 
minds of her spectators. 
We have very little evidence for the staging of Medea’s chariot in the fifth 
century, and we can never know exactly how the Greeks managed it. Nevertheless, I 
would contend that we have good reason to be conservative in our conjectures about 
the mechanics of the chariot, given the practical considerations of staging it and the 
great potential for language and gesture to stimulate spectators’ imaginations to create 
a detailed, powerful theatrical reality. Images of Medea’s escape in vase paintings may 
indeed show an elaborate, flying, dragon-drawn chariot, but vase painting 
conventionally does provide more detail than a play’s language suggests, and scholars 
are now generally agreed that we cannot use those paintings as evidence for actual 
                                                
94
 The theologeion, a high platform extending above the skênê roof, would also be a 
possibility, if such a structure existed at this time. 
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theatrical stagings.
95
 Why, then, should we jump to a spectacular, Hollywood-like 
concept of the staging of Medea’s final scene? A brief survey of scholarship on the 
ending of the play reveals a general, usually unspoken assumption that Medea’s 
chariot is indeed drawn by dragons,
96
 and yet the play’s own language provides no 
grounds at all for this understanding.
97
  
Our lack of evidence should nudge us toward a simpler understanding of the 
physical staging of the chariot, given the practical realities that support such a 
conjecture, but the nature of the theater still allows us to propose that the theatrical 
reality of Medea’s escape, that is, the details that the spectators imagine and 
understand to be true within the world of the play, may be much more elaborate. A 
flying chariot drawn by dragons or serpents (or horses, for that matter) and carrying a 
live actor and two dummies may indeed be “unstageable” in a realistic sense, but 
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 Taplin’s 2007 Pots and Plays is a recent effort to reexamine the connections 
between vase paintings and tragedy. In his introduction to the project, he points to this 
overriding scholarly trend towards “serious questioning of how art and literature 
relate, indeed whether they relate at all” (vi). Taplin’s study is a movement away from 
such a skeptical stance, but he nevertheless appreciates the distance between a staged 
performance and a later vase painting. 
96 See, for example: “Even with her dragon-drawn chariot…” (Cowherd, 135), “on her 
dragon-chariot” (Schlesinger, 89); “…the dragon chariot has obvious theatrical and 
figurative advantages” (Lawrence, 54); “Medea appears, literally out of his reach, in a 
flying chariot drawn by winged serpents” (Worthington, 502). Mastronarde, in his 
2002 commentary on Medea, is more careful in his consideration of the possibilities. 
After a discussion of various possibilities and sources, he concludes: “Thus it is 
possible that the prop used in 431 was already a serpent-chariot, but it is also possible 
that this was the iconographic choice of a subsequent production of the play in South 
Italy or of the vase-painters themselves” (378, note on 1317). 
97
 In his examination of vase paintings in relation to the play, Taplin comments that 
there is nothing in the text either to contradict or to corroborate a dragon-drawn 
chariot, but nevertheless, he suggests, “snakes are especially appropriate for the 
magical Medeia” (Pots and Plays 119). 
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through rhetoricization and the active participation of spectators, anything can indeed 
be stageable and become a theatrical reality. 
 
Conclusion 
There could be any number of reasons why a prop or another element of 
stagecraft might be rhetoricized. An object might be too small to be seen if represented 
realistically; it might have a very simple function that gesture and language could just 
as easily fulfill; the object demanded by the context might be so elaborate and 
outlandish as to be unstageable in any realistic way; an absent, rhetoricized prop might 
even enhance a thematic element of the play. While we can make only reasonable 
conjectures as to which specific props on the Greek tragic stage might have been 
rhetoricized, this convention has great potential for understanding how that theater 
might have worked. Rhetoricization of props or other elements demands an active, 
participatory audience, co-creating the larger experience of the play and its theatrical 
reality, along with the actors, the playwright’s words, and the stagecraft. Of course, 
any good theatrical experience involves some such collaboration, but it is the non-
naturalistic theater, such as Greek tragedy, that relies most heavily on such techniques.  
Some of the props identified in the catalogue in Appendix 8 must have been 
physically present on the stage. In particular, props that must do something physically 
on the stage must have been present, such as when a litter, bier, or similar object 
allows actors to carry a corpse. Likewise, significant costume pieces were probably 
present and visible because their function is often specifically to be a visual indicator 
of some aspect of the character’s role, as when garlands indicate priests or suppliants. 
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The concept of rhetoricization does not imply that the Greek tragic stage did not use 
props at all but merely that there must have been conventions to compensate for the 
practical realities of that theater. Further, once those conventions exist, playwrights 
can use them in a variety of ways, as Euripides may have done with the tablet in 
Hippolytus. In Greek tragedy, then, “props” are not limited to objects that were 
physically, visibly present on the stage, nor are they limited to objects that represent 
them with the detailed realism that we might expect in naturalistic theater.  A cast iron 
pot need not play a cast iron pot, to use Garner’s example.  
Acceptance of the concept of rhetoricization, in the case of absent, unseen, or 
abstract props, points toward a new way of reading the texts of Greek tragedy. From 
this theatrical perspective, we should approach linguistic features such as deixis and 
lengthy descriptions of objects neither as literary images, which work primarily on 
conceptual and symbolic levels through verbal accretion, nor as literal stage directions, 
which tell us exactly what should be on the stage. Rather, these passages may be 
understood as raw material for spectators’ imaginations, as information that interacts 
with the physical objects on the stage and live actors’ gestures to guide the spectators’ 
imaginative creation of the specific props invoked. The experience is complex and 
cooperative, happening in real time in the theater, and it will always elude complete 
capture by any scholar.  
Frustrating though it might be, an approach that accepts the importance of 
spectators’ cooperative creation and the rhetoricization of props may take us closer to 
understanding the Greeks’ theatrical experience. Further, an extension of the concept 
of rhetoricization to apply to stage action suggests even more strongly the potential 
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and far-reaching extent of this theatrical technique in Greek tragedy, as we will see in 
Chapter 3. Recreating the specific details of ancient stagecraft is ultimately as 
inadequate a venture as it is a futile one; seeking an understanding of the spectatorship 
of the Greek theater, however, may not yield much factual data about that theater, but 
it may lead to a fuller, more vibrant appreciation of the Greek theatrical experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STAGING THE UNSTAGEABLE: BATTLES, EARTHQUAKES, AND 
DESTRUCTION 
 
When it comes to the question of how Greek tragedies were staged, there are 
generally two extremes in critical approaches. One camp of critics insists that there 
must have been much spectacle that the text may or may not specifically indicate. 
These critics supply stage action when it seems to lag, imagine very large groups of 
extras for crowd scenes, and go to great lengths to find ways that the Greeks could 
have represented outlandish spectacles with relative realism. David Seale, for 
example, insists on scenes with very large crowds of non-speaking actors (mutes), and 
while he is right to criticize a reader’s easy assumption that only specifically indicated 
characters are on stage, his emphasis on crowd scenes and large-scale spectacle is too 
strong to be readily supported by surviving evidence (Seale 16-18). In a similar 
example, several scholars, most notably Wolfgang Schadewaldt, have supplied an 
elaborate series of actions in Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes, proposing that 
Eteocles puts on full armor while on stage at lines 677 ff.
98
 Prometheus Bound is 
particularly ripe for such theories of elaborate staging, with some early critics, notably 
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 Schadewaldt’s discussion of this scene appears in his Hellas und Hesperien, volume 
I, 367 ff. Oliver Taplin provides a succinct summary of Schadewaldt’s proposal in The 
Stagecraft of Aeschylus, pages 158-161. 
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Ulrich von Wilamowitz, suggesting that the Chorus and Prometheus somehow 
dropped down out of sight at the end of the play.
99
 
At the other extreme, mostly composed of earlier critics, the language is of far 
greater importance than staged spectacle, and difficult scenes are explained away as 
not being represented physically or visually onstage at all. The most polemic of these 
may be A.W. Verrall, a critic of the late nineteenth century who argued for an ironic 
interpretation of Euripidean tragedy. He suggested, as Ann Norris Michelini 
summarizes, “that large portions of dramatic reality could be consistently interpreted 
in a direction exactly opposite to that presented by the surface of the play” (Michelini 
13). Verrallian arguments rely on many, often far-fetched, assumptions, including a 
divided audience composed of a few sophisticated viewers who understand the play’s 
irony and a mass of vulgar spectators who mistake the surface reality for the true 
meaning and reality of the play. Ultimately, the theory that outlandish or unexpected 
action is happening only in the minds of deluded characters, while sometimes 
tempting in analyses of poetry or fiction, is wholly unsatisfying when considered from 
a theatrical perspective. The live theatrical event involves the cooperation of the 
playwright, actors, spectators, and more: if the play is meant to mislead all but a select 
few of the spectators, the value and overall effect of the performance would surely 
suffer. 
Both of these arguments stem from the problem posed by dramatic action 
found in extant tragedies that could not have been staged at all realistically, based on 
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 See Griffith’s discussion in his commentary on line 1080, pages 276-277, for a 
summary of the most prevalent theories about the staging of the cataclysm at the end 
of the play. 
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the capabilities of the Greek stage as we know them. One could understand the two 
extremes as essentially being a theatrical approach versus a literary approach, as I 
have already explained for critical approaches to props, though in this case the 
extreme versions of both seem unreasonable. However, these approaches are also a 
product of our own presuppositions about what theater is: action, spectacle, 
movement, sound effects, and realistic representation of action. We assume that 
language may be dramatic but not inherently theatrical.
100
 If we can nudge this 
understanding beyond an insistence on physical and visual spectacle, we can better 
appreciate the Greek theater’s own unique theatricality.  
If some props could be absent or unseen yet still theatrically real and viable, 
could not the same be true for outlandish spectacle and extreme action? Extending the 
theory of real but unseen props to include larger issues of stagecraft and spectacle 
allows us to understand how very outlandish scenes, elements of stagecraft, or actions 
may have been very theatrically real and effective on the Greek tragic stage, even if 
they were in some way “unstageable.” This approach emphasizes that language on the 
Greek stage can be inherently theatrical: when it creates a scene, event, or object, it 
does not collapse that phenomenon into a purely verbal or poetic phenomenon; it does 
not simply evoke an allusion, a mythical past, or an event from the play’s back-story. 
Rather, truly theatrical language can create action as it happens, and it allows the 
spectators to create a living, theatrical concept from that rhetorical base. Thus, by 
widening our scope from props to action and stagecraft more generally, we can begin 
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 Scholarship on performative language may be an exception to this general trend, 
though I would argue that this is a special case and demands a specialized knowledge 
base and critical approach.  
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to appreciate more fully the Greek theater’s cooperative imaginative project of 
creating theatrically real and powerful objects and actions through a combination of 
the theater’s stagecraft, actors’ gestures, playwrights’ words, and audiences’ 
imaginations, without insisting on either elaborate, realistic stagings or completely 
bare stages with only words to sustain the theater.  
For the critics of Greek tragedy, the “palace-miracle scene” of the Bacchae, as 
Simon Goldhill terms the choral song in which the Chorus describes the destruction of 
the palace, is possibly the most popular and most energetically contested example of 
unstageable action (Goldhill 274). In this scene, a chorus of female followers of 
Dionysus work themselves into a frenzy as they sing of extreme events that they see 
(or imagine?) taking place in and around the palace, including both natural and 
supernatural phenomena. Before turning to this challenging and highly debatable 
scene, however, I would like to examine a few scenes from earlier plays that involve 
similar challenges, beginning with an example that has attracted much less attention.  
 
Unstageable Action: The Approach of the Army in Seven against Thebes 
Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes features a Chorus of Theban Women who, in 
their entrance song, fearfully cry out with each new sight or sound that indicates the 
approach of the attacking army. They describe the sensory details of the attack as they 
experience them, make exclamations and cry to the gods for help, and ask what will 
become of them. I would like to suggest that in this passage, the Chorus creates for the 
audience the reality of the attack on the city as it progresses and invites the spectators 
to share in their emotion and panic, to some degree. 
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As the play opens, the city of Thebes is under siege by Polynices and the 
Argive army that his father in-law brings to support Polynices in his claim to the 
throne. Polynices and his brother Eteocles, both of whom have been cursed by their 
father Oedipus, had agreed to take turns ruling, but Eteocles had refused to yield 
power to his brother when his term expired, and Polynices is now attacking his 
homeland to insist on his right to return and rule. Eteocles begins the play with a 
speech to the citizens of Thebes, urging them to defend the city and pray to the gods 
for help, then sending them off to their stations. Next, one of the scouts Eteocles had 
sent to spy on the Argive army returns to make his report, and it is this scout’s speech 
that sets up and contrasts the entry song of the Chorus that will follow it. 
The report of the Scout (0#$*(0&/&.) is a single speech, without any dialogue 
with Eteocles in response to it, running about thirty lines (39-68).
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 As Oliver Taplin 
summarizes, “The Scout’s contribution is of the greatest simplicity. He has a single 
rhesis bounded by his entry and his exit…. Here the Scout’s function is to give 
Eteocles the strategic situation. He does this in large and vivid language which finely 
conveys the threat of the attackers. But it is not his part to respond to the news...” 
(Taplin (1977) 138-139). While the Scout does give some advice to Eteocles in the 
form of a warning to post his best men at the gates immediately, a small editorial 
contribution that Taplin seems to overlook, the majority of his report is a 
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 The full texts of the Scout’s speech and of the Chorus’ entry song are found at the 
end of this chapter, with both the Greek and my own English translation. The full 
passages are helpful to read in the context of my discussion, but for the sake of 
simplicity, I do not include them in the body of this chapter. 
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straightforward, past-tense messenger speech describing what the other army has been 
doing.  
He begins with the announcement that he brings “clear” truth or news of the 
army (“M01 (#,9 $'0)$!)' !0 ($%#$&" ,"%1',” 40) and, as a credential, identifies 
himself as an eyewitness of these matters (“#*$0. 0#$6/$:. =’ )?µ’ !BI $#' 
/%#Bµ*$1',” 41). He then describes the Argives’ sacrifice of a bull, their decoration of 
Adrastus’ chariot, their general attitude of steely, manly bravado (“(+=:%6,%1' B&% 
!3µ0. ''=%)53 ,-"B1' / ,/')+,” 52-53), and their drawing of lots for gate assignments. 
This first section of the speech, comprising most of his news, is dominated by verbs in 
past tenses (aorist and imperfect) and lacks comments on his own personal reactions to 
or interpretations of the events he saw, with the possible exception of his comment on 
their determined, steely spirit. This report is clear and businesslike, as Taplin’s 
summary suggests, and the Scout’s references to sensory perception focus on the 
visual. He himself is an eyewitness (“0#$6/$:.”), and he ends his speech with a 
promise to return to his post and “keep up a loyal daytime-scout eye” (“/+($0' 
5µ)%&(06/&' / V,!#-µ0' KE1,” 66-67). His only appeal to a different sense comes 
with a brief line that suggests both the sight and the sound of the attack, as he 
reinforces the immediacy of the threat to Eteocles: “for the dry-land wave/surge of the 
army shouts forth [?&U]” (64). This comment, coming near the end of his speech and 
just before his exit lines, actually looks forward to the Chorus’ very different speech to 
follow. 
Eteocles responds to the Scout’s report with a brief prayer for the city, then 
exits to make preparations for battle. The Chorus of Theban Women now enters at line 
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78 with cries of fear and exclamations of the enemy’s progress. Regardless of whether 
this is a typical entry danced by the group or a scattered entry, with individual 
members or small groups of the Chorus entering from various directions at different 
times, the emotion and style of this entrance song (parodos) stands in stark contrast to 
the clear, controlled report of the Scout.
102
 While both the Scout and the Chorus are 
performing a similar basic function inasmuch as they tell the audience what the enemy 
(which is almost certainly not represented physically on stage) has done or is doing, 
the styles and ultimate effects of their accounts are vastly different. The Scout reports 
what he has seen in the enemy camp methodically, in the order in which the events 
occurred, using conjunctions, adverbs, and participles to connect his thoughts and to 
indicate clearly how events unfolded.
103
 The Chorus, however, sings a jumbled, 
choppy song that skips quickly from one topic to another, without either progressing 
linearly through a sequence of events or building cleanly to a climax. Both the 
structure and the content of their speech create an entirely different theatrical 
experience from that of the Scout’s report, and their song invites spectators into a 
fundamentally different mode of spectatorship. 
To begin with technical elements, the verb forms, sentence structures, and 
meter of the choral song clearly distinguish it from the previous report. The difference 
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 The question of a scattered entry has been strongly debated. Taplin (1977, p. 141-
142) and Robert (Hermes 57) are among those who support a scattered, disorderly 
entry, while G.O. Hutchinson (p. 56-57) and others argue that there is no precedent for 
such or any need for it in order to convey the overall effect of panic. 
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 See, for example, “$#3%&(,#B&"'$).” [slaughtering a bull] and “!+BB*'&'$).” 
[touching] as examples of participles, which in this case are distinguished from the 
indicative verb “1%01µ6$:(#'” [they swore an oath] (43, 44, 46). Examples of 
conjunctions and adverbs include “B&%” [for/indeed], “=[)]” [but/and], and “Y=:” 
[already/now] (41, 51, 59). 
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in verb tense from the Scout’s report to the Chorus’ song is striking and very 
significant. While the Scout’s report could exist almost as a parenthetical or time-out 
from the action, consisting primarily of a recap of what has already happened and a 
warning of how to prepare for what is soon to come, the Chorus’ song is defined by its 
immediacy. They panic because they see and hear things happening now and wonder 
what they should do now. After an initial perfect indicative expressing that the army 
has set out from its camp (“µ)!)$Z[\” [it has been set loose], 79), most of the Chorus’ 
verbs here are in the present indicative, with a few imperatives and deliberative 
subjunctives.
104
 Various exclamations pepper the Chorus’ song, as the women cry out 
“.I .I,” “,)" ,)",” or “] ] ] ,” and, in more sustained exclamations, as they call out 
to the gods
105
 (87, 136, 150). Throughout their song, they also ask questions, 
wondering what the gods will do and what will become of their city.
106
 While the 
Scout has a clear sense of his duty and approaches the situation with enough 
practicality to suggest specific responses, the women of the Chorus are so at a loss that 
they have difficulty even deciding whether and how to pray to the gods for salvation, 
as their questions and deliberatives powerfully express.  
This combination of present-tense verbs, sharp exclamations, and questions 
creates a strong sense of immediacy, of action happening in this particular dramatic 
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 For variations from present indicative, see, for example, the imperative “'-)>(#$)” 
[keep away!] and the deliberative “/&$+/"(1” [should I fall?] (88, 95). 
105
 See, for example, “.^, µ*0#%). )%)=%&+” [O, blessed ones on your stately thrones!] 
and “@ /6$'+’ X%#” [O mistress Hera!] (97, 152). 
106
 For examples, see especially lines 93-94 (“Who then will save us, who then of the 
gods or goddesses will bring aid?”), 104-105 (“What will you do? Will you betray 
your own land, Ares, indigenous of old?”), and 156-157 (“What does my city suffer? 
What will happen to it? And what end does the god yet bring it?”). 
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moment. Their short, choppy sentences or phrase structures further convey their 
distress and inability to cope with the situation.
107
 While most of the Scout’s sentences 
are sustained over several lines, up to about seven lines at the longest (42-48), the 
Chorus rarely sustains a sentence over more than two lines, at least until line 162 when 
the women begin to regain control over their speech and emotions, and many of their 
sentence structures range from one line to a single word. Further, the entire song 
(again, until about line 162) is largely asyndetic, as the Chorus moves quickly from 
one distinct thought to another, without the fluid connections of conjunctions or other 
functionally similar forms.  
In keeping with their emotional state and this choppy, asyndetic structure, the 
Chorus sings predominantly in the docmiac meter, which, as G.O. Hutchinson 
explains, “expresses wild emotion” (57). Indeed, as Hutchinson continues, “its effect 
is particularly notable here, since Aeschylean choruses often entered with spoken 
anapests” (57). Eva Stehle has also noted that the first passage of the song is even 
more irregular, in that “Even docmiacs usually form strophic pairs in tragedy, but here 
the chorus’ initial song is not even strophic” (104).  Not only, then, does the meaning 
of their words express their terror, but also the very sound and rhythm of the song 
would create an overall impression of their disordered and overwhelming panic. They 
are, on one level, unable to offer a ritually correct prayer and, on another level, unable 
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 I realize that it is difficult to make specific claims about sentence length for Greek 
texts, which usually have no punctuation marks in their original texts. My point, 
though, is that in the choral song, the basic length of a complete thought or 
grammatical unit is shorter than usual. I will use the word “sentence” in this discussion 
for the sake of simplicity, but I understand it as a stand-in for the more nebulous sense 
of a grammatically and/or logically complete, independent clause or structure. 
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to perform a parodos as a chorus normally should.
108
 Collectively, these technical 
elements of the song, including verb forms, sentence structures and lengths, and meter 
create a sense of an emergency so great as to overthrow the usual structures of 
behavior, speech, and ritual. This choral song insists on the immediacy of the enemy’s 
attack, and the Chorus’ resulting fear, panic, and almost totally paralyzing aporia 
becomes a theatrically appropriate and meaningful response. 
The content of the Chorus’ song clearly contributes to the expression of their 
extreme emotion, and one particularly notable element of this content heightens the 
power of that emotion, both in its intensity and in its degree of communicability to the 
audience. While the Scout’s report is mostly a straightforward report of what he has 
seen, the Chorus’ song includes many appeals to sensory perception, as new sights and 
sounds continually assail the women and intensify their fear. Immediately following 
their first exclamation of their sufferings, the women vividly describe their perception 
of the enemy’s approach:  
The army, having left its camp, has been set loose;  
this huge horse throng gushes forth at a run;  
the dust visible [,#')$(’] in the air persuades me,  
a voiceless [-'#3=&.] but clear and true messenger.  
The soil <of my land>
109
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 Stehle offers a convincing reading of this song as the Chorus’ inability to sustain 
appropriate, good-omened speech until near the end of the song, at which point 
Eteocles interrupts them. 
109
 “The soil of my land” is Sommerstein’s translation and rendering of a corruption in 
the text (he supplies “H-)="µ#.” as line 83). The remainder of this quotation is my own 
translation. 
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hoof-resounding, brings the noise/shout [?&*'] near to my ear.  
It flies and it roars [?%"µ)+], just like an unconquerable  
torrent dashing down a mountain. (79-86) 
The women see the dust thrown up by galloping horses and hear the drumming of 
hooves as the army draws near. These words of perception in this passage (italicized 
above), along with the descriptive imagery, allow the Chorus both to describe the 
attack as they see and hear it and to help the audience to imagine it more clearly. This 
is a prime example of what Bert States calls “rhetorical scenery” (States 54). 
In Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theater, 
States proposes that many plays performed in a mostly bare or neutral space, 
particularly before the rise of realism and naturalism, have traditionally relied on 
language and metaphor to create their worlds, and these words then inflect everything 
that the audience might see on the stage. He explains, “The very thickness of 
Shakespeare’s world is derived from the way in which poetry triumphs over neutral 
space” (56). Certainly there may be set pieces, costumes, and props on the stage, but 
the language of the play, and perhaps also the actors’ gestures, can inflect those pieces 
of stagecraft with further meaning and vitality. In States’s words, “…the character 
creates a verbal world that bathes what we see before us in its quality” (States 57).  
While it is always possible for an actor to mime an object or action or for 
metaphorical language to supplement a performance’s stagecraft, it is in the case of 
action that is in some way unstageable, particularly of action that is too big and too 
spectacular to stage with anything like completeness or realism, that this phenomenon 
truly fulfills its potential. It is in these moments that an actor can use language and 
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gesture to create for the audience that unstageable action with its full sense of presence 
and immediacy. In the case of Seven against Thebes, the Chorus’ appeals to sensory 
perception are particularly effective in making the enemy’s attack theatrically real and 
present. This passage could even be an experiment by Aeschylus in how to represent a 
battle on stage. He chooses here not to bring a messenger on stage to describe the 
action after the fact, as Euripides does in Children of Heracles,
110
 for example, nor 
does he locate the onstage action in a distinctly separate place or time than the offstage 
battle, as many other tragedies do.
111
 Rather, he stages the response of a group of 
women in the acropolis of the city while it is under attack. The setting is thus 
sufficiently removed that the armies themselves need not be on stage, yet the Chorus is 
still experiencing the sights, sounds, and emotions of the battle as it takes place all 
around them. 
As the song progresses, the Chorus continues to cry out to the gods for help 
and to exclaim and describe the specific sights and sounds they perceive. Their direct 
references to their perception of the attack begin as early as the fourth line of their 
song, with the first few lines being related but less explicit, and these continue to 
weave in and out of the Chorus’ song. A few particularly vivid examples come near 
the middle of the song: as the enemy draws nearer, the Chorus’ descriptions of what 
they hear grow more detailed: 
                                                
110
 See lines 784-891, when the Messenger reports what happened in the battle (taking 
place nearby but off stage) when Iolaus arrived and miraculously became a young, 
powerful warrior again. 
111
 See, for example, Aeschylus’ Persians, which also uses a Messenger to report the 
outcome of the campaign but sets the action of the play itself in Persia, far away from 
the battles. 
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The Argives are surrounding the city-buildings 
of Cadmus, and fear of their warlike weapons 
<throws us into confusion>,
112
 and the bridles through the jaws 
of the horses whine slaughter. (120-124) 
A little later, they again seem to be hearing subtler noises and to consider the army to 
be closer than before: 
I hear the noise of the chariots around the city— 
O Mistress Hera! 
The joints of the heavy-laden axles rattle/shriek— 
Dear Artemis! 
The air goes mad, shaken by battle! (151-155) 
The whine of the bridles in the horses’ mouths and the rattle of the chariots’ axle-
joints are particularly powerful for their detail. Their specificity helps to create a 
clearer sense of what is happening beyond the city walls, and though, as Thalmann 
notes, the performance probably did not include sound effects to simulate this attack, 
the Chorus is providing the spectators with ample details for them to imagine the 
action (Thalmann 89). Furthermore, the army now seems to be closer to the city, close 
enough, that is, for the Chorus to hear those particular sounds and not simply the 
overwhelming thunder of the horses’ hooves or the indistinct roar of the approach.  
Through the course of the Chorus’ song, therefore, the enemy troops come 
ever closer to the city of Thebes itself, and the Chorus’ descriptions of what they 
perceive of the army become increasingly detailed to reflect the nearness of the enemy 
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 Sommersteins’ translation of “!%*(()+,” which he accepts from Ritschl. 
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and the urgency of the situation. There is a general progression here, beginning with 
the clouds of dust, drumming of hooves, and general roar of the army (81, 84, 85). 
Next, they hear shouting and see a glint of white shields (89, 90-91). Later, they hear 
crashes of shields and spears (100, 103); see a wave of the soldiers’ helmet-crests 
(101); hear the whine of bridles (123-124); hear the noise of chariots (151); and hear 
the rattle of the chariots’ axle-joints (153). Finally, just before they regain control of 
their emotions and speech in order to make a more auspicious prayer, they hear the 
bombardment of stones the enemy is throwing at the battlement, as well as a clashing 
of bronze-bound shields at the very gates of the city (159, 161). 
The progression of the sights and sounds through the course of this song 
reinforces the immediacy and the reality of the attack on Thebes. The passage creates 
a sense that this action is unfolding as the Chorus sings, and as the audience watches, 
even if that action is located just off stage.  In fact, this effect could be similar to that 
which Gwilym Jones proposes for the original production of Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar. Jones provides evidence for her claim that Julius Caesar was first play 
performed at the Globe Theatre at its opening in 1599 and further suggests that the 
play reveals Shakespeare showing off the new theater’s capacity for spectacle. One 
particular effect that Julius Caesar uses is a new variation in the volume of flourishes 
and battle calls: 
The battle scenes of Act 5 of Julius Caesar as read in the stage 
directions show a sensitivity for distance which had not been evident in 
the playwright’s earlier work. …. A Renaissance trumpet could be 
sounded only at one loud volume; in order to create the illusion of 
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distant battles, there needs to be some kind of backstage structure to 
dilute the sound. Only in Julius Caesar does Shakespeare begin to 
write directions such as “Low alarums” (e.g. 5.5.23). …. Julius Caesar 
marks the beginning of Shakespeare’s variations of sound distance—
the audience, perhaps for the first time, experienced their battles in a 
multi-dimensional soundscape—and it is likely that the structure of the 
Globe playhouse is crucial in this development. (Jones 7-8) 
While I would not suggest that Aeschylus was using actual sound effects as 
Shakespeare does, I do consider that the experience for the spectators could be similar. 
In each case, the ultimate purpose of the appeal to sense perception (through the 
Chorus’ developing report of what they see and hear or through trumpet flourishes 
with increasing volume) is to bring offstage battle and tumult into the stage action and 
the audience’s spectatorial experience. The element of progression in each example is 
the particularly distinctive quality of the technique, and it could be, in each case, an 
experiment in new methods of bringing such action into full theatrical vitality.  
In Engaging Audiences, his recent book applying cognitive science to theater, 
Bruce McConachie explores the concept of “mind-reading,” the process by which 
spectators “‘read the minds’ of actor/characters, …intuit their beliefs, intentions, and 
emotions by watching their motor actions” (65). McConachie bases the mechanism of 
this process on the mirror neuron system and terms it “empathy,” suggesting that as a 
spectator watches an actor/character, the neurons that she would use to perform the 
same action herself are activated, thus in some way bridging the divide between the 
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spectator and the actor/character.
113
 Furthermore, McConachie considers this process 
as necessary, and perhaps even automatic, for a spectator making meaning of a 
performance. Certainly various individual spectators will engage with characters’ 
emotions to varying degrees, but McConachie’s explanation of this process suggests 
that any spectator paying attention to the performance will automatically engage in 
those emotions to some extent, simply because our brains do that as a matter of course 
when identifying emotions, intentions, and actions in others. While the automatic 
portion of emotional engagement must be largely subconscious and is likely not very 
powerful, it nevertheless lays the groundwork for communication and transference 
between actor/characters and spectators.
114
 
There has traditionally been an argument surrounding the element of spectacle 
in Aeschylus. Some critics have pointed to the Ghost of Darius in Persians or the 
(possible) flying vehicles and great cataclysm in Prometheus Bound to support the 
view expressed in his Life that Aeschylus was distinctive for his use of spectacle. 
Others, however, have considered such lavish spectacle with insufficient motivation to 
be the mark of an inferior dramatist and have striven to read his plays in such a way as 
                                                
113
 While I accept McConachie’s explanation of this process, though, I would take 
issue with his use of the term “empathy” here, as it is loaded with a long history of 
philosophical debate and everyday usage that hinders such a drastic redefinition of the 
word. 
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 For more on these issues, see Part One of my Introduction, especially the sections 
“Bodily Presence and Communication” and “Imaginative Participation,” pages 8-18. 
In particular, projection-identification, as explained by Edgar Morin, should be an 
important component of the imaginative seeing in the theater that I am proposing. 
Since humans tend to project their own feelings and memories onto the world and take 
affective qualities from the world into themselves as they perceive, theater can use a 
variety of techniques, such as perceptual language, in order to encourage spectators to 
engage in this process more powerfully than usual. 
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to diminish the spectacle needed for the productions. Oliver Taplin, for example, 
claims: “that gratuitous spectacle is the resort of a poor playwright who is at a loss for 
true dramatic material, and that Aeschylus, as a great theatrical artist, integrates the 
visual aspects of the drama into the work as a whole. This is not the case, it seems, in 
Prom[etheus] as we have it” (Taplin (1977) 260). By Taplin’s reasoning, we have two 
basic alternatives: since tradition has long since affirmed that Aeschylus is indeed a 
great dramatist, either the Prometheus was not written by him at all, or the play was 
heavily revised by a later dramatist, who added the scenes and elements that Taplin 
considers “gratuitous spectacle.” What the Chorus’ entry song in Seven against Thebes 
shows us, I contend, is how Aeschylus could have been celebrated for his use of 
powerful, breathtaking spectacle in antiquity without our being forced to dream up 
elaborate machinery and stage effects that seem inconsistent with what we know of the 
fifth-century Greek stage and its capabilities. 
In his study of Seven against Thebes, William Thalmann cites the Life of 
Aeschylus as he explains Aeschylus’ use of spectacle: 
Aeschylus always made striking use of the possibilities afforded by 
theatrical production. The Vita in the Medicean manuscript makes a 
valuable statement about his purpose: that ‘he used spectacles and plots 
with a view towards an awe-inspiring impact (/%0. ,0/-:E+' 
$)%#$7=:
115
) rather than for the sake of illusion (µ_--&' Y /%0. 
'/*$:').’ The word ,0/-:E+. is a strong one. It denotes the amazement 
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 Literally, “towards a portentious/prodigious [$)%#$7=:] passion [,0/-:E+'].” 
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caused by the onrush of any strong feeling—love, surprise, delight, or 
terror. (Thalmann 82-83) 
Based on the preceding analysis of the Chorus’ entry song, I would argue that the Life 
is not necessarily claiming that Aeschylus used “gratuitous” spectacle with elaborate 
machinery and physical representations, but rather that his stagings thrust a strong 
emotional impact on spectators even if the action were not represented in any 
“realistic” (or “illusory” or, as '/*$:' literally means, “deceptive”) way. The Chorus 
of Theban Women effectively creates the sights and sounds of an approaching enemy 
army, along with their response of terror and disordered panic, yet the army itself need 
never appear on stage. The battle is rendered theatrically real, vital, and immediate 
simply through the Chorus’ words and movement,
116
 and for an attentive and 
accepting spectator, the emotional power of the scene could be overwhelming.
117
 The 
potential for unseen but theatrically real action thus resolves an unnecessary critical 
conflict surrounding Aeschylean spectacle, providing a technique appropriate both to 
the Greek stage and to the reported “awe-inspiring” effects. 
 In Seven against Thebes, the account of the unfolding but unstaged attack is 
provided by the Chorus, rather than by some sort of messenger or a single 
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 I have said little about the Chorus’ movement in this discussion. While several 
critics have offered interesting interpretations of what this movement may have been, 
ultimately we cannot know how they moved. They may have entered together or 
scattered; they may have moved methodically up and down a row of statues 
(Thalmann 88ff.); they may have danced in any number of potential configurations. I 
would prefer not to make a specific claim about their movement, but rather simply to 
assume that whatever that movement was, it in some way supported the emotional and 
circumstantial context of the song, as well as the technical elements of the language, 
such as the docmiacs. 
117
 Such a scene would be particularly powerful for a fifth-century Greek audience, for 
whom attacks and sieges on cities were very real, and common, threats. 
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actor/character. Some of the advantages of the use of the Chorus for this creation of 
unseen spectacle are natural and clear: a group of people can more easily create a 
sense of a strong emotion (here, fear or panic) than can a single person, and such 
emotion tends to be more “contagious” to other people when felt and expressed by a 
group. Even without the facial expressions that masks hide, the Chorus can 
communicate emotion and intentional action to the audience through gestures, and 
spectators may then, further, reinforce those emotions through contagion among 
themselves. If the Chorus panics, the spectators might feel some degree of panic 
themselves.
118
  
 The chorus has long been of particular interest to scholars, who offer various 
explanations of its distinct role in the performance. Certainly the chorus contributes to 
the visual spectacle and the aural performance, through its dance and song, as well as 
its sheer size and, likely, eye-catching costumes. On a deeper level, it may roughly 
stand in for the audience and guide the audience’s reactions to the stage action, as such 
August Wilhelm von Schlegel and his critical descendents have suggested.
119
 The 
chorus could also serve as the representative of the general citizenry and question, 
directly or indirectly, how the characters’ actions affect the overall public welfare, as 
many have suggested for the Chorus in Oedipus Tyrannus, for example. Various 
similar explanations of the role and effect of the chorus in Greek tragic performance 
have been proposed, though a full understanding and appreciation of the Greek chorus 
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 See pages 15-18 of my Introduction for more on emotional contagion. 
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 In his Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, Schlegel writes: “In a word, the 
Chorus is the ideal spectator. It mitigates the impression of a heart-rending or moving 
story, while it conveys to the actual spectator a lyrical and musical expression of his 
own emotions, and elevates him to the region of contemplation” (505). 
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seems to remain beyond us, with our modern perspective and theatrical experience. 
Nevertheless, we have some sense of the distinctive significance of the chorus, and it 
seems appropriate that it is the Chorus in the Seven that creates the offstage action and 
the onstage response to it.  
 
The Fall of Heracles and His House 
Euripides’ Heracles uses the Chorus, here composed of old men of Thebes, to 
create the destruction of the house of Heracles in a way similar to the Chorus’ 
evocation of the enemy’s attack in Seven against Thebes. In contrast to the Seven, 
however, Heracles also uses a preparatory speech from the goddess Lyssa, a 
Messenger’s speech after the action, and scattered cries from the character 
Amphitryon during the action as supplements to the Chorus’ account of the 
unstageable action.  
In Heracles, Lycus, usurper to the Theban throne, is going to kill Heracles’ 
children, his wife, Megara, and his father, Amphitryon, for fear that they would 
someday kill him in retribution for his murder of Megara’s father, Creon. When 
Heracles returns, all seems to be well, as he can now protect his family from the threat. 
At this point, however, Iris and Lyssa descend with orders from Hera to drive him to 
madness and to the slaughter of his own children. Lyssa is hesitant to destroy this 
hero, but she relents and describes what she will do: 
Neither is the sea, groaning with waves, so turbulent 
nor the shaking of the earth or the sting of a thunderbolt, blowing forth  
anguish, 
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as the course I will make into the chest of Heracles. 
I will both break his roof into pieces and throw his house onto him, 
having first killed his children. And the one killing will not know 
that he has killed the children he begot, until he breaks away from my  
madness. (861-866) 
The Scout’s report in Seven against Thebes sets the stage for the Chorus’ entrance 
song by concisely explaining what has happened in the enemy camp and predicting the 
imminent attack. In Heracles, Lyssa’s description of how she will overcome Heracles 
fills a similar function by setting up the next major action of the play, yet her speech is 
more detailed in its predictions than is the Scout’s. Lyssa provides important pieces of 
information that will help the audience understand what happens next, particularly if 
the staging of it might be ambiguous on its own. 
 Delusion can be difficult to identify and interpret, and the meaning of a 
character’s action, as well as the degree of the character’s responsibility for that 
action, can vary widely. Such characters as Ajax, Orestes, and Pentheus, as well as 
Heracles, have long been the subject of controversy over the nature and degree of their 
madness. Do the characters truly go mad? What is the cause of their madness? Are 
they responsible for actions they perform while mad? In Heracles, in contrast to Ajax 
and Orestes, for example, the onset of madness abruptly interrupts the progression of a 
triumphant resolution to the threat against Heracles’ family. Moments after he has 
provided sotêria (salvation) for his family and killed the tyrant Lycus, Heracles 
becomes the agent of their utter destruction, through the divinely induced madness, 
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and indeed, it is this abrupt change that leads some critics to explain the divine 
intervention otherwise.  
For those who approach it from a literary perspective, the play seems to fall 
into two distinct parts, without the unity traditionally demanded for dramas. Thalia 
Papadopoulou summarizes Ulrich von Wilamowitz’s influential view of Heracles’ 
madness and those that grew from it, explaining his interpretation as emerging from 
this concern for unity:  
The question of unity was essential to Wilamowitz, and one way to 
defend it was his theory that Heracles does not suddenly go mad but 
already shows signs of madness on his first appearance on stage. The 
emerging science of psychology during the nineteenth century probably 
influenced the ‘megalomaniac’ theory, according to which the strains 
of the labours were the cause of Heracles’ madness. (2)  
It is true that Heracles’ actions are consistent with his character to some extent, as his 
celebrated strength, his weapons, and his tendency to use his weapons and brute 
strength to solve problems certainly contribute his murderous rampage. However, 
while critics, particularly those who approach the play as a literary text, could argue 
over exactly how delusion functions and whether Heracles is truly under the control of 
Lyssa here,
120
 Lyssa’s clear declaration that she will cast madness upon him and that 
he will not know he is killing his children should be convincing to an audience in the 
midst of the performance, particularly to an audience that has just witnessed his 
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 For a concise summary of the major arguments along these lines, see pp. 2-3 of 
Thalia Papadopoulou’s Heracles and Euripidean Tragedy (2005). 
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poignant reunion with his family.  As Karelisa Hartigan argues, the physical presence 
of Iris and Lyssa emphasizes “the external nature of Herakles’ punishment. His 
madness is not a sickness that grows from within, resulting from some crime or deed 
he has done, nor is it an aspect of his character which is just now with divine 
assistance being revealed” (127).
121
 His attack on his family does implement some of 
the potentials already present in his character, and indeed he has just killed Lycus in 
retribution for his threats, but Lyssa’s presence shows that it is the divine intervention 
and not some inner psychological disorder that directs his aggression toward his 
family.
122
 
Lyssa’s description also provides more specific information that should clarify 
exactly what the coming events will be. For the Greeks, the word “house” often refers 
not to a physical structure but to a family line, as common phrases such as “the house 
of Atreus” clearly show. Is it not possible, then, that the destruction of the house of 
Heracles is purely metaphorical, a way of expressing the destruction of his family line 
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 In her footnote 16, page 133, Hartigan also cites a few of the prominent, divergent 
arguments, as well as a few scholars whose interpretations are in line with her own. A 
prime example of a different view would be J.C. Kamerbeek’s “Unity and Meaning of 
Euripides’ Heracles,” in Mnemosyne 19 (1966): 1-16. See especially pp. 14-15. 
Kamerbeek asks, “Is there anything phantastic in the assumption that, on the 
psychological level, the poet meant us to understand Heracles’ madness as the violent 
reaction to the overstrain of a burdensome life?” (14). 
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 Ajax is the most apt comparison here. In Sophocles’ play, Ajax was still sane and 
clear-minded when he decided to go on a murderous rampage; the madness Athena 
has imposed on him does not spur him to that action but rather clouds his eyes so that 
he believes the animals he is slaughtering are actually the leaders of the Greek army. 
Similarly, as Papadopoulou concludes her discussion of Heracles’ madness, “Madness 
does not impose upon Heracles an action which is entirely alien to his normal activity; 
he follows his familiar course of action throughout his mad fit, the only difference 
being that he is made to misperceive reality around him” (128). His anger and 
aggression are already there, but Lyssa clouds his vision and redirects those impulses. 
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through the murder of his children? On its own, a reference to the destruction of the 
“house of Heracles” could very well mean just this, but in this case, Lyssa’s 
description of what she will do clarifies that her ruin of Heracles will involve both the 
murder of his children by his own hand and the literal destruction of his house: “I will 
both break his roof [µ"-#!%#] into pieces and throw his house [=6µ&3.] onto him, / 
having first [/%#$&'] killed his children [$"0'’]” (864-865). Lyssa distinguishes 
between her destruction of the house and the killing of Heracles’ children, 
emphasizing that these are distinct events, separated in time, as indicated by “first” 
[/%#$&']. In further support of a literal, or mixed literal and metaphorical, 
understanding of “house” here, she specifies that she will cast down the house onto 
him [“!/)µ?#-#,” 864]. The prefix !/)- [on/onto] does not conclusively prove that the 
physical house crashes down, but Lyssa’s phrasing does suggest the image of a literal 
house collapse with a physical impact on someone or something, and this preparatory 
statement, coupled with later descriptions, could help the audience to understand a 
crude or abstract stagecraft effect as representing a more complete destruction. 
Just as the Chorus creates the theatrical reality of the enemy’s attack in the 
Seven against Thebes, the Chorus and the voice of Amphitryon (presumably off stage) 
combine here to create the physical destruction of the house and to narrate the action 
taking place off stage, inside the house. The Chorus laments the murder of the children 
that they now know is coming, and Amphitryon cries out from inside the house with 
sharp, relatively inarticulate exclamations such as “.I ($"B#+” [O, the house/roof!] 
(888). The combination of the Chorus’ cries of grief and anticipation with 
Amphitryon’s exclamations creates a growing sense of the tension and the progressing 
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crisis in the house. The Chorus’ cries develop through this passage, from future-tense 
laments for what will be
123
 to present-tense descriptions of what is happening now, as 
when they sing that the drumless dance begins (889) or that Heracles is now hunting 
down his children: “He hunts [03'#B)$)$] the pursuit of his children! In no way will 
Lyssa inspire a Bacchic frenzy [Q#02)>()+] in the house in vain!” (896-897). This 
turmoil lasts for about 35 lines (875-909), including the Chorus’ initial song 
anticipating the ruin Lyssa has promised. 
A likely climax of this excitement and tension comes with the Chorus’ 
exclamation about the shaking of the house: 
.=&S .=&>, 
!>)--# ()5)+ =#µ#, (3µ/5/$)+ ($"B:. 
( (·  
$5 =%U`, @ a\0` b[$, µcdefg>; (904-907) 
[Look, look! / A hurricane/storm shakes the house—the roof falls in! / 
Ah, ah! What are you doing, O son of Zeus, in the house/roof?] 
Unlike the Chorus of Theban Women in Seven against Thebes, this Chorus rarely 
speaks in the first person, likely because they themselves are not in direct danger. 
They are sympathetic to Heracles and his family, but they have heard Lyssa’s 
declaration and know what is to come and that they cannot change it. Being in a 
position of knowledge superior to that of the other characters, they use both present 
and future verb tenses to describe and lament the unfolding ruin. At this point in the 
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 See, for example, line 885: “And soon the children will breathe their last by their 
father’s hand” or lines 886-888: “O Zeus, at once the raging mad, flesh-eating, unjust 
goddesses of vengeance will lay flat your son, childless, with their evils!” 
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action, however, their language more closely resembles that of the Chorus of the 
Seven: these four lines include imperatives to look, a present-tense description of the 
devastation as it happens, the inarticulate cries of “ah, ah,” and a question that 
suggests that their knowledge is incomplete. The Chorus knows basically what will 
happen, but their language emphasizes that they are still experiencing the action as it 
progresses in the moment, and they, with Amphitryon, create the sense of immediacy 
and progression for the audience.  
 The function of the Chorus’ song, with Amphitryon’s interjections, is to 
provide the audience with some experience of the immediate, unfolding disaster as it 
happens just off stage. The details of what is happening remain unclear, as the Chorus’ 
knowledge is incomplete and Amphitryon’s cries are inarticulate. The function of the 
following scene, therefore, is to supply the specific details of that offstage action in the 
past tense, through the report of the Messenger (hE#BB)-&.). When the Messenger 
first arrives, the Chorus is already lamenting and already knows that disaster has 
struck. They ask, however, that the Messenger clarify the details for them: “How do 
you make known the grief-causing destruction, destruction of the father?” (918-919). 
The Messenger’s report, then, is a typical messenger speech with a straightforward, 
sequential report in the past tense explaining what happened off stage (922-1015). 
This speech does not create the immediacy and excitement of the previous scene, but it 
does provide more information for the spectators to interpret whatever visual 
representation they see on the stage both at this point and after the interior scene is 
revealed, probably by the ekkyklêma, around line 1031.  
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The most significant piece of information here is the further support for 
understanding the collapse of the house as a literal one. When he recounts how Athena 
finally stopped Heracles’ rampage, the Messenger explains: “He falls [/5$')+, 
historical present] to the ground, having struck his back against a pillar [05&'#], which 
from the falling [/)(91#(+] of the roof [($"B:.], broken in two, was lying on the 
foundations” (1006-1008). If there were any doubt that the physical house has in some 
way broken apart in a storm or earthquake, this description should clarify that the 
pillar to which Heracles has been bound had already fallen before Athena struck him 
with the rock. If the stagecraft of the scene has changed in some abstract, unclear way 
to represent the physical damage to the house, the information provided by Lyssa, the 
Chorus, Amphitryon, and now the Messenger should help the audience know how to 
read that visual cue.  
Regardless of the extent to which the stagecraft creates the destruction 
visually, the communication of this “unstageable,” spectacular action to the audience 
should be very clear by the time the interior scene is revealed, particularly because the 
Chorus is a trustworthy source of information. Unlike the women of the Chorus in the 
Seven against Thebes, this Chorus of Theban Elders laments for the destruction 
without ever panicking. There is no indication whatsoever that the Elders themselves 
might be delusional, as some could argue for the women of the Seven, who might be 
considered too overcome by fear to be in their right minds. There is a mention of a 
Bacchic frenzy, but it is the frenzy that Lyssa is sending through the house (see lines 
996-997), not a frenzy that extends to those outside. This Chorus’ language is more 
controlled than that of the Chorus in the Seven, and while I would argue that both 
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choruses create theatrically real, immediate, unfolding action, the Chorus of the 
Heracles is most clearly beyond suspicion of delusion or frenzy. 
Theatrically, this sequence in Heracles (843-1015) is structured in such a way 
as first to prepare the audience to understand the coming action, then to allow the 
audience to experience the tension and excitement of the action as it happens, and 
finally to provide a fuller description of the completed action to reinforce exactly what 
has happened and to ensure that the audience is “reading” both the language and the 
stagecraft correctly. This is particularly important in Heracles because while many 
Greek tragedies feature offstage death or murder scenes, some of which even involve 
exclamations from within similar to those of Amphitryon, this scene departs from the 
typical models for offstage deaths by including some action that manifests itself in 
front of the closed doors of the house. This scene, therefore, shares with the scene in 
Seven against Thebes the need to create a sense of immediacy and progression in the 
action, as well as the need to evoke a sense of presence, of action happening “right 
there” in the world of the play. Heracles then has the additional task of helping the 
audience interpret some kind of physical change that is understood to happen on the 
stage and may be represented in some abstract way. 
In his discussion of staging possibilities for the flying Chorus in Prometheus 
Bound, Oliver Taplin argues for an absolute choice between either total realism in the 
representation of their flight or a complete lack of representational staging:  
There seems little point in half measures: either there should be a 
proper attempt at spectacular illusion, or it may as well be entirely left 
to the words. It is implausible, for example, to bring on the ‘flying’ 
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Oceanids in wheeled vehicle(s) running on a solid surface. Trundling 
on wheels only contradicts the illusion of flying, and rather than this 
the vehicle(s) should be abandoned. Nor is it plausible to split the 
chorus up, and have a representative or two flown on while the rest 
enter on foot; for if the entry is acceptable with some on foot then it is 
acceptable with all on foot. If any attempt is to be made at illusion, then 
surely the whole chorus should actually travel through the air. (Taplin 
(1977) 253) 
What the example of Heracles proves, I would argue, is that Taplin’s demand for one 
extreme or the other is unnecessary. In Heracles, the outlandish, “unstageable” action 
is dramatically and theatrically real, and the play carefully leads the audience to a 
proper understanding of that action.  
Stagecraft, then, can still represent destruction or other unstageable action, 
such as a Chorus of Oceanids in flying vehicles, in some way without showing that 
action realistically, as long as the language of the play (and possibly also the actors’ 
gestures and other cues for which we do not have concrete evidence) tells the audience 
how to “read” the abstract or non-illusory effect. As a particularly clear example of 
this kind of communication to the audience, Heracles may serve, for the sake of 
scholarly investigation, as a prototype for such scenes and their presentations to 
audiences, opening the possibility that other scenes in Greek tragedy could have 
functioned in a similar way, even if their literary texts do not include quite as many 
reiterations of what is happening and how to “read” it. 
 
157 
Did the Earth Quake? The “Palace-Miracle” Scene in Bacchae 
 The destruction of Heracles’ house in Heracles could be the key to 
understanding Euripides’ later earthquake scene in Bacchae, which has provoked 
much critical controversy. In a critique of Simon Goldhill’s Reading Greek Tragedy, 
David Wiles gestures toward Heracles as a possible approach to this problematic 
scene, but he does not pursue the comparison beyond a brief summary of how 
knowledge of whether the skênê could actually collapse would affect the audience’s 
interpretation of whatever stage effect occurs here:  
In order to reconstruct the meanings which the ‘palace-miracle’ scene 
in The Bacchae held for the first Athenian audience, we would need to 
know what happened in the Herakles…. If the skênê collapsed in the 
Herakles, the audience would have known that stage sets can tumble, 
and a stable skênê in The Bacchae would enable the audience to 
perceive the Chorus as deluded. On the other hand, if the audience of 
the Herakles merely imagined a falling palace, an audience of The 
Bacchae which saw the palace physically falling would have seen a 
theatrical code disrupted,
124
 and their confidence in the theatrical 
illusion would be disturbed…. (144) 
While it is true that we have no way of knowing whether the skênê actually collapsed 
in Heracles, I have argued that the evidence does at least support the claim that the 
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 Here, I would add that about ten years intervened between the production of 
Heracles (ca. 416 BC) and that of Bacchae (most likely 405 BC). In this brief 
explanation, Wiles omits the possibility that if the skênê did not fall in Heracles, 
technology might have progressed to allow for more of an effect ten years later, and 
presumably, an audience would be surprised but also willing to accept such a change. 
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house, that is, the dramatic reality that the skênê is understood to represent, is 
understood to collapse or break apart in some way. Perhaps then, the Heracles scene 
can serve as a model for studying this scene of Bacchae, even without knowledge of 
whether the skênê itself came down during the performance.
125
 
 Although the Chorus in Bacchae is experiencing and narrating the same basic 
event as does the Chorus of Heracles, this Chorus of Bacchants may itself be more 
similar to the Chorus of Theban Women in Seven against Thebes. Both of these 
choruses are composed of women, and both could be understood as being deluded or 
otherwise overcome by emotion. The Chorus of Theban Women, as we have seen, has 
limited control over language, and their attempts to pray to the gods appropriately are 
interrupted time and again by exclamations of fear or of new sights or sounds. This 
Chorus is terrified and panic-stricken by the approach of the enemy army, and while I 
have argued that the sights and sounds they describe are certainly real in a dramatic 
and theatrical sense, their account is nevertheless colored by their emotional state. 
This emotion naturally makes their song and the action they describe even more 
immediate and powerful for the audience, but it does leave open a door for a more 
skeptical critic to claim that the women are deluded by their fear into imagining an 
attack that is not actually happening.  
Similarly, the Chorus of Bacchants in Bacchae are women, and additionally, as 
Richard Seaford summarizes the common point, “characteristic of the adherent of 
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 For the complete text of this scene, both the Greek and my own translation of lines 
576-603, see the appendix at the end of this chapter. 
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D[ionysus] is to see things which others do not see” (198).
126
 Furthermore, while these 
women of the Chorus may seem to be in their right minds for most of the play, this 
particular scene shows them in a much-elevated state of emotion and reveling as they 
respond to the voice of Dionysus. In fact, Seaford points out that the use of the term 
“maenads” to refer to the Chorus in line 601 “is the only place in the play in which a 
word beginning µ#+'- (mad) describes the chorus (this is in sharp contrast with the 
Theban ‘maenads’ and Pentheus)” (199). What, then, are we to make of the 
spectacular and supernatural events that they describe? Is the house shaken apart by an 
earthquake, as lines 586-593 suggest? Does lightning kindle a fire on Semele’s tomb 
(596-599)? 
Both Seven against Thebes and Heracles serve as theatrical precedents for this 
“palace-miracle” scene, and doubtless there were other scenes in tragedies that have 
not survived that featured similar roles for a chorus or similar presentations of 
unstageable action. Of course, any speculation about lost plays or even about 
surviving fragments and testimonia
127
 is problematic, if not totally beyond any critical 
usefulness in this case. Thus, although we have no way of knowing to what extent 
these two plays are representative of others or how they might fit into the larger 
picture of how such scenes function in Greek tragedy, the limitations of our corpus 
bring the connections between them to the forefront, and the scene of Bacchae 
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 Agave is a prime example of this phenomenon, as she kills her son while firmly 
believing that she is ripping apart a lion cub. 
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 In his commentary on Heracles, Godfrey W. Bond lists some instances of 
earthquakes in tragedy: “A similar earthquake occurs just off-stage in Ba. 585, 587f., 
591f. There are other earthquakes at Erecth. NFE 65.48ff. (note 51 i3µ/5/$)+ i$"B:), 
A. PV 1080ff., A. fr. 58N = 76M (Edon.)… Tro. 1295ff., the burning of Troy, may 
also be compared” (303). 
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emerges as an innovative combination of techniques and qualities found in each of 
these previous examples. 
From Seven against Thebes, and possibly other plays that might have featured 
a similar choral song, Bacchae’s “palace-miracle” scene takes a female chorus in the 
throes of intense emotion. The technical elements of this choral song are also strongly 
reminiscent of those of the Chorus’ entry song in Seven. As in the earlier example, the 
Chorus of Bacchants speaks in the present and future tenses, with additional 
imperatives and one-word exclamations scattered throughout their speech. Their 
description of the falling stone lintels exemplifies this pattern:  
—Ah, Ah! [F F] 
Soon the house of Pentheus  
will be shaken apart [=+#$+'*E)$#+, future] into collapse.  
Dionysus is in the house;  
worship [("?)$", imperative] him! O, we worship him!  
Look [!=)$), imperative] at these stone wedges on the columns  
falling apart [=+*=%&µ#]! Bromios raises a shout ['-#-*I)$#+, present] 
inside this house. (586-593) 
Their frenzied song thus incorporates technical elements similar to those of Seven’s 
entry song, including exclamations (such as “F F” in lines 586 and 596), imperatives 
(including “!=)$)” in line 591 and “=50)$)” in line 600), present and future verb tenses, 
and very short sentence units.  
The most significant difference in syntactical technicalities between these two 
passages is that the Chorus of Bacchae does not feature the deliberatives and questions 
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about what to do and what will happen to them that characterize Seven’s choral entry. 
These women, however, do not have the same degree of fear for their own personal 
safety as do the Theban women. In fact, while the Theban women feel completely 
terrified for themselves and the city, these Bacchants are worshippers of Dionysus, 
and in the context of Pentheus’ attitude, they have good reason to feel more vindicated 
than threatened by the god’s epiphany. Their language and actions do suggest a degree 
of fear or uneasiness about the supernatural events,
128
 and when Dionysus emerges 
from the palace, his instruction to them to take courage and stop trembling confirms 
that there is some fear mixed with their euphoria (604-607). Nevertheless, they 
respond to Dionysus’ initial calls to them by asking him to come into their midst (582-
584), and they continue to worship him throughout the scene. This blend of ecstatic 
worship with a little fear thus explains the technicalities of the passage’s language, 
with its imperatives, present and future verb tenses, and short sentence units, to 
indicate high emotion and a degree of fear, yet with a lack of deliberatives and a 
smaller number of questions as compared to the passage of Seven against Thebes, 
which reflects the Bacchants’ lower degree of concern for personal safety.  
The portion of the Bacchae passage that describes the earthquake and the fire, 
whether or not those events are visible on the stage, also employs words of perception, 
just as the Theban women’s descriptions of the enemy’s approach do. After Dionysus’ 
voice calls for an earthquake, the Chorus cries out to look [!=)$)] at the stone wedges, 
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 For example, their exclamations about the fire on Semele’s tomb could easily 
reflect a combination of ecstasy and fear (596-603). 
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and after Dionysus calls for lightning to burn up the palace, the Chorus again uses 
perceptual language as they look for the fire on Semele’s tomb:  
Ah, ah, 
do you not see [-)>(()+.], nor perceive [#*B*IC] 
the fire, around this sacred tomb of Semele,  
whom once the lightning flame  
of Zeus left lightning-struck? (596-599) 
The use of perceptual language is not nearly as pervasive in the Bacchae passage as in  
that of Seven against Thebes, but this passage is also much shorter, and the events are 
more discrete. 
 The “palace-miracle” scene of Bacchae thus invokes several of the technical 
elements that Aeschylus had already used in Seven against Thebes to enable his 
Chorus of Theban Women to make a large-scale, “unstageable” action dramatically 
and theatrically real. There are, however, clear differences in the structure and 
substance of these two choral songs. In Seven, the Chorus sings without any 
interruptions, other than their own interruptions of themselves, and the events they 
invoke should be understood to occur just off stage, at and beyond the city walls. In 
Bacchae, by contrast, the Chorus’ more typical, cohesive song (519-575) ends when 
Dionysus calls out to them from within the palace, and the following passage involves 
both cries from Dionysus and responses from the Chorus. Further, the events that the 
Chorus describes should be happening on the stage, particularly the earthquake and 
collapse of the house. For these features, we can look to Heracles for precedents. 
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 Certainly the most obvious connection between Heracles and Bacchae is the 
earthquake itself. More importantly, however, the structures of these two scenes are 
similar in their guidance of the audience through the progression of the unstageable 
action. In Heracles, as I have explained, Lyssa provides a detailed explanation of what 
she is going to do to Heracles, allowing both the Chorus and the audience to 
understand the ensuing sights and sounds as indicating the progressive playing out of 
Lyssa’s predictions. After this scene representing the very moments of the destruction, 
the messenger then gives a detailed report of what happened inside the house, and 
Heracles himself ultimately appears, probably by way of the ekkyklêma, as he is 
currently bound to a fallen pillar, and his own words further confirm what has 
happened.  
Similarly, in the scene preceding the choral song that evolves into the “palace-
miracle” scene, Dionysus warns Pentheus of the destruction he is bringing on himself 
by taking him prisoner: 
The god himself will release me, whenever I wish. 
…. 
I, being of sound mind, warn you, not being of sound mind, not to bind 
me. 
…. 
But Dionysus, whom you say does not exist, 
goes after you for recompense for these insults/outrages. 
For being unjust to us, you put him in bonds. (498, 504, 516-518) 
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Dionysus’ warnings are more cryptic than Lyssa’s detailed account of what she will 
do, but the exchange between Pentheus and Dionysus nevertheless provides some 
preparation for the god’s punishment of Pentheus.  
The “palace-miracle” scene itself, as we have already seen, invokes the 
unfolding of the earthquake, the destruction of the house, and Dionysus’ escape from 
his bonds, using language that evokes immediacy, progression, and high emotion. 
While the language and syntax of this passage are most reminiscent of the Chorus’ 
entry song in Seven against Thebes, the structure of this specific passage, as well as 
the larger arc that extends before and after it, is more reminiscent of the “unstageable” 
scene of Heracles. In Seven, the Chorus describes and creates the enemy’s attack in a 
single, long, song. While its rhythm is choppy and its syntax often disjointed, it does 
not involve any interruptions from other characters, on or offstage. In Heracles, 
however, the Chorus’ descriptions of the action and their worries for those inside the 
house are accompanied by periodic exclamations from Amphitryon, who is off stage 
and inside the house, in the thick of the unfolding action. Amphitryon’s exclamations 
heighten the emotion and the immediacy of the scene, particularly because the Theban 
elders of this Chorus, while sympathetic to Heracles and his family, are not themselves 
in danger or in fear for their own safety. Similarly, the “palace-miracle” scene of 
Bacchae involves the Chorus’ description of such events as the earthquake and the 
appearance of a flame on Semele’s tomb, combined with Dionysus’ calls to them from 
off stage, within the palace. Here, Dionysus is in control of the action inside, unlike 
Amphitryon, but his cries do serve to heighten the emotion and immediacy of the 
action in similar ways. His calls for an earthquake and for fire (585, 594-595) help to 
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create the sense of power and divine action that is vital to the scene and its intensity. 
This passage thus uses techniques of language and structure previously seen in both 
Seven against Thebes and Heracles to create a strong sense of immediacy, 
progression, and emotional intensity. 
Next, as in Heracles, a character (here, Dionysus) comes on stage from the 
house and provides more specific details of what has happened inside. Dionysus 
clearly has a more active role in the destruction than does the Messenger in Heracles, 
but he nevertheless fills a parallel role to that of the Messenger when he comes 
outside, giving a detailed response (616-641) to the Chorus’ requests that he tell them 
how he was freed (613, 615).
129
 In fact, Dionysus’ first speech upon entering confirms 
at least a degree of reality of the earthquake: “You have felt, as it seems, Bacchus / 
shaking to pieces the house of Pentheus?” (605-606). One could argue that this proves 
only that Dionysus knows that the Chorus has felt an earthquake and not necessarily 
that an earthquake actually occurred, but given its placement of immediately following 
the action itself, it is much more likely to function similarly to the Messenger’s report 
in Heracles: for an audience that might be confused about how to interpret what it has 
just seen and heard, this comment serves as a guide to interpretation. Furthermore, 
Dionysus’ more extended account of the events also confirms that a flame appeared on 
Semele’s tomb: “Bacchus, having shaken the house, and having come, placed a 
flame/fire on the tomb of his mother” (623-624). Dionysus explains that Pentheus 
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 “But how were you set free, having met an impious man?” (613), and “But did he 
not bind fast your hands in binding knots?” (615). 
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misperceived this flame as a fire consuming his entire house (624-626), but he gives 
no indication that the flame on the tomb did not, in fact, appear.  
Dionysus’ past-tense account of the preceding events mentions both of the 
most supernatural, “unstageable” events that the Chorus had perceived, the earthquake 
and the fire, and thus it provides guidance to the audience for its own interpretation of 
what has happened. The basic structure here follows that of the scene from Heracles: 
each involves a preparation followed by a scene of immediate, progressive description 
of the action as it happens, followed by a clearer, past-tense account of the action. 
Dionysus’ report may not be as objective as that of a typical messenger, but it still 
provides the framework necessary for an audience to interpret action that may have 
been staged very abstractly or not at all. 
In the epiphany of Dionysus in Bacchae, Euripides thus uses elements of the 
precedents found in both Seven against Thebes and Heracles, blending techniques that 
his audience would likely have known. This scene does not have as many or as 
explicit directives to the audience as does Heracles, but then, why should we expect 
that? Perhaps the audience is more sophisticated at this point in “reading” such scenes, 
or at least Euripides may expect it to be. Further, is it not a natural course for a 
playwright to experiment with a technique or convention that already has some 
precedent? The experiment of Bacchae, then, would be to combine the wilder, more 
emotional elements of the scene in Seven against Thebes (and possibly other plays that 
we do not have) with the type of events represented in Heracles and the structure used 
there to lead the audience through the experience and interpretation of the events. 
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Exploding the Boundaries of the Stage in Prometheus Bound 
In all three of the examples of unstageable action we have seen so far, it is the 
chorus who creates that action. The chorus of Greek tragedy is often understood as 
some kind of connection point between the audience and the performance, whether 
that connection is figured as the chorus providing a commentary on the action, 
speaking as the general citizenry, serving as an onstage audience, or otherwise 
ushering the spectators through an experience of the performance. Given this general 
understanding of the function of the tragic chorus, as varied as individual critics’ and 
particular tragedies’ versions of it might be, it seems natural that the chorus would be 
the vehicle through which the audience would understand and experience stage action 
that might otherwise be unclear. Nevertheless, extant tragedy offers one powerful 
example of “unstageable” action that does not follow this trend and thus stands in 
contrast to the techniques used in Seven against Thebes, Heracles, and Bacchae. 
At the end of Prometheus Bound, Zeus (unseen) fulfills his threats to punish 
Prometheus for his defiance, and in the final 24 lines of the play, the Chorus falls 
silent, and possibly exits, leaving Prometheus himself to narrate the cataclysm, 
whatever its staging might have entailed, as it occurs. This moment is certainly not the 
only way in which Prometheus Bound breaks from conventions and puzzles those who 
would attempt to interpret it or imagine an original performance: the play has been the 
subject of a variety of fervently debated controversies, covering topics ranging from 
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authorship
130
 to the staging of the Chorus of Oceanids in their (supposedly) flying 
vehicles.  
Aside from the authorship question, most of the issues that trouble critics are 
related to the staging of the play. How was Prometheus bound to the rock? Did the 
Chorus really enter in flying vehicles? How could that even be possible with the 
Greeks’ stage technology? Did Oceanus enter on some kind of flying creature? What 
happens to the Chorus at the end of the play? What happens to Prometheus? Indeed, 
the authorship and stagecraft controversies even intersect for some critics, as Oliver 
Taplin explains his understanding:  
It is hard to suppress the suspicion that there was a cruder and less 
creditable motive for this staging [of the Chorus]: in such an uneventful 
and wordy play the dramatist felt that some extraordinary and 
outlandish ‘happening’ was needed to enliven the scene. Throughout 
this book I maintain that gratuitous spectacle is the resort of a poor 
playwright who is at a loss for true dramatic material, and that 
Aeschylus, as a great theatrical artist, integrates the visual aspects of 
the drama into the work as a whole. This is not the case, it seems, in 
Prom[etheus] as we have it. (Taplin (1977) 260) 
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 Alan Sommerstein provides a succinct summary of the major scholarship on this 
issue in his introduction to the play in the Loeb edition (p. 432-433). Attribution to 
Aeschylus was never doubted in antiquity, but recent scholars have raised questions 
and proposed a range of other possibilities, including Aeschylus’ son Euphorion as the 
author or reviser. 
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This line of reasoning leads to the general rule that I discussed earlier concerning 
some critics’ approach to spectacle in Aeschylus: anything that seems outlandish and 
gratuitous must be an interpolation by another writer. 
 Prometheus is certainly a problematic text, and arguing for or against 
Aeschylean authorship does not resolve at all the central questions about the play and 
its staging. Ultimately, of course, we can never know exactly how the Greeks staged 
the original performance, but as with Bacchae, we can look to some surrounding 
theatrical examples to develop further our understanding of how the spectacle of this 
play might function, both in a practical sense and in a dramatic one. 
 The precise date of Prometheus is uncertain, although there are external clues 
that would place it sometime between the 460s and 430 BC.
131
 In relation to the other 
plays I have discussed as examples of “unstageable” action, then, Prometheus was 
most likely produced after Seven against Thebes (467 BC) but well before Heracles 
(ca. 416 BC) or Bacchae (probably 405 BC). In this context, I propose that we can 
understand Prometheus Bound as another experiment, whose success is debatable and 
ultimately unknowable, in how to use and stage spectacular action that would seem 
too big or otherwise impossible for the stage. Aeschylus had already used the chorus 
to create an attack on a city in Seven against Thebes, and the tetralogy that included 
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 Alan Sommerstein summarizes the evidence in his introduction to the play (p. 433-
434). Cratinus parodied Prometheus Unbound, the sequel to Prometheus Bound, in 
429, giving a relatively firm date by which the play must have been produced. There is 
less evidence for a boundary on the other end of the range: Sommerstein notes that the 
play includes a clear reference to Suppliants, which places it after that play, but the 
dating of Suppliants is itself very unclear. Aeschylus’ son Euphorion won first prize in 
431, so for those who argue for Euphorion as the playwright or reviser, this is a very 
attractive date (Sommerstein 434). 
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that play won first prize, suggesting a positive reception. Prometheus Bound, then, can 
be seen as a later experiment that takes several further steps in the extremity of the 
action invoked and also employs some important structural or technical variations in 
the creation of that action. 
 The flying entrances of the Chorus and of Oceanus are deservedly the subject 
of much critical discussion, but these moments could be handled in a variety of ways 
without substantially altering the course of the play.
132
 The final moments of the play, 
however, are undoubtedly climactic and fundamental to the overall action and 
progress of the play, as the fulfillment of Zeus’ threats to punish Prometheus, first for 
giving fire to mortals and then for refusing to tell what he knows about how Zeus 
might father a son who would overthrow him. The representation of this final action, 
then, through both words and staging, must communicate clearly to the audience what 
is happening, even if the surviving clues to that representation are less clear to readers 
almost 2500 years later.  
 Structurally, the preparation for and invocation of the play’s final cataclysm 
are similar to those found in Heracles. In Euripides’ play, Lyssa’s description of what 
she will do prepares the audience to understand the action that follows, and then the 
Chorus, supported by Amphitryon and his exclamations, creates the experience of the 
action as it happens. Similarly, in Prometheus Bound, Hermes’ detailing of what Zeus 
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 This is what would lead Taplin and others to conclude that the spectacle is 
gratuitous. I would counter that we do not have enough evidence for how these 
instances of flight were handled to understand how important they were to the 
experience, if not to the plot and central meaning, of the play. Certainly it is possible 
that the Chorus’ and Oceanus’ flying entrances highlighted the burdens and 
imprisonment of both Prometheus and Io, and I am unwilling to write off this and 
similar potential effects as superfluous. 
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will do to punish Prometheus if he does not obey, along with Prometheus’ own 
specific defiance of those threats, sets up expectations for the specific events to follow.  
As he nears the end of his attempt to convince Prometheus to yield to Zeus’ 
commands, Hermes adds more specific details to his warnings of what Zeus will do to 
punish Prometheus. He begins his detailed description of the torments to come by 
ordering Prometheus to look at what will happen if he disobeys: “But look at/consider 
[(0"C#+], if you do not obey my words, / what a storm and triple-wave of evils / will 
come upon you, inescapable” (1014-1016). Significantly, the detailed prediction that 
follows begins with an imperative of a verb of perception, “(0"C#+” [look 
at/consider], which should prepare the spectators to picture the events for themselves 
as Hermes describes them. Just as the Chorus’ words of perception in Seven against 
Thebes create a powerful, sensory impression of the enemy’s attack, this word might 
be an early, subtle suggestion to the audience of the visual, spectacular nature of the 
action to come, whether they later see an elaborate staging or imagine it for 
themselves.  
According to Hermes’ predictions, the event will include thunder and lightning 
that will shatter the rock and bury Prometheus in the debris, to be followed later by 
daily visits from Zeus’ eagle: 
… First, indeed, with thunder 
 and with lightning fire the father will tear apart 
this jagged chasm and will hide/cover your 
body, and a rocky embrace will hold you. 
And when a great length of time has been completed, 
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you will come on a return to the light. And the winged 
hound of Zeus, the tawny eagle, fiercely 
will cut apart your body to great tatters. 
Coming forth uncalled to an all-day banquet, 
it will feast itself on your liver, becoming black with gnawing. (1016-
1025)
133
 
Of these events, the eagle’s visits would belong to some future time, after the end of 
the action of this play but likely in its sequel. Based only on this speech of Hermes, the 
actions that seem to belong to the cataclysm that unfolds at the end of the play include 
the thunder and lightning and the destruction of the rock, presumably culminating in 
the burial or disappearance of Prometheus. 
 Prometheus follows Hermes’ warning with another expression of his defiance, 
and here he lists some possible actions that Zeus could take and boldly insists, “Even 
with all of that, he will not kill me” (1053). Prometheus’ mocking speech reiterates 
some of the events that Hermes has already mentioned, but it also adds new 
possibilities to that list, as Prometheus dreams up even more horrific punishments and 
announces that even those would not kill him or persuade him to relent:  
As for these things, let the two-edged curl of fire 
be thrown against me, and let the aether/air 
be roused with thunder and a spasm 
of fierce winds, and may the wind shake 
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 For Hermes’ complete speech, lines 1007-1035, see the appendix at the end of this 
chapter. 
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the earth from its foundations by its roots, 
and let the wave of the sea with jagged roaring/surging 
demolish the paths 
of the heavenly stars. And let him throw  
my body altogether into dark Tartarus 
with firm whirls of force. (1043-1052) 
Even though the added phenomena of winds, earthquakes, roaring waves, and a 
hurling into Tartarus are not specifically threatened in Hermes’ speech, Prometheus 
here brings these into the audience’s imagination. It is no small wonder that critics 
have tended to focus so strongly on Prometheus being swallowed up into Tartarus, 
despite the fact that Hermes does not predict this precise event. Oliver Taplin 
complains about this very common hasty assumption: 
It seems universally agreed that Prometheus is swallowed down into 
Tartarus. But the text does not actually authorize that. When Hermes 
gives the official account of Prometheus’ punishment in 1016-19 he 
says nothing about Tartarus. It is true that Tartarus is invoked in his 
taunt at 1026-9. But in its context this is not really a prediction; the 
audience would take it simply as an '=>'#$&'. It is Prometheus, not 
Hermes, who suggests that he will go to Tartarus… (1050-3). He is not 
saying what Zeus will do, but is defying him by saying ‘let him do 
what he will, he cannot kill me.’ (Taplin (1977), 272) 
While Taplin is certainly correct in his explanation of what each character specifically 
says, he does not consider the possibility that the perhaps over-enthusiastic adoption of 
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this thrilling further event by critics could reflect a likely audience experience and 
response. If a modern reader can feel swept up in this excitement and lose track of 
whether Hermes or Prometheus suggested the most spectacular or the punishments, 
how much more so might a spectator elide such specifics in the course of a 
performance? Again, we cannot know exactly how the end of the play was staged, and 
that staging might have made the specific events clear, but regardless, I would argue 
that Prometheus’ final speech of defiance introduces a new idea to the spectators’ 
imaginations, and theatrical logic would suggest that it would now be a part of their 
larger sense of what the cataclysm might entail. 
 Hermes’ speech of warning and Prometheus’ speech of defiance thus prepare 
the audience for whatever realization of the threatened punishment the play might 
provide. The remainder of the play does leave many questions open as to exactly what 
happens. Hermes advises the Chorus to leave so that they at least might escape, but the 
Chorus responds with an expression of support and loyalty to Prometheus, insisting 
that they will stay and suffer alongside him. Hermes reminds everyone that he has 
warned them and is not responsible for whatever will befall them, and then he exits.
134
  
It is here that our understanding of the action and staging becomes particularly 
uncertain, as Prometheus describes Zeus’ fulfillment of his threats as it unfolds: 
And now in deed/reality, and no longer in word, 
the earth has been made to shake/roll! 
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 He does not specifically say that he is leaving, but his final speech suggests that, 
and from a practical standpoint, there is already a serious challenge in how to get the 
Chorus and Prometheus off the stage or how to end the play without doing so, so I 
think it is extremely unlikely that he would linger. 
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And from the depths an echo of thunder 
bellows back, and fiery spirals  
of lightning burst forth, and whirlwinds whirl around 
dust, and with a spring, gusts  
of all winds blow against each other, 
making known their discord, 
and the aether has been thrown into confusion by the sea. (1080-1088) 
With the first line, Prometheus makes it very clear that the cataclysm is dramatically 
and theatrically real, taking place in real action [“,%B>”] and not merely in words or 
stories [“µ>!>”] (1080). Regardless of the extent to which this action is being staged 
physically and visibly, it is very much real and immediate in the world of the play. 
This line ushers in the cataclysm by emphasizing the reality, immediacy, and presence 
of the action, that is, its immediacy in terms of both time and place: the events are to 
be understood as taking place in this very moment and in the space represented on the 
stage (not, that is, in some offstage location). 
Prometheus proceeds to describe the events using the present tense that we 
should now expect,
135
 mixed with some verbs in the perfect tense that indicate that 
Zeus has done something whose results are now happening, as with “()(*-)3$#+” [it 
has been made to shake] in line 1081. Together, these verbs support the theatrical 
reality that the future tense of prediction and defiance has become a present tense of 
immediate, progressive realization. Prometheus’ specific list of phenomena here 
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 See, for example, “/#%#µ30j$#+” [bellows] (1082) and “)B-5((&3(+” [whirl/blow 
around] (1085).  
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hearkens back to both Hermes’ warning and to his own refusal to capitulate. His 
description of the cataclysm as he experiences it includes an earthquake, thunder, 
lightning, whirlwinds of dust, strong winds blowing against each other, and some kind 
of disturbance in the air caused by the sea. Hermes had explicitly mentioned the 
thunder and lightning, but the raging of the winds and the sea was Prometheus’ own 
addition in defiance, and thus we have evidence, against Taplin’s careful distinction 
between what Hermes predicts and what Prometheus invokes simply as possibilities, 
that the ideas of potential punishments have now been blended, not only in the minds 
of readers and spectators, but also in the play’s own realization of the potentials 
previously invoked. Given this blending, it is also entirely possible that the play does 
end with Prometheus either disappearing into Tartarus or being buried in debris as his 
rocky crag shatters. While he never says that he is being swallowed up by either 
Tartarus or rocks, the audience has been prepared for a climax along these lines, and 
an abstract staging could stand in for a more elaborate theatrical reality, relying on the 
audience’s imagination to fill in the gaps.
136
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 In his commentary, Mark Griffith argues: “It is most likely that, here again, the 
words did the work, and P. remained in view of the audience as the storm was 
imagined raging round him” (277). He also, however, presents some of the other 
possibilities that have been proposed for the end of the play. For example, “P. may 
have been so positioned that part of his ‘rock’ was able to be withdrawn through a 
door in the skene, or perhaps the rock itself opened up (i.e. ‘collapsed’, cf. 1018-19) 
and allowed P. to sink back out of sight (so E. Simon, Das antike Theater (Heidelberg 
1972) 32-33). Use of the ekkyklema, or of a trap-door, for this purpose is possible, but 
unlikely; (see Pickard-Cambridge, TDA 100-22, Taplin 442-3, 447-8)” (277). My 
inclination would be to imagine a middle ground, as I have done elsewhere, that 
involves some degree of visible, physical staging but relies on other forms of 
supporting theatrical communication to clarify the action and make it real to the 
audience. 
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Prometheus’ final speech thus creates theatrically a great supernatural 
cataclysm involving a powerful storm and earthquake, possibly culminating in his 
disappearance into Tartarus or under rocks. Structurally, the play leads the audience 
through the understanding and experience of the event very similarly to methods 
found in Heracles. The speeches of Hermes and Prometheus introduce particular 
phenomena as being part of the threatened punishment, setting up expectations for the 
audience of what this event will ultimately involve, just as Lyssa’s speech in Heracles 
gives the audience specific foreknowledge of what will happen in the house. In both 
plays, these predictions serve to clarify whatever physical staging will accompany the 
verbal creation of the action itself, helping the spectators to “read” whatever they see 
on the stage. Each play then features the immediate, progressive representation of the 
action with the high emotions and present-tense verbs characteristic of the Seven 
against Thebes parodos. 
The most significant way in which Prometheus Bound departs from these other 
models, however, is in the creation of the action by a character/actor, rather than by 
the chorus. This, I would like to suggest, is what makes the end of the play so baffling 
for a reader: what has happened to the Chorus? The collective nature of the voice and 
experience featured in the creation of unstageable action in Seven, Heracles, and 
Bacchae is integral to the theatrical effect of each example, as it suggests the large 
scale of the action and its pervasiveness throughout the theatrical space. With 
Prometheus as the only speaking witness of the cataclysm, however, we are left to 
wonder whether the event is so localized as to affect only him, contrary to Hermes’ 
warnings to the Chorus, or whether the Chorus has fled without any exit speech or 
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other indication, which would be unusual but possible.  If the Chorus remains present, 
what would it mean for them not to experience the action or to experience it without 
sharing that experience in speech? If the Chorus is still on stage here, it is not 
functioning as an effective connection point between stage and audience: the 
communal sharing of the experience is not offered, or at least it is not offered as 
strongly and openly as it is in the other examples we have seen. If, on the other hand, 
the Chorus leaves the stage, that sudden exit could be theatrically effective, and it 
would solve the practical dilemma of how to get the Chorus off the stage at the end, 
but it would also emphasize Prometheus’ isolation in a way that might lessen the 
impact of the unstageable action for the audience.  
The role of the Chorus in the final moments of the play has long been a point 
of contention, and in his commentary, Mark Griffith summarizes the three major 
options that scholars have proposed: the Chorus can run away before or during 
Prometheus’ final speech (as Thomson argues), stay on until the play ends and then 
leave with a “canceled” exit (supported by Taplin, Arnott, and Pickard-Cambridge), or 
disappear into Tartarus with Prometheus (as Wilamowitz and many early critics 
imagined) (Griffith 277). Each possibility involves some serious problems, and 
ultimately this is a conundrum that we can never solve. We simply cannot know 
whether the Chorus stayed or left, but in either case, the absence of that collective 
voice drastically affects the performance of those final events. Despite the stasis of the 
majority of the play, Prometheus Bound is arguably the most spectacular of the extant 
Greek tragedies, and its techniques and effects can best be understood in relation to 
other plays that attempt to stage similarly unstageable action.  
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From this angle, we can see the play using some of the techniques that Seven 
against Thebes had used (most likely before Prometheus) to create highly emotional, 
immediate, and spectacular action, as well as the basic structural pattern that Heracles 
would use years later to lead the audience through a preparation, experience, and recap 
of such action. While we cannot make the argument too strongly, given the tiny 
fraction of all Greek tragedy that remains to us, I would like to suggest that 
Prometheus Bound shows us why all of the other examples of extreme, large-scale, 
“unstageable” action feature the narration of the chorus. My hypothesis is that 
Prometheus Bound is, among other things, an experiment in the creation of the kinds 
of action I have termed “unstageable” and that, unlike its (likely) predecessor Seven 
against Thebes, it is not wholly successful. This is not to say that audiences did not 
like it, and indeed, if it was actually produced by Euphorion in his winning tetralogy 
of 431, they almost certainly liked it very much, but it is possible that the play proved 
that using a character/actor to create such action is less successful, or possibly just 
more difficult, than using a chorus. Prometheus Bound thus stands as another example 
of the techniques characteristic of the creation of unstageable action but also provides 
an important point of contrast through its conspicuously different use of its chorus. 
  
Medea’s “Dragon Chariot”: Intersections of Action and Object   
The battles, earthquakes, and physical destruction found in Seven against 
Thebes, Heracles, Bacchae, and Prometheus Bound represent the most large-scale, 
spectacular, “unstageable” action in extant Greek tragedy. There is also, however, 
another moment that has been the subject of similar critical debate with respect to its 
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stagecraft: at the end of Euripides’ Medea, Medea claims to be escaping to Athens in a 
chariot provided by her grandfather Helios. How could a flying chariot carrying 
Medea and the bodies of her two sons possibly have been represented on the Greek 
stage? While the mechanê is a tempting proposal for allowing her to fly in her chariot, 
and many scholars have argued for this staging,
137
 C.W. Marshall has shown that this 
is not a reasonable suggestion in terms of practicality and the laws of physics.
138
 The 
problem is that Medea needs to be physically separated from Jason, and she needs 
some kind of representation of a chariot to contain her and the children’s corpses, yet 
an elaborate chariot flying through the air with that much weight is simply impossible 
on that stage.  
 In light of this discussion of “unstageable” action, Medea’s chariot emerges as 
an “unstageable” prop or set piece. The chariot is dramatically real, in that it is 
necessary for the plot and action of the play that she have a means of escape to Athens 
that keeps her safely out of Jason’s reach, and it is theatrically real, in that the 
audience must understand it to be present on the stage in that moment. The chariot 
itself, however, may look very little like a “real” chariot. In contrast to the detailed 
verbal creations of unstageable action that we have seen, Medea speaks only very 
briefly to the presence of her chariot: 
/#"(#+ /6'&3 $&"=’. ). =’ !µ&" 2%)5#' ,2)+., 
                                                
137
 For example, in his commentary on the play, Donald Mastronarde describes the 
scene thus: “above the centre of the skênê a prop-chariot carrying Medea and dummy-
corpses of the children comes into view, carried by the rising arm of the crane. The 
chariot is not described in the text, but is clearly capable of flight, so is in some way 
winged…” (377). 
138
 Marshall explored issues related to the mêchanê in a lecture at Cornell University 
in 2008. 
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$&+6'=’ =2:µ# /#$%0. X-+&. /#$+% 
=5=1(+' 5µ$', ,%3µ# /&-)µ5#. 2)%6.. (1319-1322) 
[If you have a need/favor of me, say it if you which, but you will never 
touch me with your hand; such is the chariot [=2:µ#] that my father’s 
father Helios has given to me, a bulwark against a hostile hand.] 
While some have drawn on mythology and vase paintings to imagine an elaborate 
flying chariot drawn by serpents, the text itself tells us very little. For the purposes of 
the play, it is necessary only for the audience to know that Medea is in a chariot 
[“=2:µ#”] beyond Jason’s reach and that it has come from a supernatural source. 
 The staging of unstageable action relies on a detailed, extended speech or 
choral song that leads the audience through an experience of the unfolding action and 
emotion. For an unstageable object, either a prop or a set piece, however, there is no 
temporal element, and so the invocation of that object can be shorter and simpler. In 
this case, Medea simply tells the audience how to “read” whatever representation of a 
chariot might be on stage and then moves on to her arguments with Jason. This 
example provides further support for a general understanding of how Greek tragedy 
can make the “unstageable” theatrically real, present, and vital, but it also highlights 
the distinctions between the treatment of action and the treatment of objects. Some 
props may simply be unseen, but in Medea some kind of physical representation of a 
chariot must be on stage to support and separate her, yet the requirements for the 
appearance of that object become minimal in light of her helpful gloss on it. The 
unstageable prop/set piece, therefore, needs some verbal (and possibly gestural) 
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creation just as the unstageable action does, but a much shorter, simpler description is 
sufficient to confirm its identity and reality.  
 
Conclusion 
 Given the limitations of the surviving evidence, many questions about the 
staging of Greek tragedy must always remain unanswerable. We do not know exactly 
how sophisticated the Greeks’ stage technology might have been, and our knowledge 
of actors’ movement and other matters of performance is similarly limited. 
Nevertheless, some tragedies include action that operates on a very large scale and 
seems impossible to stage in anything remotely approaching realism, and these 
examples illuminate some of the unique and powerful qualities of the Greek theater. 
Events such as battles and earthquakes can become theatrically real and vital through 
the careful use of language, particularly by a collective chorus, and that language 
coupled with gesture or abstract staging can even make those events seem visible and 
otherwise real to the senses. Performance inherently involves powerful 
communication between performers and spectators, and the techniques for staging 
such action reveal the active, vibrant nature of the relationship between stage and 
audience in Greek tragedy. This form thus emerges as a theater with a unique capacity 
for staging the unstageable and granting a sense of immediacy and presence to such 
action as it unfolds before the audience. 
 As the perceptual language of some examples suggests, the staging of 
unstageable action relies on a complex invocation and use of the senses, as characters 
and spectators perceive and experience that action. As questions of which stage 
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properties might be seen or unseen, along with the resulting implications, extend to 
issues of larger action, the complex role of perception in this performance form 
becomes even more integral to understanding how the communication intrinsic to 
performance occurs. A further area of inquiry, then, naturally becomes the nature of 
perception itself and particularly perception as the Greeks understood it. What does it 
mean to see or to hear? Are some senses more reliable than others? How does 
perception affect the perceiver? How might it affect the person or thing perceived? An 
exploration of perception can thus provide a new way of interrogating the many 
unresolved questions about both Greek stagecraft and Greek concerns about the nature 
and potential effects of theatrical spectatorship. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3: FULL TEXTS OF KEY PASSAGES 
 
1. Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes, Scout’s Speech (39-68) 
a. Greek text from Alan H. Sommerstein’s edition for the Loeb Classical Library 
(2008). 
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b. English translation.
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  SCOUT 
 Eteocles, best ruler of the Cadmeans, 
40 I have come bringing clear news from the army there; 
 and I myself am an eyewitness of these matters. 
 For seven men, brave company leaders, 
 cutting a bull’s throat into an iron-rimmed shield 
and touching the bull’s blood with their hands, 
45 to Ares and Enuo and blood-loving Phobos (Terror) 
they swore an oath, either to sack the town of the Cadmeans 
by force, placing destruction on the city, 
or, dying, to mix the land into a paste with blood; 
and they were encircling memorials of themselves on the chariot 
50 of Adrastus for their parents at home, letting flow 
their tears, and there was no pity through their mouths; 
for an iron-hearted spirit, blazing with manly courage, 
was breathing, as lions seeing Ares (war) clearly. 
And inquiry of these things is not prolonged with delay,  
                                                
139
 Each English translation in this appendix is my own. In these translations, I have 
generally striven to render the meaning and structure of the Greek literally in order to 
represent the Greek accurately for readers without Greek. For staging, teaching, or 
casual reading, however, I would recommend a looser translation less stilted and more 
dynamic English. 
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55 but I left them drawing lots, so that each of them, 
 drawing from the lot, would lead against the assigned gate.  
 For this, let the best men chosen from the city 
 be stationed at the entrances of the gates at once; 
 for already the fully armed army of the Argives 
60 draws near, raises dust, and stains the ground 
 with drippings of bright foam from the horses’ lungs. 
 And you, just like a trusty helmsman of a ship 
 fortify the city, before the blasts of Ares 
 rush down on it—for the dry-land surge of the army shouts forth— 
65 and take the quickest moment for these things; 
 and I for my part will keep up a loyal 
daytime-scout eye, and perceiving the things outside 
with the clear facts of my report, you will be unharmed. 
 
2. Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes, Chorus’ Entrance Song (78-181). 
a. Greek text from Alan H. Sommerstein’s edition for the Loeb Classical Library 
(2008). 
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b. English translation. 
  CHORUS 
I cry out for terrifying, great sufferings! 
The army, having left its camp, has been set loose;  
80 this huge horse throng gushes forth at a run;  
the dust visible in the air persuades me,  
a voiceless but clear and true messenger.  
190 
The soil <of my land>
140
  
hoof-resounding, brings the noise/shout near to my ear.  
85 It flies and it roars, just like an unconquerable  
torrent dashing down a mountain. 
O, o, gods and goddesses, keep off 
the rushing evil! 
The noise <of a war-cry comes>
141
 over the walls; 
90 the white-shielded crowd rises up,  
shining, driving against the city. 
Who then will save us, who then of the gods or goddesses  
will bring aid? 
95 Then indeed should I fall down before  
the wooden images of the gods? 
It is the time to clasp the images—why  
do we delay, wailing loudly? 
100 Do you hear, or do you not hear, the crash of shields? 
 <When>, when if not now shall we indulge in 
 <casting> robes and garlands around them as prayers?
142
 
 I see the noise—it is the crash of not one spear! 
 What will you do? Will you betray your own land, Ares, 
105 indigenous of old? 
 O golden-helmeted god, look, look upon the city 
 which once you beloved! 
 
 Gods, dwellers of the city and land, come, come all of you, 
 see the band 
                                                
140
 “The soil of my land” is Sommerstein’s translation and rendering of a corruption in 
the text (he supplies H-)="µ#. as line 83).  
141
 Sommerstein notes and fills in a lacuna here, posited by Schroeder. The phrase “of 
a war-cry comes” is from Sommerstein’s translation. 
142
 Bracketed words here are part of my own translation but from emendations 
supplied by Sommerstein. 
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110 of maidens supplicating against being taken as slaves. 
 A wave of men with nodding crests splashes/breaks 
115 around the city, urged on by the winds of Ares.  
 But, o father Zeus, you who have the ultimate end of al, 
 save us altogether from capture by enemies! 
120 The Argives are surrounding the city-buildings 
of Cadmus, and fear of their warlike weapons 
<throws us into confusion
143
>, and the bridles through the jaws 
of the horses whine slaughter. 
125 And of the army seven men, heroic and clearly seen, 
 with spear-brandishing and with full equipment come to stand 
 at the seven gates, having been assigned by lot. 
 
 And you, o offspring of Zeus, battle-loving power, 
130 become the savior of our city, 
 Pallas, and the lord of the horse and ruler of the sea 
 with his <             > fish-spearing tool;  
135 give release from our fears, release! 
 And you, Ares, ah, ah, guard the city 
 named for Cadmus and be concerned for us visibly/manifestly. 
 And Cypris, who are the first mother of our race, 
 keep them away; for we have been born from your 
 blood, and we approach you crying out 
145 with prayers calling on the gods. 
 and you, lord Lycus (i.e. Apollo), become a wolf 
 to the enemy army; and you, o Leto-born 
 maiden, make ready your bow. 
 
 Ah, ah, ah, ah! 
                                                
143
 Sommersteins’ translation of !%*(()+, which he accepts from Ritschl. 
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151 I hear the noise of the chariots around the city— 
O Mistress Hera! 
The joints of the heavy-laden axles rattle/shriek— 
Dear Artemis! 
155 The air goes mad, shaken by battle! 
 What does my city suffer? What will happen? 
And what end does the god yet bring it? 
 
Ah, ah, ah, ah! 
 A shower of stones thrown from afar comes to the battlements! 
160 O dear Apollo! 
 A clash of bronze-bound shields at the gates! 
 Child of Zeus, from whom 
 comes the pure/holy war-finishing end in battle, 
 and you, blessed ruler Onca in front of the city, 
165 save your seven-gated seat. 
 
 O gods, shining over all alike, 
 o perfect gods and perfect goddesses, be guards  
 of the lands and towers; 
 don’t betray the city, toiling with the spear, 
170 to the foreign army! 
 Hear, hear the all-righteous 
 prayers, with outstretched arms, of the maidens! 
 
 O dear gods, 
175 delivering and standing around our city, 
 show that you love the city, 
 have care for the worship of the citizens, 
 and, having care, help them. 
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180 And be mindful of our city’s 
 sacrifices, offered zealously. 
 
3. Euripides, Bacchae, Earthquake/“Palace-Miracle” Scene (576-603). 
a. Greek text from David Kovacs’s edition for the Loeb Classical Library (2002). 
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b. English translation. 
  DIONYSUS 
576 O, 
 hear, hear my voice, 
 o Bacchants, o Bacchants! 
  CHORUS 
 Who is that, who and from where is the voice 
 of Euios that calls me? 
  DIONYSUS 
580 O, o, again I shout, 
 the son of Semele, and of Zeus! 
  CHORUS 
 O, o, master, master! 
 Come now into our 
 thiasos/Bacchic revel, o Bromius, Bromius! 
   
195 
DIONYSUS 
585 <Shake> the plain of the earth, o mistress/divine Earthshaker! 
  CHORUS 
 Ah, ah!  
Soon the house of Pentheus  
will be shaken apart into collapse.  
Dionysus is in the house;  
590 worship him! O, we worship him!  
Look at these stone wedges on the columns  
falling apart! Bromios raises a shout  
inside this roof/house. 
 DIONYSUS 
Kindle the flashing, bright lightning;  
595 burn to cinders, burn to cinders the house of Pentheus! 
  CHORUS 
 Ah, ah, 
 do you not see, nor perceive  
the fire, around this sacred tomb of Semele,  
whom once the lightning flame  
of Zeus left lightning-struck?  
600 Throw to the ground, throw  
your bodies, maenads!  
For the lord, the son of Zeus comes against  
this house, putting the above below. 
 
4. Aeschylus (?), Prometheus Bound, Hermes’ warning (1007-1035). 
a. Greek text from Alan H. Sommerstein’s edition for the Loeb Classical Library 
(2008). 
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b. English translation. 
  HERMES 
 Even saying much, it seems that I will speak in vain; 
 for you have not been moistened nor softened by my 
 entreaties, but having champed your mouth as a newly-yoked 
1010 colt, you are forced and you fight against the bridle. 
 But you are made vehement by a weak argument/sophism: 
 for stubbornness, for one not thinking well, 
 itself does not have greater strength than anything at all. 
 But look at/consider, if you do not obey my words, 
1015 what a storm and triple-wave of evils 
 will come upon you, inescapable. First, indeed, with thunder 
 and with lightning fire the father will tear apart 
 this jagged chasm and will hide/cover your 
 body, and a rocky embrace will hold you. 
1020 And when a great length of time has been completed, 
 you will come on a return to the light. And the winged 
 hound of Zeus, the tawny eagle, fiercely 
 will cut apart your body to great tatters. 
 Coming forth uncalled to an all-day banquet, 
1025 it will feast itself on your liver, becoming black with gnawing. 
Of such hardship expect no end, 
 until one of the gods as a successor of your toils 
 appears, and is willing to go into sunless 
 Hades and the dark depths of Tartarus. 
1030 Decide for these things, as this is not a fabricated 
 boast, but indeed it has surely been said. 
 For Zeus’ mouth does not know how 
 to lie, but he completes every word. But you 
 look about and consider: don’t think 
198 
1035 that stubbornness is ever better than good counsel. 
 
5. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, Prometheus’ speech of defiance (1040-1053). 
a. Greek text from Alan H. Sommerstein’s edition for the Loeb Classical Library 
(2008). 
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b. English translation. 
  PROMETHEUS 
1040 He shouted [literally, “barked”] these messages to me, 
 already having seen/known them, and it is not shameful 
 for an enemy to suffer badly from his enemies. 
 As for these things, let the two-edged curl of fire 
 be thrown against me, and let the aether/air 
1045 be roused with thunder and a spasm 
 of fierce winds, and may the wind shake 
199 
 the earth from its foundations by its roots, 
 and let the wave of the sea with jagged roaring/surging 
 demolish the paths 
1050 of the heavenly stars. And let him throw  
my body altogether into dark Tartarus 
with firm whirls of force. 
Even with all of that, he will not kill me! 
 
6. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, Prometheus’ final speech (1080-1093). 
a. Greek text from Alan H. Sommerstein’s edition for the Loeb Classical Library 
(2008). 
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b. English translation. 
  PROMETHEUS 
1080 And now in deed, and no longer in word, 
200 
 the earth has been made to shake/roll! 
 And from the depths an echo of thunder 
 bellows back, and fiery spirals  
of lightning burst forth, and whirlwinds roll/whirl around 
1085 dust, and with a spring, gusts  
of all winds blow against each other, 
making known their discord, 
 and the aether has been thrown into confusion by the sea. 
 Such a storm clearly marches  
1090 against me from Zeus, producing terror. 
 O my holy mother, o aether, 
 rolling the common light on all, 
 see how unjustly I suffer! 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE TOUCH OF THE SPECTATOR: PERCEPTION AS A POINT OF CONTACT 
 
As investigation into stage properties and “unstageable action” has shown, the 
Greek stage was accustomed to create theatrically real, vital objects and action without 
necessarily using tangible, visible representations of those. Language, gesture, 
imaginations, and, possibly, very abstract representations may collaborate to create 
detailed, dynamic theatrical phenomena. In these cases, the spectators “see” these 
objects or actions through their imaginations, rather than simply through their 
physiological sense of vision: the unseen becomes the seen. The natural question then 
arises, can the seen somehow become unseen? If so, why might that be necessary? 
What might these complex spectatorial processes of imaginative seeing, physiological 
seeing, and imaginative “unseeing” mean in relation to Greek ideas about perception 
and then to the performance of Greek tragedy? 
One could argue that the theater has long involved some degree of “unseeing,” 
with the audience needing or choosing to ignore a variety of conditions that might 
distract from the performance and the imagined world. Certainly naturalism relies on 
such selective unseeing, but even spectators of non-naturalistic theater may attempt to 
“unsee” or “unhear” such things as exit signs, cell phone noises, or the whispered 
conversations of people around them.
144
 In Greek tragedy, however, imagining 
                                                
144
 In the ancient Greek context, spectators of tragedy might “unsee” stage machinery, 
at least to some extent. Comedies, such as Peace and Acharnians call attention to the 
obtrusiveness of machinery (for these examples, the mêchanê and ekkyklema, 
respectively), and yet the same spectators might see those same machines used for 
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something literally seen to be unseen may be much more integral than these examples 
to the experience and meaning of the performance.  
 
Epiphany: Gods on the Stage 
The appearance of gods on the stage is a deeply complex issue for tragedy. 
Given the prevalence of gods as characters in Greek drama, it would be easy to take 
for granted their embodied, visual representation by actors, and yet their presence and 
visibility are not at all simple. In Book V of the Iliad, Athena comes to Diomedes 
when he calls out for his help, and she transforms his vision so that he might be able to 
see the gods as they fight in the battle: “'2-S' =’ #N $&+ '/’ V,!#-µ#' K-&', w /%/' 
!/9)', / =,%’ )N B+B'7(0C. :µ;' !)0' :=; 0#/ -'=%#” […and I have taken the mist 
from your eyes, which was on them before, so that you might know well both god and 
man] (V.127-128). Athena’s boon to one of her favorites confirms that in the Homeric 
world, despite the intermingling of gods and men on the battlefield, mortals are 
generally unable to see the divinities among them. Even when the gods are physically 
present and engaging directly in the action, the mortal heroes have some kind of 
“mist” ['2-S'] over their eyes preventing them from seeing those gods. The concept 
that gods might be present but unseen thus has early and significant roots in the 
literary tradition, and it would likely have been very familiar to fifth-century Greeks. 
Even if a mortal can see a god, that sight is not always right or safe. When 
Aphrodite first appears to Anchises in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, for example, 
                                                                                                                                       
serious effects in tragedies within the same festival. Comedies might emphasize the 
noise or clumsiness of the machines, but tragedies might ask spectators to ignore those 
qualities. 
203 
she alters her appearance so that he will not be frightened by the sight of her full glory: 
“($9 =’ #*$&" /%&/*%&+!) 4+0. !3B*$:% T,%&=5$:, / /#%!"'1+ '=µ9$:+ µ"B)!&. 0#/ 
)A=&. Rµ&5:, / µ9 µ+' $#%?9()+)' !' V,!#-µ&$(+ '&9(#.” [And the daughter of Zeus 
Aphrodite stood in front of him, like an unmarried maiden in stature and appearance, 
lest he be afraid upon seeing her with his eyes] (81-83). She later reveals her divinity 
to him, and he confirms her earlier expectation, hiding his face with his cloak to avoid 
looking at her: “$*%?:("' $) 0#/ =(() /#%#0-+=0' ,$%#/)' ---:+, / 6C =’ F3$+. 
2-#5':+ !0#->C#$& 0#-& /%6(1/#” […he was afraid and turned his eyes aside, and he 
hid his handsome face in his cloak] (182-183). Indeed, Anchises has good reason to be 
afraid of seeing Aphrodite: the sight of a god in his full glory is dangerous and might 
even be fatal, as it is for Semele
145
 when Zeus reluctantly appears to her as he does 
among the immortals.
146
 
In some tragedies, the appearance of a god is relatively straightforward, with 
the text clearly establishing that the characters can both see and hear the god. 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides certainly functions with the understanding that Apollo, Athena, 
and the Erinyes are present and able to interact with each other and with Orestes. To 
                                                
145
 Apollodorus includes the story of Semele’s death in his Library, III.4.3. Dionysus 
gestures toward this history at the beginning of Bacchae, as he announces his arrival in 
Thebes: “And I see this tomb of my thunderstruck mother near the palace and the ruins 
of the house, smoldering with the still-living flame of Zeus’ fire, an immortal violence 
of Hera against my mother” (6-9). 
146
 For more on epiphany in contexts other than tragedy, see Verity Platt’s 
forthcoming book, Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Graeco-Roman 
Art, Literature, and Religion. Platt’s focus falls on examples and attitudes later than 
the classical period, but her study still includes some sections relevant to earlier 
contexts. The section “What god is this? Hymnic Guides to Epiphanic Viewing” in 
Chapter 1, “Framing Epiphany in Art and Text,” is particularly useful for considering 
the Homeric Hymns. 
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take a less obvious example, Euripides’ Andromache features an appearance of the 
goddess Thetis at the end of the play, and before she speaks, the Chorus announces her 
approach: 
.I .7· 
$5 0)05':$#+, $5'&. #.(!*'&µ#+ 
!)5&3; 0&"%#+, -)>(()$’ '!%9(#$)· 
=#5µ1' )=) $+. -)30+' #.!"%# 
/&%!µ)36µ)'&. $#' B//&?6$1' 
H!5#. /)=51' !/+?#5')+. (1226-1230) 
[Oh, oh! What is this moving, which of the gods do I perceive? 
Women, look, gaze! Here some god is passing through the clear aether 
and comes down on the plain of horse-pasturing Phthia.] 
The Chorus’s exclamation at the sight of the descending goddess clearly signifies that 
they can, indeed, see Thetis.
147
 Their language is specifically visual, with the words 
“-)>(()$’” and “'!%9(#$)” exhorting each other to “see” the goddess,148 a specificity 
                                                
147
 This is, to some extent, a similar situation to the examples of unstageable action 
discussed in Chapter 3. The Chorus’ present-tense, perceptual language helps to create 
the approach of the god, but the key difference here is that there is actually an actor 
coming onto the stage, and the audience can see that. (I do not think it would be 
feasible to keep the actor off stage or otherwise hidden, since the audience certainly 
needs to be able to hear his voice.) The Chorus’ speech should help the spectators 
understand that whatever they see on the stage is representing the approach 
specifically of a god [“!)5&3,” 1227]. The Chorus can see the god, and the audience 
can see the actor, but the Chorus aids in the interpretation of that actor as god. 
148
 A similar example occurs in Euripides’ Electra. As Electra covers her mother’s 
body, the Chorus exclaims: “But look [&O=)], above the tops of the houses come some 
daemons/spirits or gods of the heavens. For that is not a path for mortals. Why ever do 
they come in an appearance to mortal sight?” (1233-1237). In Euripides’ Heracles, the 
approach of Iris and Lyssa terrifies the Chorus of Old Men, who cry out, “Oh, oh! 
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that lies in contrast to several other examples of gods’ appearances, in which 
characters emphasize their hearing of the god’s voice or use words such as 
“#"(!*'&µ#+,” a more ambiguous word meaning “to perceive.”
149
 In Andromache, 
then, we can understand the goddess Thetis as visible to the characters on stage, due to 
the Chorus’ excitement over seeing her approach. 
The epiphany of Athena at the end of Euripides’ Ion provides a more complex 
example, including a suggestion of why the appearance, and perception, of a god 
might be problematic. At the moment of Athena’s appearance, Creusa has just 
revealed to Ion that his father is actually Apollo, and he is preparing to enter the 
temple to ask whether this is true. Suddenly, Ion exclaims: 
,#· $5. &?01' !3&=601' l/)%$)-+. 
''$9-+&' /%6(1/&' !0,#5')+ !)#';  
,)>B1µ)', @ $)0&"(#, µ+ $& =#+µ6'1'  
R%#µ)', ). µ+ 0#+%6. !(!’ 5µj. R%j'. (1549-52) 
[Oh! Who of the gods [!)#'], rising above the incense-receiving 
temple, shows forth a shining/sun-facing face? Let us flee, o mother, 
and not see that [i.e. the face] of the divinities [=#+µ6'1'], if it is not 
the right time for us to see!] 
                                                                                                                                       
Have we old men come into the same shower of fear, such an apparition do I see 
[R%#] above the house? Flee, flee! Lift up your sluggish limbs, drive far away from 
here! Lord Paean, become a protector for me from calamities!” (815-821). 
149
 This word could include seeing, hearing, feeling, or “sensing” the presence of the 
god and does not necessarily entail any one of those. See below for the analysis of 
Artemis’ appearance in Hippolytus as an example of the use of #"(!*'&µ#+. 
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Ion’s surprise at seeing a god approach is quickly followed by anxiety, even fear, of 
looking upon the “shining”
150
 [''$9-+&'] face of a god when it is not right to do so. 
The gods can certainly be dangerous, and concern over what is or is not appropriate 
behavior for mortals is common. Athena quickly assures Ion and Creusa that she is 
actually benevolent towards them (1554-1555), but Ion’s initial reaction confirms both 
that he does see this god and that such a sight may not be right for them. 
While Ion’s example shows that the sight of a god may be dangerous or wrong 
for a mortal, other plays suggest that the mortal characters may not be able to see the 
god at all. Often, the god speaks before any other character mentions the approach of a 
god, suggesting that the voice may be the first indicator of that god’s presence.
151
 
Further, when gods appear at the ends of plays to resolve conflicts and give 
instructions, those words of instruction and prophecy are of primary importance.  
When Athena appears at the end of Euripides’ Iphigenia among the Taurians, 
she interrupts Thoas as he prepares to pursue the escaping Iphigenia, Orestes, and 
Pylades, and she commands him to listen to her words: “/&$ /&$ =+1Bµ0' $6'=) 
/&%!µ)>)+., -'#E / O6#.; -0&3(&' $9(=’ T!:'#5#. -6B&3.” [Where, where do you 
advance your pursuit, King Thoas? Listen to the words of Athena.] (1435-1436). 
Athena’s command not only emphasizes the importance of what she will say, but also 
serves to identify herself to Thoas, and by extension, to the audience. The scene never 
                                                
150
 Literally, “''$9-+&'” means “opposite the sun.” “Shining” or “sun-reflecting” 
would be less literal definitions but capture the visual effect. 
151
 Examples include Euripides’ Iphigenia among the Taurians (1435), Helen (1642), 
Orestes (1626), and Suppliant Women (1183). Certainly the lack of mention of a god 
before he speaks does not prove that the god should be understood as invisible, but it 
does open up that possibility and focus attention on the god’s voice. 
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specifically shows that the characters cannot see Athena, but the possibility is left 
open. Thoas’ response to her instructions again focuses on her words: “Lady Athena, 
whoever, upon hearing [0-3I'] the words [-6B&+.] of the god is [then] disobedient, 
does not think straight” (1475-1476). Further, Athena’s speech includes instructions 
for Iphigenia, who is now at sea and far from the area represented on stage, and yet the 
goddess delivers these with the second-person pronoun, as if she were speaking 
directly to Iphigenia: “(; =’ 'µ,/ ()µ'*., x,+B"')+#, -)5µ#0#. / Q%#3%1'5#. =)$ $L=) 
0-C=&32)$' !)U·” [And it is necessary for you [(;], Iphigenia, to be a priestess for this 
goddess in the holy meadows of Brauron] (1462-1463). The ability of Athena’s voice 
to travel across this distance emphasizes the significance and supernatural quality of 
that voice, beyond whatever physical, visible presence she may have in front of the 
temple with Thoas. 
Euripides’ Orestes features a very similar example, with ambiguity and 
concern about perception of a god. Apollo appears at the end of the play, just as 
Orestes and Electra are about to set fire to the palace, while Menelaus calls for an 
attack. Apollo interrupts, telling Menelaus to calm down, and then identifies himself: 
“H&$?6. (’ R U:$&". /#$. )=’ !BBS. y' 0#-#” [I, Apollo son of Leto, call you from 
nearby] (1626). As in Iphigenia among the Taurians, the emphasis is on the god’s 
calling voice, and here, “!BBS.” [nearby] even suggests that Apollo may be a short 
distance away or possibly invisible to the mortals, since he includes this note on his 
location. In his response to Apollo, Orestes praises the god for his truthful 
prophesying, but he also reveals that was initially afraid, upon hearing this voice: 
0#5$&+ µ’ !(z)+ =)$µ#, µ9 $+'&. 0->1' 
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 '-#($6%1' =6E#+µ+ (+' 0->)+' =/#. (1668-1669) 
[Indeed, fear came upon me, lest I be hearing one of the avenging 
spirits but thinking that I heard your voice.] 
Orestes, who has been suffering from visions of the Furies, has good reason to doubt 
his own perceptual clarity and to fear that a voice he hears would be from one of them, 
rather than from his advocate, Apollo. This fear is even more natural and significant if 
we understand the god to be invisible to the mortals: Apollo is a young, beautiful god, 
while the Furies are ugly, terrifying spirits, so the visual appearance of the two would 
not be at all ambiguous, and the moment of uncertainty during Apollo’s first line, 
before he introduces himself, would be most dramatically logical and powerful if it 
truly is an uncertain one for the characters. 
While some plays merely suggest the possibility that characters cannot see an 
onstage god, the prologue of Ajax clearly states this fact, and the scene involves a 
particularly complex constellation of perceptual abilities among the characters. As 
Odysseus cautiously traces Ajax’s footsteps and tries to determine where he is, Athena 
appears and offers to be a “guardian”
152
 [,>-#E] for him in his “hunt” [03'#B53] for 
information and the man himself (36, 37). She proceeds to recount Ajax’s murderous 
rampage among the livestock, including her own role in confusing his vision (51-52), 
then announces that she will actually show Odysseus this madness: “=)5E1 =; 0## (&/ 
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 As a simple definition, “,>-#E” means “guard,” but the word often refers to 
sentinels, that is, guards who look out for dangers, so this word also involves a sense 
of the visual. In fact, the Liddell and Scott lexicon includes “observer” as one of the 
secondary definitions. Athena, then, is suggesting that she will both protect and watch 
Odysseus in his efforts. In his Loeb edition, Hugh Lloyd-Jones renders Athena’s offer 
as: “…some time ago [I] set out on the way, eager to guide you in your hunt,” which 
adds a sense of her directing his efforts.   
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$9'=) /)%+,#'9 '6($&'” [And I will show you this affliction/madness clearly from 
every side.] (66). Odysseus begs her not to call Ajax out from his hut, but Athena 
rebukes him for cowardice and brings the man out, making a concession to Odysseus’ 
concerns by promising to blind Ajax’s eyes to Odysseus: “!BI (0&$7(1 ?-",#%# 0#/ 
=)=&%06$#” [I will darken/blind his eyes, even though they see.] (85).  
Thus, in one complication of the characters’ perceptions, Athena blinds Ajax’s 
eyes to Odysseus, though it remains unclear whether she also deafens him to any 
sound of her companion, since she simply orders Odysseus to keep quiet, and he 
obeys: “(5B# '3' H($I. 0#/ µ"'’ 1. 03%)$. ,21'” [Now stand silently and remain as 
you happen to be.] (87). Further, while Athena seems to be able to see and hear both 
of the mortals, they cannot see her but only hear her voice, as Odysseus’ first response 
to her clearly indicates:  
@ ,!"Bµ’ T!*'#., ,+-$*$:. !µ&/ !)#', 
1. )*µ#!". (&3, 06' -/&/$&. {., )µ1. 
,7':µ’ '0&>1 0#/ E3'#%/*I1 ,%)'/… (14-16) 
[O voice of Athena, dearest of gods to me, how clearly, although you 
are unseen, do I hear your voice/call and catch hold of it in my mind…] 
Here, Odysseus uses her voice “[,!"Bµ’”] in a synecdoche for the goddess herself and 
further specifies that she is “-/&/$&.,” literally, “away from sight/visibility” (15). Not 
only is the divine voice of primary importance, as in Iphigenia among the Taurians or 
Orestes, but it is also Odysseus’ only way to perceive his guide. Athena’s explanations 
210 
that her eye is “always” [')/] upon him and that she came “a while ago” [/*-#+153] 
suggest that she has been present through much of his search, without his knowledge, 
and Odysseus does not seem particularly surprised by this (1, 36).
154
 
In the opening scene, then, Athena can see and hear Odysseus and Ajax; 
Odysseus can see and hear Ajax but only hear Athena; and Ajax can hear Athena but 
not perceive Odysseus’ presence at all. These complicated perceptual relationships are 
further supported by the scene’s language, which constantly involves either direct 
discussion of the characters’ perception or metaphorical references to vision. Thus we 
hear not only Athena’s explicit explanation of how she is deceiving Ajax by casting 
deceitful understandings upon his eyes [“=µµ#(+”], for example, but also Odysseus’ 
report that an “V/$+%” [scout] saw Ajax slaughter the herds and then his later 
conclusion that all men are “)?=1-[#]” [images or phantoms] (51-52, 29, 126).  
If these mortal characters on the stage cannot see the goddess, what, then, does 
the audience perceive when watching the actor playing this role? In answer to this 
problem, Pietro Pucci suggests that the audience does not actually see the goddess in 
her full reality or divinity. Yes, there is an actor onstage and in a costume that in some 
way represents the goddess, but Pucci, relying partly on his investigation of gods’ 
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 “/*-#+” places an event in the past, but how far in the past remains ambiguous. The 
most common meaning is “long ago,” but secondary usage would refer to the recent 
past, as in “just now” or “just before.” In this case, the more common usage seems 
appropriate, but I translate it as “a while ago” to capture the ambiguity of the word.  
154
 Ajax never specifically mentions whether he can or cannot see Athena, though he 
does converse with her, assuming that she is his ally and protectress. However, 
Tecmessa’s description of Ajax’s madness the previous night does not mention any 
partner and specifies that he left alone [µ6'&.], so it seems that these mortal characters 
consistently perceive Athena only through hearing her voice (294). 
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epiphanies in epic, argues that this figure is merely a sign of Athena’s actual 
invisibility to mortals:  
The members of the audience, however, [unlike Odysseus] do see the 
goddess. But what they really see is her invisibility to Odysseus. …the 
visibility of the gods is thinkable only by starting from their invisibility. 
Since the gods are invisible, their visibility is represented as a blank, as 
the unsayable, the unutterable. Accordingly here the audience see 
Athena – whatever the stage production presented of her – as a sign of 
her invisibility to Odysseus. Her figure is the sign of a blank. (Pucci 
(1994) 22) 
Since the members of the audience do share in the mortality of Odysseus and Ajax, it 
seems likely that they should not imagine themselves to be so superior as to be able to 
see a complete revelation of Athena’s divinity. Whether “the sign of a blank” or an 
abstract icon of some sort, the Athena that the audience does see should be understood 
as a stand-in for what cannot be seen by mortals, even those outside the world of the 
play. While seeing this actor, the audience imaginatively creates the unseen goddess, 
in a related but converse operation to the imaginative creation of an object or event 
from an unseen “blank.”
155
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 In Religion in the Ancient Greek City, Louise Bruit Zaidman and Pauline Schmitt 
Pantel provide some general background for the issue of something concrete standing 
in for a divinity, which cannot be contained or fully expressed by such. They explain, 
“The special characteristic of all religious representation is to endow the divinity being 
figured with a presence without obscuring the fact that it is not actually there. The 
cultic image must at the same time be thoroughly material – it can be touched, moved, 
manipulated – and yet leave no doubt that it stands for something which is not actually 
present” (215). This perspective also explains how the Greeks could use such a wide 
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Ajax places its audience in a very privileged position, with much more 
information, related much more directly, than is typical in tragedy. Athena herself 
appears onstage and says clearly exactly what she has done and why.
156
 There are no 
oracles, no prophets, no messengers, no human interpretations of any sort.
157
 
Similarly, and perhaps even more strikingly, Ajax’s suicide occurs on stage, with the 
audience as the only witness.
158
 Again, there is no messenger to describe what 
happened behind closed doors and no need for the audience to rely on other 
characters’ information and speculation about how and why the death occurred. 
Through all of the deception that drives the play, the audience is actually seeing more 
clearly than usual. Nevertheless, the need somehow to “unsee” Athena ultimately joins 
the spectators to the human characters, particularly Ajax and Odysseus, whose 
incomplete perceptions drive the action of the play and comment upon the lot of 
mortals. 
                                                                                                                                       
variety of representations for the gods, from anthropomorphic statues and paintings to 
abstract forms such as the herm or simply a stone (215-218). Aniconic representation 
of the divine is thus a major tradition in Greek religion, and using a masked, costumed 
actor to stand in for an invisible, uncontainable divine is in keeping with this. 
156
 A modern production could choose to keep Athena offstage, but I think it most 
likely that the actor would have been on stage in the original production. Certainly the 
acoustics would be much better with the actor in front of the skênê, rather than behind 
it, and Athena is on stage for a full scene, conversing regularly with two other 
characters, so the easiest solution would be to put the actor on stage and give the 
audience cues to understand and imagine the goddess as unseen. 
157
 Tecmessa does relate the story of the previous night, but she does so only after 
Athena has described what really happened. Tecmessa thus provides the audience with 
information about her own, mortal perspective on the events, rather than the factual 
information of what took place. 
158
 There is a scholarly debate about this. Some critics oppose the idea of an onstage 
suicide, suggesting that Ajax exits at the end of his speech, before falling on the 
sword. This is certainly possible, but I think his speech prepares the audience for an 
onstage death, and such a staging makes much better use of the heightened dramatic 
tension of the moment. 
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 As a final example of the significance and complexity of staging the gods, we 
should turn to Euripides’ Hippolytus, another case in which the precise mode of the 
mortal characters’ perception a goddess remains ambiguous, though the situation here 
is complicated by a concern for what might be inappropriate for a god, not just a 
mortal, to see. Appearances of gods frame Hippolytus, with Aphrodite introducing the 
situation and explaining her intentions in the prologue and Artemis explaining 
Theseus’ grave mistake and Aphrodite’s role in the tragedy at the end of the play. 
Aphrodite’s speech is unremarkable as a divine prologue, in its form and context: she 
is alone on stage, and as she introduces Hippolytus’ entrance, she states that she will 
now leave (51-53). Presumably, she is gone before the mortal characters fully enter, so 
there is no opportunity for Hippolytus and his attendants to see or hear this goddess.
159
  
As they enter, Hippolytus and his servants, the Chorus, sing to the goddess 
Artemis as if she were present, including a direct-address greeting her (61-72) and a 
second-person pronoun (“(&/,” 73) in their presentation of a garland to her. This 
language and their gestures, including presenting the garland and probably also 
adorning her statue with it,
160
 support the sense of Hippolytus’ companionship with 
the goddess and of Artemis’ presence with her favorite, but there is no actor 
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 A bit later in the scene, Hippolytus and his Servant refer to a statue of Aphrodite as 
if it were the goddess herself, but clearly a statue simply stands in for the divinity 
without containing or fully embodying her (101). Although there may be some vague 
sense of the god’s presence or attention, the mortals do not seem to expect the god to 
interact with them in direct, clear ways at this point. 
160
 Hippolytus indicates the garland with the particle “$6'=),” which typically “points” 
to the referent, suggesting that the object is present on the stage (73). When 
Hippolytus uses the imperative “="E#+” [receive] to exhort the goddess to take the 
crown, he probably places it on the statue (83). In his commentary on the play, 
Michael Halleran agrees that in lines 82-83 Hippolytus “probably presents the garland 
to the goddess’s statue” (Halleran (1995) 155, note on 82-3). 
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representing Artemis on the stage at this point, and the scene lacks the direct 
interaction that marks an epiphany. Further, this opening scene introduces the idea that 
Hippolytus, despite his close relationship with her, cannot see the goddess: 
µ6'> B*% !($+ $&"$’ !µ&/ B"%#. ?%&$#'· 
(&/ 0#/ E>')+µ+ 0#/ -6B&+. 'µ)5?&µ#+, 
0->1' µ;' #*=9., =µµ# =’ &*2 R%#' $0 (6'. 
$"-&. =; 0*µC#+µ’ G(/)% :%E*µ:' ?5&3. (84-87) 
[For this privilege is for me alone of all mortals: I am together with 
you, and I exchange words with you, hearing your voice, but not seeing 
your face.
161
 And may I reach the finish line of life just as I began it.] 
Hippolytus declares his honored position as the goddess’s companion, and he clearly 
states that he converses with her and hears her voice but admits that he does not see 
her. This brief song of worship and celebration thus sets up not only Hippolytus’ 
companionship with and preference for Artemis, but also the unique perceptual quality 
of the relationship between this goddess and mortal, which then clarifies the nature of 
their interaction when Artemis appears at the end of the play. 
Unlike the early scenes of Aphrodite’s prologue and the mortals’ worship of 
Artemis, Artemis’ appearance at the end of the play involves direct interaction with 
Theseus and Hippolytus, as she reveals the true extent of the calamity to Theseus and 
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 Here, “=µµ#” [eyes] functions as a synecdoche to mean the “face,” “appearance,” 
or “sight” of a person. This is a common use of the word, but here, it also serves to 
emphasize the contrast between hearing and seeing, yielding a single line balanced 
with two hearing words (“0->1'” and “#*=9.”) in the first half of the µ|'…=" 
construction (often rendered as “on the one hand…on the other hand”) and two seeing 
words (“=µµ#” and “R%#'”) in the second half. 
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comforts her dying favorite. Artemis enters shortly after the Messenger’s description 
of Hippolytus’ violent accident, just as the Chorus acknowledges the power of Cypris 
(Aphrodite). She begins by commanding Theseus to listen and by introducing herself: 
(; $0' )*/#$%5=:' F.B"1. 0"-&µ#+ 
/#$=’ !/#0&"(#+· 
U:$&". =; 06%: (’ k%$)µ+. #*=#. (1283-1285) 
[I order you, nobly born son of Aegeus, to listen! I, the maiden 
daughter of Leto, Artemis, speak to you.] 
As Michael Halleran notes in his commentary on these lines, the command to listen 
and the god’s introduction of herself are both typical elements for the beginning of a 
god’s speech, and we have already seen similar beginnings in Iphigenia among the 
Taurians and Orestes (Halleran (1995) 258, n. on 1283-1285).
162
 As in these other 
examples, the emphasis in Artemis’ speech falls on her words, as she commands 
Theseus to listen [“!/#0&"(#+”] to her and to hear [“-0&3)”] about the current state of 
his misfortunes (1284, 1296).  
 Hippolytus’ response to the goddess’s presence further clarifies that the 
mortals can only hear, and not see, Artemis. Hippolytus enters, supported or carried by 
attendants, and laments his miserable fate at length, never acknowledging the presence 
of the goddess who has so often been his companion (1347-1388). Only after Artemis 
speaks to him does Hippolytus recognize her: 
,#· 
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 See also Sophocles’ Philoctetes (1411-1412), which also involves a reference to 
seeing the god Heracles, and Euripides’ Suppliant Women (1183-1184), Electra 
(1238-1240), Ion (1554-1555), and Helen (1642-1645). 
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@ !)$&' V(µ9. /')"µ#· 0#/ B&% !' 0#0&$. 
y' }(!6µ:' (&3 0'')0&3,5(!:' ="µ#.· 
,($’ !' $6/&+(+ $&+(5=’ k%$)µ+. !)*. (1391-1393) 
[Oh! O divine breath of fragrance! Although I am in misfortune, I have 
perceived you and felt my body lighten. The goddess Artemis is in this 
place!] 
Michael Halleran takes a literal approach to Hippolytus’ exclamation here, explaining 
that he “knows the goddess only by her scent” (Halleran (1995) 264, n. on 1391-
1393). In his translation, he accordingly renders “!)$&' V(µ9. /')"µ#” as “divine 
fragrance,” based on the definition of “/')"µ#” as a “wind” or “breeze” (Halleran 
139). However, “/')"µ#” commonly means “breath” or “breathing,” and if understood 
in this way, the phrase becomes a poetic expression of the goddess’s voice as a 
fragrant perfume, a metaphorical extension appropriate for praising a god.
163
 Since 
Hippolytus recognizes his companion only after she speaks, the latter interpretation is 
more likely in this context, and, further, an emphasis on her voice here fits with his 
earlier expression of his honor in conversing with Artemis and hearing her voice (85-
86).
164
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 See Liddell and Scott, “/')"µ#.” The first definition is “blast” or “wind,” but the 
second definition is “breathed air” or “breath” and is also very common, with many 
examples and sub-definitions. Interestingly, “!)$&' /')"µ#” later came to mean “Holy 
Spirit” in the Christian tradition. 
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 In Tragedy’s End: Closure and Innovation in Euripidean Drama, Francis M. Dunn 
interprets Hippolytus’ speech here as the delayed recognition and praise of the 
goddess that should normally accompany an epiphany: “In Hippolytus, this verbal 
expression of awe is postponed; the clumsy Theseus has no words of recognition for 
Artemis, who must wait for proper acknowledgement until the dying Hippolytus is 
brought onstage: ‘Ah! Breath of divine fragrance! Even in my misfortune I sense you 
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 Regardless of whether Hippolytus hears her voice or smells her fragrance, 
however, it is clear that he recognizes her through a mode of perception other than 
vision. He claims to have perceived her, using the word “}(!6µ:',” which could 
imply seeing, hearing, or otherwise sensing her, and given his earlier statement that he 
cannot see her face, in conjunction with his failure to notice her presence before she 
speaks, the visual aspect of this ambiguous word is at least eliminated as a possibility. 
The audience, then, can see the actor playing Artemis but must imagine the goddess 
herself as unseen. The actor in costume indicates the presence of the god but, as with 
Athena in Ajax, actually serves as a sort of placeholder for an unseen divinity that 
transcends physical, contained representation, particularly by a mere mortal. 
 In her own pronouncements to Theseus, Artemis further extends the thematic 
significance of perception through the use of perceptual language that heightens the 
contrast between gods and mortals and, indirectly, the contrast between hearing and 
seeing. The latter contrast emerges in her first statement of Theseus’ ruin: 
O:()", $5 $*-#. $&$(=) (3'9=C, 
/#$=’ &*2 R(51. (0' '/&0$)5'#. 
C)3="(+ µ>!&+. '-62&3 /)+(!)#. 
',#'9; ,#')%&' =’ ,(2)!). -$:'. (1286-1289) 
                                                                                                                                       
and my body is lightened, for the goddess Artemis is here’ (1391-93)” (31). Dunn 
does not, however, take into account the fact that even Hippolytus does not 
acknowledge her until after he has lamented his own fate in a speech of more than 
forty lines and even then does so only after she speaks to him. Dunn never considers 
the possibility that the mortals cannot see Artemis, but I think this is a more effective 
solution to the problem of the delays than simply “clumsiness” on Theseus’ part. 
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[Theseus, why do you, wretched one, rejoice at these things, having 
killed your son not piously, persuaded of unseen/unclear things by the 
false words of your wife? But you received a seen/clear destruction.] 
Theseus did not derive his knowledge of the situation from evidence that he could see, 
but his wretchedness is already clear and visible to the gods, and by supplying true 
information, Artemis will make it visible to him. As she explains to Theseus exactly 
where he erred, Artemis tells him that when he used one of his three curses granted by 
his father, Poseidon, in order to ensure his son’s death, “you were evil/base, in his 
sight and mine” [(S =’ ,' $’ !0)5'> 0'' !µ&/ ,#5'C 0#06.] (1320). While Theseus has 
been forced to rely on deceptive words, including Phaedra’s suicide note and 
Hippolytus’ refusal to break his oath by revealing the truth, Artemis and Poseidon, 
powerless to cross the will of another god,
165
 have watched with full understanding as 
the tragedy unfolded. These contrasts emphasize the sharp divide between the 
knowledge and perceptual information available to the gods and those available to 
mortals. Phaedra, Hippolytus, and Theseus have all been hampered by the limitations 
of their sight and understanding, while the gods have looked on with full 
understanding, though limited ability to intervene. 
 In Hippolytus, then, the fact that the mortals cannot see the goddess Artemis 
when she appears at the end supports the play’s thematic preoccupation with 
knowledge, deception, and human limitations. The gods may be watching everything 
from above, but the mortals themselves are left with either total blindness or partial, 
and thus dangerously deceptive, vision. Thus far, Hippolytus is not a particularly 
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 Artemis specifies that Zeus does not allow a god to cross another (1329-1334). 
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unusual case. Like Ajax, it features mortals who can hear but not see a goddess, as 
well as larger thematic significance related to that limitation. Mortals make mistakes 
based at least in part on their obscured vision and ready trust in what they hear, thus 
calling into question the reliability of seeing and hearing as sources of knowledge, as 
well as the disconnect in the knowledge available to mortals versus to gods. Alongside 
these relatively typical features, however, an additional concern for the limitations of 
perception emerges: what is or is not appropriate to see? 
 If tradition suggests that mortals cannot generally see gods in their full glory, 
at least not without repercussions, perhaps the inappropriateness of seeing a god, 
except under special conditions, is one explanation for why tragedy might have asked 
its spectators to perform this task of imaginative “unseeing.” The actor in costume 
provides a more iconic representation than a herm or an abstract stone, but when a 
play specifically clarifies that the mortal characters on stage cannot see the god, it 
also, by extension, reassures the spectators that they themselves are not seeing a real 
god. While it is unlikely that a spectator would actually confuse an actor with a real 
divinity, it is certainly possible that spectators might be nervous about the embodied 
representation of a powerful, sometimes threatening and volatile, god. Eventually, of 
course, the presence of god characters in onstage action becomes a convention in 
Greek theater, but perhaps it was not so innocuous or easily accepted early in drama’s 
development. By asking its spectators to “unsee” the represented gods, tragedy 
protects the important division between mortal and immortal, keeping actors and 
spectators alike aware of their own mortality and proper place in relation to the divine.  
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Defiling Sight: The Limits of Appropriate Seeing 
The appearance of Artemis in Euripides’ Hippolytus adds a new dimension to 
the issue of the appropriateness and reliability of perception, with Artemis’ statement 
of the limitations of her own vision: she must leave her companion in his final 
moments because she cannot look upon the dead or dying. 
0#/ 2#$%’· !µ&/ B&% &* !"µ+. ,!+$&S. R%j' 
&*=’ =µµ# 2%#5')+' !#'#(5µ&+(+' !0/'&#$.· 
R%# =" (’ Y=: $&"=) /-:(5&' 0#0&". (1437-1439) 
[And farewell; for it is not right for me to see the dead, nor to defile my 
eye/sight with dying breaths, and I see that you now are close to this 
misfortune.] 
Artemis bids farewell because, as she explains, it is not “!"µ+.” [right, lawful, or 
sanctioned by custom] for her to look upon the dead or dying, since such a sight would 
defile her divine eyes.
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 This concern sheds some light on why certain sights might be 
inappropriate for certain viewers: not only is a corpse inherently unclean, but it is 
particularly out of place if in the presence of an immortal. Death may demand some 
purification rituals for those who bury or otherwise come into contact with the dead, 
but it is nevertheless an unavoidable component of life for mortals. For immortals, 
however, death has no place in their lives.
167
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 Apollo makes a similar comment in Euripides’ Alcestis: “!BI =", µ+ µ5#(µ* µ’ !' 
=6µ&+. 052C, / -)5/1 µ)-*!%1' $#~=) ,+-$*$:' ($"B:'” [And I, lest pollution meet 
me in the house, leave the dearest roof of this house.] (22-23). 
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 In his commentary on Hippolytus, Barrett notes as an example that the life of 
Philemon includes the anecdote that the night before the comic poet died, he “had a 
dream in which nine young women left his house, saying that it was not !)µ+$6' for 
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 Mary Douglas’s 1966 exploration of the nature of pollution in “primitive” 
religions, Purity and Danger, develops an approach to the unclean that fits well with 
Artemis’ need to remove herself from Hippolytus’ deathbed. According to Douglas, 
most unclean things are not inherently unclean; rather, things are unclean when they 
are out of their proper place, when they threaten the correct order of things: 
“Uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be included if a pattern is to be 
maintained” (40). In the context of Greek religion, Louise Bruit Zaidman and Pauline 
Schmitt Pantel consider the example of blood as something that remains clean only 
when in appropriate places:  
On the one hand, it is the very principle of life, coursing round the 
human body, and a means of consecration, as when it flows out upon 
the altar during an animal-sacrifice. On the other hand, it becomes filth 
and pollution when it is spilt onto the ground or gushes out over the 
body of a murder-victim. For when it is mixed with dust, blood 
signifies murder and death …. Pollution consists in the establishment 
of a link between entities which should be kept separated and distinct. 
(10)
168
 
If purity is based at least in part on a separation of things that do not belong together, 
surely a separation of the immortal divinities from human death is in keeping with this 
logic.  
                                                                                                                                       
them to remain; they were the Muses” (Barrett 414, note on lines 1437-1439). As this 
example and others show, the concept that the gods should avoid death is not unique 
to Euripides. 
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 See Bruit Zaidman and Schmitt Pantel, p. 10-11, for more examples of objects and 
beings that may involve either purity or pollution, depending on the context.  
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Perhaps this need for separation similarly helps to explain why mortals often 
cannot see gods: the holiness of the gods may be too powerful for full perception of 
them by mortals to be appropriate, as was the case when Zeus revealed his full divinity 
to Semele. Ion’s concern for the dangers of seeing the goddess Athena in Euripides’ 
Ion would thus be somewhat parallel to Artemis’ need to avoid seeing Hippolytus’ 
dying moments. Just as Artemis asserts that it is not “!"µ+.” for her to see the dead or 
dying, Ion wants to flee to avoid seeing the face of the god, if it is not “0#+%6.” [the 
right/appropriate time] for that (1552). Inappropriate seeing can lead to pollution, and 
concerns about seeing, being seen, polluting others, and polluting oneself are 
pervasive in tragedy. 
The concern with perception and pollution, in the sense of the appropriate 
separation of things that do not belong together, continues through the end of 
Hippolytus. As Hippolytus draws nearer to death, he tells his father that darkness is 
coming upon his eyes and that he can see the gates of the underworld (1444, 1447). 
His changing perceptions indicate his slipping from one world to another,
169
 and 
finally, he asks his father to cover his face: “0)0#%$"%:$#+ $-µ’· =-1-# B*%, /*$)%. / 
0%>C&' =" µ&3 /%6(1/&' 1. $*2&. /"/-&+.” [My time for persevering has ended; for 
I have been lost/I am dying, father. But cover my face immediately with my 
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 For a very similar example of changing vision as a sign of dying, see Alcestis’ 
death scene in Eurpides’ Alcestis, especially line 385: “0#/ µ+' (0&$)+'0' =µµ# µ&3 
?#%>')$#+” [And truly my eye/vision grows oppressed with darkness]. “Looking upon 
the light” is a common metaphor for life in Greek literature, and these (rare) onstage 
death scenes take up that metaphor in reverse. 
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garments.] (1457-1458). As Theseus expresses his final lament, he most likely 
complies with his son’s final wish, drawing his clothes over his face.
170
 
Covering the dead is a sign of respect and piety in many cultures, but 
particularly in the context of the play’s earlier preoccupation with appropriate 
separation, including both Hippolytus’ limited perception of Artemis and Artemis’ 
need to leave before seeing Hippolytus’ dying breath, this final gesture functions as 
the ultimate separation of father and son, living and dead. Hippolytus is losing his 
vision, a mark of life, and as he drifts into darkness, Theseus shrouds his visibility as 
well. Hippolytus’ request may also reflect concern for those around him: contact with 
a corpse involves a degree of pollution, and the dying man is, in essence, protecting 
his father and others from such defilement, while also facilitating one final moment of 
poignant contact and reconciliation between himself and Theseus before he dies. This 
concern would be in keeping with Hippolytus’ release of his father from the guilt and 
pollution of spilling kindred blood,
171
 completing the process of release and 
purification in this intensely human moment.
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 There is no way to confirm with full certainty that the actor did this on the stage, 
but it is a simple, yet highly significant action, and not staging it would be misleading 
and entirely inappropriate for the final moment of the play, after the reconciliation of 
father and son. 
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 {O:.} D $+' !µ+' -'#B'&' !0-+/I' 2"%#; 
{8/.} &* =9$’, !/)5 () $&"=’ !-)3!)%# ,6'&3 (1448-1449) 
[Theseus: “[Will you go] leaving my hand unclean? Hippolytus: No indeed, since I 
free you of this murder] 
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 In his study of shame and purity in the play, Charles Segal explains that the very 
thing that defiles the goddess purifies the mortals here: “As he was once a miasma to 
his father (946), but now renders him pure, he is, conversely, at this his deepest 
moment of human purity, unclean in the eyes of his virgin goddess. …. Death which 
would defile the remote Olympian can bring a kind of purity between men” (298). 
This contrast again heightens the distinction between gods and mortals. 
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Concern about what one sees is a recurring theme in tragedy, whether the 
object of one’s vision is a god, a corpse, or a polluted person. Just as Hippolytus asks 
his father to cover his face in his dying moments, other characters cover their faces 
either to prevent others from becoming polluted by seeing them, or to avoid seeing 
something that could bring pollution on themselves. To begin with the example from 
the end of Hippolytus, tragedy offers many scenes with dead bodies, and several of 
those feature the bereaved covering the corpse, hiding it from further sight. Sophocles’ 
Antigone, of course, turns on the debate surrounding and the consequences of 
Antigone covering her brother’s body with a little dirt, as a symbolic or provisional 
attempt at burial, but other plays involve a corpse covered with clothing immediately 
after death, well before full burial rites. 
In Euripides’ Electra, Orestes exhorts his sister to help him cover their 
mother’s body with her robes, after the two have killed her and Aegisthus, then come 
to feel remorse and despair at their current lot: 
-#?&", 0*-3/$) µ"-)# µ#$"%&. /"/-&+. 
0#/ 0#!*%µ&(&' (,#B*.. 
,&'"#. ,$+0$). F%* (&+. (1227-1229) 
[Take hold, and cover the limbs of our mother with garments, and join 
together/close her wounds. You bore, then, your own murderers.] 
Electra replies, as the two, presumably, cover the body: 
.=&>, ,5-3 $) 0&* ,5-3 
,*%)# $*=’ 'µ,+?*--&µ)', 
$"%µ# 0#0#' µ)B*-1' =6µ&+(+'. (1230-1232) 
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[Look! On her both dear and not dear we cast these cloths/shrouds, the 
culmination of great evils for our house.] 
Orestes and Electra cover Clytemnestra’s body in a ritual-like gesture that might 
prefigure a full funeral and burial. Electra’s exclamation “.=&>” [Look!] highlights the 
spectatorial aspect of the process, as they both look at the mother they have murdered 
and cover her from sight. Orestes’ call to close her wounds emphasizes the respectful 
element of their action, confirming that they cover her not simply to protect 
themselves from further pollution, but also as fulfillment of their filial duties 
This covering of the body and step towards respectful mourning makes a sharp 
turn from Orestes’ initial response upon killing his mother, one of shameless 
spectacle. As the inner scene is revealed, perhaps by means of the ekkyklema, Orestes 
fearlessly proclaims: 
.I Wj $) 0#/ R)" /#'=)%0"$# 
?%&$#', ?=)$) $*=’ ,%B# ,6'+- 
# µ3(#%*, =5B&'# (7µ#$’ !' 
2!&'/ 0)23µ"'# /-#BU =+/-U 
2)%0. l/’ !µj., -/&+'’ !µ#' 
/:µ*$1'… (1177-1182) 
[O Earth and Zeus, all-seeing of mortal things, look upon these bloody, 
foul/polluted deeds, double bodies outstretched on the ground by a 
double blow by me, compensation for my sufferings…] 
Several lines are lost after this point, and by the time our text resumes, Electra calls 
the sight “=#0%3$[6.]” [tearful], and the mourning and despair begin. The visibility of 
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the corpse on the stage thus illustrates the siblings’ attitude towards their mother and 
their deeds: unabashed spectacle accompanies feelings of defiance and triumph, while 
covering comes with their growing sense of internal conflict and despair, if not in 
recognition of the evil of their actions, at least at the thought of the few options that 
remain to them as matricides. 
 The question of whether one should look upon a corpse is a complex one: on 
the one hand, contact with a corpse defiles the world of the living with the world of 
the dead, but on the other hand, appropriate burial rites and appeasement of the dead 
require that the closest kin do come into contact with the corpse. In Honor Thy Gods: 
Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy, Jon D. Mikalson discusses this first concern, that 
of the polluting nature of corpses. As he explains, one “purpose of burial rites was to 
remove from the world of the living the pollution of death. The clearest evidence of 
this pollution is the decaying flesh of the visible and tangible body, and burial or 
cremation eliminated that. One wishes to avoid or remove this -B&. (S. Ant. 255-256), 
leaving the dead QB'6. and oneself )*#B9.173 ” (123-124).174 Proper care and burial of 
the body thus serves as the primary means of purification, despite involving more 
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 Mikalson leaves these terms untranslated, but definitions would be: pollution 
[-B&.], pure/holy [QB'6.], and free from pollution [)*#B9.]. 
174
 Other examples confirm that corpses were considered polluting or otherwise 
frightening in Greek culture. Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood cites Plutarch’s Lycurgus 
27, for example, as evidence for the Spartan exception to the almost universal move to 
extramural burial in the archaic and classical Greek world. As she recounts, Lycurgus 
instituted a law that “permitted intramural burial as a means of familiarizing youths 
with death, so that they do not shrink from it, fearing that they would become polluted 
if they touched a corpse or trod on a grave” (438). Sourvinou-Inwood sees the 
transition to extramural burial (i.e. outside the city walls) as part of a trend of 
increasing death avoidance.  
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direct pollution for the immediate kin, for whom that pollution is actually in some 
sense right and sacred.
175
  
In “Reading” Greek Death, Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood particularly 
emphasizes this importance of separation in her examination of the grave monument 
in Homer: 
The heaping of the burial mound or erection of any other form of grave 
monument is the last act in the manipulation of the deceased’s remains 
during the last stage of the burial ceremony, which marked the end of 
the period of abnormality that followed a death and the restoration of 
normality and order. The closure of the grave, completed and sealed 
with the erection of the mound, marks the final stage in the separation 
of the deceased from the world of the living and the community: now 
his shade is incorporated into Hades and his body/bones into the earth, 
both beyond boundaries: the shade beyond the infernal river, the corpse 
beyond the mound of earth or other less emphatic physical boundary of 
the burial space. …. Thus its erection was inextricably connected with 
this separation. (109) 
In Book XXIII of the Iliad, as Sourvinou-Inwood shows, Achilles announces the 
burial of Patroklus with three specific ritual acts: the cremation of the corpse, the 
erection of the grave monument, and the cutting of the mourners’ hair, and these acts 
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 This, of course, is the situation at the end of Hippolytus: Theseus must come into 
contact with the dying Hippolytus in order to cover him, but the end result is a 
covered, separated corpse and the completion of his own purification from kindred 
murder. 
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collectively ensure the final separation of himself from his friend (110). Further, she 
continues, Achilles’ refusal to wash until after completing the burial is a “narrative 
transformation…of the ritual behaviour pertaining to the death-ritual before the burial 
ceremony which involves deliberately taking on pollution as part of the process of 
embracing death; this embracing of pollution and death entails also a partial 
identification with the deceased and it is acted out in the pre-burial part of the death-
ritual” (111). The larger process of funeral rites may be a means of removing pollution 
from the world of the living, but even so, it must involve some temporary pollution, 
which Achilles so dramatically embraces, while the bereaved mourn and prepare the 
body for burial. 
As Sourvinou-Inwood’s study of Iliad XXIII shows, the entire burial process 
serves as a ritual of separation of the dead from the living, and if the erection of the 
grave monument indicates the final passage of the soul into Hades, that element of the 
ritual, the burial itself, must be of vital importance for the dead as well as for the 
living. Sarah Iles Johnston, too, explores this idea in her study of “ghost stories” and 
relations between the living and the dead in ancient Greece. As she explains, the dead 
cannot enter the Underworld until they have had a proper burial, and the living must 
take care to fulfill their obligations (9-11). For the sake of both themselves and the 
dead, then, the living must work through the sequence of funeral rituals in order to 
ensure both the deceased’s passage to Hades and their own safety from lingering 
pollution. 
 Sophocles’ Ajax clearly exemplifies this tension between the needs to look 
upon and to cover the dead. When Ajax’s concubine Tecmessa and the Chorus of his 
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sailors first discover his body, their first impulse is to hide him from sight. The Chorus 
asks where Ajax lies (912-914), and Tecmessa responds: 
&%$&+ !)#$6.· '--* '+' /)%+/$32)$ 
,*%)+ 0#->C1 $2=) /#µ/9=:', !/)/ 
&*=)/. 6' )($+. 0#/ ,5-&. $-#5: ?-"/)+' 
,3(#'$’ -'1 /%0. q$'#. ,0 $) ,&+'5#. 
/-:B9. µ)-#'!;' #8µ' '/' &.0)5#. (,#B9.. (915-919) 
[No, he is not to be seen! But I will cover him entirely with this 
enfolding cloth, since no one, no one who is a friend, would endure to 
look upon him spouting dark blood upwards to his nostrils and out from 
the bloody strike/wound, from self-slaughter.] 
Tecmessa’s action of covering the body provides a dramatically powerful moment of 
contact between her and the man who had served as her protector in this foreign camp. 
Further, her strong statement that no friend [“,5-&.”] would want to endure the pain 
[“$-#5:”] of looking on this bloody and lamentable sight both emphasizes the 
suffering that such a sight provokes in a grieving seer and suggests the scornful 
laughter or similarly disrespectful response that the sight could provoke in an exulting 
enemy. Though she couches it in a statement about how the bereaved would feel, 
Tecmessa is clearly concerned about the reactions that Odysseus, Agamemnon, and 
Menelaus might have. Her covering of the body, therefore, serves several functions: it 
begins the process of preparing the body for burial by respectfully placing that first 
barrier between the dead and the living; it relieves the bereaved from the pain of 
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looking at the body any further; and it protects the body from the disrespectful gazes 
of enemies. 
 Despite Tecmessa’s immediate decision to cover the body, Teucer’s own 
immediate response to the scene that greets him when he finally returns to camp is to 
uncover the body and look at the painful sight:
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@ $#' Q/*'$1' =+ !)#µ*$1' !µ&/ 
--B+($&' 7' /%&()$=&' V,!#-µ&$. !B7, 
…. 
QBI 0-3I' =>($:'&. !0/&=I' µ;' y' 
l/)($"'#I&', '"' =’ R%#' '/6--3µ#+. 
&?µ&+. 
?!’, !00*-3C&', 1. ?=1 $0 /j' 0#06'. (992-993, 1000-1003) 
[O of all sights most painful to me, of those I have looked upon with 
my eyes! …. I, wretched one, hearing it [i.e. the news of Ajax’s death] 
while a long way off, groaned, but now, seeing it, I am utterly 
destroyed. Alas! Go, uncover him, so that I might see the whole evil.] 
Seeing the body brings closeness and stronger pain than simply hearing the report of 
the suicide, but while Teucer does not enjoy the sight, as Tecmessa predicts no friend 
would do, he insists upon seeing the body anyway, in order to “see the whole evil.” 
                                                
176
 Plato provides a good example of similar ambivalence toward looking at a corpse 
in Book IV of the Republic, 439e-440a. As part of his discussion of how a man’s mind 
might be divided by two divergent desires or thoughts, he tells the story of a man 
walking outside the city walls who becomes aware of [“#.(!6µ)'&.”] dead bodies. He 
both wants and does not want to look at them, and at first he covers his head to avoid 
the sight, then finally loses his self-control and looks at them. 
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His command may also be a way of acting upon his duties as close kin and new 
protector of Ajax’s dependents, in keeping with the usual tension between the need to 
administer proper honors and burial rites and the need then to remove the corpse and 
purify oneself.
177
  
Teucer continues to lament both Ajax’s fate and his own bleak prospects until 
Menelaus’ approach turns his attention to the need to bury his brother, against the 
wishes of the Argive commanders. In a play very much concerned with issues of 
seeing and being seen, which begin with Athena’s invisibility in the prologue, this 
sequence of covering, uncovering, arguing over burial, and finally beginning the burial 
rites emphasizes the significance of a corpse’s visibility and of a prompt burial. 
Respectful interaction with the dead demands first contact, then separation, while 
disrespectful attitudes feature spectacle.
178
 
Despite the clear significance of covering corpses, as a first step towards the 
all-important burial rites, many instances of covering bodies or faces in tragedy 
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 The ambivalence of these conflicting desires to see and to not see the dead seems 
similar to the ambivalence surrounding materials that may be either sacred or polluted, 
depending on context. These distinctions and their implications are not by any means 
absolute. 
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 A final example of covering a corpse, most similar to the example of Euripides’ 
Electra, would be the Argives’ immediate move, in an offstage scene, to cover 
Polyxena’s body with leaves after she has been sacrificed in Euripides’ Hecuba (573-
574). The messenger reports this covering as the Argives’ response to Polyxena’s 
courage and virtue in offering herself to the sacrifice and refusing to allow anyone to 
hold her. Incidentally, the tragedy’s report of this scene is very different from the 
rendering on the Polyxena Sarcophagus, which shows three men holding Polyxena 
horizontally, at waist height, while another man (probably Neoptolemus) pulls her 
head down by her hair and stabs her throat. The sarcophagus was found in Gümüscay 
in 1994 and dated to ca. 520-500 BC (Pedley 191-192). It is now in the Çannakkale 
Museum in Turkey, and images are available in John Griffiths Pedley’s Greek Art and 
Archaeology (192, figure 6.70) and online, through Oxford’s Beazley Archive: 
http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/sculpture/styles/grave6.htm. 
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involve the living.
179
 To return to the example of Euripides’ Electra, Orestes reports 
that he covered his eyes during his offstage murder of Clytemnestra: 
!BI µ;' !/+?#-I' ,*%: 06%#+. !µ#$. 
,#(B*'> 0#$:%E*µ#' 
µ#$"%&. ,(1 ="%#. µ)!)5.. (1221-1223) 
[I, casting my garments before my eyes, began the slaughter with my 
sword, releasing it into my mother’s neck.] 
Orestes explains to the Chorus that this measure was what allowed him to endure the 
killing of his mother, and though the characters do not suggest it explicitly, it is also 
possible that this gesture is one of shielding himself from the sight of his polluting 
slaughter of his mother. In Iphigenia at Aulis, Agamemnon, too, is reported to cover 
his face before shedding kindred blood: “Vµµ*$1' /"/-&' /%&!)5.” […casting his 
cloak before his eyes] (1550). Here, the messenger interprets this gesture as one of 
grief upon seeing his daughter just before the sacrifice, but as in Electra, it may also 
carry a sense of hiding oneself and avoiding a horrifying, perhaps polluting, sight.
180
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 In addition to the reasons I will discuss below, tragedy also includes examples of 
people covering themselves out of modesty (e.g. Iphigenia says that she was veiled 
when she went to what she thought was her marriage to Achilles, in Euripides’ 
Iphegenia among the Taurians 372-376) or grief (e.g. Hecuba lies wrapped in her 
garments from the beginning of Euripides’ Hecuba, as Talthybius notices at 486-487). 
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 Euripides’ Orestes features a very similar example: as Orestes returns to his senses 
after his frenzied struggle with the Furies, real or imagined, he asks Electra why she is 
weeping and covering her head with her clothes, then tells her to uncover her head and 
stop weeping (280, 294-295). Since Electra was covering her head during Orestes’ fit, 
this gesture probably indicates grief and despair, but like these other examples, she 
may also be shielding herself from her brother’s madness or torment by the Furies. 
The Polyxena Sarcophagus also makes an interesting comparison: the man who stabs 
Polyxena’s throat looks directly into her face, with boldness and violence that make 
the scene very unsettling, at least to modern viewers, but the other men who hold her 
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This conjecture becomes more attractive in light of the examples of Iphigenia 
among the Taurians and Heracles. In these plays, characters explicitly discuss the 
need to hide themselves, or others, from seeing polluted people, and indeed, 
Iphigenia’s trick of the barbarian king Thoas in Euripides’ Iphigenia among the 
Taurians relies on an understanding that proximity to and sight of those polluted by 
murder can spread the pollution.
181
 
After Iphigenia comes to recognize Orestes and Pylades, the three Greeks 
develop a plan for escaping from the barbarians. Iphigenia comes outside the temple, 
carrying the statue of Artemis and explaining, on the authority of her role as priestess, 
that the men provided as sacrificial victims were not pure: “&* 0#!#%* µ&+ $& !>µ#$’ 
:B%)>(#(!’, -'#E” [The offerings you captured for me are not clean, King.] (1163). 
When Thoas asks how she knows that, she claims that the statue turned away from 
them, and Thoas continues with a suggestion that he picks up from Iphigenia’s earlier 
claim: “5 =’ #.$5# $5.; D $0 $#' E"'1' µ>(&.;” [What was the reason? Was it the 
defilement of the foreigners?] (1168). Thoas answers his own question with the very 
                                                                                                                                       
look at each other or back to the people standing behind them (mourning women and 
an older man, possibly Nestor), pointedly not at Polyxena. 
181
 Well before the recognition scene and subsequent scheming, the play introduces the 
concept of pollution when Iphigenia questions whether Artemis truly wants human 
sacrifices, or whether the barbarians use her as an excuse for their own murderous 
tendencies. She expresses the conflict she sees: “…whoever of mortals has come into 
contact with murder or childbirth or a corpse by touching with hands, she keeps from 
her altars, holding him unclean, but she herself enjoys human sacrifices!” (381-84). 
This early mention of pollution in the play is useful for introducing the idea and 
showing that, in this world, the standard concerns about keeping the pollutions of 
murder, birth, and death separate from the gods do hold. 
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conclusion that Iphigenia has already suggested, thus showcasing her prowess as a 
trickster: she has planted an idea that Thoas now seems to think is his own.
182
 
As the scene continues (lines 1157-1233), Iphigenia leads Thoas further along 
into a full conviction that proximity to people polluted by such murder can spread that 
pollution and that the goddess’s statue, Thoas, and the people of the city are all at risk 
from this contagion. She explains that the two men killed their mother, and Thoas 
asks: “Is it for this reason that you bring the statue outside?” [D $#'=’ K0#$+ =9$’ 
-B#-µ’ ,E1 ,"%)+.;] (1176). “Yes,” she says, “[I bring it] into the holy air so that I 
might remove it from the murder” [()µ'6' B’ l/' #.!"%’, 1. µ)$#($9(1 ,6'&3] 
(1177). Again, Thoas is now making the suggestion himself, and he has adopted the 
fundamental premise that Iphigenia needs to support the demands she will make: he 
accepts that proximity to those polluted by murder would also pollute the goddess’s 
statue. After assuring the king that she still intends to complete the sacrifice, Iphigenia 
explains that she first needs to purify her ritual equipment and the sacrifices (the two 
Greeks) by washing them in the sea (1191-1194). Thoas accepts each of her new 
conditions to the purification requirements, as she demands solitude (1197), adds the 
goddess’s statue to the group of items needing purification (1199), asks him to have 
the men bound (1204), and requires that the men’s faces be veiled: 
Iphigenia: 0%j$# 0%>C#'$). /"/-&+(+'. 
Thoas: 5-5&3 /%6(!)' ,-&B6.. (1207) 
[Iphigenia: …hiding/covering their heads with their garments. 
                                                
182
 This is a very common strategy for trickster characters and others engaged in 
manipulation. For an example outside of the Greek context, see Iago’s manipulation of 
Othello in Shakespeare’s Othello, such as in Act III, scene 3.  
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Thoas: Before the light of the sun.] 
By this point in the stichomythia, Thoas has assimilated Iphigenia’s line of reasoning 
and is able to complete her lines, anticipating her requests and the reasons behind 
them. Continuing this thread, Iphigenia asks further that he announce to the city that 
everyone should remain inside, and again, he adds the explanation for the instruction: 
“µ+ (3'#'$#(+' ,6'>;” […so that they do not come face to face with murder?] 
(1210). Finally completing her quest to ensure that no one could see their escape, 
Iphigenia ultimately instructs Thoas himself to cover his eyes, supposedly for his own 
protection: 
{I,.} 5'50' 6' =’ ,E1 /)%#(+' &B E"'&+  
{O&.} $5 2%9 µ) =%j'; 
{I,.} /"/-&' Vµµ*$1' /%&!"(!#+.  
{O&.} µ+ /#-#µ'#5&3. ?-"/1.183 (1217-1218) 
[Iphigenia: When the foreigners come outside… 
Thoas: What should I do? 
Iphigenia: …cast your garments over your eyes. 
Thoas: So that I might not look upon those stained with blood-guilt.] 
By gradually leading him into an understanding of murder-pollution as contagious, 
Iphigenia has guaranteed secrecy and plenty of time for their escape. 
 The role of pollution fears in Iphigenia’s trick is a complex one. On the one 
hand, concerns about pollution were widespread in the Greek world, though likely 
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 An alternate manuscript reading of this text still yields a similar meaning: “µ+ 
/#-#µ'#$&' -*?1” [So that I might not take on blood-guilt]. 
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quite varied, so Iphigenia’s reasoning about the dangers of contagion seems legitimate 
(Parker 34). On the other hand, given that she is tricking a barbarian who, for the 
dramaturgical purposes of the play, functions as both a villain and a buffoon, the scene 
would also work well if the audience is skeptical of this theory of contagion and can 
thus laugh at Thoas’ readiness to accept her explanations.
184
 In either case, the scene 
does seem to assume that the audience is aware that such pollution concerns exist, 
though the question remains as to whether the majority of the spectators would 
consider those concerns to be deeply real and immediate to their own lives or a vestige 
of the past heroic age that no longer applies in a literal, direct way.
185
 
 Regardless of the degree to which fifth-century spectators might have taken 
pollution fears seriously, the tragedies, with their setting in the heroic age, certainly do 
treat them so. Iphigenia’s precautionary, and expedient for her own purposes, 
measures to prevent the spread of pollution emanating from matricides support the 
concerns about pollution that emerge less explicitly in other contexts, as when 
characters report having covered their eyes while killing or when they quickly cover 
                                                
184
 For a very similar scene, compare Helen’s tricking of the barbarian king 
Theoclymenus in Euripides’ Helen 1184-1300. Here, Helen succeeds by exploiting 
two primary weaknesses: Theoclymenus’ overwhelming desire for her and his 
ignorance of Greek customs. She and Menelaus can ask for anything they need by 
couching it as a requirement for proper, ritual burial for those who die at sea. 
185
 In Honor Thy Gods, Jon D. Mikalson is skeptical of whether the average Athenian 
would have worried about literal pollution from an unburied body. In a discussion of 
Teiresias’ warnings in Antigone 1015-1022, Mikalson considers this problem: “We 
might like to think that average Athenians had in mind such a pat explanation of the 
relationship between burial rites, pollution, and the goodwill of the gods. There is, 
however, only slight evidence elsewhere that such an explanation was widely known 
or generally accepted. …. No doubt the interrelationship of burial rites, sin, pollution, 
and the gods of the living and dead was recognized by the average person, but it was 
hardly understood or articulated in this way” (128). 
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corpses or cover themselves in the presence of a polluted, or potentially polluted, 
person. Euripides’ Heracles provides a less ambiguous example of concerns about 
pollution through contact or vision even than Iphigenia among the Taurians: like 
Iphigenia and Thoas, Heracles and Theseus clearly understand Heracles’ pollution 
from slaughtering his family to be contagious, yet here there is no hint that we should 
be skeptical of such a belief. 
 As Heracles awakens from the sleep that immediately follows his murderous 
rampage, he wonders why his father, Amphitryon, is weeping and covering or closing 
his eyes: “/*$)%, $5 0-#5)+. 0#/ (3'#µ/5(2C 06%#.” [Father, why do you weep and 
keep back your eyes?] (1111). Amphitryon may be covering his eyes simply as a 
gesture of grief, but his drawing back from his son also indicates his fear that Heracles 
might attack him again and possibly also his desire to separate himself from the 
horrors of Heracles’ crime and the destruction of his family. Amphitryon’s gesture, 
however, is of minor importance by comparison with Heracles’ covering himself as he 
realizes his crimes, though this first example functions well as a precursor to the later 
gesture. 
 When Heracles finally realizes that he has killed his wife and children in a fit 
of madness, he laments his position and considers how he might kill himself, but as he 
sees Theseus approach, he quickly moves to concern for his friend: 
'--’ !µ/&=7' µ&+ !#'#(5µ1' ?&3-)3µ*$1' 
O:()S. )=’ K%/)+ (3BB)'+. ,5-&. $’ !µ6.. 
1155 V,!:(6µ)(!#, 0#/ $)0'&0$6'&' µ>(&. 
!. =µµ#!’ ME)+ ,+-$*$> E"'1' !µ#'. 
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&?µ&+, $5 =%*(1; /&$ 0#0#' !%:µ5#' 
)4%1, /$)%1$0. ( 0#$& 2!&'0. µ&-7'; 
,"%’, 'µ,/ 0%#$/ /)%+?*-1 </"/-1'> (06$&'. 
1160 #.(2>'&µ#+ B&% $&$. =)=%#µ"'&+. 0#0&$., 
0#/ $2=) /%&($%6/#+&' #8µ# /%&(?#-I' 
&*=;' 0#0#(#+ $&S. ''#+$5&3. !"-1. (1153-1162) 
[But, an impediment to my resolutions of death, here Theseus comes, 
my relative and friend. I will be seen [V,!:(6µ)(!#], and the 
defilement for child-slaughter will come to the eyes [=µµ#!’] for my 
dearest of guest-friends! Alas, what should I do? Where might I find 
isolation from my evils/misfortunes: flying or going beneath the earth? 
Come, let me cast around my head the darkness [(06$&'] of garments! 
For I am ashamed by the evils done, and I do not want to harm/foul the 
innocent, casting onto him the blood pollution.] 
With these words, Heracles gives one of the most explicit and compelling expressions 
of pollution fears in extant tragedy.
186
 Not only does Heracles understand pollution 
from kindred murder to be attached to himself, but he also fears that this pollution 
could stain the friend who sees him. Though he talks of flying off or going under the 
earth to avoid contact with his friend, the practical action he takes in response to the 
situation is to cover his head with his clothing. Since he cannot physically remove 
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 Sophocles’ Antigone would compete for this honor, with Teiresias’ report that the 
birds and dogs have scattered bits of Polynices’ body on the altars, preventing prayer 
and sacrifice with a very literal spreading of pollution from the unburied corpse (1015-
1022). 
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himself, he can at least cover himself to prevent Theseus from seeing him. Visual 
perception is thus one form of polluting contact, an avenue more easily obstructed 
than physical proximity, and Heracles’ use of visual words in this speech 
(“V,!:(6µ)(!#,” 1155; “=µµ#!’,” 1156; “(06$&',” 1159) emphasize the potential of 
that medium to pass on pollution.  
 Theseus, however, has come to help his friend and is not content to leave him 
lying on the ground, wrapped in his clothes.  
{O:.} '--’ ). (3'#-B#' B’ D-!&'; !00*-3/$" '+'. 
{Fµ.} @ $"0'&',  
/*%). '/' Vµµ*$1' /"/-&', '/6=+0), q"!&.  
')-5> =)$E&'. (1202-1204) 
[Theseus: But if I have come sharing in his suffering? Uncover him. 
Amphitryon: O son, let fall the garment from your eyes, throw it off, 
show your face to the sun.] 
When Heracles refuses to give in to Amphitryon’s pleading, Theseus appeals to him 
directly: 
)AH'· (; $0' !*((&'$# =3($9'&3. K=%#. 
1215  #*=# ,5-&+(+' =µµ# =)+0'>'#+ $0 (6'. 
&*=)/. (06$&. B&% 7=’ ,2)+ µ"-#' '",&. 
)($+. 0#0#' (#' (3µ,&%&' 0%>C)+)' -'. 
$5 µ&+ /%&()51' 2)$%# (:µ#5')+. ,6?&'; 
1. µ+ µ>(&. µ) (#' ?*-C /%&(,!)Bµ*$1'; 
1220  &*=;' µ"-)+ µ&+ (>' B) (&/ /%*(()+' 0#0#.· 
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…. 
''5($#(', !00*-3C&' -!-+&' 0*%#, 
?-"C&' /%0. 5µj.… (1214-1220, 1226-1227) 
[Well then; I call to you, sitting in the wretched seat, to show your face 
(literally “eye,” =µµ#) to friends. For no darkness holds so dark a cloud 
as to hide the misfortune of your evils. Why do you sign fear to me, 
holding out your hand? Fearing that you might cast pollution onto me, 
addressing me? …. [Theseus continues, arguing that he owes gratitude 
to Heracles for bringing him out of Hades.] Stand up, uncover your 
miserable head, look at me.] 
Heracles does uncover himself, and Theseus acknowledges that he now shows the full 
evil to his eyes (1230). Heracles remains concerned about his contagious pollution: 
{V%.} $5 =9$* µ&3 0%j$’ '')0*-3C#. 5-5>; 
{O:.} $5 =’; &* µ+#5')+. !':$0. y' $& $#' !)#'. 
{V%.} ,)"B’, @ $#-#5/1%’, ''6(+&' µ5#(µ' !µ6'. 
{O:.} &*=)/. '-*($1% $&$. ,5-&+. !0 $ ' ,5-1'. (1231-1234) 
[Heracles: Why, then, did you uncover my head to the sun?  
Theseus: Why? You, being a mortal, do not pollute the things of the 
gods. 
Heracles: Flee, o wretched man, from my unholy pollution/disease! 
Theseus: There is no avenger for friends from friends.] 
While he does argue that Heracles will not pollute the gods by revealing his face to the 
air, Theseus does not actually deny that the murderer is polluted, and his primary point 
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of argument is not that the pollution could not travel to others at all, but that he 
himself is willing to face such a risk because he owes such a debt of gratitude to the 
one who brought him out of Hades.  
Rather than deny the pollution, Theseus takes the sort of approach that Robert 
Parker sees in Pylades’ willingness to accompany the polluted Orestes in Euripides’ 
Orestes: “Pylades does not deny but disregards the dangers in the act of friendship; we 
might compare the action of ‘those who laid some claim to virtue’ in nursing their 
friends during the Athenian plague” (309). Similarly, Theseus acknowledges the 
gravity of the situation but chooses to help his friend begin the process of purification. 
An important component of murder-pollution is, as Parker explains, “social stigma,” 
and Theseus’ insistence on contact with Heracles serves as a first step towards 
overcoming this stigma, “showing him that he is not, after all, wholly cut off from his 
fellow men. With infinite delicacy he persuades Heracles to confront the outside 
world, first passively by sight, then by speech, and finally by actual physical contact 
with one who is not polluted” (317). 
In his extensive study of pollution and purification, Miasma, Robert Parker, 
like Mary Douglas in her broader study, focuses on the need to separate things that 
should not be together, such as the sacred and the polluted. In the case of murder-
pollution, such as that in Heracles, social stigma is essentially an application of that 
broader concept to the context of social relations:
187
 the polluted person must be kept 
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 Explaining the distinction between “natural” pollutions such as childbirth and such 
unnatural pollutions as murder, Parker writes: “All these pollutions are produced by 
breaches of order, but the source of disturbance is quite distinct in the different cases. 
Murder-pollution is caused by an unnatural act, and for this reason is virtually 
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separated from the rest of the community. Pollution might travel from the murderer to 
others by physical contact or proximity, or even by the fact of kinship, as it seems to 
do on the occasion of a death (Parker 39). Physical contact and proximity are natural 
choices for avenues of pollution contagion, given the logic of separation that governs 
pollution concerns generally, but the gesture of covering or uncovering the face in 
tragedy points towards visual perception as a particularly strong mode of pollution 
transfer. If physical proximity alone could fully pollute a bystander, why would 
Heracles bother to cover himself when Theseus approaches, or why would Thoas 
consider it sufficient protection simply to cover himself and the matricides? 
Visual perception seems to be more dangerous than simple proximity, though 
it might be a step removed from direct physical contact. If this is the case, the question 
naturally follows: what is it about visual perception specifically that might be so 
dangerous? Why would polluted people take care to cover themselves, and why would 
others avoid looking at them? Why, for that matter, should people avoid looking at 
corpses? An answer to these questions, I suggest, may be found through an 
examination of the Greeks’ understanding of how visual perception actually happens. 
 
Perception in the Ancient World: Mechanics and Implications 
As is the case with so many topics, we have no way of knowing what the 
average Greek in the fifth century BC thought about the mechanics of perception. The 
                                                                                                                                       
identified, as we saw, with the anger of the man unnaturally killed. This anger then 
directs itself in ways that in theory enforce the expulsion of the killer from the 
community. Birth- and death-pollution, by contrast, merely cause those most affected 
to lie low for a while” (125). 
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issue was certainly of interest to philosophers, but most texts dealing directly with the 
nature and processes of perception either do not survive or come from a period later 
than that of our extant tragedies. Plato and Aristotle, for example, constructed detailed 
theories for sense perception, but they wrote well after the deaths of the three 
tragedians whose plays survive.
188
 Nevertheless, I would propose that an examination 
of the surviving philosophical texts can still give us some sense of the major theories 
that were under discussion in the fourth century, while fragments and summaries 
found in the work of later writers help to illuminate the theories of the Presocratics
189
 
in the fifth century, contemporary with the surviving tragedies. Although may not be 
able to determine exactly what the average, non-philosopher, “Greeks-on the-street” 
might have thought, I suggest that some basic ideas form a trend through most of the 
philosophical treatises on the subject, and as a result of their predominance, they may 
point towards a general way of thinking about perception that the tragedians and their 
audiences may have accepted, even if they did not engage in intense philosophical 
debate about the subject.  
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 A few example dates should provide some sense of the time scale here: Sophocles 
and Euripides died in 406 BC; Plato wrote his Timaeus, which provides his most 
detailed theory of vision, ca. 360 BC; the dates of Aristotle’s De Sensu and De Anima 
[On the Soul] are uncertain, but they were likely products of his time leading the 
Lyceum in Athens, 334-323 BC. 
189
 “Presocratic” is a problematic term, not the least because Democritus, one of the 
most important of the philosophers considered a “Presocratic,” was roughly 
contemporary with Socrates and actually survived him by approximately thirty years. 
Some scholars in the field now advocate for using the term “early Greek philosophers” 
in place of “Presocratics,” but the latter term is still dominant. David T. Runia notes 
that “Presocratic” existed as a concept even in the ancient world and that, despite its 
problems, it will probably remain the primary scholarly term, at least as long as 
Hermann Diels’s editions of the fragments continue to be the standard reference 
(Runia 28). 
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Theories of Perception: The Presocratics 
 Unfortunately, most of the writings of the Presocratic philosophers have been 
lost, leaving only fragments and summaries in later writers, which we can sometimes 
piece together for a sense of the original texts. Theophrastus, a successor of Aristotle, 
wrote a treatise on sense perception, On the Senses,
190
 that includes summaries of the 
earlier theories of Empedocles, Democritus, Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras, and others, but 
this text, too, survives only as a large fragment and in summaries by even later writers, 
such as Priscian of Lydia.
191
 Despite these complications, such doxographies by later 
writers, which typically include paraphrases of earlier texts and sometimes also the 
writers’ own criticisms, are our best sources for the Presocratics.
192
  
 Perception theories of the Presocratics are of interest for our current study 
primarily as a result of being roughly contemporary with tragedy. While our 
understanding of these theories necessarily involves some conjecture and potentially 
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 The Latin title is De Sensibus, and the Greek is N)%/ #.(!9()1'. The title N)%/ 
#.(!9()1. also appears in manuscripts, but the plural is more common. See H. 
Baltussen, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato, p. 2, n. 1 for more on the 
title. 
191
 Priscian was a Neoplatonist in the sixth century AD. Many of his works likewise 
do not survive, but part of his summary of Theophrastus’ On the Senses is extant. See 
Priscian, On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, Trans. Pamela Huby (Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 1997). The surviving sections focus on Theophrastus’ account of Aristotle’s On 
the Soul, which survives independently. 
192
 For the sake of expediency, I will not dwell further on the complications of 
manuscript traditions and transmission, but a good introduction to these issues is 
available in David T. Runia’s “The Sources for Presocratic Philosophy” and, for 
Theophrastus specifically, in H. Bertussen’s “General Introduction” to Theophrastus 
against the Presocratics and Plato. Runia’s essay is the first chapter in The Oxford 
Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, pages 27-54, and he provides a thorough 
explanation of both the ancient sources and the more recent transmission history, 
particularly through Hermann Diels’s Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. For 
Bertussen, see especially pages 2-4 and 12-15. 
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uncritical or forced selectivity, we do have a sense of some of the major ideas in 
circulation. I will not attempt to summarize every theory here, but by way of a sample, 
I will briefly discuss the theories of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. 
 According to Theophrastus, Empedocles explains: 
…perception occurs because something fits into the passages [)". $&$. 
/6%&3.] of the particular <sense organ>. For this reason the senses 
cannot discern one another’s objects, he holds, because the passages of 
some <of the sense-organs> are too wide for the object, and those of 
others are too narrow. And consequently some <of these objects> hold 
their course through without contact [&*0 Q/$6µ)'#], while others are 
quite unable to enter. (On the Senses, section 7)
193
 
This theory of perception is based on the understanding, common to many of the 
atomists, that all objects emit some sort of “effluence,” and so these effluences 
encounter all parts of a perceiver’s body, providing usable perceptual data only when 
they enter the pores [/6%&+] in the appropriate sense organ.
194
 A. A. Long summarizes 
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 Translation by George Malcolm Stratton, in Theophrastus and the Greek 
Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (p. 71). His Greek text of On the Senses is 
that of Hermann Diels’s Doxographi Graeci, with a few minor changes. Brackets 
indicate words supplied from context, without corresponding words in the Greek.  
Although Bertussen has noted some problems with Stratton’s text, translation, and 
commentary, the new edition by André Laks and Glenn W. Most that Bertussen 
anticipated in 2000 has yet to appear, though Laks has published editions of other 
Theophrastean texts (Bertussen 13, 3). 
194
 See David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler: “To be sure, 
within the atomic school there was considerable diversity of opinion, and it would be 
gross error to suppose that atomists from Leucippus to Lucretius spoke with a single 
voice. Nevertheless, there was a significant core of agreement, springing from the 
common premise that all sensation is caused by direct contact with the organ of sense 
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the essential components of Empedocles’ theory in “Thinking and Sense-Perception in 
Empedocles”: “But an essential property of all bodies—all temporary compounds of 
elements—is the production of '/&%%&#5, effluences; ‘knowing that there are 
effluences from all things which have come into being’, )((’ !B"'&'$& (B89). …. The 
function of /6%&+ is the reception of '/&%%&#5. In this process we have the essence of 
Empedocles’ theory of perception…” (259-260). There must be some fundamental 
similarity between the effluences and the pores of a particular sense organ in order for 
perception to occur, creating a qualification of “like to like” for perception.
195
 
Furthermore, as Long explains, a particular medium may be required as a precondition 
for each sense, such as fire (i.e., light) for vision or sound (air) for hearing (264). 
Thus, perception would occur only when an effluence travels through a particular 
medium to reach the corresponding sense organ’s pores. 
 Empedocles’ theory implies a sort of contact between perceiver and perceived: 
something emanates from an object in the environment, travels through a medium, and 
enters into “pores” in a perceiver’s sense organ. Indeed, Theophrastus succinctly 
reduces Empedocles’ larger theory to two factors: “to likeness and to contact” [$2 $) 
Rµ&5> 0#/ $L Q,L] (On the Senses, section 15, trans. Stratton). The importance of a 
sort of contact to all modes of perception becomes problematic in the cases of touch 
and taste, since these two rely on direct physical contact, and if all senses involve 
some form of contact, it would seem that all senses have been reduced to touch. A. A. 
                                                                                                                                       
and therefore that a material effluence must be conveyed from the visible object to the 
eye” (2). 
195
 Plato’s theory of vision is based on the same basic idea, as we will see in the 
following section. 
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Long discusses this problem, which troubled the ancient philosophers as well, but he 
concludes that for Empedocles, direct physical contact may be the necessary 
precondition for touch and taste, just as light or sound might be preconditions for 
seeing and hearing (266). Regardless of the precise nature of each type of contact, 
though, all modes of perception in Empedocles’ theory do involve some kind of 
contact between perceiver and perceived, as effluences penetrate a sense organ 
through the pores, and this, for our purposes, is the key idea of this theory. 
 The perception theory of Anaxagoras, who flourished at approximately the 
same time as Empedocles, in the fifth century BC, is noteworthy primarily because it 
relies on the meeting of opposites, rather than like with like. Theophrastus 
summarizes: 
Anaxagoras holds that sense perception comes to pass by means of 
opposites, for the like is unaffected by the like. He then essays to 
review each sense separately. Accordingly he maintains that seeing is 
due to the reflection in the pupil, but that nothing is reflected in what is 
of like hue, but only in what is of a different hue. …. All sense 
perception, he holds, is fraught with pain, —which would seem in 
keeping with his general principle, for the unlike when brought in 
contact <with our organs> always brings distress. (On the Senses, 
sections 27, 29) 
Theophrastus has no patience for the idea that sense perception always involves pain, 
though he does find some value in the idea of opposites (section 31). Although 
Anaxagoras proposes that perception occurs through opposites rather than through 
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fundamentally similar bodies, his understanding of the transmission process itself 
seems to be very similar to Empedocles’. Indeed, Theophrastus understands this to be 
the case: “In making the correspondence between <the senses and> their objects 
depend on size, Anaxagoras seems to be speaking after the manner of Empedocles, 
who explains sense perception by the supposition that <emanations> fit into the 
passages <of sense>” (section 35, trans. Stratton). Thus, while the theories of 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras would seem to be diametrically opposed, the underlying 
concept of perception by means of effluences and a sort of contact remains in each. 
 Finally, we will turn to Democritus, to whom Theophrastus grants the most 
attention in his On the Senses.
196
 According to Theophrastus, it is unclear whether 
Democritus’ theory involves opposites or like with like, which prevents our making a 
simple comparison with those of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (section 49). However, 
Theophrastus does provide a summary of Democritus’ theory for each sense, 
beginning with vision: 
Vision he explains by the reflection <in the eye> of which he gives a 
unique account. For the reflection does not arise immediately in the 
pupil. On the contrary, the air between the eye and the object of sight 
[$&" R%1µ"'&3: literally, “thing seen”] is compressed by the object and 
the visual organ, and thus becomes imprinted [$3/&"(!#+]; since there 
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 According to Stratton, Theophrastus deals with eight philosophers, but of the 91 
sections of On the Senses, discussions of Democritus extend for 34 sections. This is in 
comparison to eighteen sections on Empedocles, about ten each to Diogenes, 
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is always an effluence of some kind [$+'# '/&%%&9'] arising from 
everything. (section 50, trans. Stratton) 
Again, this theory relies on the understanding that all objects continuously emit 
effluences of some sort, as well as that some kind of contact takes place between 
perceiver and perceived, which is particularly vivid here in the image of imprinting. 
 In “Democritus on Visual Perception: Two Theories or One?”, Richard W. 
Baldes undertakes a study of the accounts of Democritus provided in both 
Theophrastus and Aristotle. He explains that some scholars have been tempted to 
reconcile seemingly contradictory accounts by positing two separate theories of 
perception for Democritus, one involving a visual that comes out of the eye to meet an 
image coming out of an object and a second involving a “midair air impression,” in 
which a visual ray from the eye and an image from the object meet in midair and 
create to create an impression (94). As this summary of the two proposed theories 
suggests, these are not, in fact, necessarily divergent ideas, and Baldes argues that 
Democritus taught only one theory, and the accounts we have in Theophrastus and 
Aristotle appear to be incompatible in some respects simply because those 
philosophers are discussing different aspects of the theory. Aristotle, he argues, is 
concerned with “how the ‘image’ is transferred from the physical object to the eye,” 
while Theophrastus “is reporting on what happens to the image at the percipient” (99). 
Democritus, Baldes proposes, does not consider the “thing seen,” which comes 
together with the eye to create an imprint, to be a physical object in the world but 
rather an image or effluence coming from that object (100).  
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Working from his identification of the “thing seen” as an effluence, Baldes 
details Democritus’ theory of the process of visual perception: “As the image gets very 
close to the eye, some air is trapped there between it and the eye; this trapped air is 
compressed against the eye by the momentum of the oncoming image and there also 
receives the imprint from the image” (100-101). Thus, Democritus’ theory does not 
necessarily rely on a visual ray proceeding from the eye or on a “midair” impression, 
though it does demand the production of an “impression” or “imprint.” Rather, as 
Baldes asserts, this theory involves the production of this imprint at the percipient. 
“Theophrastus,” he says, “does not mention travel of this air impression to the eye 
precisely because no such travel is involved” (101).  
Baldes’s refinement of the reconstruction of Democritus’ theory of vision 
creates an even stronger sense of contact between perceiver and perceived than we 
might initially understand from Theophrastus’ summary. This intensification of 
contact, however, explains much better than the “midair impression” idea why 
Aristotle would criticize Democritus so strongly for reducing all the senses to touch. 
In his treatise On Sense Perception, Aristotle complains: “Democritus and most of the 
physical philosophers who treat of sensation commit a most senseless blunder. They 
identify all sense qualities with the tactual. It is clear that if this were true each of the 
other senses would be a sort of touch; but it is not difficult to see that this is 
impossible” (442a-b, trans. G. R. T. Ross). For Aristotle, the theories of Democritus 
and like-minded philosophers figure all the senses as, in some way, tactile, due to a 
process we now term “intromissionist”: effluences from an object enter into the sense 
organ of the perceiver. 
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Although our understandings of the Presocratic theories are fraught with 
complications and uncertainties, the works of later writers do give us glimpses of 
those earlier ideas. As this brief survey of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus 
has shown, the theories of the Presocratics may have differed in the exact processes 
they constructed for perception, yet they generally involve some common underlying 
concepts. Whether like meets like or opposite meets opposite, some kind of effluence 
comes out from objects in the environment to meet the appropriate sense organ. These 
theories rely upon some concept of atoms, that is, particles that can make up the 
effluences, as well as upon a moment of contact between those particles and the 
perceiver.
197
 Taking these as the central concepts of Presocratic perception theories, 
we can now continue to Plato and then to Aristotle, where we may at least enjoy more 
complete and reliable texts. 
 
Theories of Perception: Plato 
Despite the gap of perhaps forty years between the deaths of Sophocles and 
Euripides and the writing of his Timaeus dialogue, Plato remains our best, closest, 
surviving source for philosophical theories of perception during tragedy’s heyday. The 
most sustained and detailed discussion of perception in Plato comes in the late 
dialogue Timaeus, which gives Plato’s most comprehensive discussion of the nature of 
the universe, including a creation story. According to this story of the creation of the 
universe, the gods shaped humans with a front and a back, and on the front of the head 
                                                
197
 See Lindberg, p. 2-3 for more on the underlying similarities of the theories of the 
atomists. 
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they attached organs “for every foreknowledge of the soul” [/*(C $L $9. C329. 
/%&'&53], starting with the “light-bearing eyes” [,1(,6%#…=µµ#$#] (45B). Plato 
explains that these eyes were made from a gentle type of the basic element of fire, a 
substance similar to daylight. Vision, then, works through a fusion of the fire found in 
a visual ray coming out of the eye with the fire in the light: 
Whenever then there is daylight surrounding the current of vision, then 
this issues forth as like into like, and coalescing with the light is formed 
into one uniform substance in the direct line of vision, wherever the 
stream issuing from within strikes upon some external object that falls 
in its way. So the whole from its uniformity becomes sympathetic; and 
whenever it comes in contact with anything else, or anything with it, it 
passes on the motions thereof over the whole body until they reach the 
soul, and thus causes that sensation which we call seeing. (45C-D)
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 This is basically what we now call an “extramissionist” theory of vision: the 
eye actually sends out a visual ray, rather than simply receiving light or other 
information from the environment, and the fusion of the common element (fire) of the 
ray and the environmental light sends back motions that pass through the eyes to the 
soul. This model suggests a strong connection between the seer and the object seen, 
and indeed Plato elsewhere explains that the subject and object have a mutually 
dependent relationship, as perception itself makes one into the percipient and the other 
into a percept. In his explanation of colors in the Theaetetus, he concludes that subject 
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quotations from Timaeus are from Archer-Hind’s translation. 
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and object (here, “active” and “passive”) are so only in relation to one another: “For 
even in the case of the active and passive motions it is impossible, as they say, for 
thought, taking them singly, to pin them down to being anything. There is no passive 
till it meets the active, no active except in conjunction with the passive; and what, in 
conjunction with one thing, is active, reveals itself as passive when it falls in with 
something else” (157a).
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As R.D. Archer-Hind summarizes, “subject and object are inseparably 
correlated and exist only in mutual connection—subject cannot be percipient without 
object, nor object generate a percept without subject” (21-22). Further, as Archer-Hind 
continues, “…subject as well as object is undergoing perpetual mutation: thus, since a 
change either of object or of subject singly involves a change in the perception, every 
perception is continually suffering a twofold alteration. Perception is therefore an 
ever-flowing stream, incessantly changing its character in correspondence with the 
changes in subject and in object” (22). Thus Plato figures perception, first vision and 
then the other forms of sensory perception, to be a powerful connecting force, a 
“stream” that transforms both subject and object and is in continuous motion and 
change. 
The purpose of vision and the other senses, according to Plato, is to allow 
humans to perceive the movements of the stars and so that “learning them [the 
heavenly orbits] and acquiring natural truth of reasoning we might imitate the divine 
movements that are ever unerring and bring into order those within us which are all 
astray” (Timaeus 47B-C). Essentially, the point of perception is that it allows us to be 
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philosophers. The difficulty, however, is that perception does not always provide 
accurate information, and it can sometimes be subjective. In Theaetetus, this problem 
of subjectivity leads to the conclusion that perception does not yield knowledge at all 
(186e). Furthermore, in Philebus, Plato details the problem of false perception, which 
might involve a problem in the communication of sensory information or in the 
judgments made from the information itself (38E-39C).  
Here we come to the consequences of Plato’s distinctions between specific 
parts of the “soul.” In Book X of The Republic, Plato, through the mouthpiece of the 
dialogue’s character Socrates, makes an important distinction between two parts of the 
soul [C329]. One part, he explains, approaches things rationally, by measuring, 
counting, weighing, and reasoning. This part would, for example, measure two objects 
to decide which is the larger. The other part, however, tends to be persuaded by mere 
appearances and can be much more easily deceived, often thinking that one object is 
larger than another even though it is in fact smaller (603A). This second part is also 
that which tends to express strong emotions, rather than behaving in a more contained 
and reasoned way.  
In other contexts, Plato might figure the soul as having three or four parts, but 
for his ideas about perception, it is this distinction between the rational part and what 
we might term the emotional part that is significant. If the emotional part (the 
“inferior” part, by Plato’s description) is more easily deceived by appearances, we 
might conclude that this would be the part that would engage directly in perception. 
The second part, then, might be involved in the rational, cognitive process of judgment 
that would follow the basic process of perception (#"(!9(+.). As we might expect, 
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then, Plato’s understanding of the process of perception does seem to involve two 
different stages, though their boundaries may be blurry.  
In the Philebus, Plato’s Socrates imagines the soul as a papyrus roll and 
explains that “memory, sense-perceptions, and their attendant processes combine, as it 
were, to write propositions on our souls” (39A). Next, a “designer” paints illustrations 
on the soul: “a man detaches the judgments he has once formed and uttered from the 
impression of sight (or other sense), and, so to say, contemplates the images within 
himself of the old judgments and propositions” (39B-C).
200
 Basically, Plato’s model 
includes some kind of rational, cognitive process that joins memories and reason with 
the perceptual information to form judgments or beliefs (=6E#+).  
So on the one hand, perception allows people to gather information about the 
world, to philosophize, and, a important point for Plato with his theory of forms, to 
connect in some way, imperfect though it may be, with the true, universal soul or 
good. On the other hand, perception can be false or deceptive, and there are several 
steps in which a mistake could yield false perceptions or false judgments. In his study 
of several major terms in Plato’s perception theories, Jeffrey Barnouw, here working 
primarily from Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist, summarizes what he terms the 
“predicative nature of perception” found in Plato, Aristotle, and the later Stoics as 
including “its internal structuring of what is perceived in propositional form and its 
intrinsic reality claim such that, if no overriding judgment supervenes, what is 
perceived is believed to be” (11). Essentially, the “propositional” aspect of perception 
is its capability of being true or false and thus requiring some proposition and 
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judgment. The important point that emerges here is that perception can result in either 
true or false judgments and that the default judgment tends to be an acceptance of the 
perceptual information as “true,” which complements Plato’s complaints about the 
“inferior” part of the soul in the Republic. 
If the judgments resulting from perception can be either true of false, is one 
type of sense perception more reliable than another? If information from two different 
senses, such as seeing and hearing, are in conflict, which one should the perceiver 
trust? For Plato, a partial answer may lie in the different models he constructs for the 
mechanics of seeing and hearing. We have already seen that he understands vision as 
involving a ray from the eye coalescing with daylight and bringing back motions from 
any object it strikes to the soul, and bit later in the Timaeus, Plato provides a brief 
description of each of the major sensory organs as part of a large discussion of the 
parts of the human body. For the ears and the sense of hearing, he explains: 
Let us in general terms define sound as a stroke transmitted through the 
ears by the air and passed through the brain and the blood to the soul; 
while the motion produced by it, beginning in the head and ending in 
the region of the liver, is hearing. A rapid motion produces a shrill 
sound, a slower one a deeper sound; regular vibration gives an even and 
smooth sound, and the opposite a harsh one; if the movement is large, 
the sound is loud; if otherwise, it is slight. (67B) 
By this model, then, sound, like visual percepts, is composed of some kind of 
motion or vibration, but in this case, nothing reaches out from the perceiver to the 
object perceived. The ear is rather a sort of funnel, which simply collects the 
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vibrations and passes them through to the soul. Because both hearing and seeing bring 
the perceptual information to the soul, both processes may involve the subsequent 
processing of information through cognitive, rational judgment. However, Plato’s 
theory of vision involves a fusion of like with like that remains absent in his model of 
hearing. While any kind of perception might involve the risks of false perception and 
judgment, I would propose that vision, by Plato’s understanding, is particularly 
susceptible to the dangers that concern him with respect to the “inferior” part of the 
soul and, as I will suggest later, with respect to mimetic poetry.  
 
Theories of Perception: Aristotle 
 Though moving to Aristotle takes us even farther from the time of the original 
productions of the tragedies, we should nevertheless consider his contributions to 
theories of perception, particularly because he seems to refute so strongly the previous 
theories of Plato, Empedocles, and Democritus. His criticisms of Plato and the 
Presocratics further inform our understanding of the dominant theories of that period, 
and even Aristotle’s very different theories share some fundamental perspectives with 
those of earlier philosophers. Despite his firm break with earlier theories, Aristotle’s 
own construction retains a sense that perception can affect the perceiver, possibly even 
in a physical or material way.  
 Aristotle works through his theories of perception primarily in On the Soul and 
On Sense-Perception, with the latter being the more detailed study.
201
 On Sense-
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258 
Perception features a strong refutation of extramission theory, as Aristotle breaks with 
the theories of his predecessors: 
The theory is wholly absurd that sight is effected by means of 
something which issues from the eye and that it travels as far as the 
stars or, as some say, unites with something else after proceeding a 
certain distance. Than this latter a better theory would be, that the union 
is effected in the eye—the starting point; but even this is childish. What 
can the union of light with light mean? How can it come about? The 
union is not that of any chance light with any other chance light 
whatsoever. Again how can the internal light unite with the external? 
The membrane of the eye divides them. (438a-b, trans. Ross)
202
 
Aristotle clearly has little patience with the idea that rays with a substance of fire 
would travel out from the eye and coalesce with outside rays. His repudiation of 
extramission theory, however, does misread the earlier theories, to some extent, in that 
he blends his own conceptions of the eye and light itself with those of Plato and 
Empedocles, rather than evaluating the previous theories purely on their own terms. 
In Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, T. K. Johansen explains Aristotle’s 
complicated and problematic approach to the extramission theories. First of all, he 
seems to ignore that in the Timaeus, the presence of a membrane does not inhibit the 
movement of rays out of the eye:  
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There is no mention of a membrane separating the light inside from that 
outside the eye in the Timaeus. Timaeus said that the gods made the 
entire eye, and particularly the middle of the eye, ‘fine-webbed’ 
(E3µ/+-9(#'$).). That was why the coarser elements were kept back 
whereas the pure and smooth fire was allowed to leave the eyes. 
Timaeus had therefore made explicit provision for the composition of 
the entire eye to allow for the light inside to leave the eye and coalesce 
with the light outside. (60-61) 
Despite Plato’s specific provision for the easy passage of light through the eye, 
Aristotle can base one aspect of his criticism of the extramission theory on the 
existence of a membrane because he has a different understanding of the composition 
of the eye and of light itself. Johansen points out that for Aristotle, light is not fire, 
though they are related, but rather a sort of actualization of the transparent (65).
203
 For 
the proponents of extramission theory, however, light is, essentially, fire and thus a 
body, which means that the bodies inside and outside the eye must be able to come 
into contact in order to coalesce and cause perception. According to Johansen, it is this 
contact that Aristotle argues the membrane would prevent, whereas for Aristotle’s 
own theory, “there is no problem with the membrane being in between the light 
outside and the transparent korê inside the eye, for what is needed for vision to take 
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 In On the Soul, Aristotle defines light as: “…neither fire, nor in general any body, 
nor an emanation from any body (for in that case too it would be a body of some 
kind), but the presence of fire, or something of the kind, in the transparent; for there 
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place is not a coalescence of bodies but a continuity of transparent bodies” (66). 
Aristotle’s use of the membrane as the definitive factor in disproving extramission 
theory thus relies on a combination of assumptions adopted by the extramissionists 
and assumptions from his own metaphysics. Nevertheless, this strong, somewhat 
ridiculing, refutation of the earlier theory serves as a clear separation of Aristotle from 
his predecessors.
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 If he utterly rejects extramission, what, then, does Aristotle propose for the 
process of visual perception? In simplistic terms, his theory can be termed one of 
“intromission,” meaning that something comes into the eye rather than coming out of 
it. As G. R. T. Ross summarizes in his introduction to the De Sensu and De Memoria, 
objects “whether, when in contact with it, or at a distance, act upon this organism and 
produce changes, whether mechanical (mere ,&%*), or qualitative ('--&5(1(+.), in 
certain of its members. The reception of these changes in the sense organ is 
perception” (6-7, italics are Ross’s). More specifically, Aristotle’s theory is based on 
the importance of the medium that comes between the eye and the object, as he 
explains in On Sense-Perception: “We have elsewhere stated that vision without light 
is impossible; but whether it is light or air that intervenes between the object seen and 
the eye, it is the motion propagated through this that produces sight” (438b). Thus, 
while he rejects the idea that eye could emit rays to coalesce with external rays, 
Aristotle still relies on some substance or quality that connects seer and seen. 
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 Indeed, by this point in On Sense-Perception, Aristotle has already made a 
similarly strong statement: “…if [light] really consists of fire, as Empedocles alleges 
and we read in the Timaeus, and if vision is produced by the issuing forth of light from 
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 In his study of the history of theories of vision, David C. Lindberg emphasizes 
on this fundamental similarity between Plato and Aristotle, despite Aristotle’s 
insistence on his departure from extramission:  
…there is another issue of equal or greater importance on which Plato 
and Aristotle are in considerably closer agreement. For Plato, the 
coalescence of visual rays and daylight produces an effective optical 
medium between the observer and the observed -- a 'sympathetic chain,' 
as Cornford puts it,
205
 linking the visible object and the soul of the 
observer. Now Aristotle, although denying the emission and 
coalescence of rays, adopts Plato's emphasis on the creation of an 
optical medium; that it is a new state of the old medium rather than an 
altogether new medium does not alter the basic fact that this medium 
serves as the essential connecting link between the visible object and 
the observer. Aristotle, like Plato, solves the problem of vision by 
arguing that the eye and external media become parts of a 
homogeneous chain capable of transmitting motions (in the broadest 
sense) to the intellect of the observer. (9) 
Thus, both extramission and intromission involve some kind of connection between 
seer and seen. Whether the eye emits rays to coalesce with rays in the environment, or 
the eye receives effluences that objects emit, or the eye receives motions propagated 
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through a transparent medium, these theories all rely on an understanding of a sort of 
contact between the eye and the object.  
 Aristotle explicitly criticizes theories that simplify vision into a form of touch. 
He argues in On Sense-Perception: “Democritus and most of the physical philosophers 
who treat of sensation commit a most senseless blunder. They identify all sense 
qualities with the tactile. It is clear that if this were true each of the other senses would 
be a sort of touch; but it is not difficult to see that this is impossible” (442a-b). 
However, as his continuation makes clear, his own theory does not eliminate entirely 
tactile contact from other modes of perception: it simply proposes a less direct form of 
contact. Aristotle later states: “The number of the senses is uneven and the sense of 
smell, since an uneven number has a middle term, seems itself to occupy the 
intermediate position between the senses which require contact, viz. touch and taste, 
and those where the perception is mediated by something else, to wit, sight and 
hearing” (445a). Thus, even Aristotle’s professed rejection of contact as the 
foundation of all sensory perception is not absolute. His theory poses vision and 
hearing as based on a mediating substance, but since that substance itself is in contact 
with both seer and seen, it serves to connect the two through an indirect form of 
contact. 
 Aristotle’s explanation of memory in On Memory provides further support for 
the role of contact in his theory perception. Here, he focuses on the role of images in 
memory and the process of reconstructing an object or perception for oneself, with the 
awareness that the thing is in the past (450a). This explanation of memory leads him to 
ask how one can remember an absent object, and he proposes, “…it is clear that we 
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must regard the modification arising from sensation in the soul and in that bodily part 
where sense resides, as if it were a picture of the real thing, and memory we call the 
permanent existence of this modification. When a stimulus occurs it imprints as it 
were a mould of the sense-affection exactly as a seal-ring acts in stamping” (450a).
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The original sense-perception, then, acts upon the perceiver in such a way as to 
produce a lasting change, if, that is, the perceiver has a strong memory. Furthermore, 
the image of a seal creating an imprint has a strong implication of physical alteration, 
and such a process does not even seem to rely on any willingness on the part of the 
perceiver to take in the perceptual information and undergo the change. The nature of 
the change that occurs in the perceiver is a subject of great contention among scholars 
of Aristotle’s perception theories, with some arguing that “the sense organ takes on the 
property of its object” and others arguing that “the change brought about by the proper 
object of a sense is to be understood as a cognitive change—a change which can only 
be undergone by a sense or sense organ,” as Stephen Everson summarizes (58).
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Regardless of the precise nature of the change, the claim that perception effects 
a change in the perceiver clearly emphasizes the power of sensory perception and the 
contact, of whatever sort that might be, between perceiver and perceived. As David 
Lindberg summarizes during his transition from analysis of Plato and Aristotle to the 
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 In Aristotle on Perception, Everson discusses the issue of “change” as part of 
perception at great length and labels these two opposing viewpoints as the “literalist” 
and “spiritualist” interpretations (58). See his full chapter “Perceptual Change and 
Material Change” (56-102) for a detailed examination of these issues. 
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Stoics and Galen, the common ground among all of these theories is essentially role of 
a medium in between the sense organ and the object: 
Now it is evident from this brief account that the Stoics, like Plato and 
Aristotle, focused their attention on the medium between the observer 
and the visible object. …. Thus visual perception does not occur by the 
actual emanation of pieces of the visible object to the eye, but by 
qualitative changes produced by the object in a medium suitably 
prepared to receive them; this, it appears to me, is the common teaching 
of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. (9-10) 
As the connecting thread, this medium creates a form of indirect contact between 
perceiver and perceived, and this contact, though it may vary in intensity depending 
upon the theory, is the fundamental concept underlying the various theories of 
perception. 
 
Conclusion: Implications of Perception 
 This study of ancient theories of perception certainly has its complications and 
weaknesses: many of the key texts are not extant, and even if we were certain of the 
precise nature of each theory, we cannot know how widespread the knowledge of such 
theories might have been. Were the tragedians aware of the Presocratic theories that 
were in circulation in the fifth century? Would many Athenians in the audiences of the 
tragedies have heard such ideas? These questions simply cannot be answered from the 
evidence we have, and yet I would argue that these theories of perception still have 
value for our examination of tragedy. As the examples of epiphany of deities and the 
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gesture of covering a face to prevent visual perception suggest, perception, and 
particularly vision, was understood to be a very powerful, even dangerous 
phenomenon, and the philosophers’ theories about the mechanics of the visual process 
actually help to explain why vision might be so significant. 
 As we have seen, the most important concept behind many otherwise diverse 
theories of perception from Empedocles to Aristotle, and even later, with Epicurus, 
Euclid, and others, is that of some form of contact between perceiver and perceived.
208
 
The precise nature of this contact varies with the theory, but many of the philosophers 
express this component of the process with language that vividly elicits a sense of 
such contact, whether they discuss “imprints” or “coalescing” of like with like, and the 
perceptual process in some way changes the perceiver. With such an understanding of 
vision, it is only natural that social and religious practices would attempt to prevent 
perceptual contact from occurring in certain situations. The order of the development 
of these ideas is irrelevant: some ideas about pollution and purification, for example, 
almost certainly preceded philosophical ideas about vision, but in any case, the crucial 
point is that all of these ideas coexisted, in various ways and among various people, 
during the fifth century, and they strongly complement each other. 
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 See Edward N. Lee, “The Sense of an Object: Epicurus on Seeing and Hearing” for 
a study of Epicurus’ theory, which is based on the idea that objects continuously put 
forth eidôla, which, when they “strike successively upon an appropriate sense organ… 
will generate a phantasia of the object” (29). An eidôlon is “a single fleeting film of 
flying atoms, a diaphanous sheet or screen or convoy of atoms, thinner than any 
gossamer (only one atom thick) and traveling all on its own through space at some 
amazingly high speed” (29). Euclid’s theory is a primarily geometric one, based on 
rays proceeding from the eye at particular angles, and an object’s visibility depends on 
how many rays reach it and how they do so. See Lindberg, pages 12-14 for a lucid 
summary of Euclid’s theory. 
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 If vision creates a link between seer and seen object, whether that link is an 
essentially intromissionist or extramissionist one, that link could be a means of 
transferring something from seer and seen. If the seen object is polluted, the perceiver 
might contract some degree of that pollution through that visual link, just as one might 
from direct physical touch. This idea explains not only why seeing might cause the 
spread of pollution, but also why covering a polluted person might have value as an 
attempt to prevent such pollution. If mere proximity were sufficient for contagion, 
why would covering and uncovering be such a significant gesture, as in Euripides’ 
Heracles, for example? Proximity may still entail some risk, and Apollo and Artemis 
are concerned specifically about their presence near death in Alcestis and Hippolytus, 
but visual perception must be one step closer in contact and danger, as compared to 
proximity, and probably a step further from these as compared to direct physical 
touch. Thus, perception and pollution become intimately linked, and the necessity of 
proper separation of things that do not belong together is the natural result. 
 Whether the object of sight is a god or a polluted matricide, vision is a 
particularly powerful mode of connection between perceiver and perceived. 
Characters within tragedies are certainly aware of this power, and they attempt to 
avoid dangerous sights or to prevent others from seeing dangerous sights. These 
instances of perception are internal to a tragedy, occurring between characters in the 
world imagined on the stage, but of course, the theater is a seeing-place, and the 
spectators are watching everything on that stage. What, then, is the nature of their 
perception? Could unstageable, unseen props and action sometimes serve to prevent 
spectators from seeing things that may not be right to see? These are the central 
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questions that this study ultimately proposes, and since Greek tragedy is so concerned 
with seeing, not seeing, unseeing, and imagining, I would like to turn, in conclusion, 
to the implications of theatrical spectatorship. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION: SEEING IN THE “SEEING PLACE” 
 
 At its basic, literal meaning, the Greek theatron is a place for seeing. As my 
discussions of unseen props, unseen action, and imaginatively unseen epiphanies has 
shown, though, seeing itself is not a simple concept in the context of the Greek tragic 
theater. Seeing may sometimes be primarily a physiological process, as visual 
information from the world enters the mind and is interpreted, but at times it may be a 
different kind of cognitive process, as the mind constructs a visualization of a scene by 
applying an imaginative force to a variety of sensory data, not exclusively visual. 
Through this latter process, a spectator might “fill in the gaps” of the sensory data to 
imagine an earthquake as it unfolds, or, conversely, a spectator might create gaps in 
the data to imagine the true invisibility and ineffability of a god for which an actor’s 
body and voice simply mark the place. These examples show that the Greek tragic 
theater is a theater of imaginative seeing, not only for those events that occur off stage 
and in the past tense, as do many of the violent events related in messenger speeches, 
but also for the very events, objects, and characters that are occurring in the stage 
space, in the play’s present tense. 
 Indeed, this way of thinking about the distinctive spectatorial experience of 
Greek tragedy may be one step towards understanding Aristotle’s complex, sometimes 
contradictory attitude toward “opsis” [=C+.] in his Poetics. Although translators often 
render this term as “spectacle,” a word that carries heavy connotative baggage from 
contemporary usage, the basic definition of opsis is simply “appearance” or “thing 
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seen.”
209
 Aristotle’s famous rejection of spectacle as necessary for tragedy’s effect is 
thus about the visual, “seen” aspects of tragedy and so would seem to be a justification 
for studying and experiencing tragedy merely as written texts on the page, without 
attention to a superfluous performance element. My arguments for the power of the 
text in creating certain objects and actions might seem at times to take up this 
approach: after all, I have insisted on simplicity when considering stage machinery 
and special effects. However, as I hope my attention to the actors’ voices and gestures 
and to the spectators’ own imaginative contributions has indicated, the text of Greek 
tragedy is not sufficient for understanding the art form. At least, the “text” is not 
sufficient as long as we insist on a modern understanding of a written text and private, 
silent reading as the way of approaching a “text.” 
 
Aristotle: Tragedy, Poetry, and Opsis 
 Aristotle’s first strong disavowal of opsis for tragedy comes in Chapter VI of 
Poetics: 
…5 =; =C+. C32#B1B+00' µ"', '$)2'6$#$&' =; 0#/ M0+($# &.0)$&' $9. 
/&+:$+09.· 5 B&% $9. $%#B>=5#. =>'#µ+. 0#/ -')3 'B#'&. 0#/ 
l/&0%+$#' ,($+', ,$+ =; 03%+1$"%# /)%/ $+' '/)%B#(5#' $#' =C)1' 5 
$&" (0)3&/&+&" $"2': $9. $#' /&+:$#' !($+'. (1450b.16-20) 
[…but opsis is on the one hand very moving but on the other, both 
outside of the craft and the least proper/integral element of the poet; for 
                                                
209
 Liddell and Scott, first definition. Further definitions include “the power of sight” 
or “vision,” as well as specific parts or functions of the eye. 
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the power of tragedy exists without reference to both 
performance/competition and actors, and still more, the authority over 
the workmanship of opsis is more the craft of the mask-maker 
[(0)3&/&+&"]210 than that of the poet [/&+:$#'].]211 
Interestingly, Aristotle’s supposed rejection of opsis is here more properly a division 
of labor or discipline. He readily acknowledges that opsis is “C32#B1B+0'”: moving, 
persuasive, or emotionally powerful. Literally, it is a contest ('B7') with the soul 
(C329). Certainly, then, Aristotle is not dismissing opsis as weak or irrelevant but 
rather putting it to one side as not central to a particular craft. A complication with his 
argument emerges here, though, as Aristotle speaks of the realm of the poet 
[/&+:$+09.], not of tragedy as a whole, and indeed, his closing claim is that the crafts 
related to opsis are more the province of the “(0)3&/&+6.” (skeuopoios) [mask-maker] 
than of the poet.  
 Perhaps Aristotle’s fluctuation between terms for poetry and terms for tragedy 
is simply a relic of the composition and purpose of the Poetics, as notes for oral 
lecture rather than as a fully developed written treatise, but his emphasis on the 
division of responsibilities could be a key to understanding why and in what respect 
opsis might be unnecessary. Aristotle’s overarching project in his Poetics is to defend 
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 The (0)3&/&+6. was in charge of making or gathering the masks, costumes, and 
properties for the performance. This word appears in only a few texts, so our 
understanding of his domain is incomplete. Aristophanes’ Knights does include an 
enlightening reference, as Demosthenes assures the Sausage Seller and the audience 
that although Cleon is about to appear, he will not wear a mask with the real Cleon’s 
features, for “&N=)/.…$#' (0)3&/&+#'” [no one among the mask-makers] has dared 
to do such a thing (231-232). 
211
 All translations from the Poetics are my own, but the other quotations from Greek 
and Latin texts in this chapter are translated by others, as noted. 
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mimetic poetry, particularly in response to the complaints about it from Plato and his 
followers, and one of his primary methods for doing so is to compare it to epic poetry, 
a genre that enjoyed, and often still enjoys, much more universal respect and 
acceptance than the theater.
212
 He thus needs to be able to compare tragedy and epic 
through elements that they share, ideally showing that tragedy can do everything that 
they share just as well as epic can and that anything extra that tragedy adds does not 
detract from it, at least not to such an extent that it degrades tragedy below the level of 
epic. Since one of the shared elements between epic and tragedy is the poet and his art, 
Aristotle needs to be able to distinguish the poet’s contribution from the other aspects 
of tragedy, and this is exactly his project at the end of Chapter VI. Opsis is not 
unimportant, but, Aristotle argues, it is a primary concern not of the poet but of the 
skeuopoios. 
 What, then, comprises opsis as Aristotle uses it in this passage? It must 
encompass, in the first place, those crafts that the skeuopoios contributes to a 
production, such as the masks and costumes. From the preceding clause, we find two 
additional components of tragedy that, while not specifically identified as opsis, are 
deemed inessential to the power of tragedy: competition ['B7'] and actors 
[l/&0%+$[]. Many translators render 'B#'&. as “performance,” as Stephen Halliwell 
does in his Loeb edition, but 'B7' (agon) is the word for the competitions of tragedies 
and choruses at the festivals, as well as for assemblies and speeches (“contests” of 
rhetoric) before assemblies, and this important valence disappears when the term is 
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 For his specific comparisons between tragedy and epic, see especially Chapters 
XXIV-XXVI. Chapter XXVI is particularly significant, as it provides his final 
conclusions about the two (1461b-1462b). 
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translated as “performance.” It is possible that Aristotle is not arguing that tragedy’s 
power exists without any performance element at all, but that it exists without the 
formal, state-sponsored production in a festival context. Furthermore, in other parts of 
the Poetics, Aristotle clearly acknowledges the importance of the actors’ enactment 
for tragic mimesis and of the actors’ gestures in convincingly presenting emotions,
213
 
so it would seem that voice and gesture remain important to the presentation of the 
text to its audience. Do these, then, not belong to the category of opsis? 
 I would like to suggest that a key consideration for understanding Aristotle’s 
discussion of opsis and of tragedy more generally is his distinction between seeing and 
hearing. In Chapter XIV, another of his famed dismissals of opsis, Aristotle argues 
that a tragic plot should be able to produce the effects essential to tragedy even in 
someone who hears it without seeing it: 
u($+' µ;' &N' $0 ,&?)%0' 0#/ !-))+'0' !0 $9. =C)1. B5')(!#+, ,($+' 
=; 0#/ !E #*$9. $9. (3($*()1. $#' /%#Bµ*$1', )/)% !($/ /%6$)%&' 
0#/ /&+:$&" 'µ)5'&'&.. =)$ B&% 0#/ -')3 $&" R%j' &4$1 (3')($*'#+ 
$0' µ"!&' G($) $0' '0&>&'$# $& /%*Bµ#$# B+'6µ)'# 0#/ ,%5$$)+' 0#/ 
!-))$' !0 $#' (3µ?#+'6'$1'… (1453b.1-6) 
[So the fearful and pitiable is able to come about from opsis, but it is 
also from the very structure of actions, which is the higher priority 
[literally, “the first”] and of the better poet. For it is necessary that the 
story/plot be structured thus so that one hearing/reading the actions 
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 See, for example, 1449b.30-33 (Chapter VI) and1455a.29-32 (Chapter XVII). 
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happening without seeing [R%j'] them should tremble and pity at what 
results.] 
For Aristotle, the audience’s experience of fear and pity is the hallmark of tragedy, 
and he argues here that a good tragedy should be able to produce these effects even in 
one who hears it without seeing it. As long as we understand him to mean the hearing 
of the play itself and not just a summary of the story, as is most probable, the passage 
essentially argues that a good tragedy should be effective in recitation, the very form 
in which most people experience epic poetry. Here again, then, Aristotle is setting 
aside the elements specific to fully produced theatrical performance in order to show 
that tragedy can compete with epic in its own arena. Moreover, the elements that 
remain are not simply the written text but also the voice of at least one performer. He 
may dismiss the importance of actors [l/&0%+$[], in the formal and plural senses, 
without completely eliminating the need for a speaker. Perhaps even in Aristotle’s 
belittling of opsis, the old truism of the theater remains: the only essential components 
for theater are performer and audience. 
 Even those scholars who would seek to use Aristotle as the authority for 
approaching tragedy should not, therefore, use his treatment of opsis as license to 
regard tragedies simply as written texts. In the ancient world, reading silently in 
private was not the primary mode of experiencing either tragedy or epic, and even as 
Aristotle concludes his comparison of the two by claiming that reading vividly renders 
the qualities of tragedy [=+& B&% $&" ''#B+'7(0)+' ,#')%& R/&5# $5. !($+'], he 
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probably understands “reading” to be reading aloud (1462a.12).
214
 In order to show 
tragedy’s value in relation to epic, Aristotle makes the two as parallel as possible, 
insisting that a recitation of a good tragedy should produce the desired effects even 
without the apparatus that accompanies a full, official performance, and in fact, such a 
recitation by a good performer may still be able to create many, though probably not 
all, of the vivid, imaginatively constructed sights that I have argued tragedies create 
from the unstageable. Aristotle’s understanding of the most essential elements of 
tragedy seems to include those elements most necessary for stimulating spectators’ 
imaginations to experience a vivid, present-tense, theatrically real action that remains 
literally unseen. Aristotle’s opsis, then, might comprise the elements of apparatus that 
belong specifically to the theatron. By his argument, tragedy can exist outside of the 
theater, the “seeing-place,” but even in recitation or reading aloud, performance and 
the visual remain key to its effects: the degree of imagination that the audience 
contributes to the visualization may simply vary with the degree of visible apparatus 
provided in the performance. 
 Aristotle’s Poetics has been the object of so much critical fascination that it is 
a very difficult text to approach afresh. The traditional interpretations of it are heavily 
inscribed, and it is all too easy to allow preconceptions to inflect any attempt at a new 
reading. The problem is particularly acute for those who are limited to reading it in 
English translation: Aristotle uses many terms with a range of definitions and 
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 The first definition of ''#B+B'7(01 is to “know well” or to “know again,” from the 
root B+B'7(01, “to know,” but it came to mean “to read,” “to read aloud,” and 
eventually even “to attend lectures” on a subject (Liddell and Scott). While the word 
does not definitively indicate reading aloud, it certainly does not indicate silent 
reading, either. 
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valences, and any choice a translator makes must limit the meaning of that word, as 
well as pick up connotations from its usage in English. The translation of mimesis as 
“imitation” may be the most notorious instance of this issue, but as we have seen, the 
translation of opsis as “spectacle” or of agon as “performance” can be equally 
problematic.
215
 Nevertheless, if we, as scholars of classics or of theater, are to continue 
to use the Poetics as a foundational text in our research and teaching, I think a 
reappraisal of Aristotle’s approach to performance is necessary. What would it mean 
for some of our assumptions about Aristotle, Greek tragedy, and early aesthetic theory 
if we were to accept that he values highly the performance of a reader or actor, if not 
the addition of material apparatus? If Aristotle is the defender of theater, in opposition 
to Platonists, should we not expect him to support at least some of its distinctively 
theatrical elements? 
I have argued that Aristotle does not, in fact, argue that silent reading of a 
written text can provide the full effect of a tragedy. This claim would allow us to 
include a performer’s voice, and possibly gestures, as essential elements for tragedy, 
in Aristotle’s estimation, which, further, supports an understanding of tragedy as 
capable of producing visual elements through aural means. An audience can use what 
it hears, be that language or vocal inflection, in order to see something with the 
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 This issue poses a particular challenge when teaching the text to undergraduates 
without knowledge of Greek, in a theater history course or introduction to Greek 
theater, for example. In my own experience of teaching a freshman-level course in 
Greek theater, I found it helpful to provide students with glosses on several key terms, 
offering them alternative definitions and connotations. We also spent time in class 
wrestling with the possible implications of choosing one of these definitions, and I 
think the students developed a better understanding of the complexities of translation, 
in addition to a more critical approach to the Poetics. 
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imagination. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s attitude toward opsis does remain somewhat 
problematic, and I would yet maintain that his dismissal of it is too strong. Most 
importantly, the plurality of voices and bodies, especially for the chorus, is essential 
for the effect of many tragic scenes, and while Aristotle’s understanding of “reading” 
may involve recitation or reading aloud, it does not seem to involve multiple speakers. 
How could a single speaker convey the mass panic of the Chorus in Seven against 
Thebes, as they see and hear the approach of the enemy army? How could one voice 
create the polyphony of suggestions as the Chorus debates possible actions during the 
suspenseful moments in which Clytemnestra murders Agamemnon and Cassandra off 
stage in Agamemnon? While I do hope to disrupt overly simplistic interpretations of 
his use of the word opsis and of his evaluation of the significance of various elements 
for tragedy, I would also insist that his reduction of multiple performers to a single 
reader is a misguided attempt to make tragedy as parallel to epic poetry as possible, in 
his efforts to validate it by comparison to epic, and through this simplification, 
Aristotle loses one of the most distinctive and essential qualities of tragedy. 
 Despite this important reservation, I would like to continue examining how this 
new understanding of opsis and Aristotle’s use of it might relate to other ancient 
approaches to tragedy and complement my emphasis on tragedy’s ability to make the 
unseen seen. In fact, Aristotle’s emphasis on an actor’s voice over the material 
apparatus also connects him to a later treatise that speaks particularly strongly in favor 
of the power of imaginative visualization for the effectiveness of poetry and rhetoric: 
277 
Longinus’ On the Sublime.
216
 Longinus begins his investigation into sublimity by 
noting the power that comes from “transporting” the audience, rather than appealing to 
reason: 
For the effect of genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to 
transport them out of themselves. Invariably what inspires wonder, with 
its power of amazing us, always prevails over what is merely 
convincing and pleasing. For our persuasions are usually under our own 
control, while these things exercise an irresistible power and mastery, 
and get the better of every listener. (1.4)
217
 
To a great extent, Longinus’ criteria for the sublime are about the effect on the listener 
or reader, a sense of “transport” or “wonder” that overcomes the listener’s rational 
judgment. Much of the treatise that follows this introduction of the sublime explores 
how poetry or rhetoric might achieve sublimity: what kinds of tools tend to be 
successful for creating such effects? 
Since the sublime should create a feeling or experience that overwhelms 
critical judgment, the tools of sublimity cannot be simply reason, evidence, and 
compelling argumentation. The sublime, he argues, produces its effect, at least in part, 
by leading the listeners to visualize scenes: 
Weight, grandeur, and urgency in writing are very largely produced, 
dear young friend, by the use of ‘visualizations’ (phantasiai). That at 
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 The authorship of this text is unknown and very controversial, but I will refer to the 
author as “Longinus,” in keeping with tradition and for the sake of convenience. Its 
date is likewise unknown, but it is certainly well after Aristotle, probably sometime 
between the first and third centuries AD. 
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 Translations from On the Sublime are by W. H. Fyfe in the Loeb edition. 
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least is what I call them; others call them ‘image productions.’ For the 
term phantasia is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind 
from any source and engenders speech, but the word has now come to 
be used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, 
you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes 
of your audience. That phantasia means one thing in oratory and 
another in poetry you will yourself detect, and also that the object of 
the poetical form of it is to enthral, and that of the prose form to present 
things vividly, though both indeed aim at the emotional and the excited. 
(15.1-2) 
The sublime does not engage in an argument with listeners, but rather overcomes their 
rational judgment: 
There, besides developing his factual argument the orator has 
visualized the event and consequently his conception far exceeds the 
limits of mere persuasion. In all such cases the stronger element seems 
naturally to catch our ears, so that our attention is drawn from the 
reasoning to the enthralling effect of the imagination, and the reality is 
concealed in a halo of brilliance. (15.11) 
The visualizations are somehow so powerful that they disengage the rational part of 
the mind, and they may ultimately lead the audience to a conclusion that remains 
unjustified by the facts of the situation or by logical argument. 
Longinus’ phantasiai might be very similar to the imaginative visualizations 
that I have suggested for the spectators of Greek tragedy: in each case, the listener or 
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spectator sees something through the imagination that is not fully, visibly present in 
reality. In oratory, the ultimate goal is to persuade the audience to come to a particular 
conclusion, though the method is not so much to persuade as to create an emotional, 
highly energized experience that leads to the desired conclusion. The rhetoric itself 
does most of the work of creating the image and impressing it upon the listeners. 
This situation is more complex and more cooperative in the context of staged 
tragedy, however. For Longinus, writing well after the “Golden Age” of Greek tragedy 
and even, for that matter, after the height of Greek New Comedy, literary drama may 
be recited in private or studied in schools rather than performed on a stage with actors 
and a public audience. He sometimes uses passages from Euripides as examples of the 
sublime in poetry, but his treatments of those excerpts do not seem to imply that he is 
thinking of fully staged performances. His distinction between poetry and oratory, 
then, is not so much about the type of performance, since in each case it may be a 
recitation by a single speaker, as about the purpose. Oratory seeks to persuade, though 
when sublime it does so without “persuading” in a rational, argumentative sense, 
while poetry seeks to “enthrall,” to give the listener some kind of powerful aesthetic 
experience.  
In either case, the sight literally before the eyes of the audience is essentially 
the same: a performer, probably not in a costume or mask, speaking the words and 
using the voice, gestures, and possibly movement to bring the language to life. In 
either case, Longinus seems to give all, or at least almost all, of the power to create the 
visualizations and their ensuing effects to the poet and speaker. If we return to the 
context of staged Greek theater in the fifth century, however, there is much more 
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available for the audience to see, even if some actions and objects remain unseen. The 
process of creating the “visualizations” becomes more complex, as the spectators must 
use the visual data in combination with other sensory data, including the text, in order 
to see (or unsee) the appropriate images in the imagination. Longinus’ “top-down” 
understanding of how the sublime produces its effects may be problematic even for 
oratory, through its dismissal of the listeners’ agency and participation, but it certainly 
does not work as a full explanation for the imaginative vision that spectators may 
experience in a theater.  
 Both Aristotle and Longinus provide some corroboration for the idea that 
Greek tragedy, and perhaps other forms of speech or performance, asked its audiences 
to imagine some sights that were not literally visible. Although each writer is more 
concerned with the poetry itself than with the theatrical performance of it, their 
discussions of the visual element remain useful for developing an understanding of the 
ancients’ expectations of tragedy. Neither tragic poetry nor the material apparatus of 
the theater need supply every detail that the audience must understand to be present 
and visible: rather, the audience itself will find ways to see the unseen.  
 
Perception and the Ethics of Spectatorship: A Case Study in Plato 
 Longinus’ argument that the sublime should create its effect without, or even 
in spite of, the listener’s rational faculties is a vivid illustration of Plato’s great fear 
about mimetic poetry. Plato’s exclusion of theater from his ideal republic has been the 
root of much anti-theatricality in the Western tradition, and even today, shadows of his 
attitude return in arguments about censorship, violence in the media, and film and 
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video game rating systems. In each case, the central question is that of media’s (or 
performance’s) capacity to influence the audience, particularly on a subconscious 
level. For Plato, it is exactly this overwhelming of the listener/spectator’s rationality, 
which Longinus considers sublime, that is so dangerous. 
As I explained in more detail in Chapter 4, Plato makes an important 
distinction between two parts of the soul (C329, psychê) in Book X of the Republic: 
one part approaches things rationally, while the other part tends to be persuaded by 
appearances and can be much more easily deceived (603A). This latter part is also that 
which tends to express strong emotions, rather than behaving in a more contained and 
reasoned way. Ultimately, Plato concludes that the mimetic poet appeals to the 
“inferior” part of the soul, that which does not judge by reason and measurement, and 
the poet focuses on this part when presenting characters: “And is it not obvious that 
the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his 
cunning is not framed to please it, if he is to win favour with the multitude, but is 
devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?” 
(605A). Mimetic performance, according to Plato, “stimulates and fosters this 
[irrational] element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational 
part” (605B).
218
 
 How exactly might mimetic performance appeal to this part of the soul and 
override the rational part? Plato’s reasoning, I propose, is based on some of his 
presuppositions about sensory perception and its function in mimetic performance and 
spectatorship. The various theories among ancient philosophers about the exact nature 
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and processes of sensory perception help to explain why perception, particularly the 
visual, would be such a significant concern for the Greeks generally. If vision involves 
some kind of contact between perceiver and perceived, and if the contact has the 
potential to affect the perceiver, a natural consequence is a concern that one should not 
perceive anything that could be harmful, be it a polluting corpse or an all-powerful 
god. The need for proper separation of incompatible things, such as the dead and the 
living, becomes a need for perceptual separation, not simply physical separation. This 
link between theories of vision and concerns about spectatorship of mimetic 
representation, then, emerges in Plato’s arguments about the nature and the dangers of 
mimetic performance. 
Plato serves as a useful case study for connecting theories of perception and 
theories of spectatorship, since his extant work includes both the treatises on 
perception discussed in Chapter 4, such as passages of the Timaeus, and writings on 
mimetic poetry, such as the Ion and sections of The Republic. Scholarship on Plato 
tends to be sharply divided into topics, with critics studying his political philosophy, 
metaphysics, or aesthetic theory, for example, without crossing the disciplinary 
boundaries among them. However, placing his writings on perception in dialogue with 
his writings on mimetic poetry sheds new light on his notoriously skeptical, even anti-
theatrical views. 
If, as he argues in the Republic, mimetic poetry appeals to the “inferior” part of 
the soul, the part most susceptible to being deceived by appearances, it makes sense 
that this appeal would be through sensory perception, just as Longinus sees the effects 
of the sublime emerging from the phantasia it creates. Such an appeal could then lead 
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to dangerous false judgments, possibly with very little cognitive, rational judgment of 
the sensory information. The Ion dialogue, in which Socrates debates with a rhapsode 
(a performer of epic poetry) about the nature of his art, includes a particularly vivid 
description of how performance might work to short-circuit more careful reasoning, 
and this dialogue also introduces a possible distinction between seeing and hearing in 
their effects on spectators. 
In the beginning of the dialogue, Plato (or Socrates as created by Plato) uses 
the word “$&$. '0&>&3(+” to refer to the audience of a rhapsode. The word simply 
means “those who hear” and provides a relatively neutral, accurate reference to the 
audience, as Socrates explains that “…the rhapsode ought to make himself an 
interpreter of the poet’s thought to his audience” (530C).
219
 Since this term 
emphasizes the listening aspect of reception, which seems appropriate for describing 
the reception of a recitation of epic poetry, it is significant that Plato exchanges this 
for a visual term when he moves to a more detailed discussion of the audience’s 
experience of a performance.  
Later in the dialogue, Plato’s Socrates asks Ion, the rhapsode, “…when you 
give a good recitation and specially thrill your audience…are you then in your senses, 
or are you carried out of yourself, and does your soul in an ecstasy suppose herself to 
be among the scenes you are describing, whether they be in Ithaca, or in Troy, or as 
the poems may chance to place them?” (535B). In this case, the word that W. R. M. 
Lamb translates as “audience” is actually “$&S. !)1µ"'&3.,” meaning “those who 
watch.” Similarly, when Plato’s Socrates explains his analogy of a magnet drawing 
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iron rings to itself, he again uses a word of watching to refer to the audience: “And are 
you aware that your spectator [R !)#$.] is the last of the rings which I spoke of as 
receiving from each other the power transmitted from the Heraclean lodestone?” 
(535E). 
Why should Plato use one term in the beginning of the dialogue and a different 
term later? As his arguments in the Republic show, he is concerned that poetry, 
through its appeal to the “inferior” part of the soul, has the power to sweep up even 
those who normally control their feelings tightly. The specific uses of terms of seeing 
and hearing in the Ion suggest that he considers that the visual element contributes 
most strongly to this danger of emotional absorption and loss of control. When 
describing the rhapsode’s interpretation of a poet’s thought to the audience, a process 
that implies some critical thought and reason, Plato uses the term for hearers. When he 
describes the rhapsode’s ecstasy or feeling of being transported and the transmission 
of that feeling to the audience, however, he uses the word for watcher.  
It seems that the visual aspect of the performance is more important than the 
aural for creating these moments of ecstasy, and these are the moments in which the 
spectators become that final ring in the series that is drawn to the magnet. The analogy 
of the magnet and iron rings itself essentially dehumanizes the spectators, representing 
them as an object or abstraction, and this image further emphasizes their loss of 
agency. As watchers of a performance, Plato’s spectators become a powerless object 
caught up in the absorbing forces of some divine power source, with their powers of 
reason totally overcome by their emotional response. Plato’s choice of terminology 
thus emphasizes his implicit assumption that visual, bodily representation is more 
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dangerous, that is, more likely than speech alone to cause the absorption, ecstasy, and 
emotional transport that negate any individual agency. 
The significant difference between audience and spectator, or seeing and 
hearing, that emerges in the Ion is actually similar to the difference between the 
mechanics of seeing and hearing as detailed in the Timaeus. The visual process 
involves rays that extend outward from the eye, fuse with rays extending from objects 
in the world, and transmit information back through the eye to the soul. The aural 
process is much simpler and lacks the senses of contact and fusion that distinguish the 
visual process: sensory data enter the ear as if through a funnel, eventually proceeding 
to the liver and transmitting information to the soul.
220
 The nature of the contact 
between perceiver and perceived is of primary importance here. Sounds do enter the 
ear and ultimately reach the soul, but Plato’s model leaves ample room for the soul, or 
mind, to interpret that data with some independence and distance from the perceived 
object. In the case of vision, however, the visual rays serve as a medium between the 
eye and the object, resulting in close contact between the two, almost a physical touch. 
Moreover, the idea of a “fusion” between these different emissions implies some loss 
of control or condensation of the perceiver and perceived. Perhaps the perceiver has 
some agency in deciding how to direct the eye’s rays, but once the rays meet with like 
rays in the world, the process seems to override the perceiver’s control, with the 
information taking a quick path to the soul. Vision, it would seem, is capable of 
producing false judgments partly because it leaves too little room for rational analysis, 
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instead encouraging the perceiver to accept whatever conclusions the appearances may 
suggest. 
Plato’s primary concern about mimetic performance is that it stimulates the 
“inferior” or irrational part of the soul at the expense of the “superior” or rational part, 
thus encouraging unacceptable behavior and false judgments in the spectator. His 
understanding of vision then explains that mimetic performance, whether staged 
theater or recited poetry, creates this danger through the sensory processes it engages. 
Whether we limit our scope to literal, physiological vision or enlarge it to include 
imaginative vision, which seems appropriate given his use of epic as the subject of the 
Ion, that visual element threatens to overcome reason and caution on the part of the 
perceiver. As in Longinus’ discussion of phantasiai, the visual somehow breaks 
through the perceiver’s defenses with a sort of physical force, leaving an impression 
on the soul.  
 
Broadening the Scope: Perception and Performance in Theater History 
 In Late Antiquity, the nature and effects of sensory perception remained an 
important concern, particularly as Christian thinkers, including Tertullian and 
Augustine, warned Christians against attending the Roman spectacles. Tertullian, for 
example, feared that the spectacles would corrupt their spectators as a result of both 
their pagan origins and their immoral subject matter. In his short treatise On the 
Spectacles, he vividly describes the atmosphere of a race at the circus with an interest 
in the spectators’ sensory experience that Plato himself might have shown: 
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Look at the populace coming to the show—mad already! disorderly, 
blind, excited already about its bets! The praetor is too slow for them; 
all the time their eyes are on his urn, in it, as if rolling with the lots he 
shakes up in it. The signal is to be given. They are all in suspense, 
anxious suspense. One frenzy, one voice! (Recognize their frenzy from 
their empty-mindedness.) ‘He has thrown it!’ the cry; everyone tells 
everybody else what every one of them saw, all of them on the instant. 
(99)
221
  
In the final moments before the race begins, excitement runs high, due in part to the 
bets, and spectators close their minds and senses to anything except that race. Their 
intense focus, notably a visual focus on the urn and signal, creates a volatile situation, 
as a huge crowd erupts in “one voice.” Even after the race, the spectators’ minds are 
consumed by the visual, as “everyone tells everybody else what every one of them 
saw.” The spectacle itself controls their attention throughout the show, similar to the 
effect of Longinus’ phantasiai or Plato’s Heraclean lodestone, but the spectacle and 
the authorities directing it may not be able to control where their energies and 
emotions may go once aroused. Hence, the spectacle presents the danger not only of 
false judgment, but also of riots, which was a very real concern for spectacles during 
the Roman Empire.
222
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 Tacitus recounts several events that attest to the tendency for theaters and circuses 
to be sites of rioting and chaos, whether the riot begins with a spectacle or begins 
elsewhere, with the mob moving to the space for further demonstration. For example, 
in his Histories 1.72 (written ca. 110 AD), he relates an event of 69, in which “All 
Rome gathered to the Palace and the squares and, overflowing into the Circus and 
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 For early Christians like Tertullian, objections to the spectacles are many and 
varied, but as Tertullian’s description of a race suggests, the nature of perception is an 
important element. Perhaps the strongest warnings against the power of sensory 
perception at the spectacles come in Augustine’s Confessions (ca. 397 AD), with the 
story of Alypius’ transition from unwilling hearer to voracious seer. Alypius, as 
Augustine relates, was strongly opposed to the spectacles until one day when a group 
of his friends chanced upon him and forced him to accompany them to a gladiatorial 
show. In protest, he closed his eyes and refused to watch the bloody sport, but he 
could not close his ears. Eventually, a cry from the audience led him to open his eyes 
in curiosity, and as soon as he saw the action, he was overcome by a desire to see 
more and more of the fighting: 
…[he] opened his eyes, and was struck with a deeper wound in his soul 
than the other,
223
 whom he desired to see, was in his body; and he fell 
more miserably than he on whose fall the mighty clamour was raised, 
which entered through his ears and unlocked his eyes, to make way for 
the striking and beating down of his soul… For, directly he saw that 
blood, he therewith imbibed a sort of savageness; nor did he turn away, 
but fixed his eye, drinking in madness unconsciously, and was 
delighted with the guilty contest and drunken with the bloody pastime. 
(VI, Chapter VIII, section 13)
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theaters, where the mob can demonstrate with greater impunity, raised a seditious 
clamor” (Csapo and Slater 324). 
223
 I.e., the gladiator whose fall caused the audience to cry out. 
224
 Translation is by J. G. Pilkington. 
289 
In this case, the ears might seem to be the more vulnerable portal between the 
perceiver and the outside world. Because Alypius is unable to close his ears, the 
crowd’s outburst penetrates his best defenses against the spectacle. On the other hand, 
it is the instant of seeing the gladiatorial fight that functions as the point of no return. 
The visual sight leads to “the striking and beating down of his soul,” and his ensuing 
obsession with the spectacle manifests itself through vision, as he “fixe[s] his eye, 
drinking in madness unconsciously.” Again, Augustine explains the danger of the 
spectacles as a visual one. The effect is a total permeation of the soul with the desire 
for more of these visual perceptions. 
 The role of sensory perception, and particularly vision, is thus an important 
element in the anti-theatrical treatises of Late Antiquity, as Christian leaders 
encouraged their followers to devote their souls to God. In this understanding, sense 
perception can affect the soul, which then means that Christians must be careful about 
what they allow themselves to perceive. Eugene Vance explains that for Augustine, 
sense perception itself is not wrong or corrupt, but “the seer’s soul will be potentially 
degraded or reformed according to the kind of image that the soul wills and summons 
to mind during its cognitive activity,” which means that “the primordial fall of the soul 
begins not in the bodily senses, but within the soul itself when it first directs its 
attention away from its search to know spiritual or intelligible things, and chooses 
instead to entertain and indulge in the images of material things” (24). Plato’s 
understanding that visual perception needs to be controlled by an orderly, rational, 
restraining part of the soul thus recurs in arguments several hundred years later: once 
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perception awakens the “inferior” part of the soul, it is too late to stop its effects, so 
the rational part must ensure that it only allows harmless, preferably holy, perceptions. 
Although the present study cannot venture further into examinations of later 
historical moments, it should be clear at this point that Greek theories of perception 
had a lasting impact on philosophical approaches to spectatorship, even when that 
influence remains implicit. The theories of unstaged but imaginatively seen objects 
and action presented here have, likewise, strong potential for application to other 
theatrical forms and moments, as, for example, in great battle scenes or the tempests
225
 
of Shakespeare or in the extreme, often supernatural events of nineteenth-century 
closet drama. Modern-day solo performance often makes use of some of the same 
techniques as Greek tragedy for such purposes, with a performer using perceptual 
language and present-tense descriptions to recreate scenes, objects, and characters for 
the audience, sometimes with no visual representations of them at all. The 
phenomenon of staged but imaginatively unseen gods may combine with the unstaged 
and imaginatively seen in the context of medieval drama, for which the performance 
space was a platea, a neutral space, such as a town square or a pageant wagon, that 
could then become the farthest reaches of heaven and hell. Just as the Greeks faced 
complications when using human actors to represent gods, so too has Christian theater 
taken pains to represent the divine while avoiding any implication that the human 
actor is, in any way, God.
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 King Lear, as well as The Tempest, would be a fascinating subject of such inquiry. 
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 In fact, England passed Blasphemy Laws in 1606 that prohibited the performance 
of most religious drama, for just such fears. As Sarah Beckwith explains in Signifying 
God, “Corpus Christi theater became idolatrous when it was regarded as confining the 
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The theater is indeed a place for seeing. Even when some elements of a story 
remain physically unstaged, theatrical performance engages the visual sense of its 
spectators, as they imaginatively create mental images of the objects or actions that the 
performance demands. Clearly, much work remains to be done, and a wide variety of 
moments in theater history are ripe for this inquiry. Perhaps investigation even into 
our own current understandings of sensory perception, both the technical research of 
advanced fields such as neuroscience and the assumptions or perspectives of non-
experts, could help us to approach our preconceptions about theatrical performance 
and filmed or digital media. Just as Plato’s theories of vision remained implicit in his 
arguments about mimetic poetry, so too might our own theories and attitudes toward 
performance contain undercurrents of our perceptual theories and assumptions.  
                                                                                                                                       
limitless and potent God to the body of an actor, to his mortal gestures and banalizing 
mimicry, and when the actor’s act was understood to be scandalously imitating rather 
than gestically signifying God” (3).  
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APPENDIX I 
CATALOGUE OF PROPS IN GREEK TRAGEDY 
 
This catalogue lists all the props with specific references in extant tragedies. 
For ease of use, the plays are ordered by playwright (Aeschylus, Sophocles, then 
Euripides), and within each playwright’s corpus, the plays follow the order used in the 
Loeb Classical Library volumes. The Reference column lists the line(s) that indicate 
the item, based on the Loeb editions. For props that recur frequently, this list typically 
includes the first reference, any later references that are particularly significant, and 
“et alia” to indicate that there are further examples.  
For the sake of being comprehensive, this catalogue also includes set pieces 
with which characters interact and costume pieces with specific references, such as 
particularly elaborate clothing or mourning clothing. These costume pieces sometimes 
qualify as props, if characters interact with them (e.g. by tearing their robes or taking 
off a garland), but sometimes they seem to remain just costume pieces. Further, this 
catalogue includes props with textual references even if they may not actually be 
present or visible on the stage. See the comments column for notes about these two 
qualifications for the relevant items; the latter case is the subject of Chapter 2. 
 
Playwright Play Prop Reference Comments 
Aeschylus Persians Chairs for the 
Chorus 
140-141 This prop is 
possible but not 
necessary. 
Aeschylus Persians Libations and 
offerings (a 
variety) 
523-524; 
607ff. 
The Queen brings, 
then offers them. 
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Aeschylus Persians Carriage for 
Queen 
607 The Queen says 
she comes without 
her carriage this 
time, implying that 
she arrived in it 
previously. 
Aeschylus Persians Tomb or mound 647, 659, et 
al. 
A set piece, but 
actors present 
offerings and pray 
on it, and the Ghost 
of Darius rises 
from it. 
Aeschylus Persians Ragged costume 
for Xerxes 
834-836, 
1017 
This is a costume, 
but Xerxes 
specifically 
indicates it. 
Aeschylus Persians Tented wagon 1000-1001 Chorus refers to 
Xerxes’ “tented 
wagon,” but the 
comment may 
indicate that he has 
returned without it. 
Aeschylus Persians (Empty) quiver 
for Xerxes 
1020, 1022 Xerxes indicates 
his quiver, with 
“$6'=).” 
Aeschylus Persians Robes, white hair 
for Chorus 
1046 ff. Xerxes leads the 
Chorus in grieving 
for the army’s 
destruction, and the 
elders tear their 
robes and white 
hair. 
Aeschylus Seven 
against 
Thebes 
Armor for the 
soldiers 
31 Eteocles orders 
men to go to their 
stations in full 
armor. They may 
or may not be 
wearing it or 
putting it on. 
Aeschylus Seven 
against 
Thebes 
Altar, with 
images of gods 
96-98, 185 The Chorus may 
supplicate and 
clasp the images. 
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Aeschylus Seven 
against 
Thebes 
Greaves, armor 
for Eteocles 
675 ff. Eteocles calls for 
his greaves. If they 
do appear, he puts 
them on. 
Aeschylus Seven 
against 
Thebes 
Corpses: Eteocles 
and Polynices 
848 ff. The Chorus says 
that the 
messenger’s words 
of the disaster are 
now clear to see. 
Aeschylus Suppliants Olive branches 
for Chorus 
21-22, 191-
192, 333-
334, 480 ff. 
The women say 
they are carrying 
these, and Danaus 
later takes them 
offstage, to leave 
on other altars. 
Aeschylus Suppliants “Sidonian” veils 
for Chorus 
120-121, et 
al. 
The women say 
they are tearing 
their veils, though 
it may just be an 
expression, not 
enacted. 
Aeschylus Suppliants Rock, an altar to 
the Gods of the 
Assembly 
188-190 Danaus tells the 
Chorus to sit on the 
sacred rock as 
suppliants. 
Aeschylus Suppliants Trident on the 
altar 
218 Danaus says he 
sees a trident. The 
altar may have 
emblems of the 
gods, but most 
likely, these are 
invoked but not 
visible. 
Aeschylus Suppliants Luxurious, 
barbarian 
clothing for 
Chorus 
234-237, 
903-904 
Pelasgus and the 
Herald both remark 
about the women’s 
clothing. 
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Aeschylus Suppliants Girdles/belts for 
the Chorus. 
457, 465 The women 
threaten to hang 
themselves with 
these. 
Aeschylus?
227
 Prometheus 
Bound 
Rocky cliffs 4-5, 20 This is the setting, 
but Prometheus is 
later bound to a 
rock or cliff face 
on stage. 
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
Adamantine 
bonds, which 
Hephaestus uses 
on Prom. 
6, 19, 54 
(“C*-+#,” 
“harness”), 
et al. 
Specific bonds: a 
wedge through 
chest (64-65), 
around torso (71), 
around legs (74).  
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
Hammer for 
Hephaestus 
56 Heph. drives in the 
bonds with a 
hammer. 
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
Fetters or nails 76 Heph. drives them 
in to hold the 
bonds to the rock. 
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
“Fishing-net” or a 
surrounding bond 
('µ,5?-:($%&') 
81 Heph. says it is 
around 
Prometheus’ legs. 
It may be one of 
the bonds 
mentioned earlier. 
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
Winged car(s) for 
the Chorus 
135 The Chorus of 
Oceanids claims to 
arrive in winged 
cars, though these 
may not be staged. 
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
Winged, four-
legged bird for 
Oceanus to ride 
286, 395 The exact creature 
is unclear. It could 
be staged with the 
mechane or may be 
left unstaged. 
Aeschylus? Prometheus 
Bound 
Cow’s horns for 
Io 
588 Io points them out, 
but no one interacts 
with them. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Staffs for Chorus 75 Staffs show the age 
of the elders. 
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Aeschylus Agamemnon Olive wreath for 
Herald 
493-494 Chorus sees this as 
an indication that 
he brings the news. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Chariot or 
carriage for 
Agamemnon and 
Cassandra 
906, 1039, 
1054 
Clytemnestra and 
the Chorus refer to 
it. It enters at least 
by line 810. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Fine, purple, 
ornate fabrics 
908-911 et 
al. 
Clytemnestra 
orders servants to 
cast them on his 
path. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Agamemnon’s 
shoes 
944 Ag. calls for 
someone to take 
them off. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Cassandra’s staff 
and prophetic 
bands 
1266-1267 Cassandra takes 
them off and 
tramples them. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Agamemnon’s 
corpse (in a net? 
– 1392-1393, 
1492) 
1372 ff.; 
see 
especially 
1404 
Clytemnestra 
indicates the dead 
Ag. He may be 
wrapped in a net.  
Aeschylus Agamemnon Cassandra’s 
corpse 
1440-1447 It appears with 
Agamemnon’s 
corpse, but no one 
mentions it until 
here, where 
Clytemnestra does. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon Sword for 
Clytemnestra 
1496 et al. 
and implicit 
She implies (and 
Chorus confirms at 
1496) that she 
killed Agamemnon 
with a sword, 
which she may still 
hold.  
Aeschylus Agamemnon Swords for 
soldiers 
1651 Aegisthus orders 
soldiers to keep 
their swords ready. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Agamemnon’s 
tomb 
4, et al. Setting, but Orestes 
and Electra interact 
with it, making 
offerings and 
prayers. 
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Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Lock of Orestes’ 
hair 
6-7, 168, et 
al. 
Orestes offers it at 
Agamemnon’s 
tomb, and Electra 
finds it. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Black clothing for 
Chorus, Electra 
10-12 Orestes notes their 
clothing, which 
indicates 
mourning. The 
women may tear 
them. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Libations 24, 87 ff. Electra brings 
them, escorted by 
the Chorus. She 
pours them out at 
124 ff. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Footprints 206 Not a prop and 
probably not 
visible but still a 
recognition token. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Piece of weaving 
or a garment 
231 Size is unclear. 
Orestes shows it to 
Electra as a 
recognition token. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Luggage for 
Orestes 
675-676 He may carry it as 
part of his disguise. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Clytemnestra’s 
garment 
896-898 She bares her 
breast to Orestes. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Sword for Orestes Implicit He likely carries 
and shows a sword. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Corpses of Cly. 
and Aegisthus 
973-974 ff. Orestes reveals 
them for all to see. 
Aeschylus Libation 
Bearers 
Net or robe that 
caught 
Agamemnon 
981 ff. Orestes indicates it 
and tells someone 
to spread it out for 
display. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Navel-stone in 
the Temple of 
Apollo 
40 Orestes clings to 
this center stone. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Sword for Orestes 42 Pythia says he 
holds a drawn 
sword. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Olive branch for 
Orestes 
43-45 Pythia says he 
holds an olive 
branch with a 
wreath of wool. 
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Aeschylus Eumenides Chairs for Furies 46-47 Pythia notes them. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Apollo’s bow 181 ff. Apollo threatens 
the Furies with it. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Athena’s aegis 404 This may be more 
of a costume than a 
prop. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Etruscan trumpet 567-568 Athena calls for it 
to be sounded. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Votes and voting 
urns 
742-743  Athena and judges 
vote on Orestes’ 
fate; others count 
the votes. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Torches for the 
procession 
1005, 1022 Athena (and 
others?) escort(s) 
the Eumenides 
with torches. 
Aeschylus Eumenides Red/purple robes 
for Eumenides 
1028 These may or may 
not appear on 
stage. 
Sophocles Ajax Slaughtered 
livestock, etc. 
346 ff.  These are probably 
on stage but may 
not function as 
props. 
Sophocles Ajax Ajax’s sword, 
previously 
Hector’s 
658, 815 ff. Ajax may have it 
earlier, but he first 
indicates it here. 
Sophocles Ajax Ajax’s corpse 898 ff. The corpse may 
appear earlier, but 
Tecmessa indicates 
it at 898. 
Sophocles Ajax Cloth or garment 915-916, 
1003 
This is used to 
cover the corpse. 
Sophocles Ajax Locks of hair and 
something to cut 
them 
1173-1179 Teucer cuts locks 
of hair and gives 
them to Eurysaces 
for adorning the 
corpse and for 
supplication. 
Sophocles Ajax Tripod, armor, 
shovel, and more 
1402 ff. Teucer calls for 
many things to 
begin the burial, 
but they probably 
do not appear on 
stage. 
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Sophocles Electra Libations and 
possibly hair 
offerings 
52 Orestes intends to 
offer them, and 
presumably has 
them. 
Sophocles Electra Bronze urn, 
supposedly with 
Orestes’ ashes 
54, 1113-
1114 ff. 
It is hidden in the 
bushes, then given 
to Electra, then 
taken inside the 
palace. 
Sophocles Electra Electra’s bad 
clothing 
190-191 She indicates it, but 
she may not 
interact with it. 
Sophocles Electra Offerings 326-327, 
405 ff. 
Chrysothemis 
carries them but 
decides not to offer 
them. 
Sophocles Electra Electra’s girdle 
and locks of hair 
448-452 Electra convinces 
Chrysothemis to 
substitute these for 
Clytemnestra’s 
offerings. 
Sophocles Electra Clytemnestra’s 
offerings 
634 ff. Clytemnestra’s 
attendant carries 
these for her; Cly. 
offers them to 
Apollo. 
Sophocles Electra Orestes’ seal, 
which was Ag.’s 
1222 This serves as a 
recognition token. 
Sophocles Electra Clytemnestra’s 
corpse or a 
covered bier 
1466 ff. Orestes reveals 
something to 
Aegisthus. 
Sophocles Electra Orestes’ sword Implicit No specific 
reference, but he 
probably has one to 
threaten Aegisthus. 
Sophocles Oedipus 
Tyrannus 
Boughs, wreaths 2-3, 142-
143 
The people of 
Thebes wear them 
as suppliants. 
Sophocles Oedipus 
Tyrannus 
Crown of bay 
leaves 
82-83 Creon wears it, 
indicating a 
triumphant return 
from the oracle. 
Sophocles Oedipus 
Tyrannus 
Garlands, incense 911-913 Iocasta brings them 
and offers them to 
Apollo. 
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Sophocles Antigone Haemon’s corpse 1257 Creon carries it on 
stage, according to 
the Chorus. 
Sophocles Antigone Eurydice’s corpse 1293 Chorus says Creon 
can see the news of 
her death, that it is 
no longer hidden 
indoors. 
Sophocles Women of 
Trachis 
Poisoned tunic 580, 607-
615 
Deineira shows it 
to the Chorus, then 
gives it to Lichas, 
who takes it off 
stage to Heracles. 
Sophocles Women of 
Trachis 
Litter for the 
dying Heracles 
901, 971 ff. The Nurse 
mentions that 
Hyllus is preparing 
a litter; it comes on 
at 971, carrying 
Heracles. 
Sophocles Philoctetes Philoctetes’ cave, 
rags hanging 
outside; bed, cup, 
stones inside 
33-39 It is possible that 
no one actually 
picks up or 
manipulates any, 
and many may be 
off stage or 
unstaged. 
Sophocles Philoctetes Philoctetes points 
out his “wild” 
appearance. 
226 Probably just 
costume pieces, not 
manipulated as 
props. 
Sophocles Philoctetes Odysseus’ sword 1255 He puts his hand 
on the hilt as a 
threat. 
Sophocles Philoctetes Arrow 1299 Philoctetes draws 
the bow and aims 
an arrow at 
Odysseus. Arrows 
may be on stage 
earlier as well. 
Sophocles Oedipus at 
Colonus 
Rough rock 19, et al. Oedipus sits on it. 
Sophocles Oedipus at 
Colonus 
Statue of Colonus 59, et al. The Athenian man 
indicates it when 
explaining where 
they are. 
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Sophocles Oedipus at 
Colonus 
Etnean colt 311-321 Antigone describes 
Ismene riding on it 
as she approaches. 
It probably does 
not come on stage. 
Sophocles Oedipus at 
Colonus 
Thessalian sun 
hat for Ismene 
313-314 Antigone says 
Ismene is wearing 
one, but no one 
interacts with it. 
Sophocles Oedipus at 
Colonus 
Oedipus’ bad 
clothing, 
appearance 
1256-1261 Polynices points 
out his appearance, 
but it remains a 
costume, not prop. 
Sophocles Oedipus at 
Colonus 
Food/provisions 
for Oedipus 
1263 Polynices says 
Oedipus carries 
food as wretched as 
his appearance. It 
may or may not be 
staged. 
Euripides Cyclops
228
 Silenus’ iron rake 32-33 He says he needs to 
sweep with it 
before Cyclops 
returns. 
Euripides Cyclops Empty vessels, 
pails for 
Odysseus and his 
men 
87-89 As they approach, 
Silenus says they 
carry empty jars for 
food and pails for 
water. 
Euripides Cyclops Wineskin 145 ff. Odysseus produces 
it for Silenus. 
Euripides Cyclops Cup 152 Odysseus gives it 
to Silenus for the 
wine. 
Euripides Cyclops Flocks and cheese 188-190, 
224-227 
Silenus gives them 
to Odysseus in 
exchange for wine. 
Euripides Cyclops Club for Cyclops 210-211 He brandishes it 
when he enters. 
                                                
228
 Note that Cyclops is a satyr play, not a tragedy. I include it here for the sake of 
comparison and because it is traditionally included with volumes of tragedies, being 
that it is the only extant satyr play. I do not, however, include props from Cyclops in 
my discussion in Chapter 2 or in the categorization of tragic props in Appendix II. 
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Euripides Cyclops Sword for 
Odysseus 
456 Odysseus says he 
has sharpened a 
stake (off stage) 
with “this” sword. 
Euripides Cyclops Mixing bowl of 
wine 
545 ff. Silenus puts it 
behind Cyclops, 
and they later drink 
from it. Probably 
on stage earlier as 
well. 
Euripides Cyclops Crown or garland 558-559 Silenus seems to 
crown Cyclops. 
Euripides Cyclops Cliff or crag by 
Cyclops’ cave 
683-684 Cyclops collides 
with it. 
Euripides Alcestis Apollo’s bow and 
arrows 
34-35, 39 Death points them 
out, asking if 
Apollo intends to 
try to prevent him 
from taking 
Alcestis. 
Euripides Alcestis Death’s sword 74-76 Death indicates it, 
which he will use 
to cut a bit of 
Alcestis’ hair and 
mark her as his. 
Euripides Alcestis Mat/litter for 
Alcestis 
232 ff., 
especially 
267 
Implicit, but 
Alcestis cannot 
support herself and 
lies down at 267. 
Euripides Alcestis Admetus’ hair cut 
for mourning 
512 Heracles notes it. 
This is a costume 
piece but a change 
from Admetus’ 
earlier appearance. 
Euripides Alcestis Finery for the 
dead Alcestis 
611-613, 
618 
Admetus’ father’s 
servants carry it 
when they enter. 
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Euripides Alcestis Alcestis’ corpse 393 ff., 606 
ff., 729 
She dies on stage, 
so this played by 
an actor but carried 
off stage as if an 
object. If the 
servants come onto 
the stage space 
when carrying her 
to the tomb, the 
body reappears as a 
dummy at 606 ff. 
Euripides Alcestis Garlands for 
Heracles 
759-760, 
831-832 
The servant 
describes him as 
garlanded with 
myrtle; Heracles 
later refers to his 
head as garlanded. 
Euripides Alcestis Shorn hair, black 
clothes for 
servants 
818-819 This would be a 
change from 
earlier, but the 
lines are bracketed. 
Euripides Alcestis Veil for Alcestis 
(possibly) 
1008-1121 No specific 
reference, but 
Admetus does not 
recognize her until 
Heracles tells him 
to look at her (and 
removes the veil?). 
Euripides Alcestis Clothing and 
adornment of a 
young woman 
1050 Costume, but 
Admetus 
specifically 
describes it thus. 
Euripides Medea Poisoned gown 
and diadem 
950-951, 
956 
Medea orders a 
servant to bring 
them out; she gives 
them to her 
children to take to 
Jason’s bride. 
Euripides Medea Sword for Medea 
(maybe) 
1244 She tells herself to 
“take the sword,” 
but she probably 
does not have a 
physical sword 
with her here. 
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Euripides Medea Gates and/or door  1317-1318 Medea asks Jason 
why he rattles the 
gates and tries to 
get through the 
door. It is a set 
piece, but Jason 
interacts with it. 
Euripides Medea Chariot of Helios 1321-1322 
ff. 
The exact staging 
is very unclear, but 
it keeps her out of 
Jason’s reach. 
Euripides Medea Corpses of 
Medea’s and 
Jason’s two sons 
1377 and 
implicit 
Medea has them 
with her in the 
chariot. 
Euripides Children of 
Heracles 
Altars 33 Iolaus and 
Heracles’ sons are 
sitting at an altar in 
supplication. 
Euripides Children of 
Heracles 
Suppliant wreaths 71 Iolaus refers to 
their wreaths as the 
herald tries to pull 
them away from 
the altar. 
Euripides Children of 
Heracles 
Herald’s clothing 
is Greek 
130-131 Demophon notes 
this, but it remains 
a costume, not 
prop. 
Euripides Children of 
Heracles 
Maiden daughter 
of Heracles asks 
Iolaus to cover 
her with her 
garments when 
she dies. 
560-563 This is not enacted 
on stage, but the 
request is similar to 
other examples of 
covering. 
Euripides Children of 
Heracles 
Iolaus asks the 
boys to set him 
down on the altar 
and cover him 
with his 
garments. 
603-604 This is enacted on 
stage, and it shows 
Iolaus’ grief. His 
clothes function as 
a sort of prop. 
Euripides Hippolytus Garland 73-83 Hippolytus puts it 
on the statue of 
Artemis. 
Euripides Hippolytus Statue of Artemis 73 ff., 
implicit 
Hippolytus 
garlands it. 
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Euripides Hippolytus Statue of 
Aphrodite 
101, 115-
116 
The servant 
indicates it, in 
warning to Hipp. 
Euripides Hippolytus Bed or mat for 
Phaedra 
179-180 The Nurse says her 
sickbed is outside. 
Euripides Hippolytus Headdress or veil 
for Phaedra 
201-202, 
243-250 
Phaedra calls for 
someone to take it 
off, then asks the 
Nurse to put it back 
on, and she does. 
Euripides Hippolytus Ambassador 
garland for 
Theseus 
806-807 The garland 
indicates success at 
the oracle. 
Euripides Hippolytus Phaedra’s corpse 808-811, ff. Theseus calls for 
the servants to 
open the door and 
show him his wife; 
the Chorus then 
addresses her. 
Euripides Hippolytus Tablet in dead 
Phaedra’s hand 
856 ff. Theseus sees it in 
her hand and reads 
it. He says it 
“shouts” (876). 
Euripides Hippolytus Hippolytus’ 
mangled body 
1341 ff. This is the actor, 
but he is supported 
by attendants or 
carried on a litter. 
He seems to die on 
stage, around 1458. 
Euripides Hippolytus Arrows for 
Artemis 
1420-1422 She says she will 
punish a mortal 
Aphrodite loves 
with “these” 
arrows. 
Euripides Hippolytus Garments to 
cover Hippolytus’ 
face 
1457-1458 Hippolytus asks 
Theseus to cover 
his face as he dies. 
Euripides Andromache Shrine of Thetis 43-44 Andromache sits 
here as a suppliant. 
Euripides Andromache Gold, elaborate 
clothing for 
Hermione 
147-148 Hermione 
specifically 
indicates it but may 
not interact with it 
306 
Euripides Andromache Bonds for 
Andromache 
425, 717-
720 
Menelaus orders 
slaves to bind her 
hands. Peleus later 
releases her. 
Euripides Andromache Scepter for Peleus 588 He threatens 
Menelaus with it. 
Euripides Andromache Hermione’s veil, 
clothing in 
disarray 
830-832 She casts away her 
veil, tears at her 
clothing. 
Euripides Andromache Neoptolemus’ 
corpse 
1166 ff. Attendants carry it 
on stage to Peleus. 
Euripides Hecuba Cloak for 
Odysseus  
342-344 Odysseus hides his 
right hand in it to 
avoid Hecuba’s 
supplication. 
Euripides Hecuba Polyxena’s 
garments 
432-434 She asks Odysseus 
to wrap her 
garment around her 
head and lead her 
away. 
Euripides Hecuba Hecuba’s 
garments 
486-487 She lies wrapped in 
them, in grief. 
Euripides Hecuba Polydorus’ corpse 679-680 ff. It may be brought 
on stage at 658. 
Euripides Hecuba Polydorus’ 
clothes are Trojan 
734-735 Agamemnon notes 
this. They are 
props only in the 
sense of being on a 
corpse. 
Euripides Hecuba Corpses of 
Polymestor’s 
sons 
1049 ff. Polymestor is also 
blinded and 
staggering. 
Euripides Suppliant 
Women 
Suppliant 
branches for 
Chorus 
10, et al. They later place 
them on the ground 
around Aethra, 
then pick them up 
later. 
Euripides Suppliant 
Women 
Adrastus’ head is 
covered 
110-112 Theseus tells him 
to uncover it. It 
may be covered for 
supplication, 
mourning, or 
shame. 
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Euripides Suppliant 
Women 
Aethra holds her 
garments before 
her eyes 
286-288 She weeps in grief 
for the Chorus 
women. Theseus 
says she does this. 
Euripides Suppliant 
Women 
Five corpses on 
biers 
766, 794 ff. They process off 
with Theseus and 
Adrastus at 954. 
Euripides Suppliant 
Women 
Evadne’s finery 1054 Iphis asks why she 
has adorned herself 
in this way. It 
probably remains a 
costume, not prop. 
Euripides Suppliant 
Women 
Urns with bones 
or ashes of the 
dead 
1114 ff. Chorus sees the 
boys approaching 
with these. 
Euripides Electra Water jug for 
Electra 
55-56, 107-
110, 140 
Electra says she 
does this to show 
Aegisthus’ outrage 
against her to the 
gods. 
Euripides Electra Electra’s dirty 
clothes, short hair 
184-185, 
241 
This is a costume 
but very important 
and could be 
manipulated. 
Euripides Electra Altar near the 
house 
216 Electra says men 
are hiding near it, 
but they probably 
do not interact with 
it specifically. 
Euripides Electra Sword for Orestes 225 Electra notes it. 
Euripides Electra Lamb, garlands, 
cheese, wine 
493 ff. The Old Man 
brings these for 
Electra and guests. 
Euripides Electra Tattered clothes 
for Old Man 
501-502 He says he wants 
to wipe his eyes on 
them. 
Euripides Electra Lock of hair from 
the tomb 
520-521 Old Man tells 
Electra to put it 
against her own 
hair. He may or 
may not have it on 
stage. 
Euripides Electra Garlands for 
Electra 
870-873, 
882 ff. 
Electra garlands 
Orestes and 
Pylades. 
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Euripides Electra Aegisthus’ corpse 880 ff., 
especially 
895; 1172 
ff. 
Orestes brings it on 
at 880, indicates it 
at 895, and drags it 
off at 959-961. 
Euripides Electra Clytemnestra’s 
finery 
966 Orestes notes this 
as she approaches.  
Euripides Electra Cart/chariot for 
Clytemnestra 
966, 998, 
1135-1136 
It may come on 
stage. 
Euripides Electra Clytemnestra’s 
corpse (with 
Aegisthus’) 
1172 ff. Chorus announces 
the sight. Electra 
and Orestes later 
refer to them. 
Euripides Electra Garment to cover 
Clytemnestra’s 
body 
1227-1232 Orestes and Electra 
cover her, at 
Orestes’ 
suggestion. 
Euripides Heracles Altar to Zeus the 
Savior 
48 Megara and the 
children are 
suppliants at it. 
Euripides Heracles Staffs for Chorus 107-110, 
254 
Their first song 
emphasizes their 
old age and trouble 
walking. 
Euripides Heracles Funeral clothing 
for Megara, 
Amphitryon, 
children 
442-443, 
329-335, 
562-563 
Megara asks Lycus 
to let the go inside 
and adorn 
themselves before 
being killed. 
Heracles later tells 
them to take off the 
adornments from 
their hair. 
Euripides Heracles Heracles’ 
clothing 
520-522, 
623-633 
The children cling 
to his clothes. 
Euripides Heracles Club for Heracles 570 He probably also 
carries his bow and 
arrows.  
Euripides Heracles Corpses of 
children and 
Megara 
1032-1033 
ff. 
Chorus notes them 
when the interior 
scene is revealed. 
309 
Euripides Heracles Ropes, pillars, 
with Heracles 
bound to them 
1035-1038, 
1123 
Messenger 
describes this; it is 
revealed around 
1029; Amphitryon 
loosens the bonds 
at 1123. 
Euripides Heracles Bow and arrows 
on the ground 
1098-1100 Heracles sees them 
scattered as he 
awakens. 
Euripides Heracles Garment for 
Amphitryon to 
veil his eyes 
1111-1112 He veils his eyes, 
weeping; Heracles 
asks why he does 
so. 
Euripides Heracles Garments to 
cover Heracles’ 
head 
1159, 1200-
1204 ff. 
He wants to cover 
himself so that 
Theseus will not 
look at him and be 
polluted. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Torches for 
Cassandra 
308 ff. Talthybius 
exclaims at the 
sight of fire; 
Cassandra enters 
with torches; he 
takes them from 
her at 348. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Garlands, sacred 
clothing for 
Cassandra 
329-330, 
451-452 
She throws them 
on the ground 
before exiting. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Pallet or mat for 
Hecuba 
507-508 She asks to be led 
back to her pallet 
on the ground. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Wagon carrying 
Andromache, 
Astyanax, and 
booty 
568-569 ff. Chorus describes 
them on the wagon. 
Talthybius returns 
and takes away 
Astyanax. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Finery for Helen 1023 Hecuba reproaches 
her for her finery. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Astyanax’s 
corpse on 
Hector’s shield 
1118-1122 
ff. (1156 
for shield) 
Chorus calls out to 
look at him, as 
Talthybius and 
attendants bring it 
on stage. 
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Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Adornments for 
Astyanax’s 
corpse 
1207-1208 
ff. 
Attendants bring 
them out; Hecuba 
adorns the corpse. 
Euripides Trojan 
Women 
Torches for 
Talthybius and 
his men 
1256-1258 Chorus indicates 
them before the 
men enter. The 
men set fire to the 
city. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Artemis’ temple, 
altar; trophies of 
victims hanging 
34, 72-76 Orestes and 
Pylades note the 
“trophies.” Most 
likely, no one 
interacts with them, 
and they remain 
elements of the set. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Libations for 
Iphigenia (in 
vessels or bowls) 
159 ff. Iphigenia pours 
them out for 
Orestes and 
Agamemnon. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Bonds for Orestes 
and Pylades 
456-457 Chorus announces 
their approach, 
with hands bound. 
Servants release 
them at Iphigenia’s 
order, at 468-469. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Tablet/letter for 
Iphigenia 
727 ff. Iphigenia brings it 
on. She later gives 
it to Pylades, who 
gives it to Orestes. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Statue of Artemis 1157 ff. Iphigenia carries it 
out of the temple. It 
must be small. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Finery for 
Artemis, lambs, 
torches, and other 
objects for 
purification 
1222-1225 Iphigenia requests 
these from Thoas, 
and servants bring 
them out at 1222. 
Euripides Iphigenia 
among the 
Taurians 
Clothing covering 
Orestes’ and 
Pylades’ heads 
1207, 1222 Their heads are 
covered to prevent 
pollution. Their 
hands are bound. 
Euripides Ion Laurel boughs for 
Ion 
79-80, 103-
104, 112 
Hermes describes 
him coming out 
with laurel made 
into a broom. 
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Euripides Ion Bow for Ion 108, 158 ff. He says he will 
keep away the 
birds with it. 
Euripides Ion Vessels of water 434-436 Ion says he will fill 
vessels with water 
but probably goes 
off stage to do it. 
These may never 
be on stage. 
Euripides Ion Staff for Old Man 743-744 Creusa helps 
support him. 
Euripides Ion Garments for Old 
Man 
967 He covers his head 
in grief after 
hearing Creusa’s 
story. 
Euripides Ion Golden vessel 
with Gorgon’s 
blood 
1030 Creusa describes it 
at 1003-1027 and 
gives it to the Old 
Man at 1029 ff. 
Euripides Ion Swords for mob 
of Delphians 
1257-1258 Creusa says they 
come with swords. 
Euripides Ion Altar and statue 1255, 1258, 
1280, 1404 
Creusa takes refuge 
here. 
Euripides Ion Cradle, objects 
inside 
1337-1338 
ff. 
Bit of weaving 
(1417-1425), 
golden snakes 
(1427-1432), 
garland of olive 
leaves (1433-
1436). 
Euripides Helen Tomb of Proteus, 
leaves on it 
63-65, 528-
529 ff., 798 
Helen takes refuge 
on it as a suppliant. 
Menelaus later cuts 
her off as she tries 
to run back to it. 
Euripides Helen Menelaus’ rags 420-422, 
544-545, 
554, 1079-
1080, 1204 
Menelaus, Helen, 
and Theoclymenus 
all point out his 
rags. They become 
a tool in their trick. 
Euripides Helen Torches for 
Theonoe’s 
servants 
865 ff. They cleanse the 
air with them. 
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Euripides Helen Sword for 
Menelaus 
983, 1044, 
1086 
He talks as if he 
has a sword, but he 
is in rags and 
totally destitute, so 
it is possible that 
he does not have 
one. 
Euripides Helen Helen’s white vs. 
black clothes 
1087-1089, 
1186 ff. 
She changes from 
white to black 
clothes and also 
cuts her hair and 
tears her cheeks to 
show mourning. 
Euripides Helen Dogs, hunting 
nets for 
Theoclymenus 
1169-1170 He enters with 
them and tells 
servants to take 
them inside. 
Euripides Helen Bull, bedding, 
armor, fruits 
1255 ff., 
1390-1391, 
1410-1411, 
1436-1437 
Menelaus requests 
these, and some of 
them may come on 
stage, e.g. armor. 
Euripides Helen New clothes for 
Menelaus 
1296-1297, 
1382-1384 
Helen takes him off 
stage and dresses 
him in new clothes. 
Euripides Helen Armor, shield, 
spear, panoply for 
Menelaus 
1375-1381 Menelaus gains 
these with his new 
clothes. 
Euripides Helen Sword for 
Theoclymenus 
1632 ff., 
1656 
He threatens to kill 
Theonoe, but it is 
unclear whether he 
has a weapon. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Ladder 100 Antigone climbs a 
ladder to a high 
room to look out. 
The ladder may not 
be visible. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Golden armor for 
Polynices 
168-169 Antigone sees it; he 
presumably wears 
it when he comes 
on stage. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Sword and sheath 
for Polynices 
267, 277 Polynices says he 
carries his sword in 
his hand for fear of 
treachery. He 
sheathes it at 277. 
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Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Jocasta’s short 
hair and ragged, 
dark clothes 
322-326 She says she has 
cut her hair and put 
on these clothes in 
grief. This remains 
just a costume. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Armor and 
weapons for 
Eteocles 
779-780 He calls for them, 
but then he exits, 
so these may not 
appear on stage. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Lot tablets for 
Teiresias 
838-840 He and his 
daughter bring 
them on stage. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Golden crown or 
wreath for 
Teiresias 
856, 858 He wears it as a 
sign of victory 
from a war in 
Athens. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Corpses of 
Polynices, 
Eteocles, Jocasta 
1480-1484 
ff. 
Chorus announces 
the arrival of the 
bodies. Antigone 
holds Polynices’ 
body at 1661. 
Oedipus touches 
the bodies at 1693 
ff. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Veil for Antigone 1490 She casts it away. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Yellow robe for 
Antigone 
1491 She loosens it in 
her mourning. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Hair for Antigone 1524 ff. She tears out hair 
and casts it on the 
bodies. 
Euripides Phoenician 
Women 
Staff for Oedipus 1539-1540 Oedipus enters, 
using a staff as a 
guide. 
Euripides Orestes Bow for Orestes 268 ff. He refers to his 
bow but may not 
actually have one. 
Kovacs notes that 
the scholia say that 
he had one in early 
productions but not 
in later ones. 
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Euripides Orestes Garment or cloth 
for Electra 
294 Orestes tells her to 
uncover her head, 
so she must have 
covered it during 
his fit. 
Euripides Orestes Menelaus’ rich 
clothing 
348-351 This remains just a 
costume, but it 
contrasts 
significantly with 
Orestes and 
Electra. 
Euripides Orestes Tyndareus’ black 
clothing, shorn 
hair 
457-458 Again, just a 
costume but a 
significant one. 
Euripides Orestes Swords for 
Orestes and 
Pylades 
1223, 1504, 
1575 
Pylades mentions 
these in his plan, at 
1125. 
Euripides Orestes Torches for 
Orestes, Pylades, 
and Electra 
1573 They are 
threatening to burn 
the house and kill 
Hermione. 
Menelaus notes the 
torches. 
Euripides Bacchae Tomb of Semele 6-8, 596-
599 
Dionysus indicates 
it, saying it still 
smolders with 
Zeus’ fire. 
Characters may or 
may not interact 
with it. 
Euripides Bacchae Drums for the 
Chorus 
58-61, 124 Dionysus tells 
them to take up 
their drums and 
make noise. During 
their song, the 
Chorus refers to 
“this drum.”  
Euripides Bacchae Bacchant clothing 
(fawnskin, ivy 
crown) and 
thyrsus for 
Cadmus 
174-177, 
180-189, 
250-254, 
363 
He carries an ivied 
staff (thyrsus). His 
costume is prop-
like in its 
significance, and 
there could be 
interaction with it. 
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Euripides Bacchae Bacchant 
clothing, thyrsus 
for Teiresias 
174-177, 
205, 248-
251 
See Cadmus’ 
costume, above. 
Euripides Bacchae Ivy crown for 
Cadmus to try to 
put on Pentheus 
341-344 Cadmus tells 
Pentheus to come 
here and be 
garlanded, but he 
rejects it. 
Euripides Bacchae Bonds for 
Dionysus’ hands 
437-440, 
451 
The Servant brings 
Dionysus on stage, 
bound. Pentheus 
orders that his 
hands be released. 
He may have him 
bound again at 505. 
Euripides Bacchae Dionysus’ hair 455-456, 
493-494 
Pentheus notes 
Dionysus’ long 
hair. He seems to 
cut locks of it, so 
the wig could 
become a prop. 
Euripides Bacchae Thyrsus for 
Dionysus 
495-497 Pentheus takes it 
away from him. 
Euripides Bacchae Falling stones, 
shaking palace 
585 ff. This is more a set 
than prop, but the 
changes are 
significant. This 
probably was not 
staged. See Chapter 
3 for further 
discussion.  
Euripides Bacchae Woman’s 
bacchant costume 
for Pentheus 
(dress, long hair, 
fawnskin, 
thyrsus) 
821, 827-
835, 914-
915 ff. 
Dionysus takes him 
inside and dresses 
him. When they 
come out, 
Dionysus adjusts 
his costume. 
Euripides Bacchae Headdress, loose 
curl 
928-934 Dionysus points it 
out to Pentheus and 
fixes it. 
Euripides Bacchae Thyrsus for 
Pentheus 
941-942 He asks Dionysus 
which hand he 
should use to hold 
it. 
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Euripides Bacchae Pentheus’ head 
on Agave’s 
thyrsus 
1139-1143, 
1169-1175, 
1214-1215, 
1277-1284 
The Messenger 
says she impaled 
Pentheus’ head on 
her thyrsus. When 
she enters, she 
indicates what she 
thinks is a 
mountain lion cub. 
Euripides Bacchae Pentheus’ body 
parts, possibly on 
a stretcher of 
some sort 
1216-1221, 
1299 
Cadmus brings 
Pentheus’ body on 
stage. Since it is in 
pieces, he (or 
attendants) 
probably carry it on 
a stretcher. 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Letter/tablet for 
Agamemnon 
34-41, 107-
113 ff., 
155-156, 
307 ff. 
Old Man describes 
Agamemnon 
writing it. Ag. 
gives it to him to 
deliver. Menelaus 
takes it from him 
(off stage), and 
they fight for it (on 
stage). 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Scepter for 
Menelaus 
311 Menelaus threatens 
to hit the Old Man 
with it. 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Chariot for 
Clytemnestra and 
Iphigenia 
599-600 ff. They get down 
from the chariot. 
Clytemnestra tells 
attendants to stand 
in front of the 
horses. 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Bridal gifts 610-612 Clytemnestra 
orders attendants to 
take them out of 
the chariot. 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Baby Orestes 621 ff., 
1119, 1241 
ff., 1450 
As a babe in arms, 
Orestes is a sort of 
prop here. 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Sword for 
Achilles 
970 He tells 
Clytemnestra that 
he will defend 
Iphigenia with 
“this sword.” 
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Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Garments for 
Iphigenia to hold 
before her face 
1122-1123 Agamemnon asks 
her why she holds 
them there. 
Euripides Iphigenia at 
Aulis 
Armor for 
Achilles’ men 
1359 Achilles indicates 
his men with their 
armor, prepared to 
defend Iphigenia. 
Euripides? Rhesus
229
 Spears, armor, 
etc. for Hector 
and soldiers 
58, 99, et 
al. 
Hector wants the 
soldiers to take up 
arms, but it is 
unclear when these 
weapons might be 
on stage. 
Euripides? Rhesus Gold armor, 
shield with bells 
on rim for Rhesus 
381-384 Chorus notes this 
and says the bells 
clang.  
Euripides? Rhesus Spoils (weapons? 
armor?) for 
Odysseus and 
Diomedes 
591-593 They say they are 
carrying spoils 
back to their camp, 
but it is unclear 
exactly what these 
are. 
Euripides? Rhesus Spears, weapons 
for Chorus 
675 ff. Chorus stops 
Odysseus (and 
Diomedes?) and 
threatens 
him/them. 
Euripides? Rhesus Corpse of Rhesus 886-888 One of the Muses 
appears carrying 
his body. 
 
                                                
229
 I include Rhesus here but not in Appendix II. The play is unusual, and its dating 
and authorship are strongly contested. I do include it in Appendix III, however, for its 
interesting use of gods on the stage. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
CATEGORIES OF PROPS IN GREEK TRAGEDY 
 
 
 The following is an alternative organization of the items found in Appendix I, 
Catalogue of Props in Greek Tragedy. There are two separate categorization schemes, 
the first being a breakdown based on what the items are and the second being a 
classification of the various functions these props tend to have. The final section is a 
list of some common associations that adhere to the props found in Greek tragedy. 
This list is by no means complete, and I have not listed particular props for these, as 
such lists of could vary with the performance or spectator and be very long and 
unstable. These associations are included merely as a guide for thinking about the 
concepts, connotations, and moods that most often accompany these props. 
Costume pieces to which characters specifically call attention are included here 
under “Costume Pieces” and occasionally other categories, though they are not 
actually props unless characters interact with them in ways other than simply wearing 
them. In the main part of the Costume Pieces section, I include a brief parenthetical at 
the end of an entry if the item is a costume piece and not used as a prop. I choose to 
include some costume pieces that are not, by my definition, props because those 
particular costumes function similarly to props in some way. The usage of a few items 
is ambiguous, and I give the label I think most likely and note the ambiguity as 
appropriate. Note that these costume pieces and ambiguous items may occur in other 
categories as well, but the identifying parenthetical notes are typically restricted to 
their first listings, found in the Costume Pieces section.
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Part I: Props Organized by What They Are 
 
Weapons:  
1. Quiver (empty?) for Xerxes: Aesch., Persians 1020, 1022 
2. Armor, weapons for soldiers: Aesch., Seven against Thebes 31 
3. Swords for guards: Aesch., Agamemnon 1651 
4. Orestes may carry a sword: Aesch., Libation Bearers (throughout, especially 891 
ff.) 
5. Sword for Orestes: Aesch., Eumenides 43-45 
6. Apollo’s bow: Aesch., Eumenides 181 ff. 
7. Ajax’s sword, of Hector: Soph., Ajax 658, 815 ff. 
8. Orestes may carry a sword, particularly for the end of the play: Soph., Electra 
9. Philoctetes’ bow, of Heracles: Soph., Philoctetes 654 ff., 762 ff., et al. 
10. Odysseus’ sword: Soph., Philoctetes 1255 
11. Arrow for Philoctetes’ bow: Soph., Philoctetes 1299 
12. Apollo’s bow and arrows: Eur., Alcestis 34-35, 39 
13. Death’s sword: Eur., Alcestis 74-76 
14. Medea might have a sword: Eur., Medea 1244 
15. Arrows for Artemis (may or may not appear onstage): Eur., Hippolytus 1420-1422 
16. Swords for mob of Delphians: Eur., Ion 1257-1258 
17. Sword for Orestes: Eur. Electra 225 
18. Club for Heracles: Eur., Heracles 570 et al. 
19. Bow and arrows for Heracles: Eur., Heracles 571, 1098-1100, 1377 
20. Bow for Ion: Eur., Ion 108, 158 ff. 
21. Sword for Menelaus (H probably has one but may not.): Eur., Helen 1044, 1086 
22. Theoclymenus’ dogs and hunting nets: Eur., Helen 1169-1170 
23. Armor, shield, spear, and panoply for Menelaus: Eur., Helen 1375-1381 
24. Sword for Theoclymenus (unclear whether he has one as he makes his threats): 
Eur., Helen 1632, 1656 
25. Golden armor/weapons (noticed by Antigone) and a sword (which Polynices 
notes) for Polynices: Eur., Phoenician Women 168-169, 267 
26. Weapons, armor for Eteocles (He calls for them, then exits, so they may not come 
on stage.): Eur., Phoenician Women 779 ff. 
27. Orestes may have a real or mimed bow to “fight” the Furies: Eur., Orestes 268 ff. 
28. Swords for Orestes and Pylades: Eur., Orestes 1223 
29. Achilles’ sword: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 970 
30. Achilles’ men come with armor and, presumably, weapons: Eur., Iphigenia at 
Aulis 1359 
 Total
230
: 30 
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 For each category, this total refers to the number of entries in the preceding list. It 
does not count each item individually. An entry for “swords” or “lamb, cheese, and 
wine,” for example, would count as just one, for the purposes of this total. Note also 
that categories often include a few items that may or may not be present or be used in 
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Costume Pieces: 
Clothing:  
1. Persians are wearing elaborate Eastern dress, and the Chorus will tear their robes: 
Aesch., Persians 1060 (tearing; style is implicit) (costume) 
2. Xerxes’ rags: Aesch., Persians 834-837, 1017 (costume) 
3. Chorus wearing luxurious robes and headbands that are not Greek: Aesch., 
Suppliant Women 234-237, 903-904 (costume) 
4. Chorus wears girdles and belts that they threaten to use as nooses: Aesch., Suppliant 
Women 457 
5. Agamemnon’s shoes: Aesch., Agamemnon 944 
6. Cassandra’s prophetic insignia, which she casts off: Aesch., Agamemnon 1264 ff. 
7. Chorus and Electra wear black garments for mourning: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
10-12 
8. Orestes’ piece of weaving or garment, made by Electra: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
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9. Clytemnestra baring her breast: Aesch., Libation Bearers 896-898 
10. Furies’ appearance, as described: Aesch., Eumenides 45 ff. (costume/mask) 
11. Athena calls for the Eumenides to be dressed in red robes: Aesch., Eumenides 
1028 (If this does happen on stage, these are props.) 
12. Cloth/cloak to cover Ajax’s body: Soph., Ajax 915-916, 1003 
13. Poisoned tunic, given from Deinara to Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 580, 
612, et al. 
14. Electra’s girdle, which Chrysothemis takes to offer on Agamemnon’s tomb: Soph., 
Electra 448-452 
15. Electra’s bad clothing: Soph., Electra 190-191 (costume) 
16. Oedipus’ bad clothing: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 1256-1261 (costume) 
17. Finery for the dead Alcestis: Eur., Alcestis 611-613, 618 
18. When Alcestis returns, she wears the clothes and adornment of a young woman: 
Eur., Alcestis 1050 (The clothing is not really a prop; the veil may be.) 
19. Poisoned gown and diadem: Eur., Medea 950-951, 956 
20. Herald wears Greek clothing: Eur., Children of Heracles 130-131 (costume) 
21. Hermione’s gold, elaborate clothes, later in disarray: Eur., Andromache 147-148, 
830-832 (She throws her veil in 830-832, qualifying it as a prop. Other items are 
simply costumes.) 
22. Odysseus hides his right hand in his cloak: Eur., Hecuba 342-344 
23. Polyxena asks Odysseus to wrap a garment about her head and take her away: 
Eur., Hecuba 432-434 
24. Hecuba lies wrapped in her garments: Eur., Hecuba 486-487 
25. Polydorus’ clothes are Trojan: Eur., Hecuba 734-735 (costume) 
26. Adrastus’ head is wrapped in his garments, and Theseus tells him to uncover it: 
Eur. Suppliant Women 110-112 
                                                                                                                                       
such a way as to qualify for the category. I note the ambiguity of these items but still 
include them in the totals. 
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27. Theseus says that Aethra holds her clothing before her eyes, weeping: Eur. 
Suppliant Women 286-288 
28. Evadne wears fine, elaborate clothes: Eur. Suppliant Women 1054-1055 (costume: 
Iphis comments on her clothing, and it suggests her suicide) 
29. Electra’s miserable clothing, short hair: Eur. Electra 107-110, 184-185, 241, 304 
ff. (costume and the subject of many comments) 
30. Old Man’s clothing is ragged, and he wants to wipe his tears with the tatters: Eur. 
Electra 501-502 
31. Clytemnestra’s finery: Eur. Electra 966 (costume: Orestes comments on it) 
32. Funeral clothing for Megara, Amphitryon, and children: Eur. Heracles 442-443 
(probably just costume) 
33. Amphitryon covers his eyes (with his clothes?) as Heracles wakes: Eur., Heracles 
1111 
34. Heracles wants to cover his head with his clothes so that Theseus will not look at 
him and be polluted: Eur., Heracles 1159, 1200-1204 ff. 
35. Garlands, sacred clothing mark Cassandra as a seer: Eur., Trojan Women 451-452 
36. Helen is dressed in finery: Eur., Trojan Women 1023 (costume) 
37. Orestes’ and Pylades’ heads are covered, probably with their clothing: Eur., 
Iphigenia among the Taurians 1207, 1222 
38. Thoas covers his head with his clothing: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians, 
1217-1218 
39. Menelaus’ rags: Eur., Helen 420-422, 544-545, 554, 1079-1080, 1204 (This is 
costume but draws much attention; they could be props, depending on the 
performance.) 
40. Helen’s clothing change, from white to black (also cuts hair, bloodies cheeks): 
Eur., Helen 1087-1089, 1186 ff. (This could be either costume or prop, depending on 
performance.) 
41. Menelaus bathes, gets new clothes more fitting of a king: Eur., Helen 1296-1297, 
1382-1384 (likely just a costume: change happens off stage) 
42. Jocasta has cut her hair and put on dark, ragged clothes to show her misfortune and 
pain for Polynices’ exile: Eur., Phoenician Women 322-326 (The actor may or may 
not interact specifically with the costume.) 
43. Antigone casts away her veil/mantle and lets her saffron robes fly open in her 
distress: Eur., Phoenician Women 1490-1491 
44. Orestes is filthy, rough-looking: Eur., Orestes 219-220, 225-226, 387 (He may or 
may not interact specifically with his costume.) 
45. Garment/veil to cover Electra’s head (Orestes tells her to uncover her head after 
his fit): Eur., Orestes 294 
46. Menelaus is splendidly dressed, contrasting his fortune with that of his relatives: 
Eur., Orestes 348-351 (costume) 
47. Tyndareus is in black, with cut hair for mourning: Eur., Orestes 467-468 (costume) 
48. Phrygian slave’s Asian boots, etc.: Eur., Orestes 1366 ff. (probably just costume) 
49. Cadmus’ bacchant clothing: Eur., Bacchae 180 et al. (Some items are likely 
props.) 
50. Teiresias’ bacchant clothing: Eur., Bacchae 205, 248-53 (Some are likely props.) 
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51. Dionysus’ long hair: Eur., Bacchae 455, 493-94  
52. Pentheus’ female bacchant clothing, headdress, and thyrsus: Eur., Bacchae 914-
915, 928-929, 941-942 
53. Iphigenia covers her face with her clothes: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 1122-1123 
 Sub-Total: 53
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Headgear: Veils, Garlands, Etc.: 
1. Chorus may be wearing Sidonian veils (They say they are tearing them, but it could 
be just an expression): Aesch., Suppliant Women 120-121 
2. Cow’s horns for Io: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 588 
3. Olive wreath on herald’s head: Aesch., Agamemnon 493-494 
4. Boughs/wreaths that suppliants wear: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 2-3, 142-143 
5. Crown of bay leaves that Creon wears: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 82-83 
6. Garlands, etc. for Heracles, for celebrating/reveling: Eur., Alcestis 759-760, 831-
832 
7. Veil for Alcestis when returns (possible, implicit): Eur., Alcestis 1121 
8. Suppliant wreaths that children of Heracles wear: Eur., Children of Heracles 71 
9. Veil or cover for Phaedra’s head: Eur., Hippolytus 245, 250, 201-202 
10. Theseus wears an ambassador garland: Eur., Hippolytus 806-807 
11. Hermione’s veil, which she throws: Eur., Andromache: 830-832 
12. Electra puts a garland in Orestes’ hair, gives another to Pylades: Eur. Electra 882 
13. Garlands mark Cassandra as a seer: Eur., Trojan Women 451-452 
14. Teiresias’ golden crown/wreath: Eur., Phoenician Women 856 
15. Antigone casts away her veil/mantle: Eur., Phoenician Women 1490-1491 
16. Pentheus’ headdress/snood: Eur., Bacchae 928-929 
 Sub-Total: 16 
 
Armor: 
1. Armor, weapons for soldiers: Aesch., Seven against Thebes 31 
2. Greaves, other armor for Eteocles: Aesch., Seven against Thebes 675 ff. (props, if 
they appear, because he puts them on while on stage) 
3. Armor from the temple, which Iolaus puts on: Eur., Children of Heracles 720 ff. 
4. Achilles’ men come with armor: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 1359 
5. Armor, shield, spear, and panoply for Menelaus: Eur., Helen 1375-1381 
6. Golden armor/weapons for Polynices: Eur., Phoenician Women 168-169 
7. Weapons, armor for Eteocles (He calls for them, then exits, so they may not come 
on stage.): Eur., Phoenician Women 779 ff. 
 Sub-Total: 7 
 
Staffs: 
1. Staffs for the Chorus of Elders: Aesch., Agamemnon 75 
                                                
231
 This sub-total is, of course, of limited use because it includes many items that are 
really only used as costumes. My best guess is that about twenty of these are only 
costumes, but the exact usage of some is ambiguous, leaving this sub-total very rough. 
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2. Cassandra’s staff: Aesch., Agamemnon 1266-1267 
3. Chorus carries staffs: Eur. Heracles 107-110 
4. Old Man’s staff: Eur., Ion 743-44 
5. Staff for Oedipus: Eur., Phoenician Women 1539-1540 
6. Cadmus’ ivied staff/thyrsus, which supports himself and Teiresias: Eur., Bacchae 
363 
 Sub-Total: 6 
 
Royal Regalia: 
1. Peleus’ scepter: Eur., Andromache 588 
2. Menelaus’ scepter: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 311 
 Sub-Total: 2 
Total for Costume Pieces: 84 (Very approximate: see Note 2.) 
 
Religious/Ritual Items: 
Altars, Statues, Etc.:  
1. Tomb of Darius: Aesch., Persians 659 et al. 
2. Rock/altar, with trident and possibly other markings: Aesch., Suppliant Women 189, 
218, et al. 
3. Altar with statues/images of gods: Aesch., Seven against Thebes 98 
4. Navel/center-stone of Oracle of Delphi: Aesch., Eumenides 40 
5. Statue of Colonus: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 59, et al. 
6. Altars: Eur., Children of Heracles 33 
7. Statue of Aphrodite: Eur., Hippolytus 101 
8. Shrine of Thetis: Eur., Andromache 43 
9. Altar near the house: Eur. Electra 216 
10. Altar to Zeus the Savior: Eur. Heracles 48 
11. Temple of Artemis, altar, trophies of victims hanging: Eur., Iphigenia among the 
Taurians 74-76 
12. Small statue of Artemis, which Iphigenia carries: Eur., Iphigenia among the 
Taurians 1157-1158 
13. Altar (and statue?): Eur., Ion 1280, 1404 
14. Tomb of Proteus: Eur., Helen 63-65, 798 
Sub-Total: 14 
 
Funerary Items/Other Offerings: 
1. Queen’s libations/offerings: Aesch., Persians 523-524, 607 ff. 
2. Lock of hair from Orestes: Aesch., Libation Bearers 7, 168, et al. 
3. Libations from Electra to Agamemnon: Aesch., Libation Bearers 87 ff.  
4. Locks of hair, something to cut them: Soph., Ajax 1171-1172 
5. Libations and other offerings Orestes brings for the tomb: Soph., Electra 52 
6. Offerings Chrysothemis brings on behalf of Clytemnestra: Soph., Electra 326-327, 
405 ff. 
7. Electra’s girdle and locks of hair from both sisters, which Chrysothemis takes to 
offer on Agamemnon’s tomb: Soph., Electra 448-452 
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8. Fruits, offerings from Clytemnestra to Apollo: Soph., Electra 634 ff. 
9. Garlands, incense that Iocasta offers to Apollo: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 911-913 
10. Finery for the dead Alcestis: Eur., Alcestis 611-613, 618 
11. Adornments for the dead Astyanax: Eur., Trojan Women 1207-8 
12. Bowl, gold vessel holding libations: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 159 ff. 
13. Hair that Antigone tears out and casts on the bodies of her mother and brothers: 
Eur., Phoenician Women 1524-1526 ff. 
14. Helen’s hair offering and libations, which she gives to Hermione to take to 
Clytemnestra’s tomb: Eur., Orestes 113 
Sub-Total: 14  
 
Branches, Wreaths, Garlands, Etc.: 
1. Olive branches for Chorus: Aesch., Suppliant Women 21-22, 191-192, 480 ff.  
2. Orestes carries an olive branch: Aesch., Eumenides 43-45 
3. Boughs/wreaths for suppliants: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 2-3, 142-143 
4. Crown of bay leaves that Creon wears: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 82-83 
5. Garlands that Jocasta offers to Apollo: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 911-913 
6. Garlands, etc. for Heracles, for celebrating/reveling: Eur., Alcestis 759-760, 831-
832 
7. Suppliant wreaths for the children of Heracles: Eur., Children of Heracles 71 
8. Garland that Hippolytus brings for Artemis: Eur., Hippolytus 73 
9. Ambassador garland that Theseus wears: Eur., Hippolytus 806-807 
10. Suppliant branches for Chorus: Eur., Suppliant Women 10 
11. Garlands that the Old Man brings to Electra’s house, along with other things: Eur. 
Electra 496 
12. Electra puts a garland in Orestes’ hair, gives another to Pylades: Eur. Electra 882 
13. Garlands, sacred clothing mark Cassandra as a seer: Eur., Trojan Women 451-452 
14. Laurel boughs, which Ion makes into a broom: Eur., Ion 79-80, 103-104, 112-113 
15. Ivy crowns Cadmus and Teiresias wear, plus one Cadmus tries to put on Pentheus: 
Eur., Bacchae 205, 341-344 
16. Golden crown/wreath for Teiresias: Eur., Phoenician Women 856 
 Sub-Total: 16 
 
Other: 
1. Cassandra’s staff and prophetic bands: Aesch., Agamemnon 1266-1267 
2. Vessels that Ion says he will fill with water as part of his duties at the Oracle (He 
may or may not do it on stage.): Eur., Ion 434-436 (may also include his broom of 
laurel and his bow here) 
3. Lot tablets with auguries on them for Teiresias: Eur., Phoenician Women 838 
4. Chorus may carry drums, possibly other bacchic items: Eur., Bacchae 124 
5. Cadmus’ bacchant clothing and thyrsus: Eur., Bacchae 180, 188, 363, et al. 
6. Teiresias’ bacchant clothing and (possibly) thyrsus: Eur., Bacchae 248-253 
7. Dionysus’ thyrsus, which Pentheus takes: Eur., Bacchae 495 
8. Pentheus’ female bacchant costume, headdress, thyrsus: Eur., Bacchae 914-915, 
928-929, 941-942 
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9. Agave’s thyrsus with Pentheus’ head: Eur., Bacchae 1173-1175 et al. 
10. Bridal gifts (if a wedding is considered a ritual): Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 610-612 
 Sub-Total: 10 
 Total for Religious/Ritual Items: 54 
 
Mats/Litters/Biers: 
1. Wheeled tent/carriage/litter for Xerxes: Aesch., Persians 1000-1001 
2. Litter for dying Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 971 ff. 
3. Some kind of mat or litter for Alcestis (possible): Eur., Alcestis 232 ff., especially 
267 
4. Phaedra’s sickbed or mat: Eur., Hippolytus 179-180 
5. Something to carry in the dying Hippolytus (possible: he may just be supported by 
attendants): Eur., Hippolytus 1347 ff. 
6. 5 biers carrying the corpses of 5 of the 7 against Thebes: Eur. Suppliant Women 794 
7. Hecuba may be lying on a mat: Eur., Trojan Women 507-8 
8. Shield bears the body of Astyanax: Eur., Trojan Women 1136 ff. 
9. Bed/mat for Orestes: Eur., Orestes 35 et al. 
10. (Implicit) Some kind of stretcher carrying Pentheus’ body parts: Eur., Bacchae 
1216-1217 
 Total: 10 (possibly fewer) 
 
Jars/Urns:  
1. Jars to hold the Queen’s libations/offerings: Aesch., Persians 523-524, 607 ff. 
2. Jars to hold the libations Electra brings to Agamemnon: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
24, 87 ff. 
3. Voting urns: Aesch., Eumenides 742-743 
4. Jars (implicit) to hold the libations Orestes brings for the tomb: Soph., Electra 52 
5. Jars holding offerings Chrysothemis brings on behalf of Clytemnestra: Soph., 
Electra 326-327, 405 ff. 
6. Bronze urn, supposedly with Orestes’ ashes: Soph., Electra 1113-1114 ff. 
7. Some kind of urn or vessel (implicit) to hold the ashes/bones of the dead: Eur., 
Suppliant Women 1114 ff. 
8. Water jug that Electra carries: Eur. Electra 55-56, 107-110 
9. Something to hold the wine the Old Man brings to Electra’s house: Eur., Electra 
493 ff. 
10. Bowl, gold vessel holding libations: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 159 ff. 
11. Vessels that Ion says he will fill with water (he may or may not do it onstage): 
Eur., Ion 434-436 
12. Jars to hold Helen’s libations, which she gives to Hermione: Eur., Orestes 113 
 Total: 12 
 
Household Items (jars, brooms, blankets, food, etc.):  
1. Cloth/cloak to cover Ajax’s body: Soph., Ajax 915-916, 1003 
2. Items outside Philoctetes’ cave: Soph., Philoctetes 
3. Provisions for Oedipus: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 1263 
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4. Water jug that Electra carries: Eur. Electra 55-56, 107-110 
5. Lamb, cheese, wine that the Old Man brings to Electra’s house: Eur., Electra 493 ff. 
6. Broom of laurel boughs: Eur., Ion 79-80, 103-104, 112-113 
7. Vessels that Ion says he will fill with water as part of his duties (he may or may not 
do it on stage): Eur., Ion 434-436 
8. Cradle plus weaving and other items inside: Eur., Ion 1337-1338 ff. 
9. Food and many other items that Menelaus requests (unclear which, if any, are ever 
on stage): Eur., Helen 1255 ff., 1390-1391 
10. Blanket/cloak for Orestes: Eur., Orestes 42-44 
 Total: 10 
 
Magical or Supernatural Items:  
1. Hephaestus’ hammer and unbreakable adamantine bonds: Aesch. (?), Prometheus 
Bound 6, 56, et al. 
2. Philoctetes’ bow, of Heracles: Soph., Philoctetes 654 ff., 762 ff., et al. 
3. Poisoned tunic, from Deinara to Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 580, 612, et al. 
4. Poisoned gown and diadem: Eur., Medea 950-951, 956 
5. Medea’s dragon chariot: Eur., Medea 1321-1322 ff. 
6. Armor from the temple, which Iolaus puts on (This may not be magical, but it is 
supernatural in some way; it may or may not appear on stage): Eur., Children of 
Heracles 720 ff.  
7. Golden vessel with Gorgon’s blood: Eur., Ion 1030 
 Total: 7 
 
Bonds/Ropes:  
1. Bonds for Prometheus (together called a “psalia,” harness, in line 54): Aesch. (?), 
Prometheus Bound 6, 19, et al. (for chest: 71, wedge through chest: 64-65, for legs: 
74) 
2. Nails to fix the bonds to the rock: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 76 
3. Fishing-net (“amphiblêstron”) around Prometheus’ legs: Aesch. (?), Prometheus 
Bound 81 
4. Bonds for Andromache’s hands: Eur., Andromache 425 
5. Ropes that bind Heracles to pillars: Eur., Heracles 1035-1038 
6. Bonds for Orestes and Pylades: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 456-457 
7. Bonds for Dionysus’ hands: Eur., Bacchae 451 
 Total: 7 
 
Torches:  
1. Torches for procession (possible): Aesch., Eumenides 1022 
2. Torch Cassandra carries: Eur., Trojan Women 308 ff. 
3. Torches for Talthybius and men: Eur., Trojan Women 1256-1258 
4. Torches for Theonoe’s servants: Eur., Helen 865 ff. 
5. Torches for Orestes, Pylades, and Electra: Eur., Orestes 1573 
 Total: 5 
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Tablets:  
1. Tablet in dead Phaedra’s hand: Eur., Hippolytus 856-857 
2. Tablet/letter for Iphigenia: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 727 ff. 
3. Lot tablets with auguries on them for Teiresias: Eur., Phoenician Women 838 
4. Tablet/letter for Agamemnon: Eur. Iphigenia at Aulis 35-36, et al. 
 Total: 4 
 
Corpses:  
1. Bodies of Eteocles and Polynices: Aesch., Seven against Thebes 848 ff. 
2. Bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra: Aesch., Agamemnon 1372 ff. 
3. Bodies of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus: Aesch., Libation Bearers 973-974 ff. 
4. Ajax’s body: Soph., Ajax 898 ff. 
5. Clytemnestra’s body or a covered bier: Soph., Electra 1466 ff. 
6. Haemon’s body, Eurydice’s body: Soph., Antigone 1257, 1293 
7. Alcestis’ body: Eur., Alcestis 393 ff., 606 ff., 729 
8. Bodies of Medea’s and Jason’s two sons: Eur., Medea 1377 and implicit 
9. Phaedra’s body: Eur., Hippolytus 808-811, ff. 
10. Neoptolemus’ body: Eur., Andromache 1166 ff. 
11. Polydorus’ body: Eur., Hecuba 679-680 ff. 
12. Bodies of the sons of Polymestor: Eur., Hecuba 1049 ff. 
13. Bodies of 5 of the 7 against Thebes, on biers: Eur. Suppliant Women 766, 794 ff. 
14. Aegisthus’ body: Eur., Electra 880 ff., especially 895; dragged off in 959-61 
15. Clytemnestra’s body: Eur., Electra 1172 ff. 
16. Bodies of Megara and the children: Eur., Heracles 1032 ff. 
17. Astyanax’s body on Hector’s shield: Eur., Trojan Women 1118 ff. 
18. Bodies of Eteocles, Polyneices, and Jocasta: Eur., Phoenician Women 1480 ff. 
19. Pentheus’ head on Agave’s thyrsus: Eur., Bacchae 1139-1143, 1169-1175, et al. 
20. Pentheus’ body parts: Eur., Bacchae 1216-1221, et al. 
21. Not a corpse, but a body: the baby Orestes would most likely have been a prop: 
Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 621 ff., et al. 
 Total: 32
232
 (plus the unclear number of children in Heracles) 
 
 
Part II: Props Organized by What They Do 
 
Basic, Practical Functions: 
Carry a dying person or corpse: 
1. Litter for dying Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 971 ff.  
2. Some kind of mat or litter for dying Alcestis (She may or may not be carried in on 
it; may lie down on it at 267.): Eur., Alcestis 232 ff., especially 267  
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 In contrast to all other totals in this appendix, this number reflects the total number 
of individual corpses, rather than the number of items in the list. Thus, for example, I 
count the bodies of Eteocles and Polynices in Seven against Thebes as two, rather than 
as one. 
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3. Something to carry in the dying Hippolytus (possible: he may just be supported by 
attendants): Eur., Hippolytus 1347 ff. 
4. Five biers carry the corpses of five of the seven who led the attack against Thebes: 
Eur. Suppliant Women 794 
5. Hector’s shield carries the body of Astyanax: Eur., Trojan Women 1136 ff. 
6. (Implicit) Whatever carries Pentheus’ body parts: Eur., Bacchae 1216-1217 
 Sub-Total: 6 
 
Carry a person (carts, chariots, etc.): 
1. Queen returns without a carriage, so she must have had one for first entrance: 
Aesch., Persians 607 (giving information about earlier) 
2. Wheeled tent/carriage for Xerxes: Aesch., Persians 1000-1013.  
3. Winged car(s) for Chorus: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 135, 278-81 
4. Winged, 4-legged bird that Oceanus rides: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 286, 395 
5. Chariot/carriage for Agamemnon and Cassandra: Aesch., Agamemnon 906, 1039, 
1054 
6. Etnean colt, which Ismene rides: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 311-321 (probably not 
on stage) 
7. Medea’s dragon chariot: Eur., Medea 1321-1322 ff. 
8. Wagon/chariot for Clytemnestra: Eur. Electra 966, 998 
9. Wagon carrying Andromache, Astyanax, and booty: Eur., Trojan Women 568-569 
10. Chariot for Clytemnestra and Iphigenia: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 600 
 Sub-Total: 10 
 
Allow a person to sit or lie down: 
1. Thrones/chairs for Furies: Aesch., Eumenides 46-47 
2. Statue of Colonus and nearby rock: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 19, 59, et al. 
3. Phaedra’s sickbed or mat: Eur., Hippolytus 179-180 
4. Hecuba may be lying on a mat: Eur., Trojan Women 507-508 
5. Bed/mat for Orestes: Eur., Orestes 35 et al. 
 Sub-Total: 5 
  
Other: 
1. Bonds for Prometheus (together called a “psalia,” harness, in line 54): Aesch. (?), 
Prometheus Bound 6, 19, et al. (for chest: 71, wedge through chest: 64-65, for legs: 
74) 
2. Hammer for Hephaestus to nail bond to rock: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 56 
3. Nails to fix the bonds to the rock: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 76 
4. Fishing-net (“amphiblêstron”) around Prometheus’ legs: Aesch. (?), Prometheus 
Bound 81 
5. Votes and voting urns allow the vote to take place: Aesch., Eumenides 742-743 
6. Whatever is used to cut locks of hair: Soph., Ajax 1171-1172 
7. Bonds that restrain Andromache: Eur., Andromache 425 
8. Electra says that men (Orestes et al.) are hiding near the altar (They are using it to 
hide, which makes it prop-like.): Eur. Electra 216 
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9. Ropes that restrain Heracles, binding him to pillars: Eur., Heracles 1035-1038 
10. Bonds that restrain Orestes and Pylades: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 456-
457 
11. Broom of laurel boughs, which Ion uses to sweep: Eur., Ion 79-80, 103-104, 112-
113 
12. Whatever Pentheus uses to cut Dionysus’ hair: Eur., Bacchae 493-494 
13. Ladder or steps that allow Antigone to climb to the top story of the house (but 
likely is not onstage; could be behind set): Eur., Phoenician Women 100 
 Sub-Total: 13 
 Total for Basic, Practical Functions: 34 
 
Identify a Character/Role: 
1. White hair for Chorus, identifying them as elders: Aesch., Persians 1056 
2. Armor, weapons identify the soldiers: Aesch., Seven against Thebes 31 
3. Persians wearing elaborate Eastern dress (implicit): Aesch., Seven against Thebes 
4. Olive branches for Chorus, identifying them as suppliants: Aesch., Suppliant 
Women 21-22, 191-192, 480 ff. 
5. Chorus may be wearing Sidonian veils, identifying them as foreigners (They say 
they are tearing them, but it could just be an expression.); also wearing luxurious, non-
Greek robes and headbands: Aesch., Suppliant Women 120-121, 234-237, 903-904 
6. Hephaestus’ hammer: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 56 
7. Cow’s horns for Io: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 588 
8. Staffs for the Chorus of Elders: Aesch., Agamemnon 75 
9. Olive wreath on herald’s head: Aesch., Agamemnon 493-494 
10. Cassandra’s staff and prophetic bands: Aesch., Agamemnon 1266-1267 
11. Luggage for Orestes (if on stage) contributes to his disguise as a traveler: Aesch., 
Libation Bearers 675-676 
12. Olive branch and sword help identify Orestes and his position as suppliant: Aesch., 
Eumenides 43-45 
13. Apollo’s bow: Aesch., Eumenides 181 ff. 
14. Athena’s aegis: Aesch., Eumenides 404 
15. Athena calls for the Eumenides to be dressed in red robes, further marking their 
transformation: Aesch., Eumenides 1028 
16. Boughs/wreaths that identify the people as suppliants before their king: Soph., 
Oedipus Tyrannus 2-3, 142-143 
17. Crown of bay leaves that show that Creon has returned successfully from the 
Oracle of Delphi: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 82-83 
18. Philoctetes’ bow, of Heracles: Soph., Philoctetes 654 ff., 762 ff., et al. 
19. Apollo’s bow and arrows: Eur., Alcestis 34-35, 39 
20. Death’s sword: Eur., Alcestis 74-76 
21. Garlands, etc. that indicate that Heracles is a guest and reveling in Admetus’ 
home: Eur., Alcestis 759-760, 831-832 
22. Wreaths that identify the children of Heracles as suppliants: Eur., Children of 
Heracles 71 
23. Herald wears Greek clothing: Eur., Children of Heracles 130-131 
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24. Garland that identifies Theseus as an ambassador: Eur., Hippolytus 806-807 
25. Arrows for Artemis (may or may not appear onstage): Eur., Hippolytus 1420-1422 
26. Peleus’ scepter: Eur., Andromache 588 
27. Polydorus’ clothes are Trojan: Eur., Hecuba 734-735 (not a prop, but the clothes 
show that he is Trojan and identify him as Polydorus the lost son) 
28. Suppliant branches identify Chorus as suppliants: Eur., Suppliant Women 10 
29. Funeral clothing for Megara, Amphitryon, and children, showing that they expect 
to die: Eur. Heracles 442-443 
30. Club, bow, and arrows for Heracles: Eur., Heracles 568 ff. 
31. Garlands, sacred clothing mark Cassandra as a seer: Eur., Trojan Women 451-452 
32. Menelaus’ rags identify him as a shipwreck (though they also impede his 
identification as Menelaus, at least for the characters): Eur., Helen 420-422, 544-545, 
554, 1079-1080, 1204 
33. Menelaus bathes, gets new clothes that restore him to the role of king: Eur., Helen 
1296-1297, 1382-1384 
34. Lot tablets, golden crown help identify Teiresias: Eur., Phoenician Women 838, 
856 
35. Phrygian slave’s Asian boots, etc. identify his role: Eur., Orestes 1366 ff. 
36. Drums, any other bacchic items the Chorus may carry identify them as 
worshippers of Dionysus: Eur., Bacchae 124 et al. 
37. Cadmus’ bacchant clothing, thyrsus mark him as a worshipper of Dionysus: Eur., 
Bacchae 180, 188, 363, et al. 
38. Teiresias’ bacchant clothing, ivy crown (and possibly thyrsus) mark him as a 
worshipper of Dionysus: Eur., Bacchae 205, 248-253 
39. Dionysus’ long hair, which Pentheus later cuts: Eur., Bacchae 455, 493-494 
40. Pentheus’ female bacchant costume, headdress, and thyrsus belong to the role of a 
bacchant: Eur., Bacchae 914-915, 928-929, 941-942 
41. Menelaus’ scepter: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 311 
 Total: 41 
 
Show a Character’s Good or Bad Fortune, Wealth or Poverty: 
1. Queen returns without a carriage, so she must have had one for first entrance: 
Aesch., Persians 607 (giving information about earlier) 
2. Xerxes’ rags: Aesch., Persians 834-837, 1017 
3. Purple, ornate fabric shows the wealth and glory of Agamemnon’s house, could 
suggest the turn ahead: Aesch., Agamemnon 909 ff. 
4. Chorus and Electra wear black garments for mourning: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
10-12 
5. Whatever is revealed when Tecmessa opens the door to Ajax’s hut: Soph., Ajax 346 
ff. 
6. Electra’s bad clothing: Soph., Electra 190-91  
7. Items outside Philoctetes’ cave: Soph., Philoctetes 33-39 
8. Oedipus’ bad clothing: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 1256-61   
9. Hermione’s gold, elaborate clothes, later in disarray: Eur., Andromache 147-148, 
830-832 
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10. Evadne wears fine, elaborate clothes, showing that she is not in normal mourning: 
Eur. Suppliant Women 1054-1055  
11. Water jug that Electra carries, showing her low state: Eur. Electra 55-56, 107-110 
12. Electra’s miserable clothing, short hair: Eur. Electra 107-110, 184-85, 241, 304 ff. 
13. Clytemnestra’s finery: Eur. Electra 966  
14. Old man’s staff, showing his age: Eur., Ion 743-744 
15. Menelaus’ rags: Eur., Helen 420-422, 544-545, 554, 1079-1080, 1204 
16. Helen’s clothing change, from white to black; she also cuts her hair, bloodies her 
cheeks (deceptive show of fortune change): Eur., Helen 1087-1089, 1186 ff. 
17. Menelaus bathes, gets new clothes, showing his change of fortune: Eur., Helen 
1296-1297, 1382-1384 
18. Jocasta has cut her hair and put on dark, ragged clothes to show her misfortune and 
pain for Polyneices’ exile: Eur., Phoenician Women 322-326 
19. Golden crown for Teiresias attests to his recent success in Athens: Eur., 
Phoenician Women 856 
20. Antigone casts away her veil/mantle and lets her saffron robe fly open in her 
distress: Eur., Phoenician Women 1490-1491 
21. Orestes is filthy, rough-looking: Eur., Orestes 219-220, 225-226, 387  
22. Menelaus is splendidly dressed, contrasting his fortune with that of his relatives: 
Eur., Orestes 348-351 
23. Tyndareus is in black, with cut hair for mourning: Eur., Orestes 467-468 
24. Bridal gifts, indicating the expected wedding and the wealth of the family: Eur., 
Iphigenia at Aulis 610-612 
 Total: 24 
 
Identify a Scene or Indicate Myth/Background: 
1. Tomb of Darius: Aesch., Persians 659 et al. 
2. Rocky cliffs/crags in the wilderness: Aesch. (?), Prometheus Bound 1-6 
3. Items outside Philoctetes’ cave: Soph., Philoctetes 33-39 
4. Temple of Artemis, altar, and trophies of victims hanging: Eur., Iphigenia among 
the Taurians 74-76 
 Total: 4 
 
Create a Recognition Scene: 
1. Lock of hair and footprints left by Orestes: Aesch., Libation Bearers 7, 168, 206, et 
al. 
2. Orestes’ piece of weaving or garment, made by Electra: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
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3. Seal that belonged to Agamemnon: Soph., Electra 1222-1223 
4. Tablet/letter that Iphigenia writes: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 727 ff. 
5. Cradle plus weaving and other items inside: Eur., Ion 1337-1338 ff. 
6. (Arguable) Pentheus’ head on Agave’s thyrsus brings about her recognition of her 
son and her actions: Eur., Bacchae 1173-1175, 1280 ff. 
 Total: 6 
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Kill a Character/Create a Death Scene: (also, in a sense, a practical function) 
1. Chorus threatens to use their girdles and belts to kill themselves: Aesch., Suppliant 
Women 457 
2. Orestes may carry a sword, especially after he is revealed over Aegisthus’ body; the 
sword would kill Aegisthus, then Clytemnestra off stage: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
891 ff., et al. 
3. Ajax’s sword, of Hector: Soph., Ajax 658, 815 ff. (potentially an onstage death) 
4. Poisoned tunic, given from Deinara to Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 580, 612, 
et al. (begins off stage, continues on stage) 
5. Poisoned gown and diadem: Eur., Medea 950-951, 956 (offstage death) 
6. Medea might have a sword: Eur., Medea 1244 (offstage deaths) 
7. Sword for Orestes: Eur. Electra 225; offstage murder described in 1221-1223 
8. Club, bow, and arrows that Heracles uses to kill Megara and his children off stage: 
Eur., Heracles 568 ff., 1098-1100, 1377 et al. 
9. Golden vessel with Gorgon’s blood: Eur., Ion 1030 (unsuccessful offstage murder 
attempt) 
10. Swords for Orestes and Pylades nearly create a death scene off stage for Helen and 
again on stage as they hold Hermione hostage: Eur., Orestes 1223, 1567 ff. 
 Total: 10 
 
Accomplish a Trick/Deceit: 
1. Luggage for Orestes (if on stage) contributes to his disguise: Aesch., Libation 
Bearers 675-76 
2. Bronze urn, supposedly with Orestes’ ashes: Soph., Electra 1113-1114 ff. 
3. Poisoned tunic, given from Deinara to Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 580, 612, 
et al. (accidental, on Deinara’s part) 
4. Poisoned gown and diadem: Eur., Medea 950-951, 956 
5. Tablet in dead Phaedra’s hand, accusing Hippolytus: Eur., Hippolytus 856-857 
6. Small statue of Artemis, which Iphigenia carries; also lambs, torches, etc.: Eur., 
Iphigenia among the Taurians 1157-1158 
7. Helen’s clothing change, from white to black (also cuts hair, bloodies cheeks): Eur., 
Helen 1087-1089, 1186 ff. 
 Total: 7 
 
Ritual Function: 
Perform an offering: 
1. Queen’s libations/offerings: Aesch., Persians 523-524, 607 ff. 
2. Locks of hair offered by Orestes on Agamemnon’s tomb: Aesch., Libation Bearers 
7, 168, et al. 
3. Libations offered by Electra to Agamemnon: Aesch., Libation Bearers 24, 87 ff. 
4. Libations, other offerings that Orestes brings, then uses off stage to perform the 
offering: Soph., Electra 52, 892 ff. 
5. Offerings Chrysothemis brings on behalf of Clytemnestra but then pours out: Soph., 
Electra 326-327, 405 ff. 
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6. Electra’s girdle and locks of hair from both sisters, which Chrysothemis takes to 
offer on Agamemnon’s tomb: Soph., Electra 448-452 
7. Fruits, offerings from Clytemnestra to Apollo: Soph., Electra 634 ff. 
8. Garlands and incense that Iocasta offers to Apollo: Soph., Oedipus Tyrannus 911-
913 
9. Garland that Hippolytus brings for Artemis: Eur., Hippolytus 73 
10. Bowl, gold vessel holding libations: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 159 ff. 
11. Helen’s hair offering and libations, which she gives to Hermione (offering made 
off stage): Eur., Orestes 113 
 Sub-Total: 11 
 
Grant sanctuary to suppliant(s): 
1. Rock/altar, possibly with trident or other markings: Aesch., Suppliant Women 189, 
218, et al. 
2. Navel/center-stone of Oracle of Delphi: Aesch., Eumenides 40 
3. Statue of Colonus: Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 59, et al. 
4. Altars: Eur., Children of Heracles 33 
5. Shrine of Thetis, where Andromache is a suppliant: Eur., Andromache 43 
6. Altar to Zeus the Savior, where children of Heracles take refuge: Eur. Heracles 48 
7. Altar (and statue?): Eur., Ion 1280, 1404 
8. Tomb of Proteus: Eur., Helen 63-65, 798 
 Sub-Total: 8 
 
Perform funerary rites over a corpse:  
1. Locks of hair, something to cut them: Soph., Ajax 1171-1172 
2. Finery for the dead Alcestis: Eur., Alcestis 611-613, 618 
3. Ashes/bones of the dead, probably in urns (the ashes allow the women to weep over 
the dead as for a funeral): Eur., Suppliant Women 1114 ff. 
4. Adornments for the dead Astyanax: Eur., Trojan Women 1207-1208 
5. Hair that Antigone tears out and casts on the bodies of her mother and brothers: 
Eur., Phoenician Women 1524-1526 ff. 
 Sub-Total: 5 
 
Other: 
1. Chorus clasps statues of gods on altar in supplication, possibly garlands them: 
Aesch., Seven against Thebes 98 ff. 
2. Torches for procession for Eumenides to go below the earth (possible): Aesch., 
Eumenides 1022 
3. Vessels that Ion says he will fill with water as part of his duties at the Oracle (he 
may or may not do it on stage): Eur., Ion 434-436 
4. Torches for Theonoe’s servants to use to purify the air: Eur., Helen 865 ff. 
5. Drums, any other bacchic items the Chorus may carry allow them to worship 
Dionysus: Eur., Bacchae 124 et al. 
6. Locks of Dionysus’ hair, which Pentheus cuts (blasphemy): Eur., Bacchae 493-494 
 Sub-Total: 6 
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 Total for Ritual Function: 30 
 
Symbolic Function
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:  
1. Purple, ornate fabric: Aesch., Agamemnon 909 ff. 
2. Robe or net that caught Agamemnon: Aesch., Libation Bearers 980-983 
3. Votes and voting urns: Aesch., Eumenides 742-743 
4. Ajax’s sword, of Hector: Soph., Ajax 658, 815 ff. 
5. Philoctetes’ bow, of Heracles: Soph., Philoctetes 654 ff., 762 ff., et al. 
6. Statue of Colonus, Soph., Oedipus at Colonus 59, et al. 
7. Medea’s dragon chariot: Eur., Medea 1321-22 ff. 
 Total: 7 
 
Show Aggression: 
1. Armor, weapons for soldiers show imminence of battle: Aesch., Seven against 
Thebes 31 
2. Greaves, other armor for Eteocles in preparation for battle (props, if they appear, 
because he puts them on while on stage): Aesch., Seven against Thebes 675 ff. 
3. Swords for guards: Aesch., Agamemnon 1651 
4. Orestes may carry a sword, especially after he is revealed over Aegisthus’ body: 
Aesch., Libation Bearers 891 ff. et al. 
5. Apollo’s bow (shows his protection of Orestes): Aesch., Eumenides 181 ff. 
6. (Implicit) Orestes may carry a sword, particularly for the end of the play: Soph., 
Electra 
7. Philoctetes’ bow; arrow at 1299: Soph., Philoctetes 654 ff., 762 ff., 1299, et al. 
8. Odysseus’ sword: Soph., Philoctetes 1255 
9. Apollo’s bow and arrows: Eur., Alcestis 34-35, 39 
10. Death’s sword: Eur., Alcestis 74-76 
11. Bonds for Andromache’s hands: Eur., Andromache 425 
12. Sword for Orestes, which Electra interprets as a threat: Eur. Electra 225 
13. Heracles’ weapons: Eur. Heracles 568 ff., et al. 
14. Achilles’ men come with armor and, presumably, weapons: Eur., Iphigenia at 
Aulis 1359 
15. Swords for mob of Delphians: Eur., Ion 1257-1258 
16. Sword for Menelaus (he may or may not have one; if not, this is just bluster): Eur., 
Helen 1044, 1086 
17. Armor, shield, spear, panoply for Menelaus shortly before the offstage escape and 
massacre: Eur., Helen 1375-1381 
18. Sword for Theoclymenus (It is unclear whether he has one as he makes his 
threats.): Eur., Helen 1632, 1656 
19. Golden armor; sword for Polynices: Eur., Phoenician Women 168-169, 267 
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 Many, perhaps even most, props have some symbolic function. This list includes 
only those that I consider to have the strongest and most significant symbolic 
resonances. 
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20. Weapons, armor for Eteocles indicate he is about to go to battle (he calls for it, 
then exits, so it may not come on stage): Eur., Phoenician Women 779 ff. 
21. Orestes may have a real or mimed bow to “fight” the Furies: Eur., Orestes 268 ff. 
22. Swords for Orestes and Pylades: Eur., Orestes 1223, 1504, 1575 
23. Torches for Orestes, Pylades, and Electra, with which they threaten to burn down 
the house: Eur., Orestes 1573 
24. Pentheus cuts Dionysus’ hair: Eur., Bacchae 493-494 
25. Achilles’ sword (shows his new role as protector of Iphigenia and his own honor): 
Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 970 
 Total: 25 
 
Indicate or Embody Power: 
1. Philoctetes’ bow, of Heracles: Soph., Philoctetes 654 ff., 762 ff., et al. 
2. Peleus’ scepter: Eur., Andromache 588 
3. Club, bow, and arrows for Heracles show the return of a powerful protector: Eur., 
Heracles 570 et al. 
4. Menelaus’ scepter: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 311 
 Total: 4 
 
Create a Contact Point: 
1. Bonds, nails, etc. for Hephaestus to bind Prometheus to the rock face: Aesch. (?), 
Prometheus Bound 57 ff. 
2. Indirect: Lock of hair and footprints from Orestes bring contact between him and 
Electra: Aesch., Libation Bearers 7, 168, 206 et al. 
3. Both direct and indirect: Bronze urn, supposedly with Orestes’ ashes: Soph., 
Electra 1113-1114 ff. 
4. Indirect: Poisoned tunic, given from Deinara to Heracles: Soph., Women of Trachis 
580, 612, et al. 
5. Philoctetes’ bow, of Heracles: Soph., Philoctetes 762 ff. (Philoctetes hands it to 
Neoptolemus, who later returns it.) 
6. Veil/cover for Phaedra, which the Nurse removes and replaces: Eur., Hippolytus 
201-202, 243-245, 250 
7. Cloth/garment that Theseus uses to cover Hippolytus’ face: Eur., Hippolytus 1457-
1458 
8. Electra puts a garland in Orestes’ hair and gives another to Pylades: Eur. Electra 
882 
9. Tablet/letter that Iphigenia gives to Pylades, who passes it to Orestes: Eur., 
Iphigenia among the Taurians 727 ff. (It passes from Pylades to Orestes at 791; it is 
unclear when it passes to Pylades.) 
10. Cradle plus weaving and other items inside: Eur., Ion 1337-1338 ff. 
11. Golden vial with Gorgon’s blood, which Creusa gives to the old man as they 
confirm their partnership and plan: Eur. Ion 1029ff. 
12. Ivy crown that Cadmus tries to put on Pentheus (refused point of contact): Eur., 
Bacchae 341-344 
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13. Pentheus cuts locks of Dionysus’ hair and takes his thyrsus: Eur., Bacchae 493-
495 
14. Curl of hair and headdress, which Dionysus adjusts for Pentheus: Eur., Bacchae 
928-934 
15. The baby Orestes (probably a prop): Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 1452
234
 
 Total: 15 
 
Cover or Uncover Someone
235
: 
1. Chorus may be tearing their Sidonian veils (They say so, but it could just be an 
expression.): Aesch., Suppliant Women 120-121 
2. Cassandra’s prophetic bands/insignia, which she casts off: Aesch., Agamemnon 
1264 ff. 
3. Clytemnestra baring her breast: Aesch., Libation Bearers 896-898 
4. Cloth/cloak to cover Ajax’s body: Soph., Ajax 915-916, 1003 
5. Veil for Alcestis when she returns with Heracles (possible, implicit; veil may be 
drawn back, potentially creating contact.): Eur., Alcestis 1008-1121 
6. Iolaus asks the boys to set him down on the altar and cover him with his garments: 
Eur., Children of Heracles 603-604 
7. Veil or cover for Phaedra’s head: Eur., Hippolytus 201-202, 243-245, 250 
8. Something to cover face of dying Hippolytus: Eur., Hippolytus 1457-1458 
9. Polyxena asks Odysseus to wrap a garment about her head and take her away (This 
may also involve contact, if Odysseus does wrap her head.): Eur., Hecuba 432-434  
10. Hecuba lies wrapped in her garments: Eur., Hecuba 486-487 
11. Adrastus’ head is wrapped in his garments, and Theseus tells him to uncover it: 
Eur. Suppliant Women 110-112 
12. Theseus says that Aethra holds her clothing before her eyes, weeping: Eur. 
Suppliant Women 286-288 
13. (Off stage) Orestes says he covered his eyes with his clothes when killing 
Clytemnestra: Eur. Electra 1221-1223 
14. Amphitryon covers his eyes as Heracles wakes: Eur., Heracles 1111 
15. Heracles wants to cover his head with his clothes so that Theseus won’t look at 
him and be polluted: Eur., Heracles 1159, 1200-1204 ff. 
16. Orestes’ and Pylades’ heads are covered: Eur., Iphigenia among the Taurians 
1207, 1222 
17. Thoas covers his head to avoid pollution from seeing the polluted foreigners: Eur. 
Iphigenia among the Taurians, 1217-1218 
18. Old man covers his head in grief for Creusa and her father: Eur., Ion 967 
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 The precise movements of the baby Orestes are very unclear, and much of the 
relevant text is uncertain. I suggest 1452 as an approximate point at which Iphigenia 
would give the baby to Clytemnestra or an attendant. (She had brought the baby 
onstage and asked him to help supplicate their father.) 
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 Some examples of this category fit neatly as a subcategory of “Create a Contact 
Point.” This is a category in its own right, however, because many characters cover 
themselves, without involving contact with another character. 
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19. Veil/mantle for Antigone, which she casts away: Eur., Phoenician Women 1490-
1491 
20. Veil/garment to cover Electra’s head (Orestes tells her to uncover her head after 
his fit): Eur., Orestes 294 
21. Iphigenia covers her face with her clothes: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 1122-1123 
22. (Off stage) Messenger reports that Agamemnon held his garment before his face 
for the sacrifice: Eur., Iphigenia at Aulis 1549-1550 
 Total: 22 
 
 
Part III: Common Associations for Props 
 
Masculine vs. Feminine 
Earthly vs. Supernatural 
Wealth/Good Fortune vs. Poverty/Bad Fortune 
Greek vs. Barbarian 
Civilization vs. Wildness 
Light vs. Dark 
City vs. Country/Farm 
War 
The Home 
Temple/Oracle 
Mourning/Death 
Marriage/Wedding 
Medical: illness, injury, nursing, etc. 
A particular family heritage 
A particular mythological background 
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APPENDIX III 
 
EPIPHANIES IN GREEK TRAGEDY 
 
The following is a categorization of plays based on their use of gods on the 
stage. Most entries include a brief explanation and analysis of the god’s appearance 
and, when applicable, interactions with characters. 
 
Plays with No Gods Appearing on Stage: 
Aeschylus, Persians: None, but the ghost of Darius does appear. 
Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes: None 
Aeschylus, Suppliants: None 
Sophocles, Electra: None 
Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus: None 
Sophocles, Antigone: None 
Sophocles, Women of Trachis: None 
Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus: None 
Euripides, Medea: None, but Medea at the end fills this role to some degree. 
Euripides, Children of Heracles: None 
Euripides, Hecuba: None, but there is a ghost (Polydorus), and Polymestor post-
blinding fills that role to some degree, through his prophecies. 
Euripides, Phoenician Women: None 
Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis: None 
Total: 13 
 
Plays with Gods as Prologues but No Interaction between Gods and Characters: 
Euripides, Alcestis: Apollo gives the prologue, along with Death. There are no gods at 
the end, but Heracles with Alcestis is somewhat similar in its resolution of the plot. 
 
Euripides, Trojan Women: The play begins with a discussion between Poseidon and 
Athena. In his opening speech, Poseidon indicates Hecuba lying here in front of the 
door, but the gods never interact with her, and she does not know they are there. 
Total: 2 
 
Plays with Gods Whom Characters Can See: 
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound: Prometheus is the protagonist. Hephaestus and Cratos 
appear at the beginning to bind him; Hermes comes later to try to convince him to give 
Zeus information. 
 
Aeschylus, Oresteia: Athena, Apollo, and the Erinyes are important characters in 
Eumenides. 
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Sophocles, Philoctetes: Heracles appears at the end. He speaks before the characters 
notice him, but he tells them, “Know that you hear the voice of Heracles with your 
ears and see his face” [,*(0)+' =’ #*=+' $+' %#0-"&3. / '0&L $) 0->)+' -)>(()+' $’ 
=C+']  (1411-1412). The language is specific to hearing and seeing. 
 
Euripides, Andromache: Peleus is lamenting the death of his son, Neoptolemus, and 
his speech ends with: “And you, o Nereid (nymph daughter of Nereus) in your dark 
cave, you will see me having fallen, completely destroyed” (1224-1225). The Chorus 
then seems to see Thetis approaching: “Oh, oh! What is this moving, which of the 
gods do I perceive? Women, look [-)>(()$’], gaze at/watch ['!%9(#$)]! Here some 
god is passing through the clear aether and comes down on the plain of horse-
pasturing Phthia” (1226-1230). This language is more specifically visual than in many 
other examples of epiphany. Thetis appears and tells Peleus not to be too upset by his 
misfortunes. She tells him to listen as she tells him why she has come, and then she 
gives her instructions. Peleus joyfully agrees to do as she says. 
 
Euripides, Electra: Castor and Polydeuces appear at the end. The Chorus sees them 
coming: “But look, above the tops of the houses come some daemons/spirits or gods 
of the heavens. For that is not a path for mortals. Why ever do they come in an 
appearance to mortal sight/eyes?” (1233-1237). Castor begins: “Son of Agamemnon, 
listen! The twin brothers of your mother, the Dioscuri, call you, Castor and my brother 
Polydeuces here” (1238-1240). Castor gives instructions to Orestes, Electra, and 
Pylades. Orestes asks, “O sons of Zeus, is it right for us to draw near into your 
voice/conversation?”
236
 Castor replies, “It is right, for you are not with polluting 
murders.” Electra then asks, “And [is it also right] for me to be with speech, sons of 
Tyndareus?” Castor: “And for you; for I will assign this bloody/murderous deed to 
Pheobus” (1293-1297). This exchange could have interesting implications for 
understanding murder pollution and the play’s attitude toward the murder of 
Clytemnestra. 
 
Euripides, Heracles: Lyssa and Iris appear in the middle of the play. The Chorus 
panics upon seeing them approach: “Oh, oh!/Look! Look! Have we old men come into 
the same shower of fear, such an apparition/phantasm to I see above the house? Flee, 
flee! Lift up your sluggish limbs, drive far away from here! Lord Paean, become a 
protector (literally: bring about a turning away) for me of pains/calamities!” (815-
821). Iris then says: “Take heart, old men, looking upon this daughter of Night, Lyssa, 
and me, the handmaid of the gods, Iris. For we have not come with harm for the city, 
but we advance against the house of one man, whom they say is of Zeus and 
Alcmene…” (822-826). After Lyssa tries to talk Iris out of the plan, she says, “I call 
Helios as a witness for myself, that I, doing this, do not want to do it” (858). She then 
describes what she will do and is doing. Note especially “.=&>” for its command to 
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 Diggle’s 1981 edition gives this line to the Chorus and rearranges some of the lines 
in this section. 
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look at what is happening (867). She ends by telling Iris to go back to Olympus and 
saying that she herself will go down into Heracles’ house, invisible (874). 
 
Euripides, Ion: Before Athena speaks, Ion says: “Hey!/Look! Which of the gods 
shows forth a shining face from over the incense-filled temple? Let us flee, mother, 
and let us not look at the gods, unless it is the right time for us to see” (1549-1552).
237
 
Athena tells them not to run away, then gives her story and instructions. (Hermes also 
appears to give the prologue, but no one else is on stage then.) 
 
Euripides, Bacchae: The staging of Dionysus in this play is too complicated for 
analysis here, but there is a god on stage through most of the play. Characters certainly 
see Dionysus, but they may not see his full divinity, at least not until the end of the 
play. 
 
Euripides, Rhesus: One of the Muses appears at the end, carrying the body of Rhesus. 
The Chorus announces her approach, asking who appears above their heads carrying a 
newly killed corpse (885-889). This is the second epiphany in the play; the first 
features an unseen god (Athena). 
Total: 9 
 
Plays with Gods Who Are, or May Be, Only Heard
238
: 
Sophocles, Ajax: Athena appears at the beginning of the play. Odysseus cannot see 
her; Ajax probably cannot, either. Both can hear her voice. (See Chapter 4 for further 
analysis of this scene.) 
 
Euripides, Hippolytus: Aphrodite gives a prologue alone on stage. In lines 84-87, as he 
sings praises to Artemis, Hippolytus says that he alone of mortals spends time together 
with her and converses with her, though he can only hear her voice and not see her 
face. Artemis appears at the end, as Hippolytus is dying. Theseus has just said that 
Cypris holds sway over everything, and Artemis appears, saying: “I command/urge 
you, noble son of Aegeus, listen! I, daughter of Leto, Artemis, call you” (1282-1285). 
A bit later in the same speech, she tells him to “hear” [-0&3)] the state of his 
misfortunes (1296). When Hippolytus comes on stage, he makes no mention of 
Artemis, even though she is already there, until she speaks to him. His response is: 
“Hey!/Look! O divine breath of fragrance! Although I am in misfortune, I have 
perceived you and felt my body lighten. The goddess Artemis is in this place!” (1391-
1393). He then asks her, “Do you see [R%U.] me, mistress/lady, as I am, wretched?” 
(1395). She says, “I see you [R%#], but it is not right for me to cast tears from my two 
eyes” (1396). Everyone laments, but then Artemis says she must leave: “And farewell; 
for it is not right for me to see the dead, nor to defile my eye/sight with dying breaths; 
and I see that you now are close to this misfortune” (1437-1439). She then exits. 
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 This list includes ambiguous examples. 
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Euripides, Suppliant Women: Athena appears at the end of the play: everything seems 
to be settled, with Theseus and Adrastus about to part, when Athena enters (with no 
notice from any characters before she speaks). She tells Theseus to listen [“-0&3),” 
1183] to the words of Athena and to exact an oath from Adrastus that the Argives will 
never attack this city and that they will protect it against any others who might attack. 
She continues to give instructions and predictions. Theseus says he will obey. 
 
Euripides, Iphigenia among the Taurians: Athena appears at the end, just as Thoas is 
preparing to pursue Iphigenia, Orestes, and Pylades. She interrupts him, without 
anyone commenting about seeing or hearing her first: “Where, where, King Thoas, do 
you advance your chase? Listen to the words of Athena. Stop your pursuit…” (1435-
1436). Later in the speech, she addresses Iphigenia using the second person, which 
indicates that Iphigenia can hear her, even though she is actually at sea and far away: 
“And it is necessary for you, Iphigenia, to be a priestess for this goddess in the holy 
meadows of Brauron” (1462-1463). After all the instructions, Thoas says, “Lady 
Athena, whoever upon hearing the words of the god is [then] disobedient, does not 
think straight” (1475-1476). Here, the focus falls heavily on the words, not the 
appearance, of Athena and on the need to hear and obey them. 
 
Euripides, Helen: Castor and Pollux appear at the end, stopping Theoclymenus from 
trying to kill his sister and the servant. They speak before he notices them, telling him 
to stop. After their instructions, Theoclymenus says he will give up his claim on Helen 
and not punish his sister. 
 
Euripides, Orestes: Apollo appears at the end of the play, just as Orestes, Pylades, and 
Electra are about to set the house on fire, with Menelaus calling for reinforcements. 
Apollo speaks before anyone notices him, telling Menelaus to calm down. He then 
identifies himself: “I, Apollo son of Leto, call you from nearby” (1626). This might 
imply that they cannot see him. Orestes responds: “O prophetic Loxias, you are not 
false in your prophesying but truthful. Indeed fear came upon me, hearing one of the 
avenging spirits but thinking that I heard your voice” (1666-1669). Also significant for 
this play is Orestes’ madness in the beginning, as the Furies torment him. The Furies 
are probably not visible on the stage. 
 
Euripides, Rhesus: Athena appears in the middle of the play, lines 595-674. She 
speaks to Odysseus and Diomedes, telling them not to retreat but to kill Rhesus and 
steal his horses. In response to her first speech, Odysseus replies: “Mistress Athena, 
indeed I perceive the familiar sound of your voice” [="(/&+'’ T!*'#, ,!"Bµ#$&. B&% 
}(!6µ:' / $&" (&" (3'9!: B9%3'] (608-609). Later, Alexandros approaches, and 
Athena says that although she has spoken instructions to Odysseus and Diomedes, 
Alexandros has not been able to hear them (640-641). She then speaks to Alexandros, 
pretending to be Aphrodite, and deceives him. It seems that none of the mortals can 
see Athena. 
Total: 7 
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